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When I read about clashes around the world—political clashes, 
 economic clashes, cultural clashes—I am reminded that it is  within 
our power to build a bridge to be crossed. Even if my neighbour 
doesn’t understand my religion or my politics, he can understand my 
story. If he can understand my story, then he’s never too far from 
me. It is always within my power to build a bridge. There is always 
a chance for reconciliation, a chance that one day he and I will sit 
around a table together and put an end to our history of clashes. And 
on this day, he will tell me his story and I will tell him mine.
—Paulo Coehlo
Quoted from p. x (Foreword) of The Alchemist by Paulo Coelho translated by Alan R. Clarke. 
 Copyright © 1988 by Paulo Coehlo. English translation copyright © 1993 by Paulo Coehlo and Alan R. 
Clarke. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.
Figure 1. The Sackler Crossing, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, London. Copyright Chris 
 Woodfield 2016.
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Chris Woodfield, who built bridges, 
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What is Postwar Multiculturalism in 
Theory and Practice?
Richard T. Ashcroft, University of California, Berkeley
Mark Bevir, University of California, Berkeley
Cultural diversity raises pressing issues for both political theory and practice. The 
remaking of the world since 1945 has increased demographic diversity within many 
states, and led to greater acknowledgment of the value of social heterogeneity. The 
heightened awareness of difference has contributed to pressure on traditional 
forms of liberal-democratic governance, which historically have operated within 
polities that are—or at least have assumed themselves to be—broadly culturally 
homogeneous. The term “multiculturalism” refers to the political, legal and philo-
sophical strategies that emerged after World War II to accommodate this new-
found social diversity. For much of this period, multiculturalism enjoyed a steady 
rise to prominence, but in recent years the growing consensus has been questioned 
by politicians and prominent social commentators. Whether this amounts to a 
“retreat” or “rebalancing” is still being debated, but it is clear that multiculturalism 
is being reevaluated. This volume adds to the existing empirical and normative 
literature by situating modern multiculturalism in its national, international, and 
historical contexts, bringing together practitioners from across the humanities 
and social sciences. It addresses questions vital for understanding contemporary 
debates: What is “multiculturalism,” and why did it come about? What dilemmas 
has it posed for liberal-democratic governance? How have these been responded 
to in theory and practice, and are the different responses adequate? Are there alter-
native approaches to cultural diversity that have been overlooked?
We start this introductory chapter by sketching the different issues that may be 
characterized as “multicultural,” noting how the scope of the term varies between 
different contexts and straddles theory and practice. We nevertheless provide a 
rough definition to help guide our analysis, and situate modern multiculturalism 
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historically. We trace the connection between contemporary debates and the 
period of decolonization and globalization following World War II, which itself 
has its roots in the interrelated rise of nation, state, and empire in the early modern 
period. We demonstrate that the Commonwealth is a crucial context for studying 
multiculturalism, gathering together the key philosophical and empirical issues. 
We then show how this volume contributes to the literature by facilitating fruitful 
comparison across national, historical, and disciplinary boundaries. Finally, we set 
out the structure of the volume, and summarize the chapters that follow.
WHAT IS  MULTICULTUR ALISM?
To call a society “multicultural” is to claim that it contains multiple cultural groups 
rather than just one. In the abstract, therefore, “multiculturalism” is simply the 
opposite of cultural homogeneity. In concrete terms, however, “multiculturalism” 
evokes a series of discourses regarding the appropriate way to respond to cultural 
and other forms of difference. These debates cover a wide variety of topics, includ-
ing appropriate modes of dress, land rights, anti-racism, religious freedom, court 
procedure, immigration, language and educational policy, the scope of human 
rights, and even the basic structure and aims of the polis. The study of multi-
culturalism thus provides a meeting point for a variety of scholarly disciplines, 
including social science, law, history, anthropology, philosophy, and public policy. 
Discussion of multiculturalism is not limited to academia, however, but is also 
prominent in political and popular discourse.
In common use, the term “multiculturalism” can relate to a number of con-
nected phenomena. For example, it may simply refer to the basic sociological 
fact of diversity, or alternatively to the challenges this diversity presents to our 
modes of thinking and governing. Sometimes it will directly invoke the policy or 
legal responses to these challenges, and some uses indicate normative approval 
of multicultural goals. Multiculturalism may be used as a catch-all term for the 
claims of marginalized groups, such as those who identify as LGBTQIA, people 
with disabilities, racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and women. A slightly dif-
ferent but overlapping usage refers to issues facing minority immigrants, and it is 
also frequently invoked in relation to minority national groups and indigenous 
peoples. Given the variegated nature of “multiculturalism,” its meaning, applica-
tion and value are inevitably contested, and subject to appropriation for different 
purposes in different contexts. This means we must guard against the temptation 
to reduce multiculturalism to a list of essential features that override its historicity.
Any simple definition of multiculturalism will therefore be potentially mis-
leading, yet we must make some attempt to delineate the scope of our enquiry 
and enable comparison between the different cases.1 The different multicultural 
debates bear a family resemblance to one another, and so it is possible to iden-
tify certain recurring situations which may usefully be labeled “multiculturalism.” 
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For example, a common form of multiculturalism occurs where the practices of a 
previously dominant cultural group are challenged by the presence of a minority. 
Often members of the minority seek tolerance for behaviors that clash with major-
ity norms, particularly if those norms have a disproportionate impact on their 
well-being. This may be accompanied by requests for exemptions from relevant 
legal provisions (e.g., regulations on animal slaughter), for reforms that facilitate 
the inclusion of the minority group (e.g., adapting rules on dress, language policies, 
or altering evidential procedure in courts), or for social policies aimed at promot-
ing intra-societal understanding and inclusion (e.g., educational policy, reforming 
public symbols/holidays, or funding community activities).
Multiculturalism is not limited, however, to issues stemming from the inter-
action of minority and majority norms. It frequently engages broader issues in 
governance. For example, sometimes a minority will demand control of a prac-
tice, institution, or resource, such as the ability to conduct legal marriages, a sepa-
rate religious court, or rights over land or language. Multiculturalism is thus also 
implicated in debates regarding fundamental aspects of the polis, including con-
stitutional structures, national identity, immigration restrictions, basic rights, and 
forms of special political representation or self-rule. These questions can occur 
when there is no clear majority, but rather multiple groups co-exist within a polity. 
The precise scope of the term “multiculturalism” therefore varies across the dif-
ferent countries of the Commonwealth, but always involves the basic problem of 
how to manage deep-seated diversity, and consideration of the implications of this 
diversity for governance. Multiculturalism thus consistently challenges the valid-
ity of basic norms, and calls into question the political, economic and cultural 
processes through which they are expressed. Multiculturalism thereby inevitably 
poses societal dilemmas at the level of both theory and practice.
THEORY AND PR ACTICE
There are several different senses of “theory” and “practice” relevant to this vol-
ume, the most salient of which relate to the understandings of multiculturalism in 
politics and academia.2 In political practice, multiculturalism is largely construed 
in relation to postwar immigration. The central debate in this conceptualization 
is regarding the merits of assimilation versus integration, and how best to achieve 
the desired outcomes through adjustments in policy and law. This understanding 
of multiculturalism predominates worldwide in current political discourse and 
has been the subject of much recent public debate. Multiculturalism in academia 
is closely associated with political theory, where its scope is much broader than in 
political debates. In that literature, which is dominated by thinkers from Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, multiculturalism encompasses, not just immigrant 
integration, but also groups such as the Québécois and indigenous peoples and 
their claims for political autonomy or reparations.
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Most uses of the term “multiculturalism” will draw on these understandings of 
its theory and practice, which continue to condition political and academic dis-
course even as they are subject to challenge. Yet there are other forms of theory 
and practice relevant to multiculturalism. For example, cultural diversity calls 
into question both standard methods of liberal-democratic governance, and the 
fundamental principles underlying them. Justifications of both liberalism and 
mass democracy are typically cast in terms of a moral universalism that presumes 
similarly situated individuals should be treated the same regardless of, inter alia, 
religion, race, sex, gender, culture, and sexual orientation. This traditional “differ-
ence-blind” approach has been called into question by multiculturalism, as have 
prominent formulations of doctrines such as political equality, state neutrality, 
and the rule of law. Increased cultural diversity highlights cleavages within liberal 
democracy masked by greater homogeneity, including those between individual 
rights and majority rule, positive and negative liberty, and between nation and 
state. These potentially destabilizing effects have been compounded by postwar 
immigration that threatened dearly held aspects of collective identities, including 
forms of national identity that many argue are necessary for liberal-democratic 
practice.3 Multiculturalism therefore poses particularly acute problems for liberal 
democracies, highlighting tensions that straddle political philosophy and practice, 
between, for example, sameness and difference, public and private, local and cen-
tral, individual and community, and particular and universal.
Furthermore, questions of theory and practice are not easily separated from 
each other even analytically. In broad terms, theory relates to how we understand 
the world, and practice to how we respond to the world by acting. Yet understand-
ing and action inevitably feed into each other, and are therefore mutually con-
structing. Their interrelationship is especially clear in the case of multiculturalism, 
where theory and practice cut across each other because cultural diversity poses 
both pressing social questions and complex philosophical puzzles. In fact, mul-
ticultural adaptations to liberal-democratic governance are themselves attempts 
to mediate normative claims derived from abstract principles and the historical 
specificity of particular groups/issues. The challenges multiculturalism presents 
therefore vary in relation to the different political institutions, national histories, 
intellectual traditions, and forms of diversity present in each case. These contexts 
themselves alter how liberal democracy itself is understood in each country, feed-
ing back into the ways practical problems and philosophical questions are tackled.
We propose that the interrelated nature of theory and practice is not, how-
ever, just a empirical feature of multiculturalism in postwar liberal democra-
cies, but rather should be a basic philosophical presumption that informs how 
we approach its study. The editors share an underlying commitment to holism, 
which we have defended at length elsewhere.4 Holism is grounded in the idea 
that we cannot approach facts or propositions in an isolated, atomistic way, as 
is typical in analytic philosophy or positivist social science. This means there are 
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no entirely tautologous statements, pure facts, or self-evident truths, and so none 
of them can serve as unassailable foundations for our beliefs. Holism shows that 
our theories and observations—moral, political, and empirical—form an inter-
twined and mutually constructing set. Within these “webs of belief,” our theories 
condition our observations and our experiences challenge our theories, which 
means there can be no points that are absolutely immune from revision. Instead, 
all knowledge arises within the contingent world view of particular individuals, 
who are in turn embedded in a nexus of traditions and practices constituted by the 
beliefs and actions of others. Abstract argument and empirical investigation are 
thus open-ended, and are undertaken by historically situated individuals against 
a background of overlapping influences. Holism therefore pushes us toward inter-
pretivist forms of the human sciences and away from the logical positivism that 
still dominates modern social science research and government policy-making.5 
We should therefore privilege description and explanation, rather than prediction, 
and prefer certain types of empirical evidence over others. For example, holism 
indicates we should be wary of formal models that treat their data as atomized 
units of information to be processed, and focus instead on constructing continu-
ous and coherent narratives. As holism commits us to the basic presumption that 
theory and practice constantly remake each other, it also implies that historical 
investigation and philosophical analysis are not separate activities, but rather must 
go hand in hand, and may productively inform each other.6
Proponents and critics of multiculturalism have, however, a common tendency 
to rely on unsubstantiated claims regarding the empirical consequences of mul-
ticulturalism, including the effects of multicultural political theory and political 
practice on each other.7 Given the tangle of theoretical and practical issues raised 
by multiculturalism, it is unsurprising that the academic literature—in particular 
political theory—has fed into political and legal approaches to both immigrants 
and national minorities, and that theoretical understandings of multiculturalism 
have evolved in the light of political/legal practice as well as philosophical con-
cerns.8 Yet, while holism indicates that theory and practice are mutually construct-
ing, it also suggests that this is a dynamic process that will take place in myriad 
different ways, constantly reshaping the beliefs and actions of particular actors. We 
must therefore be cautious of broad-brush claims regarding the precise effects of 
multicultural theory and practice, even as we acknowledge these effects must exist. 
Detailed historical study, including examining the relevant intellectual traditions 
and arguments, will be needed to recover these effects, and even then clear causa-
tion may be hard to establish. Any conclusions we draw regarding the theory and 
practice of multiculturalism are necessarily generalizations from concrete histori-
cal examples and must be applied with a suitable degree of caution.
Ultimately, therefore, holism foregrounds the importance of an integrated 
approach to studying multiculturalism. Particular beliefs, theories, or practices are 
neither plucked from the ether by pure reason nor revealed to consciousness by 
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unmediated experience. They are only intelligible within an appropriately defined 
context, which must not only delineate the relevant concepts and modes of reason-
ing but should also foreground the dilemmas that have spurred a reevaluation—
and potential reconstitution—of a set of beliefs and, through them, the broader 
theories and practices in which those beliefs are embedded.  In order to under-
stand multiculturalism in both its philosophical and empirical aspects, we must 
therefore situate it within its relevant historical, national, and intellectual contexts.
SITUATING POST WAR MULTICULTUR ALISM
Although cultures have come into contact with each other throughout history, the 
problem of how to manage these interactions between and within states became 
especially prominent after 1945.9 The parallel processes of decolonization and glo-
balization set in motion the movement of both people and ideas on a vast scale, 
creating in many societies a substantive rise in cultural diversity and increased 
awareness of it. The related rise of human rights discourse, identity politics, and 
indigenous movements led to greater acknowledgement of the plight of minority 
groups, which in many societies prompted policies self-consciously addressing the 
challenges of cultural diversity. These policies started in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II, but became more prominent in the 1970s, when both Canada and 
Australia adopted official state multiculturalism. Many other liberal democracies 
adopted similar policy approaches in the following decades, with most public actors 
consistently endorsing multiculturalism in some form. The steady rise of multicul-
turalism was halted by the events of 9/11, which, as well as raising the specter of 
domestic terrorism, triggered the “war on terror” and the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. This has led some commentators to argue that multiculturalism is experi-
encing some form of crisis, adding fresh urgency to already volatile debates.10
Modern multiculturalism as a set of social realities and related series of 
 discourses must therefore be situated primarily in the period from 1945 to the 
present day, which is the main focus of this volume. Its factual and philosophical 
roots go back much deeper, however, to the gradual, haphazard and contested rise 
of the nation and state as the dominant forms of social organization in the West. In 
the early modern period, the shift from smaller feudal and sacral communities to 
larger modern society gave rise to new forms of governance with which to  manage 
the inevitable social upheaval.11 As the modern liberal and bureaucratic state 
developed, it impinged on earlier forms of social organization, which inevitably 
provoked resistance, fueling conflict between the central and local. These tensions 
were exacerbated by the Reformation and the rapid socioeconomic changes driven 
by capitalism, with the rise of nationalism partly attributable to the dislocating 
effects of these. The modern nation-state thus evolved partly in order to manage 
greater social diversity, yet simultaneously facilitated forms of social and political 
cohesion operable on a far larger scale than in previous eras.
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These developments coincided with the heyday of European imperialism, and 
both domestic and international policy during the nineteenth century were pri-
marily narrated through developmental histories that valorized Enlightenment 
liberalism and rationalism.12 Simple progressivist narratives became unsustainable 
in the twentieth century, however, when two world wars and a growing aware-
ness of the realities of imperialism undercut assumptions regarding the superi-
ority of the West. The postwar unraveling of imperialism therefore set the stage 
for contemporary multiculturalism by foregrounding hollow aspects of the West’s 
self-understanding and causing a huge increase in its demographic diversity. 
Decolonization thus posed problems for liberalism and democracy at the level 
of both theory and practice, contributing directly to the series of postwar civic 
resettlements in both Europe and her former colonies. These reconstitutions of the 
state—and the self-understandings of the nation often conflated with it—resulted 
in the series of social dilemmas we refer to as “multiculturalism.”
The British Commonwealth spans multiculturalism’s relevant national, inter-
national, and historical contexts and therefore is vital for its study. The central 
sites of liberal-democratic governance are nations and states, which are both 
the fora within which the social world is remade and communities subject to 
that remaking. This means multiculturalism should be narrated in relation to 
national context, and the Commonwealth provides a rich array of cases to draw 
on. Given the direct connection of multiculturalism to imperialism, however, it 
cannot be understood purely as a domestic phenomenon. The intra- and inter-
national elements of multiculturalism are ineradicable, and thoughtful analysis 
requires an awareness of both. The Commonwealth foregrounds this dualism, 
forming a common context within which states have negotiated multicultural-
ism, and bringing about demographic, political, and cultural (including philo-
sophical) connections between member countries. These connections have been 
forged primarily through Britain’s imperial influence, but also through the “Old” 
Commonwealth’s genesis of influential approaches to multiculturalism, and the 
“New” Commonwealth’s role as a significant source of migrants to other member 
states.13 The consistent movement of people, goods and ideas within the British 
Empire and Commonwealth has thus produced a degree of commonality across 
the member states, which aids our analysis. Utilizing it as a framework enables us 
to trace the different trajectories of multiculturalism, but also to find connected 
vantage points from which to compare these. For example, the Commonwealth 
provides a perspective from which to view both the nation-states and the cross-
national movement central to multiculturalism. It also facilitates comparison 
across time and geographic locale, bridging the relevant short-, medium-, and 
long-term contexts. The Commonwealth and multiculturalism have grown along-
side each other in the postwar period, and share roots in the earlier practices 
of imperialism and nation-state building that shaped modern liberal democracy. 
The rise and fall of empire is central to multiculturalism on both empirical and 
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normative levels, which makes the Commonwealth a particularly useful frame-
work for its study.
By cutting across disciplinary, temporal and geographical borders in one vol-
ume, Multiculturalism in the British Commonwealth: Comparative Perspectives 
on Theory and Practice highlights which aspects of multiculturalism are ubiqui-
tous, and which are specific to particular localities. This volume thereby facili-
tates methodologically sound, intellectually fruitful comparison of the theory and 
practice of multiculturalism, enhancing previous scholarship. The literature is as 
variegated as multiculturalism itself, and so it is difficult to encapsulate it neatly 
or to identify clear gaps. Nevertheless, we can determine three main strands that 
this volume speaks to and enriches: political theory, specific case studies, and com-
parative work.
In the academy, multiculturalism is most closely associated with political 
theory, and has multiple strands which can be characterized in a variety of ways 
depending on one’s purposes.14 Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some fea-
tures broadly accepted by advocates and opponents of multiculturalism alike. 
Most obviously, the agenda for the literature been shaped by the early work of the 
Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka, which set out a liberal defense of multicul-
tural rights grounded in the importance of culture for autonomous choice and 
self-respect.15 The core debates revolve around the ability of liberalism to respond 
suitably to minority groups in both theory and practice, with Kymlicka’s theory 
usually taken as the starting point.16 The literature has been dominated by thinkers 
from the Old Commonwealth—especially Canada—which has likely contributed 
to a focus on concerns prominent in those countries. The political theory of multi-
culturalism is thus centered around appropriate policy approaches to, and the legal 
rights of, immigrant groups, minority nations such as the Québécois, and indig-
enous peoples. Most multicultural theorists utilize these categories of groups—
albeit with varying levels of endorsement and rigidity—with the majority seeing 
them as entitled to different bundles of multicultural rights. Immigrant groups 
are usually only allocated “polyethnic” rights aimed at integrating them into the 
host society, whereas “national minorities” such the Québécois and indigenous 
groups are frequently seen as entitled to some form of political autonomy, with 
some theorists arguing that the latter also have a right to historical reparations.17 
There is therefore an overall tendency to separate groups and rights typologically, 
largely on the basis of the varying historical experiences of the relevant minorities 
and/or the putatively different role culture plays for the members of each. Whereas 
early multicultural theory tended to employ the universalist style of reasoning 
prevalent in post-Rawlsian liberal philosophy, subsequently there has been a shift 
toward more context-sensitive and politically oriented forms of theorizing.18 This 
has led to qualification of the more robust normative claims associated with early 
philosophical multiculturalism, and a recent focus in Anglophone political theory 
on particular cases in their immediate historical circumstances. Nevertheless, 
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most political theorists still utilize some form of the basic organizing typology of 
groups and rights drawn from the Old Commonwealth, and therefore the focus 
on immigrant groups and national minorities remains, as does the clear tendency 
of advocates of multiculturalism to limit claims to self-government to the latter.19
This volume makes an important contribution to the political theory literature 
in two main ways. Firstly, it highlights that the standard typology is tailored to 
historically specific situations and may have limited traction in contexts where not 
all of the groups are present. Also, by tracing the connections between the differ-
ent forms of postwar multiculturalism, it demonstrates that even where all these 
groups are present, their precise interactions are conditioned by local factors, par-
ticularly their varying experiences of colonialism. In turn, this foregrounds prob-
lematic presumptions behind the ascription of different rights to different groups, 
particularly those grounded in functional accounts of the relationship between 
culture and liberal-democratic governance. For example, many prominent politi-
cal theorists assume that “the nation” or “culture” plays a central—perhaps even 
necessary—role in governance.20 Advocates of multicultural rights therefore tend 
to take for granted that there is a stable cultural “core” to the typical nation-state, 
which must be adjusted in response to minority claims, and critics often oppose 
multicultural rights on the grounds that they will erode common principles and 
values central to liberal democracy. Yet we will see that these sorts of assumptions 
have limited application in the New Commonwealth, and that the historical cases 
show the relationships between culture, nation, state, and governance to be both 
highly contingent and deeply conditioned by empire. This volume therefore com-
plicates the typology of groups and rights that frames multiculturalism in politi-
cal theory, foregrounding problematic assumptions behind it and forcing us to 
rethink central normative claims.
Secondly, this volume helps to mitigate a broader tension between universalist 
and contextualist approaches that poses risks for the study of multiculturalism. 
For example, abstract normative argument without an understanding of historical 
context falsely homogenizes real-world difference, yet methodological contextu-
alism in turn has difficulty avoiding a relativism that loses normative purchase 
altogether. This volume considers multiculturalism without committing a priori to 
universalism or contextualism, and is therefore able to speak productively to both. 
Our case-by-case exploration of multiculturalism in its various historical, geo-
graphical, and temporal contexts militates against the homogenizing tendencies 
of universalist theory, but the overall volume highlights commonalities between 
the normative issues at play in different countries. It therefore provides material 
useful to both universalists and contextualists, while challenging extreme versions 
of either approach.
Another aspect of the multicultural literature is comprised of detailed inves-
tigations of individual countries, or specific cases within those countries.21 This 
strand overlaps with some of the narrower contextualist case studies in political 
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theory, but differs in that its primary focus is descriptive rather than normative. 
These case studies therefore tend to possess greater historical detail and depth 
than even the more empirically minded forms of political theory. Yet in doing so, 
they can lose sight of the international aspects of modern multiculturalism, or 
only assess these from a particular domestic perspective. This reduces the pos-
sibility of fruitful comparison across national contexts, and an empirical focus can 
mean that scant attention is paid to normative issues, which are inseparable from 
multiculturalism in both theory and practice. Even if descriptive accounts of the 
normative issues are provided, the lack of mechanisms for comparison and assess-
ment make this literature less likely to address the core normative questions, or to 
do so in a context-specific way. Case studies thus run the risk of joining more radi-
cal contextualist political theory in focusing so tightly on particular circumstances 
that critical perspective is compromised.
As well as providing a series of detailed and insightful case studies of mul-
ticulturalism, the volume as a whole adds to the literature by retaining con-
siderable historical depth without foregoing normative purchase. Using the 
Commonwealth to frame the array of cases covered in the different chapters 
ensures we do not lose sight of the fact that the different national contexts are 
connected by  historical, international, and philosophical exchanges, which 
also influence the form  multiculturalism takes within them. It ensures that the 
 fundamental  empirical and theoretical connections between multiculturalism, 
decolonization, and  liberal-democratic governance are not hidden by the specific 
issues that occur in each country. This volume therefore facilitates comparison 
by highlighting the normative issues that reoccur across national contexts, while 
simultaneously throwing into relief their particular features.
The third aspect of the multiculturalism literature, and the one that this volume 
most obviously contributes to, is comparative in orientation. There are many excel-
lent cross-national examinations of issues relevant to multiculturalism, embody-
ing a vast array of methodologies, particular objects of study, and philosophical 
commitments. The comparative work on multiculturalism is therefore the most 
heterogeneous strand of the literature, and contains the greatest preponderance 
of self-consciously interdisciplinary work, making it difficult to summarize suc-
cinctly.22 Some works focus on comparisons between countries within particu-
lar geographical areas or organizations, or nations grouped together on the basis 
that they raise similar issues or provide useful contrasts.23 Other cross-national 
comparisons have focused on particular groups, such as indigenous peoples, or 
particular aspects of multicultural regimes, such as law, especially international or 
immigration law.24 Yet others focus either on the broad outline of contemporary 
national policy regimes and discourses or on much more specific aspects of multi-
cultural policies, including their social effects.25
The existing comparative work on multiculturalism is, of course, extremely 
valuable, but we hope to supplement it. Multiculturalism in all its aspects is part 
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of a process of contestation in which individuals and communities remake their 
social structures and understandings—and thereby their individual and collective 
identities—through complex patterns of discourse and praxis. Politics, economics, 
and culture therefore interact in different ways in each context, constructing idio-
syncratic forms of multiculturalism. Utilizing the Commonwealth as a framework 
brings out the subtleties of each country’s response to cultural diversity, mitigating 
the risk of circumscribing our understanding of multiculturalism ahead of time 
through selecting a narrower metric of comparison. Placing contemporary multi-
culturalism against its historical backdrop also illustrates the ways in which long-
term factors feed into current debates.26 Examining the diverse historical sources 
of current legal and policy regimes mitigates the risk of reducing multiculturalism 
to current political and public understandings, thereby ignoring the thicker his-
torical, cultural, and philosophical factors they draw on.
Overall, this volume speaks to and enriches all three main strands of the mul-
ticultural literature in ways that flow directly from our use of the Commonwealth 
as framework. Since the Commonwealth spans the relevant issues and time 
periods, we can approach multiculturalism in a holistic manner. Just as there is 
a family resemblance between the different issues that fall under “multicultur-
alism,” there is also a family resemblance between the different countries in the 
Commonwealth that aids comparison across contexts and challenges assumptions 
prevalent in current debates. This volume will improve our understanding of any 
given national context, providing historical nuance that aids both comparison of 
contemporary policy debates and analysis of the normative issues, and we hope 
it will be a resource for scholars and students across various disciplines, sparking 
further scholarship.
STRUCTURE AND C ONTENT
The volume is divided into three main sections, each dealing with a set of coun-
tries that raise distinctive but interrelated issues. The first section explores mul-
ticulturalism in the United Kingdom between 1945 and the present day. As the 
imperial metropole and subsequent head of the Commonwealth, Britain has been 
in a unique position to affect both the discourses and realties of multicultural-
ism, particularly in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the process of 
decolonization. This section will examine the political and legal trajectory of mul-
ticulturalism in the UK during this period, as well as analyzing historical and con-
temporary debates over Britishness and citizenship.
The second section looks at multiculturalism in the “Old” Commonwealth 
countries of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.27 These historically white- 
dominated settler colonies have a history that is dissimilar from most other parts 
of the former empire, and as “Greater Britain” their political, legal, economic, and 
cultural relationships with the UK were also substantively different. All three of 
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these countries have had comparable processes of settlement, contact with indig-
enous peoples, and immigration, and are generally considered to be world leaders 
in official approaches to cultural diversity in the postwar era.
The third part of the book contains chapters on the “New” Commonwealth 
countries of India, Nigeria, Malaysia/Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago. These 
countries, although culturally and politically disparate, are all marked by histories 
of internal religious and ethnic diversity, and their experiences of both coloniza-
tion and independence differ substantially from the Old Commonwealth. There 
are a number of commonalities and connections between them, which sharpens 
our understanding of multiculturalism, throwing into relief experiences elsewhere.
PART I :  BRITISH MULTICULTUR ALISM
In chapter 2, the volume editors take a long-term view of multiculturalism in 
Britain, charting its political and legal trajectory from World War II to the pres-
ent day. We argue that the radical changes undergone in Britain since 1945 must 
be traced back to the process of decolonization, which forced a reassessment of 
Britain’s place in the world. A cross-party attempt to secure the Commonwealth as 
a distinct British sphere of influence led directly to legal reforms that sparked an 
unanticipated influx of nonwhite immigration. This resulted in an idiosyncratic 
“regime” of multiculturalism, comprised of tough external immigration controls 
and a generous internal regime of race-relations legislation, welfare rights, and 
pluralist accommodations for minority cultural groups. The bifurcated approach 
remained broadly stable from 1962 on, but there has been a strong rhetorical and 
weaker policy shift in recent years. Our narrative demonstrates that multicultural-
ism in Britain is closely associated with debates over immigration, race, citizen-
ship, and national identity, and we argue that the interaction of these debates were 
a significant cause of the Brexit vote and renewed calls for Scottish independence. 
We conclude that the framing of multiculturalism in Britain as solely relating to 
immigrant integration is therefore inadequate, since it hides deeper connections 
between multiculturalism, basic constitutional issues, and a British national iden-
tity struggling to define itself after empire.
In chapter 3, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood explore controversies over mul-
ticulturalism in contemporary Britain, arguing that recent political rejections 
of it have not been reflected in a wholesale change of policy, and that it is help-
ful to think of British multiculturalism as undergoing a rebalancing, rather than 
retreat. They argue that the fluid nature of British multiculturalism means that it 
can be co-opted by different actors for a variety of purposes. They identify three 
main strands in contemporary British multiculturalism: a “cohesion” strand that 
emphasizes assimilation to majority norms; a secular and anti-essentialist account 
that focuses on “lifestyle” and behavioral identities; and a “political” multicultur-
alism, prominent since the 1990s, that incorporates the priorities of both of the 
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above but also stresses the inclusion of ethno-religious minority groups. It is this 
latter form of multiculturalism that has been subject to rhetorical criticism and 
policy rebalancing, but even here they find that British politicians of all stripes 
define “Britishness” through a simultaneous appeal to political-institutional his-
tory and cultural diversity.
PART I I :  THE “OLD” C OMMONWEALTH
In chapter 4, Avigail Eisenberg examines the most prominent example of state 
multiculturalism in the world, that of Canada. She argues that multiculturalism 
in Canadian politics usually only refers to the issues surrounding the protection 
and integration of nonwhite immigrants and not the separate cases of Quebec and 
indigenous peoples. Despite the separation of these groups into different “silos,” 
they still interact with each other through political and legal contests in ways 
that undercut the aims of Canadian multiculturalism. Firstly, the constitutional 
entrenchment of multiculturalism has politicized it by overriding the more local 
measures of the 1970s, which has prompted Quebec to allege anti-democratic 
overreach by the federal government. Secondly, multicultural policy is operation-
alized through a legal mechanism of “reasonable accommodation,” which assumes 
that majority practices are a norm from which deviation must be justified. Thirdly, 
collective rights of groups have been subject to a “distinctive culture test” colored 
by the above, which renders legal remedies superficial and ignores deeper con-
cerns over identity, recognition, and colonialism. Eisenberg concludes that the 
Canadian multicultural provisions and the normative ideals that underlie them 
have therefore been politicized and distorted, and instead of fulfilling principles 
of cultural equality and democratic inclusion, current arrangements rather aim at 
accommodating difference without disturbing the status quo.
In chapter 5, Geoffrey Brahm Levey shows that Australian multiculturalism has 
a distinctive architecture. He argues that Australian state multiculturalism is best 
understood as an expression of a broader “liberal nationalist” approach to national 
identity, citizenship, and cultural diversity that emerged as part of a reassessment of 
Australian identity. He sees three animating propositions in Australian multicul-
turalism as it relates to this question of national identity. Firstly, Anglo-Australian 
identity and culture were formative in establishing Australia’s institutions and 
“way of life,” and should be duly acknowledged. Secondly, national identity will 
inevitably change over time with the changing composition of Australian soci-
ety. Thirdly, it must be ensured that all Australians, including those not of the 
majority culture, enjoy the same rights and opportunities. Levey concludes that 
Australian multiculturalism is a policy framework that seeks to check the cultural-
nationalist aspects of the core culture from overreaching and violating its liberal-
democratic aspects. This feature of Australian multiculturalism is not well grasped 
by the political class or the general public, and therefore those who cite Australia 
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as further evidence of a worldwide trend toward liberal universalism, or a purely 
civic conception of the nation, fundamentally misread the Australian case.
In chapter 6, Katherine Smits shows that New Zealand is both bicultural and 
multicultural. The term “multiculturalism” was first introduced in New Zealand in 
the 1970s to refer to settler-Maori relations, but it is now assumed to apply to the 
diversity resulting from non-British immigration. She argues that cultural plural-
ism in New Zealand is shaped by the interactions between shifting and compet-
ing discourses regarding multi- and biculturalism, indigenous peoples and civic 
values. New Zealand’s national identity historically contains a strong commitment 
to social justice, but this was challenged by the neoliberalism of the mid-1980s. 
The related “rebranding” of New Zealand was aimed partly at encouraging foreign 
investment, but it also attempted to co-opt Maori communal values to mitigate the 
internal effects of welfare cuts. Public resistance was articulated through liberal 
nationalism cast in social justice terms, and by the Maori, who made calls for self-
government under the Treaty of Waitangi and emerging international norms. New 
Zealand’s multiculturalism is therefore framed by the values and discourses of the 
various political, economic, and nationalist projects of state and nonstate actors. 
Yet it is also developed and invoked in order to support them, becoming a form of 
governmentality sustained by languages of value.
PART I I I :  THE “NEW ” C OMMONWEALTH
In chapter 7, Rochana Bajpai details the “multicultural” elements in the Indian 
Constitution of 1950 that predate similar policies in Western democracies. These 
have given rise to an extensive regime of group rights that ranges across many 
 policy areas and levels of government. Bajpai puts forward three key theses regard-
ing the constitutional settlement and Indian multiculturalism more broadly. Firstly, 
 rejection of colonial forms of devolved governance and the convergence of the inter-
ests of liberals and nationalists during constitution-making led to the emergence 
of a multicultural framework that was significantly “limited” in several respects. 
Secondly, India’s constitutional compromise on multiculturalism suffers from a 
deficit in terms of normative justification, eliding the distinction between rights for 
members of groups, and rights for groups. Thirdly, although there has been a  gradual 
expansion of multicultural policies, because of the normative deficit these are seen as 
discretionary concessions motivated by electoral considerations rather than  matters 
of justice, which in turn plays into the rhetorical strategies of the Hindu Right. Bajpai 
concludes that multiculturalism in India therefore needs to recover resources from 
a range of alternative traditions to justify multiculturalism, and to complement the 
recent discursive shift back toward communitarian secularism, group rights, fair 
equality of opportunity, and more radical participatory democracy.
In chapter 8, Farah Godrej analyzes what appears to be an ambivalence about the 
notion of secularism in Gandhi’s thought, which she argues is due to two different 
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conceptions of religion. The first sees religion as a practice-based seeking after 
truth through reflection on one’s own conscience, in the light of one’s own religious 
traditions. This view relies on the Jainist metaphysic of anekantavada, which sees 
divine truth as something that can only ever be partially understood by a human 
mind situated in particular circumstances. The second view understands religion as 
claiming absolute doctrinal truth, which is the view of religion implicit in the meta-
physics of the Abrahamic religions and at work in colonial missionary practices. 
Godrej argues that Gandhi thought the first “private” understanding of religion 
could nevertheless usefully inform a public political practice of engagement with 
other views, but that the second form of religion should be strictly separated from 
politics because of its tendency to facilitate competition and ideological entrench-
ment. This reconstruction of Gandhi’s views shows him to have been prophetic 
regarding the debates around religion and secularism in modern India, which are 
arguably driven by a Western understanding of secularism that is anathema in the 
Indian context historically, politically, and on a deeper metaphysical level.
In chapter 9, Wale Adebanwi traces the history of cultural diversity in Nigeria, 
showing how it is intimately connected to colonial forms of rule and the influence 
of these on constitutional negotiations around independence. He argues that the 
federalism adopted at independence based on the existing administrative regions 
was problematic, since it institutionalized an unstable tripartite balance of power, 
encouraging the regions to become loci of loyalty competing with the nation itself, 
while simultaneously glossing over the existence of more than three hundred 
underlying minority groups. This led to civil war and (eventually) a more radical 
but more stable form of devolved government that better reflects Nigeria’s vast 
diversity. Adebanwi concludes that the compromised form of federalism adopted 
at independence was largely the result of British practices of rule that constructed, 
not just the country itself, but also the problematic discourses through which the 
indigenous groups understood one another. This created an overall understand-
ing of multiculturalism as a “menace,” as well as a broader suspicion of polycen-
tric government. This narrative is symptomatic of broader issues in postcolonial 
Africa, where failure adequately to manage multicultural difference has frequently 
led to overt or covert centralization, dictatorship, and the silencing of minorities.
In chapter 10, Daniel Goh examines the twin cases of Malaysia and Singapore. 
Against conventional explanations privileging nationalism, Goh argues that the 
key influence in each was state-building related to capitalist development, which 
responded to the contradictions of colonial and postcolonial racial formation. 
Given the racialized character of the division of labor inherited from Britain, 
each side pushed for a political multiracialism that suited its economic approach. 
This meant the state builders eventually fell out, because Singapore looked toward 
transforming itself into an industrial hub, while Kuala Lumpur privileged agrar-
ian and natural resource capitalist development. Patronage multiracialism aligned 
with economic policy favoring the bumiputera (“son of the soil” in the Malay 
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language) was institutionalized in Malaysia, whereas corporatist multiracialism 
abetting statist capital accumulation was pursued in Singapore. Goh argues that 
by the 1980s and 1990s the contradictions of postcolonial racial formation were 
surfacing in both states, which led to the adoption of new forms of multicultural-
ism supposedly more suited to an era of globalization. In the era of global finan-
cial crises, however, the old multiracialisms remain institutionally dominant over 
the new forms of multiculturalism. Goh concludes that although Malaysia and 
Singapore developed their political institutions and economies divergently and 
on different multiracial premises, the evolution of their forms of multiculturalism 
have been “arrested” by underlying political and economic contradictions.
In chapter 11, Viranjini Munasinghe examines the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago, concentrating on the approach to cultural diversity on the politically 
 dominant, and more populous and diverse, island of Trinidad.28 She argues that 
the absence of a clear symbolic core to the nation—whether homogeneous  settler, 
or  indigenous—shapes Trinidadian multiculturalism. This  multiculturalism is 
marked by a struggle where ethnic groups battle for the nation against the back-
ground of a rigid colonial racial hierarchy of Europeans as masters, Africans as 
slaves, and East Indians as indentured laborers. The legacy of this colonial racial-
ization, combined with national imperatives to indigenize and mediate diversity, 
subsequently fixed African ancestry as the ideological culture-history referent. 
This made Afro-Creoles the legitimate inheritors of both nation and state, a 
cultural hegemony that, ironically, draws sustenance from homogenizing national 
narratives that invest only some groups with “native” privilege. Munasinghe con-
cludes that more recent Indo-Trinidadian charges of state bias in sponsorship of 
Afro-Trinidadian culture have been possible only because homogenizing national 
narratives of creolization did not (or could not) establish an uncontestable new 
purity. In Trinidad, the dialectical play between homogenizing and cosmopolitan 
narratives and metaphors, founded on colonial race hierarchies, continues to resist 
consolidation of either African or Indian ancestry as the nation’s symbolic core.
C ONCLUSIONS
Multiculturalism is comprised of a series of overlapping issues and discourses, 
with the precise nature of what is at stake varying from country to country. This 
fluidity makes identifying common themes and questions difficult. As editors, we 
therefore decided to let the authors speak for themselves before drawing the differ-
ent threads together in a concluding chapter. There we provide a philosophically 
inflected comparison of the different historical examples of multiculturalism that 
accounts for the variety across the Commonwealth, yet also draws out the deeper 
connections between its different forms. We argue that the dominant forms of 
multiculturalism in theory and practice are unduly narrow, leading to an unhelp-
ful siloing of “multicultural” issues, groups, and rights. Ultimately, we conclude 
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that achieving a fruitful, holistic multiculturalism requires modes of governance 
that are far more polycentric and pluralist than present ones.
“Multiculturalism” as we have narrated it here is part of the wider story of the 
development of the modern state through liberal-democratic governance, domestic 
nation- and state-building, and the rise and fall of imperialism. Britain is of course 
central to this story. As the leading imperial power, the first country to industrial-
ize, and the progenitor of much modern liberal theory and practice, Britain has had 
a unique role—for good or ill—in forming the modern world. This role has helped 
to forge indelible connections between otherwise radically different countries, and 
the collapse of the British Empire after 1945 prompted a fundamental remaking 
of those nations and states. The postwar British Commonwealth is therefore vital 
for understanding the evolution of modern multiculturalism, and the dilemmas it 
poses for the theory and practice of contemporary liberal democracy.
NOTES
1. For another discussion of the scope of multiculturalism, see Jacob T. Levy, The Multicultural-
ism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 5. We share his view that in such accounts 
“[u]sefulness, not truth, is the goal” (p. 125). Imposing a rigid typology of multicultural groups of rights 
is unhelpful.
2. For a differing account of the relationship between the theory and practice of multiculturalism, 
see Will Kymlicka, “The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos,” in Varun 
Uberoi and Tariq Modood, eds., Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas, New Direc-
tions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 209–49. Kymlicka’s organizing vocabulary in 
“The Essentialist Critique” is different from ours, revolving around the distinction between philosophi-
cal approaches, actual policies, and real-world outcomes. By multicultural “policy,” he means govern-
ment responses to the full range of issues/groups covered by the political theory of multiculturalism. By 
“practice,” he generally means the social outcomes of those policies, although he alleges his critics blur 
the distinction between the results of government policies and the philosophical justifications behind 
them (ibid., 225–29). In contrast, we use “policy” or “political practice” to mean government attempts 
to integrate minority immigrants, and the accompanying public debates. We distinguish multicultural 
policy/practice in this sense from the broader scope of the term “multiculturalism” in political theory. 
Nevertheless, our commitment to philosophical holism means that at some points we use “practice” as 
a more general contrast to “theory” in order to distinguish theoretical “webs of belief ” from the social 
practices in which they are instantiated. Some of Kymlicka’s arguments in “The Essentialist Critique” 
against the thinkers he calls “post-multiculturalist” turn on something like this broader distinction, 
although we believe our defense of polycentricity is not caught by these. In any event, the different uses 
of the terms are either specified or (we hope) clear from the context.
3. There is a clear historical correlation between the rise of liberal democracy and the development 
of the modern nation-state, and long-standing theoretical connections traceable to, inter alia, J. S. Mill 
(see “Of Nationality as Connected with Representative Government” in Mill, Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government [London: Parker, Son, & Bourn, 1861]). Many scholars have subsequently argued 
that some version of the cultural nation plays a key role in the functioning of modern governance, e.g., 
Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and David Miller.
4. See Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, “Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: Multi-
culturalism and Scottish Independence,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
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21, no. 1 (2018): 65–86; Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, “Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship: 
Britain after Brexit,” Political Quarterly 87 (2016): 355–59; and Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of 
Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5. See Mark Bevir, A Theory of Governance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
6. For instance, holism suggests that the application of existing theoretical frameworks is necessary 
for ordering and analyzing historical data, even if these frameworks must remain open to revision in 
the light of new information. Nevertheless, while we know that theory and practice continually remake 
each other, the ways in which they do so are not always apparent. Historical investigation may help 
to foreground these processes, thereby illuminating the dilemmas that have spurred reconstitution 
of beliefs, the traditions those beliefs draw on, and the practices through which they are expressed. 
Philosophical analysis of the normative issues raised by practical examples may thereby highlight over-
looked similarities between different concrete cases, suggesting a change in how we approach these in 
practice. Inversely, a comparative historical examination may help to clarify the normative issues at 
stake, thereby problematizing existing philosophical frameworks and pointing to the value of a new set 
of philosophical questions and political arrangements.
7. These claims can be regarding the results of specific polices, laws, and discourses, or the broader 
social consequences of cultural diversity. We therefore agree with Kymlicka that clear evidence of the 
effects of multicultural policies in liberal democracies is “not easy to locate”, and is both “tentative” and 
“preliminary” (Kymlicka, “Essentialist Critique,” 216–17). It is notable, however, that Kymlicka attempts 
to assess the effects of multiculturalism on substate national minorities, indigenous peoples, and immi-
grant groups separately. We argue that this sort of typological separation of multicultural groups and 
rights is unstable philosophically and ineffective in political practice, which indicates that assessment 
of the real-world effects of multiculturalism should also be holistic, requiring both historical and philo-
sophical investigation.
8. The influence of practice on theory can be seen in Kymlicka’s later work (e.g., Multicultural Odys-
seys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], and 
“Essentialist Critique”), which is more empirical and comparative than his earlier more philosophical 
work (see his Liberalism, Community, and Culture [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], and Mul-
ticultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995]).
9. For a series of “histories” of the multicultural debate see “Introduction” and “Part I: Trajectories” 
of Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen, eds., Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). These histories emphasize different aspects of the debates, but are 
broadly compatible with each other and our account. While the connection to decolonization is widely 
acknowledged, we differ by foregrounding the ways in which the intersection of liberal, colonial, and 
multicultural governance conditioned the various forms of postwar multiculturalism, and in our sug-
gested response of polycentricity and pluralism.
10. See Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” 
British Journal of Sociology 55 (2004): 237–57.
11. Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Michel Foucault, Karl Polanyi, and Max Weber, all argue 
for this in their different ways.
12. See Historicism and the Human Sciences in Victorian Britain, ed. Mark Bevir (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017).
13. For convenience we use “United Kingdom” and “Britain” interchangeably, i.e., including North-
ern Ireland in both. We use “Old” and “New” Commonwealth to distinguish the white-settler colonies 
of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand from other colonies in the Empire that were never intended 
to be permanently settled by the British, and whose relationship to Great Britain was marked by more 
nakedly extractive practices. These terms have functioned historically as thinly veiled proxies for race, 
and their use is more common in Britain than elsewhere, but even though this volume problematizes 
them, we find the distinction helpful as shorthand. For the reasons given in n. 27 below, we do not 
generally include South Africa and Zimbabwe in the Old Commonwealth.
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14. Different theorists conceptualize the debates according to their particular concerns, but many 
of these accounts are complementary rather than competing. For instance, multiculturalism is both 
a debate within liberalism between strands of universalism and contextualism, and a debate between 
liberalism and its communitarian, republican, and postcolonial critics. Multiculturalism is often asso-
ciated with the identarian “politics of difference,” yet this can be cast in terms of both “positional” and 
“cultural” difference, as it is by Iris Marion Young (see her “Structural Injustice and the Politics of Dif-
ference,” in Laden and Owen, eds., Multiculturalism and Political Theory, 60–88). Nevertheless, it seems 
generally accepted that the early association of multicultural political theory with the claims of minor-
ity groups that were not overtly cultural (e.g., women or those with disabilities) later shifted to a focus 
on issues relating to immigrants and national minorities. The “politics of difference” is closely related 
to the “politics of recognition,” which is broken down by Charles Taylor into the “politics of equal dig-
nity” and the “politics of difference” (Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, 
ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994]). In turn, multiculturalism as the “politics of recognition” is often contrasted—albeit controver-
sially—with the “politics of redistribution” more closely associated with liberal egalitarian and social 
democratic theory (see Nancy Fraser’s “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 
‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review 1, no. 12, July–August 1995, and Brian Barry’s Culture and Equal-
ity [Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2001]). Feminist theory arguably cuts across all of these debates, with 
different theorists falling on different sides of the various divides. For useful introductions to, and 
summaries of, the political theory literature along these lines see Laden and Owen, eds., Multicultural-
ism and Political Theory; Sarah Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Song, “Multiculturalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed November 19, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/
entries/multiculturalism.
15. See Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship.
16. See Laden and Owen, eds., Multiculturalism and Political Theory, 7. Prominent respondents 
to Kymlicka include Charles Taylor, Iris Marion Young, Susan Moller Okin, Brian Barry, Chandran 
Kukathas, Bhikhu Parekh, James Tully, Roger Scruton, Jacob T. Levy, Seyla Benhabib, Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Jeremy Waldron, and Sarah Song.
17. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in the Age of Diversity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the 
Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
18. “Context-sensitive” covers a broad range of theoretical approaches, ranging from utilizing his-
torical examples to illustrate abstract points to more radical approaches that use historical context 
to generate normativity itself. For a fuller discussion, see Jacob T. Levy, “Contextualism, Constitu-
tionalism, and Modus Vivendi Approaches,” in Owen and Laden, eds., Multiculturalism and Political 
Theory, 173–97. By “politically oriented” we mean approaches that prioritize actual political processes, 
in particular democratic deliberation, in determining outcomes. For a helpful discussion, see Anthony 
Simon Laden, “Negotiation, Deliberation, and the Claims of politics,” in Owen and Laden, eds., Mul-
ticulturalism and Political Theory, 198–217. For a fuller account of the effect of the contextual turn on 
multicultural political theory, see Song “Multiculturalism,” and for an example of work that is sensitive 
to both contextual and political strands without being conditioned by them, see her Justice, Gender and 
the Politics of Multiculturalism.
19. The separation of groups and rights is central to Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism as set 
out in his early work, and his influence over liberal multiculturalism and the wider debate has ensured 
that his typology is ubiquitous in the literature. Some version of it also seems to be implicit in other 
defenses of multiculturalism, such as Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition, which draws on Herderi-
an accounts of culture and defends the right to cultural survival in perpetuity. Taylor’s views on Quebec 
clearly suppose that minority national groups have rights to some form of self-government that immi-
grant groups do not: see the report he co-authored with Gérard Bouchard, Report of the Commission 
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on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Difference (Quebec: Government of Quebec, 2008). 
Postcolonial theorists such as Tully and Coulthard, who are critical of mainstream multiculturalism in 
theory and practice, also nevertheless advocate self-rule for indigenous groups historically subject to 
colonization, albeit that this does not turn squarely on the role of culture. Admittedly, some actors in 
the debate do not fall neatly into the typology as we have articulated it. For example, Iris Marion Young 
is broadly sympathetic to a multicultural politics of difference, yet rejects the usual multiculturalist 
focus on ethno-religious groups and the distribution of rights, instead focusing her critique on under-
lying structures of social power and domination. Alternative accounts of freedom from domination 
draw on civic republicanism and thereby emphasize the quality of social and political relations within 
and across groups, opening spaces for accommodations based on culture, as well as some group self-
government that is not. Critics of Kymlicka such as Brian Barry, Susan Moller Okin, and Roger Scru-
ton reject most “multicultural” rights on principle, including robust political autonomy for minority 
groups. Chandran Kukathas takes the opposite view, granting self-rule to any group or association that 
desires it, albeit not directly on the basis of culture (see Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of 
Diversity and Freedom [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003]). The later Kymlicka does move away 
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Ébanda de B’béri, eds., Global Perspectives on the Politics of Multiculturalism in the 21st Century: A Case 
Study Analysis (London: Routledge, 2014).
23. See Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1999); Maya Shatzmiller, ed., Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic 
Societies (Montreal and Kingston, Ont.: McGill–Queen’s University Press 2005); Will Kymlicka and 
Baogang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Irene Bloem-
raad, Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
24. See James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Samuel L. Myers 
and Bruce P. Corrie, eds., Racial and Ethnic Economic Inequality: An International Perspective (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2006); Paul Havemann, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zea-
land (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds., Multiculturalism 
and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
Rachel Sieder, ed., Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy (New 
What is Postwar Multiculturalism in Theory and Practice?    21
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); and Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State: The United 
States, Germany, and Great Britain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
25. For the broader comparative work on policy, law, and governance, see e.g., Crawford Young, 
Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry (New York: Macmillan, 1998); and Augie 
Fleras, The Politics of Multiculturalism: Multicultural Governance in Comparative Perspective (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For a sample of the vast array of detailed work in the social sciences, 
see, e.g., Matthew Wright and Irene Bloemraad, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and 
Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspec-
tive,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 (2012); John Sides and Jack Citrin, “European Opinion about 
Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information,” British Journal of Political Science 37 
(2007): 477–504; and Steven Weldon, “The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A 
Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 
(2006): 331–49.
26. Arguably Multiculturalism in Asia by Kymlicka and He is a work in a similar vein.
27. South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) can be considered part of the Old Common-
wealth, and were by British elites in the first half of the twentieth century. We have not, however, 
considered them in this volume, for two main reasons. Firstly, their histories of institutionalized racial 
apartheid were not aimed at integrating immigrants or granting genuine self-rule to minorities, but 
rather attempts to control and oppress a majority racial “group.” They are therefore part of the broader 
story of decolonization but do not sit easily within a discussion of genuine attempts at accommodating 
cultural (or other) diversity (see Kymlicka in Liberalism, Community, and Culture, chap. 13). Secondly, 
both of these countries left the Commonwealth in the 1960s, although they later rejoined (and in Zim-
babwe’s case, left again). Their forms of governance were therefore deeply isolationist for a long period 
of the twentieth century and had very little overlap with the policies of bi- and multiculturalism devel-
oped in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
28. Since it is almost entirely populated by people of African descent, the island of Tobago (which 
has a population of around 60,000, compared to Trinidad’s 1.3 million) is much less ethnically diverse 
than Trinidad, and political/economic power is therefore overwhelmingly Trinidadian, as are the 
dominant narratives of nationhood. We follow Viranjini Munasinghe in using “Trinidad,” “Indo-Trin-








British Multiculturalism after Empire
Immigration, Nationality, and Citizenship
Richard T. Ashcroft, University of California at Berkeley
Mark Bevir, University of California at Berkeley
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is composed of sev-
eral nations, and therefore has always been culturally diverse. Yet “multicultural-
ism” did not arise as a distinct phenomenon in Britain until after 1945, when the 
country was transformed by the end of Empire.1 This chapter provides an overview 
of this modern British multiculturalism.2 It supplements the existing literature by 
situating recent developments within the overall trajectory of postwar British mul-
ticulturalism and politics, highlighting connections to broader national debates 
and contextualizing the other chapters in this volume.3
Our goal is therefore primarily descriptive rather than normative, so here we 
will largely ignore the philosophical literature. Instead we focus on the relevant 
UK policy and law, outlining the central features of this framework.4 We trace the 
development of this distinctive multicultural “regime” and identify aspects of the 
postwar political landscape that influenced it. There are several ways of delineat-
ing British politics during this period, but the three most important traditions 
for understanding the evolution of British multiculturalism are social democracy, 
conservatism, and what we call British exceptionalism, a Whiggish view of the 
world that valorizes the evolution and exportation of British political institutions, 
values, and ideas.5 The first two have dominated national politics via the two major 
parties, yet operate partly against the background of the last. Our central thesis is 
that the interactions between actors situated within these three traditions have 
conditioned the particular form multiculturalism has taken in the UK, entangling 
it in wider debates over immigration, nationality, and citizenship.
The central dilemma facing postwar Britain was how to understand its role 
in the world, and the idea of Britishness itself, in a nonimperial context. Britain 
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responded to this challenge by undertaking a radical overhaul of its law relating to 
nationality and citizenship. As well as creating the modern welfare state, an expan-
sive redefinition of British nationality was passed in 1948 with little fanfare, in the 
main because a widespread belief in British exceptionalism combined with promi-
nent strands of conservative and social democratic thinking to ensure cross-party 
support. The British Nationality Act 1948 was intended to secure Britain’s place at 
the head of a robust Commonwealth of Nations, but instead led to an unexpect-
edly large influx of nonwhite migrants. The speed and scale of this immigration 
challenged British national identity, and put pressure on the new welfare state. 
Ultimately, this postwar reconstitution of the British polity gave rise to a distinc-
tive form of “British multiculturalism,” which combined tough immigration con-
trols with an internal regime of citizenship rights, race-relations legislation, and 
pluralistic accommodations for minorities. This framework of law and policy has 
persisted in its broad outlines from the mid-1960s until the present, but since the 
turn of the millennium there has been a reaction against some aspects of it. The 
recent shift is more pronounced in rhetoric than policy, however, and therefore 
British multiculturalism may be better understood as undergoing a “rebalancing” 
rather than a “retreat.” Whatever the correct characterization, we suggest that 
Brexit and renewed calls for Scottish independence are entangled with current 
 disagreements over multiculturalism. Understanding these connections in turn 
highlights that multiculturalism raises fundamental questions regarding the 
 structure and purpose of the British polity.
For the sake of clarity, we have split our narrative into five sections: the period 
of open borders between 1945 and 1962; the emergence of the distinctive British 
approach to multiculturalism between 1962 and 1979; the persistence of this 
“regime” under pressure from the Conservative Party governments of 1979–97; 
the developments under New Labour and the subsequent Conservative govern-
ments from 1997 to 2016; and finally, the connections to the recent referendum on 
EU membership and renewed calls for Scottish independence.
1945–1962 :  THE PERIOD OF OPEN B ORDERS
The British state was created in 1707, and Linda Colley has argued forcefully that 
a distinctive understanding of “Britishness” was first forged through the strug-
gle against France and the period of empire-building that followed.6 Historians 
still debate the precise impact of imperialism on British domestic culture, but we 
believe it is clear that the Empire was a fundamental part of British national iden-
tity from at least the mid-Victorian period up until the mid-twentieth century.7 
Decolonization after 1945 therefore threatened both Britain’s international stand-
ing and its sense of self. In response, postwar governments tried to position Britain 
at the head of a Commonwealth sphere of influence that would allow key aspects of 
British identity and influence to be preserved, albeit in a slightly diminished form. 
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The importance of spreading its forms of governance has been a long-standing 
theme in British public discourse, and a key justification of the Empire was that—
unlike other European forms of imperialism—it would ultimately prepare its colo-
nies to rule themselves.8 Shifting from an overt “Whig imperialism” to a more 
egalitarian “Commonwealthism,” was therefore a natural response to the problem 
posed by decolonization, and a continuation of British exceptionalism rather than 
a rejection of it. As Randall Hansen demonstrates in his measured and detailed 
analysis, this Commonwealth vision had bipartisan influence in the immediate 
postwar period, when the question was not whether, but how, to achieve it.9
The Attlee government’s solution was to redefine British nationality in 1948 in 
such a way as to simultaneously reaffirm and transform the relation of Britain to 
her colonies. Until the British Nationality Act 1948, there was no legal definition 
of citizenship in UK law, which revolved around the concept of subjecthood.10 
Subjecthood was granted automatically to everyone born within the British Empire 
and Commonwealth, nominally giving recipients all the privileges attached to the 
status of British subject equally.11 One of these privileges, albeit one that had previ-
ously existed primarily as a convention, was the right to migrate to Britain. Ireland 
had already rejected the unilateral ascription of British subjecthood to its citizens, 
but the immediate trigger for reform was the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946, 
which defined Canadian citizenship for the first time and made British subject-
hood for Canadians dependent on that citizenship, rather than being a direct grant 
from the British Crown. This change meant there was now the potential for con-
flict between subjecthood dependent on domestic citizenship and the universal 
British version.12
The 1948 British Nationality Act attempted to reconstitute common subjecthood 
status throughout the Commonwealth and Empire by creating a new citizenship 
in UK law, and making all grants of British subjecthood dependent on some form 
of citizenship, whether in Britain or elsewhere. The two most important categories 
of citizens under the Act were “Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies” 
(CUKCs) and “Citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries” (CICCs). 
These two categories covered the vast majority of British subjects, with the for-
mer receiving subjecthood directly from the UK and the latter via their domestic 
citizenship. Both had broadly the same rights in relation to the UK, including the 
right to live and work there, to vote, and even to stand for Parliament.13 The crucial 
legal effect of the British Nationality Act 1948 for our purposes was twofold. First, 
it gave statutory form to a right to immigrate to the UK previously possessed only 
as a convention (and even then unevenly), granting this right to the vast majority 
of those in the Empire/Commonwealth.14 Secondly, it linked this right to a new 
form of citizenship conferred by the UK on almost everyone in the Empire who 
was not a citizen of an independent country.
Part of the motivation for these reforms was that the right to migrate to the UK 
was considered a clear—but largely symbolic—way of reasserting Britain’s status 
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as the “mother country,” and thereby its commitment to the freedom and equality 
of both its individual subjects and the nations in the Empire and Commonwealth. 
Astonishingly, there is little indication that any of the politicians involved thought 
that this right would be utilized on a mass scale, instead presuming that prewar 
patterns of migration, which largely consisted in a flow from Britain to the “Old” 
Commonwealth, with a small number in return, would continue as before.15 
Nevertheless, the 1948 Act opened the UK to the possibility of legally protected 
mass immigration from the predominantly nonwhite countries of the “New” 
Commonwealth. Contrary to popular belief, however, active recruitment from these 
countries was limited to a few employers; the Attlee government looked primarily to 
continental Europe to meet postwar labor shortages. In fact, the Labour government 
and its Conservative successor sought to discourage further New Commonwealth 
immigration by “informal” means, pressuring the Jamaican, Indian, and other gov-
ernments to put administrative roadblocks in the way of potential immigrants.16 
It is equally clear, however, that this was conducted as private government-to-
government business, because any attempt to distinguish between Old and New 
Commonwealth immigrants would have been seen as racist, undermining the 
rhetoric of British Exceptionalism that justified the UK’s role as the head of a multi-
racial Commonwealth. This would have had potentially devastating effects on for-
eign relations and Britain’s conception of itself in the postwar world.
The commitment to the Commonwealth informed by British exceptionalism 
aligned with elements of the other two traditions. Anti-racism and the creation 
of a citizenship that provided a full range of civil, political and socioeconomic 
rights were central parts of Labour’s postwar project. This meant that social 
 democrats—and some liberal conservatives—could not as a matter of principle 
 countenance race-based immigration restrictions and usually assumed that the 
new “Marshallian” citizenship would effectively assimilate new migrants into 
Britain.17 In addition, there was a powerful group in the Conservative Party—and 
some in Labour—who saw a special connection between Britain and the anglo-
phone Old Commonwealth. Many Conservatives may have wanted to restrict 
nonwhite immigration, but when faced with a choice between restricting all 
Commonwealth immigration or none, they opted to reject any restrictions at all in 
order to keep the door open to those in “Greater Britain.”18
Given this confluence of interests, further legal reform restricting New 
Commonwealth immigration was impossible during this period, with the 
Colonial Office effectively exercising an institutional veto.19 Despite racially tinged 
public and political pressure, this impasse remained in place until the late 1950s, 
when a variety of factors removed the impediments to immigration reform. Once 
social democratic and conservative actors were no longer politically restrained 
by the goal of securing Commonwealth relations, anti-immigrant public opinion 
produced further legislation on immigration and nationality.20 Out of this arose a 
distinctive British form of multiculturalism.21
British Multiculturalism after Empire    29
1962–1979 :  THE BIRTH OF “BRITISH 
MULTICULTUR ALISM”
By the 1960s, it had become clear that Britain would not be able to secure the 
Commonwealth as distinct sphere of influence, which diminished the immedi-
ate political influence of British exceptionalism. The resulting shift in focus onto 
Europe and the United States paved the way for immigration reform, and a com-
promise between the two main parties and traditions in terms of how to deal with 
cultural diversity.22 The result was a bifurcated legal framework of multicultural-
ism, which consisted, on the one hand, of tough external immigration controls 
parsed in increasingly racialized terms, and, on the other, of a strong internal race-
relations regime of broad citizenship rights that rejected “assimilation” in favor of 
“integration.” This dichotomous approach defined multiculturalism as a political 
issue in the British context.
As the Commonwealth ideal faded in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the influ-
ence of the Colonial Office declined markedly, allowing the Ministry of Labour to 
push for immigration restrictions.23 Pressure for reform increased after race riots 
in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958 highlighted growing public resistance to 
nonwhite immigration.24 Conservative and Labour backbenchers began to ques-
tion the assumption that the flow of immigrants could effectively be assimilated by 
granting citizenship rights.25 Informal measures could no longer stem the tide, and 
rumors of impending controls resulted in a spike of immigrants arriving from the 
New Commonwealth during 1961.26 All of this led Harold Macmillan’s government 
to pass the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962.27
In legal terms, the difficulty facing the Conservative Party under Macmillan 
was how to restrict the immigration of individuals who were all British subjects, 
and many of whom were British citizens. Although it would have been possible to 
simply exclude individuals from independent Commonwealth countries such as 
Canada and India (i.e., CICCs), that would still have allowed large-scale immigra-
tion by CUKCs from countries that were not yet independent, since their citi-
zenship status was the same as that of those born in the UK. The government 
could have created a specifically British citizenship distinct from citizenship in the 
colonies, but it was reluctant to offend the inhabitants of the remaining colonies 
by unilaterally changing their citizenship status. In any event, any attempt to do 
so would have involved a lengthy period of legal and political wrangling and was 
therefore unattractive.28 Instead, the Conservatives opted to keep the basic struc-
ture of the British Nationality Act 1948 in place, but to amend it so as to limit the 
right of entry to: (i) those born in the UK; and (ii) those CUKCs whose passports 
were issued under the authority of London rather than by a colonial administra-
tion.29 These restrictions on entry were coupled with a nominally race-blind work-
voucher scheme that prioritized skilled workers and capped immigration for each 
category at a certain limit.30
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The overall effect of the 1962 reforms was to make almost all CICCs and those 
CUKCs born and living in the colonies subject to immigration control, which 
meant you could possess the primary citizenship status of a CUKC without having 
a right even to enter Britain, let alone live there. The Bill passed despite opposition 
from the Labour Party, which nevertheless did nothing to overturn the Act after 
it returned to power in 1964, when the focus shifted to what form of immigration 
control there should be, and how to deal with those that had already arrived. Yet 
once the initial taboo against any form of immigration control had been breached 
by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, growing hostility to nonwhite immi-
gration made further legislation inevitable.31 There was another Act in 1968 in 
response to the Kenyan crisis, which shamefully abandoned the Asians in Kenya 
to their fate by unilaterally revoking their right of entry as CUKCs after the fact, 
thereby denuding their citizenship of any meaningful protections.32 More legisla-
tion followed in 1971, restricting immigration even further.33 The Immigration Act 
1971 employed criteria that turned even more decisively on race, such as the noto-
rious “patriality” requirement, which allowed most white descendants of British 
colonists into the UK but effectively barred nonwhites.34 Nevertheless, it must be 
understood that none of this could do much to stem the tide of family reunifica-
tions, despite gradual tightening of the rules for determining cases of secondary 
immigration from this period on.35
The correlate of this tightening of external immigration controls in racialized 
terms was the imposition of an increasingly potent internal race-relations regime 
over the same period, with acts passed by Labour in 1965, 1968 and 1976.36 The 
1965 Race Relations Act outlawed discrimination in public places and incitement 
to racial hatred, and set up the Race Relations Board. The 1968 Act extended 
nondiscrimination to the key areas of housing and employment and created the 
Community Relations Commission. The 1976 Act amalgamated the two previous 
bodies into the (now defunct) Commission for Racial Equality, and introduced 
the idea of indirect discrimination.37 Measures were put in place at the local level 
too, with the establishment of Community Relations Councils and Racial Equality 
Councils. These reforms, although arguably inspired by the universalist aspects 
of the social democratic tradition, were nevertheless accompanied by a conscious 
shift in the mid-1960s away from “assimilation” to “integration.”38 In a famous 
statement in May 1966, Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins clearly articulated a 
racially diverse conception of Britishness that did not require assimilation into the 
dominant anglophone culture, saying: “Integration is perhaps rather a loose word. 
I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national char-
acteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot,’ 
which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon 
copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman. . . . I define 
integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal oppor-
tunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”39
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This shift meant that “Britain turned against the idea of assimilating her immi-
grants earlier than any other country in the Western world,” instituting a series of 
exceptions from general laws for ethnic, racial, and religious minorities.40 These 
accommodations were accompanied by a high degree of funding and activism 
engaged with the needs of minority communities. The price of external immigra-
tion control extracted by the predominantly anti-racist social democratic tradi-
tion and the more liberal wing of the Conservative Party was therefore a generous 
internal multicultural regime. This cross-party consensus emerged around the 
time of the Labour government’s White Paper on immigration in 1965 and can 
be attributed to the interaction of aspects of the traditions with the historical 
 circumstances and the goals of political actors.41
The Conservative Party was willing to accept this compromise, since its lead-
ership struggled over this period to restrain overtly racialized interpretations of 
conservatism. The dominant “One Nation” conservatism exemplified by Harold 
Macmillan pursued social welfare through pragmatic paternalist policies; it did 
not seek to reverse the basic thrust of the welfare state, yet still clung to a con-
ception of the country that drew on British exceptionalism.42 Its organic concep-
tion of community and nation in historical (but not directly racial) terms was, 
however, challenged by the scale and speed of New Commonwealth immigration. 
Some Conservatives, such as Enoch Powell and Cyril Osborne, put up increasingly 
strident opposition to nonwhite immigrants on the grounds they could not be 
effectively assimilated. In doing so, these Conservatives blurred the line between 
cultural and ethnic/racial difference, tying arguments over immigration to issues 
surrounding race, which in turn colored debates over citizenship, Britishness, 
and multiculturalism. The majority of the Conservative Party leadership were 
avowedly anti-racist, but as concern about Commonwealth relations became less 
influential, they struggled to restrain the more prejudiced elements of their party. 
The Conservative leadership was therefore willing to maintain a bipartisan con-
sensus to keep immigration out of front bench politics as much as possible, even 
though it might present them with something of an electoral advantage in the 
short term.43
There was also something of an uneasy balance within the social democratic 
tradition and the Labour Party that helped bring about the bifurcated approach 
to multiculturalism. During this period, social democracy was predominantly 
marked by an optimistic progressivism aimed at enhancing welfare through a 
combination of state action and community organization, primarily in the form 
of legal rights ascribed to all citizens equally by central government. Nevertheless, 
there was also strand of social democratic pluralism that sought the decentral-
ization of political power and a diversity of free associations that would allow a 
more open, flexible form of community.44 Within the Labour Party, this meant that 
strong anti-racist and anti-imperialist elements had to be balanced against the sus-
picion of the working class and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) that large-scale 
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immigration could lead to unemployment, and would damage the power of col-
lective bargaining and hence standards of living.45 There were numerous examples 
of racial prejudice on the shop floor, but nevertheless the TUC was officially anti-
racist, and the influence of that principle on the social democratic movement as a 
whole was so strong that Labour took a more consistently pro-immigrant line than 
the Conservatives. The combination of the universalist parts of the tradition with 
the more pluralist strand thus arguably led to the toleration and preservation of 
differences within a framework of broad citizenship rights.
The different strands of social democracy and conservatism in British politics 
ensured that the price of restrictive immigration reform was a strong internal 
race-relations regime and a notable degree of internal cultural pluralism. This con-
sensus represented a balance both between the two main traditions and parties, 
and elements within them. Nevertheless, the racial overtones of public discourse 
and the subsequent immigration reforms are impossible to ignore. Part of the 
problem, as Christian Joppke argues, was that the expansive definition of citizen-
ship introduced in 1948 could not be used itself as the sole criterion for restricting 
immigration.46 In the face of public resistance to the influx of people from the New 
Commonwealth, immigration restrictions had to be recast to operate on proxies 
of birth and ancestry, which in the British legal and political context effectively 
meant race. The ultimate legacy, therefore, of the cross-party influence of British 
exceptionalism in the years immediately after World War II was twofold. Firstly, it 
triggered reforms that intertwined race, immigration, nationality, and citizenship 
in law and politics. Secondly, it helped create a distinctive British approach to mul-
ticulturalism comprised of tough external immigration controls and an internal 
race-relations regime of broad citizenship rights and pluralist accommodations.47
1979–1997 :  AN UNEASY STATUS QUO
Given Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s dominance of the political landscape 
in these years, and her deserved reputation for anti-immigration rhetoric, radi-
cal policies, and political confrontation, one might expect her control of central 
government to have led to significant changes in the approach to multiculturalism. 
In fact, the existing bifurcated regime was broadly maintained in policy terms, 
although support for it was no longer entirely bipartisan.
In terms of immigration and nationality law, the British Nationality Act of 1981, 
which finally overturned the legal regime created by the 1948 Act, was a signifi-
cant piece of legislation, but it was not as radical a departure from the practices 
of the preceding two decades as is often claimed.48 The 1981 Act repealed the 1948 
Act, “all but abolished the status of British subject,” and finally put in place a clear 
definition of British citizenship, which corresponded directly to the right to live 
in Britain.49 The remaining CUKCs were split into two different categories, but 
neither of these received the right to enter the UK. The controversial terminology 
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of “patriality” was done away with, but its effects were largely preserved by a shift 
away from a pure jus soli that gave British nationality to almost anyone born on 
UK soil to include elements of a jus sanguinis approach, making British citizen-
ship dependent on having a parent who is a UK citizen or “settled” in Britain.50 
Crucially, it would seem that the criteria for immigrating to the UK under the 
British Nationality Act 1981 were much the same as under the Immigration Act 
1971, and a version of the status quo was thus preserved in immigration law.51 
Nevertheless, Thatcher’s anti-immigration rhetoric embodied a cultural national-
ism with racialized undertones, as demonstrated by her infamous appearance on 
World in Action in the run-up to the 1979 election. It must also be noted that many 
of the secondary immigration rules were significantly tightened from this point on 
in ways that seemed to target nonwhite immigration.52
The other arm of British multiculturalism also remained broadly in place, 
despite more direct attacks on it by the Thatcher governments.53 Thatcher’s brand 
of neoliberal “conservatism” was still committed to universal citizenship rights, 
albeit shorn of the welfarist elements, and so she had no reason to attack the differ-
ence-blind aspects of the race-relations regime, leaving this part of the bipartisan 
consensus largely intact. Elements of the “integration not assimilation” approach 
also survived during this period, since Thatcher governments passed many 
accommodations for minorities that extended Labour Party policies of the 1970s.54 
Surprisingly, Thatcher’s attack on the welfare state as a whole failed to undermine 
the basic thrust of the multicultural regime, even if it weakened it in some respects. 
In part, this was because implementation of much of the relevant welfare provi-
sion was in the purview of local governments dominated by the Labour Party. For 
instance, local authorities were charged under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 
1976 with eliminating unlawful discrimination and promoting equal opportunity, 
and were permitted under the Act to advertise jobs in specialist presses in order 
to encourage more applications from minorities. In some cases this morphed into 
de facto affirmative action hiring policies and thus increased diversity. The correc-
tion of “indirect discrimination” also allowed more interventionist policies, and 
section 35 permitted the provision of services targeted directly at the special needs 
of minority groups, a trend that increased after the Scarman Report on the Brixton 
riots of 1981. Anti-racism and multiculturalism became core parts of teacher train-
ing and the curricula designed predominantly at the local level, much of which 
was inspired by the pluralist rhetoric of Lord Swann’s 1985 Report on Education.
The perceived excesses of some local government, most notably in Liverpool 
and London, were utilized by central government in the 1980s as a reason to reduce 
local funding and power. Yet even afterwards local authorities had substantial 
funds under their control, and significant welfare responsibilities for community 
services, housing, and education. During this period social democracy in Britain 
was therefore expressed through a more activist anti-racism and valorization of 
difference, and the Labour Party became closely associated with a commitment to 
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multiculturalism.55 Overall, British multiculturalism became “entrenched” during 
this period at the local level, and so the distinctive bifurcated approach arising out 
of the postimperial experience remained largely intact. In the face of neoliberalism, 
however, the compromise between social democracy and conservatism—and the 
strands of universalism and pluralism within them—transitioned into an uneasy 
balance between more homogeneous parties and different levels of government.
1997–2016 :  RENEWAL,  RETREAT,  REBAL ANCING
New Labour’s form of social democracy had important consequences for British 
multiculturalism. Its leading practitioners hailed primarily from the Fabian strand 
of social democracy, which traditionally placed great faith in a liberal democracy 
informed by social science.56 This inheritance meant their reinterpretation of the 
tradition was heavily impacted by modern social science research and techniques, 
which affected how they conceived of and responded to political issues, includ-
ing multiculturalism. The two most influential strands of social science on New 
Labour were new institutionalism and communitarianism.57 Whereas Thatcher 
promoted markets, competition, and the “hollowing out” of the state, New Labour 
drew on new institutionalism to defend the use of broader “networks” of gover-
nance, consultation, and private/public partnerships within a context of “joined 
up government.”58 Whereas Thatcher declared, “there is no such thing as society,” 
New Labour drew on a communitarianism that valorized shared values and an 
“active citizenship” comprised of both rights and duties. And whereas Thatcher 
attacked the economic “dependency” engendered by the welfare state, New Labour 
drew on both new institutional and communitarian conceptions of social capital 
in order to reduce exclusion.
New Labour impacted multiculturalism in a variety of ways, marrying a plural-
ist idea of local governance—including devolution—that emphasized difference 
to a revitalized sense of citizenship, trust, and obligation to the community.59 It 
also reasserted the value of the welfare state, extended the scope of the race-rela-
tions regime and hate speech laws,60 and consolidated UK anti-discrimination 
law.61 There was a relaxation of the position on nonwhite immigration through 
the dropping of the controversial “primary purpose” immigration rule, which had 
previously been used to limit the right of British citizens (predominantly of South 
Asian ethnicity) to bring their spouses to the UK.62 Overall, therefore, New Labour 
initially reinvigorated the bifurcated framework, with the publication of the report 
by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 perhaps being 
the “high-water mark” of postwar British multiculturalism.
British multiculturalism was put under strain, however, by events in the early 
2000s. Race riots in the north of England in 2001 were the initial trigger for a 
reevaluation of multicultural policy, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the London bombings of July 2005. The 
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government responded with a more strident emphasis on the need for immigrant 
and minority communities to assimilate British values and traditions, with similar 
views articulated by the nongovernment Left in David Goodhart’s famous series 
of articles in Demos and Prospect.63 This shift can be seen in numerous statements 
by figures such as Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly,64 the various reports on the 
2001 riots,65 David Blunkett’s introduction to the 2002 White Paper Secure Borders, 
Safe Haven,66 the introduction of “ideological” criteria for community group fund-
ing,67 and in the fact and form of the new nationality test and citizenship cer-
emonies.68 These changes were accompanied by a tightening of immigration and 
asylum law and draconian anti-terrorism legislation. Security measures were also 
linked explicitly to assimilationalist policies which often muddled together coun-
terterrorism work with community relations.69 British Muslims became particular 
objects of public and governmental suspicion, which exacerbated criticism of mul-
ticultural policies from both majority and minority groups.
Policies and rhetoric in this vein have been continued by the governments of 
David Cameron and Theresa May. Both Cameron and May are self-described 
“One Nation” conservatives, construing national identity in terms of a shared and 
cohesive set of values.70 Prime Minister Cameron famously declared in 2011 that 
the “state doctrine of multiculturalism” had failed, explicitly citing it as a cause of 
domestic terrorism because of its putative role in “weakening our collective iden-
tity,” advocating instead the need for a “muscular liberalism” that asserts “British 
values.”71 This rhetoric was strengthened after the 2015 election, when he intro-
duced anti-extremism legislation and adopted further immigration restrictions, 
commenting: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to 
our citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone. It’s often meant 
we have stood neutral between different values. And that’s helped foster a narrative 
of extremism and grievance. . . . This Government will conclusively turn the page 
on this failed approach. As the party of one nation, we will govern as one nation, 
and bring our country together. That means actively promoting certain values.”72 
Brexit has meant that the stance on immigration has hardened further under the 
May governments, as has the accompanying rhetoric regarding social cohesion 
and shared values.73
British multiculturalism therefore initially underwent a revival during this 
period. That has been followed by something of a backlash, however, which draws 
on elements in all three of the main political traditions we have identified. New 
Labour relied on both new institutionalism and communitarianism, thereby 
simultaneously affirming difference and social cohesion, and advocating both 
local community governance and efficient public administration. New Labour’s 
version of social democracy therefore initially led to a renewal of British multicul-
turalism, but its disparate commitments have come under pressure from events 
since 2001, and the Labour Party has responded by reemphasizing the central-
izing and homogenizing aspects of its tradition at the expense of the pluralistic 
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ones.74 This shift toward social cohesion and shared values has been followed by 
Conservative politicians in recent years, who have drawn on long-standing parts 
of their own tradition in doing so, including an emphasis on institutions and 
values that have evolved historically. The result has been an overall tendency in 
British political discourse since the millennium to juxtapose “multiculturalism” 
and liberal nationalism, and to advocate more robust forms of the latter. The dom-
inant articulation of the national community in current British public discourse is 
therefore in terms of political and moral values, which are frequently couched in 
the language of British exceptionalism. The appeal to “unique” British values and 
practices is, however, usually accompanied by an emphasis on anti-racism and the 
culturally diverse nature of modern Britain. It is therefore plausible to argue, as 
Meer and Modood do in this volume, that recent events should not be understood 
as a full-scale retreat from the postwar approach of “integration not assimilation,” 
but rather as a “rebalancing” of Britain’s distinctive bifurcated approach to multi-
culturalism in the light of current concerns.
It is noteworthy, however, that in articulating their liberal nationalisms for the 
new millennium, the leaderships of both major parties have often utilized language 
reminiscent of the form of British exceptionalism popular after World War II.75 
The imagery of Empire was invoked even more directly by the campaign to leave 
the EU, which explicitly framed Brexit as an opportunity to rekindle Britain’s 
globe-straddling past.76 It was perhaps inevitable that the May governments have 
sought to sell Brexit to the public in similar terms, yet they have been accused—
not unfairly—of expressing their liberal nationalism in ways that play on the 
ethno-culturalism that marred the referendum.77 In so doing, they have arguably 
echoed problematic aspects of the conservative tradition (and the Conservative 
Party) that were prominent during the birth of British multiculturalism in the 
1960s. These recent articulations of national identity are unpopular with some 
aspects of the social democratic Left, which has a deep-seated commitment to 
anti-racism, multiculturalism, and difference. The lukewarm opposition to Brexit 
of the current Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn—largely driven by traditional 
social democratic fear of the effect of highly mobile foreign labor competing with 
British workers—has, however, hampered resistance to the overall trend toward 
homogenizing forms of nationalism.
2016 ON:  BREXIT AND BEYOND
Our narrative has taken us from 1945 to the present day, demonstrating that for 
much of this period the basic form and understanding of British multiculturalism 
has remained broadly stable. This consistency is to some extent the result of the 
path-dependency created by the postwar immigration, nationality, and citizenship 
reforms, themselves partly inspired by British exceptionalism. We suggest that it is 
also because the underlying policy regime has been able to balance aspects within 
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and across social democracy and conservatism—and the two main political par-
ties through which they are expressed—over time. We end, however, by compli-
cating our story. We analyze Brexit and renewed calls for Scottish independence, 
illustrating the ways in which both issues are at least partly rooted in debates over 
multiculturalism. This not only enriches our understanding of British multicul-
turalism, but also suggests that its proper scope reaches beyond current discursive 
boundaries to include basic constitutional issues.
Brexit was driven by conflicting evaluations of multiculturalism, national 
identity, and the worth of multiple citizenships.78 Resistance to immigrant multi-
culturalism was a substantial factor in the Leave vote. Immigration, multicultural-
ism, race, and security were frequently conflated in public discourse during the 
campaign, most succinctly in the UK Independence Party’s notorious “Breaking 
Point” poster depicting a massed column of mostly nonwhite, young male 
migrants in southeastern Europe. This played into the narrative that multicultur-
alism has damaged social cohesion, making Brexit part of a broader contest over 
national identity. The emotive nature of nationalism complicated the debate, with 
immigrant multiculturalism—and thereby the EU—seen by some Leave voters as 
undermining what it means to be British. Differences in the national identities 
that underlie “Britishness” complicated matters even further. A significant sense 
of Englishness correlates more strongly with Euroscepticism than Scottish, Welsh, 
and Northern Irish identities do, and this may be linked to divergent views as to 
whether—and which—national identity is threatened by immigration and multi-
culturalism.79 In addition, many UK voters identify as European as well as British, 
adding a further layer to the conflict between plural identities.
The various national identities in contemporary Britain are in turn entangled 
with the multiple citizenships at play. Most referendum voters possessed both 
European and British citizenship, with many Leave voters feeling that the former 
has undermined aspects of the latter. This is partly because the economic impact of 
the freedom of movement conferred by EU citizenship has likely varied—at least in 
the short term—across different demographics and geographical areas in the UK. 
This has strengthened the perception that the welfare state is under threat, even 
if it seems likely that any such problems in reality have more to do with austerity 
than immigration. The erosion of the economic elements of British citizenship 
central to the multicultural regime—and the postwar national settlement more 
broadly—are therefore also part of Brexit. Political aspects of different citizenships 
were also in conflict, and many who voted Leave were concerned about a loss of 
British political sovereignty to the EU and a lack of institutional accountability. 
The high-handed dismissal of these very real concerns by the Remain campaign, 
and the EU itself, was unhelpful.
Yet a lack of democratic responsiveness is arguably a problem within the UK 
itself, with the 62 percent of voters in Scotland who wanted to remain in the 
EU being overridden by those in England and Wales.80 Proponents of Scottish 
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independence therefore paint Scotland as different from other parts of the UK in 
its embrace of both multiculturalism and immigration.81 These purported differ-
ences partly underpin the SNP’s claim that Scotland suffers a “democratic defi-
cit” within the UK that was mitigated by devolution, but has been exacerbated 
by Brexit.82 Although this argument is couched in democratic language, we have 
argued elsewhere that it implicitly relies on the claim that the cultural nation is a 
necessary condition of successful liberal-democratic politics.83 This claim connects 
Scottish independence to the political theory of multiculturalism, most notably 
Will Kymlicka’s defense of political autonomy for “national minorities” based on 
the role culture plays in meaningful choice and self-respect.84 Whether or not this 
“cultural nationalism” is ultimately persuasive—which we strongly doubt—our 
analysis makes it clear that recent claims of Scottish independence are not just 
closely connected to multiculturalism and Brexit in a causal sense, but also on a 
deeper theoretical level.
C ONCLUSIONS
Our narrative suggests that the roots of our current political confusion can be 
uncovered through understanding the trajectory of multiculturalism in postwar 
Britain, which arose as a response to the destabilizing of British power and national 
identity by decolonization. This chapter has argued that modern British multicul-
turalism is the direct consequence of the failed postwar attempt to construct a 
geopolitically relevant Commonwealth of Nations, itself inspired by a widespread 
belief in British exceptionalism. The result has been a distinctive bifurcated form 
of multiculturalism, comprised of tough external immigration controls coupled 
with an internal regime made up of citizenship rights, race-relations legislation, 
and pluralistic accommodations for minorities. A broad consensus in favor of this 
distinctive type of multiculturalism was maintained from the mid-1960s until the 
early 2000s. In recent years, however, there has been something of a shift toward 
more assimilative forms of liberal nationalism, frequently articulated through the 
rhetoric of British exceptionalism.
Multiculturalism in modern Britain as a demographic fact and policy frame-
work is thus primarily the result of nonwhite immigration after 1945. The overall 
effect of the postwar transformation of Britain has been to ensure that debates 
over multiculturalism, citizenship, and national identity are entangled with one 
another. The connection between multiculturalism and postwar immigration is 
widely acknowledged by public actors, as is the ineluctable role of race. Yet the 
broader effects of the postwar legal and political reforms on multiculturalism in 
the UK are often ignored. Framing “British multiculturalism” in terms of inte-
grating nonwhite immigrants obscures the deeper challenges to national identity 
and liberal-democratic governance posed by decolonization. The British nation 
and state are deeply connected to empire, which continues to cast a shadow over 
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contemporary debates even as we try to move beyond its legacy. This is illustrated 
by the inability of political actors of both Left and Right successfully to articulate 
a vision of modern Britain without drawing on some form of British exceptional-
ism, directly invoking imperial imagery, or lapsing into ethnically tinged national-
ism. This suggests that Britain has not yet negotiated the dilemmas posed by the 
dissolution of the Empire, nor forged a stable identity without it.85
Both Brexit and Scottish independence are best understood as part of these 
ongoing and interrelated contests in Britain over multiculturalism, national iden-
tity, and citizenship. We suggest that the failure in current political discourse to 
appreciate the interrelated nature of these issues has several problematic con-
sequences. Firstly, it facilitates the divisive, racially charged rhetoric that allows 
multiculturalism-as-immigration to become an empty signifier for all of contem-
porary Britain’s social ills. Secondly, it has hampered the ability of the different 
factions within the two major parties to agree on the cause, scope, and import of 
Brexit, contributing to a lack of clear political alternatives. Thirdly, it hides the con-
nection between multiculturalism and broader questions of governance, reducing 
the possibility of addressing all the relevant issues in a holistic manner. And lastly, 
it glosses over the historical claims, normative values, and accounts of the nation 
that implicitly inform contemporary public discourse, but which may not stand up 
to public or intellectual scrutiny when foregrounded.
Multiculturalism in Britain should be understood as raising questions regard-
ing its basic constitutional structure, and even the purpose of Britain as a polity. 
Recent events may therefore call for more than simply “rebalancing” the exist-
ing legal framework. British multiculturalism may not be amenable to top-down 
policy solutions; rather, it may require restructuring our modes of governance, 
and perhaps the United Kingdom itself, from the ground up.
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An Open or Closed Activity?
Nasar Meer, University of Edinburgh
Tariq Modood, University of Bristol
In this chapter, we explore some of the political discourse around contemporary 
debates about Britishness and the alleged “retreat” of multiculturalism. Although 
new discourses of Britishness have accompanied new policies prioritizing types of 
unity, neither of these have completely overridden the recognition of “difference” 
and anti-discrimination that previously comprised multiculturalism at both the 
local and national levels. On the contrary, although a sense of plural Britishness 
owes something to the UK’s multinational character, it undeniably also reflects 
the political integration and contestations of postwar Commonwealth migrants 
and their descendants. While the story of Commonwealth nonwhite immigra-
tion to Britain is one of incremental immigration controls, it is also a story about 
anti-racism and multiculturalism guiding the redefinition of what it means to be 
a “British” citizen.
Some years ago we argued that contemporary revisions of British multicultural-
ism could be understood as evidence of a “civic re-balancing.”1 That reading was in 
marked contrast to an emerging thesis, proposed by a number of commentators, 
which pointed to a “post-multicultural” era, or at least contained the view that we 
were witnessing a “retreat” of multiculturalism.2 We agreed (and still do) that the 
term had become politically damaged, but we concluded that the policies and dis-
courses that make up the strands of British multiculturalism remained in place, even 
though they have been contested and joined by others. We sought to show that there 
are a number of intellectual and political developments (sometimes competing, 
sometimes complementary) that have been shaping British multiculturalism over 
the medium to long term, in which current changes need to be located and inter-
preted. One implication being that it is a mistake to view British multiculturalism as 
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a completed or closed project, not least because the identities it seeks to take account 
of are dynamic, even when they are coherent, and a political multiculturalism would 
thus always need to be open to renewal—as indeed it has been.
Our argument was that it is short-sighted to view the elevation of previously 
perhaps underemphasized features of national identity as an abandonment of 
British multiculturalism. Such developments need no more lead to the abandon-
ment of British multiculturalism than would lead to the abandonment of other 
public policy approaches concerned with promoting equality of access, partici-
pation, and public recognition, such as gender mainstreaming and the disability 
rights agenda. On the contrary, in the case of a multiculturalism sensitive to eth-
nic, racial, and religious differences, the pursuit of an inclusive national identity 
appeared to reconcile itself to what had earlier been promoted (perhaps to the 
disappointment and frustration of critics of multiculturalism). For example, even 
as he and other Conservatives spoke derisively of multiculturalism, the leading 
right-wing Cabinet Minister Michael Gove MP also stated “Britishness is about 
a mongrel identity.”3 Similarly, Pauline Neville-Jones, a figure regarded as on the 
right of the Conservative Party, led a review group that argued: “We need to rebuild 
Britishness in ways which . . . allow us to understand the contributions which all 
traditions, whether primarily ethnic or national, have made and are making to our 
collective identity.”4 Indeed, a Leverhulme project that interviewed cabinet minis-
ters and shadow cabinet ministers in 2007/08 did not find a uniformity of views 
on this matter but instead considerable cross-party agreement that British national 
identity had to be opened up to include minorities, and that politicians and the 
state had a role to play in this process.5
Even while emphasizing that integration was something that had to be worked 
on, politicians of all hues made glowing references to the opening ceremony of the 
2012 London Olympics and the success of Team GB, including the Somalia-born 
Mo Farah and the mixed race Jessica Ennis. Indeed, the opening ceremony of the 
Olympic Games in London in July 2012 was an excellent expression of a multicul-
tural Britishness that New Labour tried to articulate without ever quite succeeding. 
Its positive reception in the British media—including the same papers that had 
lambasted the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) some years earlier—
shows how far we have advanced.6 An Australian political theorist opined that the 
Britain displayed at the Olympics meant that many countries were now “looking 
to Britain as an example of a dynamic multicultural society united by a generous 
patriotism.”7 The left-wing journalist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, a member of the 
CMEB, who returned her MBE as a protest against the Iraq War, wrote: “These two 
weeks have been a watershed of true significance. There has been a visceral reaction 
among black and Asian Britons to what we have seen. For some, it has been perhaps 
the first time they have really felt a part of this country. For others, the promise of 
tolerance and integration has come true.”8
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Since the publication of “The Multicultural State We’re In” in 2009, which cov-
ered the period since the mid-1960s in broad terms and the New Labour gov-
ernments in detail, public policy developments have continued apace. There has 
not yet, however, been much peer-reviewed analysis of the Conservative-Liberal 
coalition (2010–15) or the subsequent Conservative majority government (2015–).9 
In this chapter, we thus begin by reminding ourselves of the core features of British 
multiculturalism as we have understood it, before turning to the present gov-
ernment’s strategy, which is deemed by some to be forging a new path. Current 
multicultural strategy is allied (indeed twinned) with significant changes in both 
immigration/settlement policies and approaches to anti-terrorism; the former are 
widely touted as being more restrictive and perhaps even leading to something like 
a British guest worker model, and the latter identifies “integration” as one of the 
primary objectives of counter-radicalism.10
We should not, however, ignore the potential significance of centrifugal ten-
dencies for questions of “integration” in Britain that have become increasingly 
prominent since the publication of our 2009 article. These include the galvanized 
movement for the “break up of Britain” evident in the 45 percent of the elector-
ate that voted in favor of Scottish independence; the potential fracturing of the 
European project and the prospect of splintering states therein (or formal tiering of 
membership); and the rise of popular English nationalisms, whether in relatively 
benign, though ultraconservative, forms like the English Democrats, or more 
menacing articulations of the Far Right that explicitly trade on an anti-Muslim 
rather than an anti-minority platform such as the English Defence League.11
C ONTEXTUALIZING THE TERR AIN
While multiculturalism in Britain had for some time been perceived as creak-
ing under the weight of “culturally unreasonable or theologically alien [Muslim] 
demands,” there was a noticeable increase in governmental and non-right-wing 
criticism of multiculturalism after urban riots in the north of England in 2001.12 
By 2004, a swathe of publications and institutions of the center and/or liberal 
left—including Prospect, the Observer, the Guardian, the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE), Open Democracy, Channel 4, and the British Council—had held 
seminars or produced special publications with titles like “Is Multiculturalism 
Dead?” With a chorus of commentators declaring that multiculturalism had been 
killed by the London bombings of 7/7,13 it is therefore not surprising that it is com-
monplace to characterize British multiculturalism as being “in retreat.”14
In querying the validity of this assessment, we distinguish at the outset between 
those seeking to point to a normative or descriptive tendency and others who have 
made little attempt to disguise their political motives in rejecting Britain’s multi-
culturalism. In the latter camp, we could include, on the center left, the influential 
commentator David Goodhart, who evidently sympathizes with the position of 
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those he perhaps unfairly calls “Burkeans” that “we feel more comfortable with, 
and are readier to share with and sacrifice for, those with whom we have shared his-
tories and similar values. To put it bluntly—most of us prefer our own kind.”15 We 
could also include Trevor Phillips, previously chair of the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE) and its successor, the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC), who stated that Britain should “kill off multiculturalism,” because it “sug-
gests separateness.”16 While in opposition David Cameron characterized British 
multiculturalism as a “barrier” that divided British society,17 and subsequently as 
Prime Minister argued that “the doctrine of “state of multiculturalism” has encour-
aged culturally different people to live apart from one another and apart from the 
mainstream.”18 Perhaps seeking to stake out a British Leitkultur  (lead culture), 
Cameron also complained that multiculturalism led to the minimization of 
Christianity as a guiding public ethos, allowing “segregated communities to behave 
in ways that run completely counter to our values and has not contained that 
extremism but allowed it to grow and prosper.”19
While a much stronger and vitriolic critique is not unusual from a center right 
in Britain that has historically lamented and contested governmental interven-
tions recognizing the diversity of minority populations,20 opposition to the recog-
nition and support of minority cultural practices in Britain has undoubtedly had a 
qualitatively greater impact since it was joined by “the pluralistic center-left [and] 
articulated by people who previously rejected polarizing models of race and class 
and were sympathetic to the ‘rainbow,’ coalitional politics of identity.”21
One outcome for the British approach is that the inclusion of ethnic minori-
ties is now increasingly premised upon greater degrees of qualification. This was 
epitomized by the introduction of citizenship tests, the swearing of oaths during 
citizenship ceremonies and language proficiency requirements for new migrants, 
as well as repeated calls for an unambiguous disavowal of “radicalism” or “extrem-
ism” from Muslims in particular. Writing in the British Journal of Sociology in 
2004, Christian Joppke interpreted these changes as evidence of a “retreat” from 
multiculturalism and a “turn to civic integration” that is “most visible in Britain 
and The Netherlands, the two societies in Europe . .  . that had so far been most 
committed to official multiculturalism.”22 Our argument was that Joppke assumes 
that “civic integration” and “multiculturalism” constitute a dichotomy or a zero-
sum equation, and thus ignores the extent to which they could just as plausibly 
be synthesized in a potential outgrowth of one another. For if it is the case that 
Britain is engaged in a “retreat” from multiculturalism, heralding a victory for lib-
eral or republican universalism, would it not follow that, as Keith Banting and Will 
Kymlicka point out, it must “have rejected the claims of substate national groups 
and indigenous peoples as well as immigrants. After all, the claims of national 
groups and indigenous peoples typically involve a much more dramatic insertion 
of ethnocultural diversity into the public sphere, and more dramatic degrees of 
differentiated citizenship [emphasis in original].”23
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Since this does not appear to be the case in Britain at least, with quite the oppo-
site in fact seeming to be true, one explanation of the “widely divergent assess-
ments of the short history and potential future of multiculturalism” pertains to the 
meaning and usage of the term itself. Indeed, this “highly contested and chame-
leon-like neologism whose colours change to suit the complexion of local condi-
tions” seems to have a “chameleon” quality that is adopted differently in support 
of different projects.24 For example, while some intellectuals, commentators, and 
politicians of differing persuasions have in recent years united in their rejection 
of post-immigration multiculturalism—our concern here—their critiques have 
simultaneously revealed the diverging ways in which multiculturalism in Britain 
has been conceived.
This chapter argues that there are at least three discernible contemporary posi-
tions: (1) an integration and social cohesion perspective that seeks to include 
minorities through a process of greater assimilation to majority norms and cus-
toms; (2) an alternative, explicitly secular “multiculture” or “conviviality” approach 
that welcomes the “fact” of difference, and stresses lifestyle- and consumption-
based behavioral identities that are anti-essentialist in orientation, and which inval-
idate “group” identities; and (3) a political multiculturalism that can to some extent 
incorporate the priorities of either or both of these positions, while also inclusive of 
“groupings,” not least subjectively conceived ethno-religious minority groupings.25
Of these three positions, it appears that the latter had been taking a cumula-
tive and progressive institutional form since the early 1990s, mainly by develop-
ing certain racial equality discourses and policies beyond their starting points in 
a response to minority ethnic and religious assertiveness.26 This has taken legal 
form in, for example, the outlawing of religious discrimination and the incitement 
to religious hatred, and an educational form in the inclusion in England of some 
non-Christian, non-Jewish faith schools within public sector maintained by local 
authorities.27 It is this multiculturalism that has been the principal target of recent 
critiques from across the political spectrum. We argue, however, that rather than 
having been defeated, the fate of this peculiarly British multiculturalism currently 
remains undecided and might equally be characterized as subject to a “re-balanc-
ing” rather than a wholesale “retreat.” One way to begin to explore the plausibility 
of this argument is to look at the most robust, coherent public policy advocacy of 
multiculturalism that Britain has known.
THE MULTICULTUR AL MOMENT?
In the course of ushering in an era “after multiculturalism,” Yasmin Alibhai-Brown 
has argued that “all societies and communities need to take stock periodically to 
assess whether existing cultural and political edifices are keeping up with the 
people and the evolving habitat.”28 Just such an exercise was the production of a 
report on The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain by the Commission on the Future of 
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Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB). This report, sponsored by the Runnymede Trust 
and chaired by the political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh,29 made over 140 policy 
recommendations to help Britain take advantage of “its rich diversity” and real-
ize its full potential as “a confident and vibrant multicultural society.”30 It strongly 
endorsed both the possibility and desirability of forging a meta-membership of 
“Britishness” under which diversity could be sustained. To this end, its recom-
mendations not only sought to prevent discrimination or overcome its effects, but 
simultaneously championed an approach that could move beyond conceptions 
of formal equality by recognizing the substantive elements of “real differences of 
experience, background and perception.”31 For example, the CMEB advocated a 
systematic type of ethnic monitoring that would “go beyond racism and culture 
blind strategies” and could be implemented across public institutions in order to 
promote an awareness of cultural diversity in general, and unwitting discrimina-
tion in particular.32 This “multicultural moment” following the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry was when the New Labour government declared its commitment to creat-
ing a country where “every colour is a good colour,” “everyone is treated accord-
ing to their needs and rights,” and “racial diversity is celebrated.”33 As then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair insisted:
“This nation has been formed by a particularly rich complex of experiences…..
How can we separate out the Celtic, the Roman, the Saxon, the Norman, the 
Huguenot, the Jewish, the Asian and the Caribbean and all the other nations [sic] 
that have come and settled here? Why should we want to? It is precisely this rich 
mix that has made all of us what we are today.”34
This was not only a time of reflection on the presence of institutional racism 
alongside Britain’s ethnic diversity, however, but a period in which the policy recog-
nition of Britain’s historical multinational diversity was being concretized by devo-
lution in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It was not unreasonable, then, that 
post-migrant ethnic minorities too were seeking recognition of particularities aris-
ing from previously demeaned identities; not as self-governance, but through an 
endorsement of the pluralizing of the mainstream with their own distinctive differ-
ences derived from ethnicity, religion, or culture. This high-water mark of British 
multiculturalism was in truth the consequence the cumulative political movement 
following the migrations of the parents and grandparents of many of Britain’s post-
immigrant ethnic minorities, who had exercised their Commonwealth citizenship 
by moving to its metropole from South Asia, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. The 
CMEB recommended that the government formally declare Britain “a multicul-
tural society,” hoping that this would invalidate the social and political inequalities 
derived from minority cultural differences.35
That the report was subject to an unrelenting critique from the Right, not least 
in the national media, has been well documented elsewhere.36 What is worth not-
ing here, however, is the extent to which it also incurred the wrath of some promi-
nent liberals who considered its approach a grave contravention of universalistic 
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principles, not least those recommendations that promoted diversity as a means to 
facilitate equality.37 Lord Anthony Lester, one of the founders of the Runnymede 
Trust and a key architect of Britain’s race-equality legislation, said of the report 
that “much of the more theoretical sections is written entirely from the perspec-
tive of victims, with little to challenge attitudes and practices prevalent among 
some minorities and their leaders that are difficult to reconcile with the ideals of 
a liberal-democratic society based upon the rule of law.”38 Such a view minimizes, 
however, both a key problem identified by the CMEB—the role of differences that 
serve as an obstacle to political equality in the public sphere—and substantive ele-
ments of the British approach that has intertwined, albeit inconsistently, agendas 
relating to equality and diversity.39
A MOVE TO NATIONAL C OHESION
One of the components of diversity that we have in mind has developed a promi-
nence over a longer duration and increasingly in the shadow of a policy trajectory 
concerning naturalization and civic unity. For example, the 1997-98 government-
sponsored inquiry into citizenship education chaired by Sir Bernard Crick explic-
itly avoided the relationship between citizenship and nationality: “We’re not 
dealing with nationality, we’re dealing with a skill, a knowledge, an attitude for 
citizenship,” Crick insisted.40 This understanding of citizenship as mainly about 
delivering the knowledge and skills to pupils so as to promote active participa-
tion has shifted significantly over time.41 Whereas citizenship and nationality 
were clearly distinguished by the original Qualification Curriculum Advisory 
Commission (QCA), they were explicitly juxtaposed in the domain of natural-
ization following Crick’s “migration” from the Department of Education to the 
Home Office after the 1998 report.42
The Home Office Advisory Group, also chaired by Crick, was set up by Home 
Secretary David Blunkett to develop proposals for language and citizenship educa-
tion for immigrants applying for naturalization as British citizens. The Advisory 
Group’s report, published in September 2003, demonstrates the ways in which the 
“failed integration hypothesis” of the various community cohesion reports/strategies 
has informed the citizenship strategies for “new” migrants to the United Kingdom.43 
For example, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) explicitly intro-
duced a test for residents seeking British citizenship (implemented in 2005), and 
those immigrants applying for “indefinite leave to remain” in the UK (effectively 
implemented since April 2, 2007). Applicants must show “a sufficient knowledge 
of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic” and also “a sufficient knowledge about life in 
the United Kingdom” through passing the test.44. If applicants do not have sufficient 
knowledge of English, they should attend English for Speakers of Other Languages 
(ESOL) and citizenship classes. Some categories can get free tuition, but in principle 
applicants have to pay for the classes, and also for the test itself.
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Overall, the focus of David Blunkett’s citizenship strategy was less on the 
deliberative quality of identities, forged (and modified) in interaction with oth-
ers, than on a rather more “practical” intervention, in which basic skills (English 
language proficiency and a superficial “knowledge of life in the UK”) become the 
means whereby civic responsibilities can be taken up. The ability to speak English 
thus formed the bedrock of the dialogic, participatory, and active citizenship ele-
ments advocated by Blunkett’s citizenship/integration discourse. The provision of 
English-language training for new and established migrants was described in the 
Strength in Diversity consultation document as a means of providing “practical 
support” that would “overcome the barriers to integration” that might face those 
newly arrived in Britain.
This relationship between English-language skills and the idea of a culture of 
active citizenship resurfaced as being central to the findings of the Commission 
on Integration and Community Cohesion (CICC) in both its interim statement 
and final report published in 2007.47 In the latter, English-language proficiency 
is linked with enhancing participation in civic culture in new and established 
migrant groups. The emphasis on English-language proficiency and increas-
ing participation and dialogue between communities found in the Cantle-
Blunkett civic assimilationist discourse (and to a certain extent in the CICC’s 
recommendations) is, however, relegated to the category of “taken for granted 
skills” new migrants are expected to possess. As Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
wanted more from immigrants than just the ability to speak English and to have 
knowledge of “life in the UK,” he wants would-be citizens to “become British” 
at a deeper level.48
It is telling, however, that the government insisted that “it would be unfair 
for migrants to have to answer questions on British history that many British 
people would have difficulties with.” Home Office explanatory documents 
stress that the tests aim at “integration,” but without this meaning “complete 
assimilation.”45 What this illustrates are the strong emphases on the experience 
of living in Britain rather an attempt to define Britishness per se. A critical 
interpretation of these initiatives is offered by Derek McGhee who is worth 
quoting at length:
The “integration” of “new” migrant communities in asylum and immigration policy, 
as well as the desegregation of “established” migrant communities in community 
cohesion discourses, were to be achieved through a common policy solution: the 
establishment of an inclusive sense of common citizenship. In turn, in asylum and 
immigration policy, the emphasis in the process of attaining British citizenship 
began to have a distinct “community cohesion” flavor, especially in its emphasis 
on the “new citizenship pedagogy,” namely, on building the capacity in “new citi-
zens” for effective engagement and “active citizenship.” This was to be achieved by 
transforming naturalization from a bureaucratic process into “an act of commit-
ment to Britain and an important step in the process of achieving integration into 
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our society.” The  acquisition of the English language and knowledge of “British life” 
were presented as key to successful integration of “new” migrants, as, without them, 
according to the Home Office, migrant communities were ill-equipped to take an 
active role in society.46
It is difficult not to recognize this as a particularly critical reading, however, 
given the kinds of measures introduced and the extent to which they retain 
strong commitments to anti-discrimination and the recognition of  difference 
within them. For example, in the Home Office’s Strength in Diversity, the 
 government maintains that: “Civil renewal is at the heart of the Government’s 
vision of life in our 21st century communities. It aims to reconnect citizens 
with the public realm by empowering them to influence the development of 
 solutions to problems affecting them. It is vital that barriers to participation—
from lack of confidence and capacity to express one’s views to prejudices which 
lead to  exclusion—are tackled so that the aspiration for wider engagement can 
be  translated into reality.”49
This perhaps also illustrates two further continuities. The first concerns the 
utilization of notions of social capital within stipulations of civic renewal, as 
elaborated at the beginning, and the second is what has been termed the “Janus 
face” of British race-relations traditions (progressive to insiders but regressive to 
 outsiders). This is perhaps symbolically illustrated by how “Britain as a diverse 
society” is one of the six areas upon which applicants seeking citizenship are tested. 
Yet it is also worth noting how on several occasions government ministers at the 
time maintained that “this is not a test of someone’s ability to be British or a test 
of their Britishness. It is a test of their preparedness to become citizens.”50 The key 
point is that while scholars took the rhetorical failure/demise of  multiculturalism 
at face value, when it required empirical rebuttal.51
IMMIGR ATION,  INTEGR ATION,  AND SECURIT Y
In “The Multicultural State We’re In” (2009), we surveyed a number of further pub-
lic policy documents and developments in public policy and concluded that what 
had been taking place in Britain could accurately be called a “retreat” of multicul-
turalism. Rather, the emergent multiculturalism of the 1990s that was attempting to 
accommodate Muslim communities has been simultaneously subjected to at least 
two critiques. One emphasizes commonality, cohesion, and integration; the other 
was alive to fluidity, multiplicity, and hybridity, especially in relation to expressive 
culture, entertainment, and consumption. Each critique was a reaction against 
ethno-religious communitarianism, but neither emphasized what is not usually 
present in some form in most accounts of multiculturalism. Hence, we argued that 
“it is better to see these newly asserted emphases and the interaction between these 
three positions, as a re-balancing of multiculturalism rather than its erasure.”52 But 
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this should not be taken to mean that we underestimate the implications of com-
peting developments.
The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 was the basis for the post-
Blair migration and integration strategy of Prime Minister Gordon Brown and 
Home Secretary Jacqui Smith from 2008 on. In particular, Brown elaborated 
how becoming a British citizen should not just be a matter of the applicants’ 
choice, but ought to reflect a contract whereby they accept the responsibilities 
of  becoming British and thus “earn” the right to citizenship.53 To support this, a 
status of “ probationary citizenship” was created as a pathway between temporary 
immigration status and either naturalization or the right to abode. Crucially, the 
length of this period could be reduced by two years in cases where applicants 
demonstrated that they were contributing to the community through “active 
 citizenship.” This could be achieved through “formal volunteering” or “civic 
 activism.” The idea of taking this further and developing a points-based system 
of citizenship was put forward in 2009. This included the prospect of “deducting 
points or applying penalties for not integrating into the British way of life, for 
criminal or anti-social behaviour, or in circumstances where an active disregard 
for UK values is demonstrated.”54
An overview of the new selectivity under the managed migration points system 
provided by McGhee points to the consolidation into five “tiers” of the more than 
eighty existing work and study routes to permission to remain:
∙ Tier 1: Highly skilled workers (e.g., scientists or entrepreneurs)
∙ Tier 2: Skilled workers with a job offer (e.g., nurses, teachers, engineers)
∙ Tier 3: Low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labor shortages 
(e.g., construction workers for a particular project)
∙ Tier 4: Students;
∙ Tier 5: Youth mobility and temporary workers (e.g., working holidaymakers 
or musicians coming to play a concert)55
The Conservative-Liberal coalition government narrowed these tiers further, 
mainly by eliminating Tier 3.56. The most controversial change, taking away the 
right to remain in Britain for more than five years from most Tier 2 migrant work-
ers earning less than £35,000 a year, did not come into effect until April 2016.57 
This last reform may perhaps be taken perhaps as evidence of an emerging guest-
worker type of approach for new migrants, although Brexit will certainly compli-
cate matters still further.
A notable trend during the period we were initially exploring was the tendency 
for slippage between integration and security agendas. Whereas this was initially 
implicit, it is now a much more explicit coupling. Indeed, the striking development, 
and one that could not have been anticipated by proponents of multiculturalism in 
the 1990s, is how the assemblage of citizenship strategies has been reorganized to 
give a central role to counterterrorism strategies. This has not happened overnight 
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with the present government, and indeed owes some provenance to the previ-
ous administration and the way in which following the London bombings, and 
several aborted bombings in a similar “leaderless Jihad,” the Labour government 
(1997–2010) created seven working groups comprising representatives of Muslim 
communities under the rubric of “Preventing Extremism Together” (PET, or 
“Prevent”).58 These were clustered as follows: (1) engaging with young people; (2) 
providing a full range of education services in the UK that meet the needs of the 
Muslim community; (3) engaging with Muslim women; (4) supporting regional 
and local initiatives and community actions; (5) imam training and accreditation 
and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community; (6) security—
Islamophobia, protecting Muslims from extremism, and community confidence 
in policing; and (7) tackling extremism and radicalization.
Initiated by the Home Office, this would later fall under the remit of the sub-
sequently created Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). 
These working groups devised a series of proposals to develop “practical means” 
of tackling violent extremism. Sixty-four recommendations were put forward in 
a report published in November 2005, which especially emphasized three recom-
mendations that would serve as central planks in the unfolding of government 
strategies concerned with preventing violent extremism.
These included, firstly, the development of a “scholars’ roadshow” coordinated 
by British Muslim organizations to facilitate “influential mainstream” Muslim 
thinkers to address audiences of young British Muslims. The rationale being that 
these speakers would distil effective arguments against extremist justification for 
terrorism in denouncing it as un-Islamic, so as to “counter the ideological and theo-
logical underpinnings of the terrorist narrative.”59 A second proposal focused on 
the creation of Muslim forums against extremism and Islamophobia. These could 
be led by key individuals and brought together members of local Muslim com-
munities, law enforcement, and public service agencies to discuss how to tackle 
extremism and Islamophobia in their area. The third and perhaps most substantive 
recommendation, in terms of proposed structural capacity building within British 
Muslim communities, promoted the formation of a Mosques and Imams National 
Advisory Board (MINAB). To this end, a steering group of Muslim leaders under-
took an extensive national consultation on matters such as the accreditation of 
imams, better governance of mosques, and interfaith activity. Alongside this pro-
fessional development program or “upskilling” of imams and mosque officials, rec-
ommendations were also made for a national campaign and coalition to increase 
the visibility of Muslim women, and specifically to empower and equip them in the 
course of becoming “active citizens.”
While Prevent inevitably included some security-related work, it was criticized 
for a variety of reasons, “ranging from targeting the wrong people to stigmatiz-
ing Muslim communities by treating them all as potential terrorists.”60 Two recur-
ring issues were that: firstly, intelligence agencies were using the softer cohesion 
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aspects of Prevent “to spy and illicitly collect intelligence, which has dramatically 
harmed the programme as a whole”;61 and secondly, that Prevent was oriented to 
address wider social policy within Muslim communities which implied that this 
policy was only valuable because it contributed to counterterrorism (something 
illustrated by the fact that funding was directly linked to the size of the Muslim 
population in a local authority, not on the basis of known risk).
It is unsurprising that a strategy premised upon entering, and to some extent 
reformulating, the life worlds of British Muslim communities has been the subject 
of critical debate in the study of ethnic relations more broadly.62 That this objective 
was intended could be gleaned from the fact that immediately after the London 
bombing, the Home Office signaled that it would establish a Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion (COIC) “to advise on how, consistent with their own 
religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community 
inadequately integrated.”63
The previous government had sought to advance Prevent through a variety of 
local community partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as voluntary 
agencies and community groups “with police forces, local authorities and their 
partners working closely together to oversee and deliver the project.”64 To foster 
these outcomes the Prevent-related funding of around £45 million to foster these 
outcomes for the period from 2008–9 to 2010–11 was distributed via local authori-
ties. The Prevent strategy thus signaled some diffusion of formal responsibilities 
for policy implementation and service delivery in a way that some see as indicative 
of broader developments in “governance” practices whereby “responsibility and 
accountability for a wide range of social issues is increasingly focused towards 
local levels, while at the same time centralized control in terms of resources and 
target-setting is maintained.”65
While it is not immediately apparent in the earlier quotation, the incorpora-
tion of faith-based groups from the non-profit “third sector” is potentially party 
to novel approaches to engaging with religious minorities through the prac-
tices and models of representation, stakeholders, and advocacy in the consulta-
tive arena; perhaps as a development of what has been termed a multicultural 
“municipal drift.”66 The extent of this shift is not the central focus here, other than 
in elaborating the manner in which the Prevent agenda, in constituting part of 
the broad counterterrorism strategy, appears to be simultaneously subject to at 
least two broader prevailing dynamics, comprising firstly “the implementation of 
anti-terrorist laws that can be used disproportionately against Muslims leading to 
the potential for their increased surveillance and control and thereby serving to 
reduce Muslims’ trust of state institutions, while [secondly] at the same time pur-
suing approaches that acknowledge, and stress the importance of, the involvement 
of British . . . Muslim communities in helping to combat extremism.”67
Spalek and Imoual frame these dynamics relationally in terms of “harder” 
and “softer” strategies of engagement, whereby the former may be understood as 
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consisting of various means of surveillance, policing, intelligence gathering, and 
so on.68 The latter, meanwhile, would include the development of dialogue, par-
ticipation, and community feedback between Muslim communities, state agen-
cies, and voluntary organizations in a way that may serve to increase trust in “the 
battle for hearts and minds.” For example, the Prevent strategy also emphasized 
long-established equality traditions historically orientated towards ethnic and 
racial minorities and sought to extend them to Muslims: “The Prevent strategy 
requires a specific response, but we must also make the most of the links with 
wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other forms 
of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), build cohesion and empower communi-
ties. . . . Likewise, it is recognised that the arguments of violent extremists, which 
rely on creating a ‘them’ and an ‘us,’ are less likely to find traction in cohesive 
communities.”69
This built upon recognition of Muslim religious difference in government poli-
cies and legislation that has been manifested in other ways, including measures 
against religious discrimination as set out in the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010. 
The tensions, then, surround the extent to which the prevailing British citizenship 
being extended to Muslims through social and community-cohesion measures is 
twinned, or placed within the same register as, counterterrorism strategies that 
import or rely upon certain securitized “hard” aspects of this dimension of state-
Muslim engagement. The risk has always been that “active citizenship” for Muslims 
is to some extent framed in terms of demonstrable counterterrorism activities in a 
way that assumes that Muslim communities in general are the “locus. . . of extrem-
ism.”70 Arguably, this risk is now being actively stated as a policy ambition, as the 
concern is expressed within the Prevent strategy that insufficient attention has 
been paid to whether Muslim organizations comprehensively subscribe to main-
stream British values.
As then Home Secretary Theresa May stated in her foreword to the second 
iteration of the Prevent strategy: “We will respond to the ideological challenge 
of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. In doing so, we must be 
clear: the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious 
belief emphatically is not. But we will not work with extremist organizations that 
oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy 
and full participation in our society. If organizations do not accept these funda-
mental values, we will not work with them and we will not fund them.”72 As such, 
while it is not quite the case that, as Liz Fekete has suggested, public policy engag-
ing with Muslims amounts to being “tough on mosques, tough on the causes of 
mosques,” it has become common to find statements such as that made by the for-
mer Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, that Muslim organizations must take “a 
proactive leadership role in tackling extremism and defending our shared values.”71
The new Prevent strategy thus takes a much more interventionist line regard-
ing the constellation of British Muslim politics, forthrightly insisting that the 
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government will not fund organizations “that hold extremist views or support 
terrorist-related activity of any kind.”73 Much here hinges on the word “extremist,” 
and mainstream organizations easily fall foul of this threshold by, for example, 
taking oppositional positions on foreign policy or towards the state of Israel. 
The current integration strategy of Department for Communities and Local 
Government thus explicitly asserts the previously implicit view that Prevent is 
“distinct from but linked to integration, tackling non-violent extremism where 
it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and popularises ideas which 
are espoused by terrorist groups.”74 A parallel effort was the Conservative-Liberal 
coalition’s three-year “Near Neighbours” strategy, a program to “bring people 
together in diverse communities, helping them build relationships and collabo-
rate to improve the local community they live in,” which was run by the Church 
Urban Fund, a Church of England charity set up in 1987, and initially focused on 
Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester and East London.75 Nevertheless, the Prevent 
agenda remains the British government’s most significant investment in Muslim 
civil society organizations.
C ONCLUSIONS
While new policies, complementing anti-discrimination strategies and recogni-
tion of “difference,” albeit with an emphasis on commonalities, have been intro-
duced in the twenty-first century at both local and national levels, this has not 
eliminated multiculturalism. It is most striking that when senior British politi-
cians seek to define Britishness, they simultaneously appeal to a political-insti-
tutional history (monarchs, rule of law, parliamentary democracy, etc.) and to 
cultural diversity.76 Although this sense of plural Britishness owes something to 
the UK’s multinational character, it undeniably also reflects the political integra-
tion of postwar Commonwealth migrants and their descendants. In general, the 
story of Commonwealth nonwhite immigration to Britain is one of immigration 
controls, but also of redefining what it means to be “British” through anti-racism 
and multiculturalism.
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Multiculturalism in a Context 
of Minority Nationalism and 
Indigenous Rights
The Canadian Case1
Avigail Eisenberg, University of Victoria
Canada has long been considered a world leader at promoting the values of mul-
ticulturalism. In part, this is because Canada is a remarkably diverse society with 
diversity reflected in its state institutions and, in part, this is because some of the 
leading normative theorists of multiculturalism have written with the Canadian 
experience in mind.2 Canada is globally admired for its success at recognizing 
and protecting diversity in its laws and Constitution, and at integrating new 
immigrants as well as long-standing minorities into mainstream life. Yet, despite 
these successes, some minorities in Canada continue to experience racism, higher 
rates of poverty and unemployment, and lower rates of educational attainment 
than the dominant French and English groups.3 Also, Canada’s multicultural pol-
icy is not popular amongst the Québéçois and Indigenous peoples4 because, in 
some respects, the policy has been implemented at the expense of their legal and 
 political status.5
The very idea that multiculturalism threatens the status of Quebec and Indigenous 
peoples is ironic given that the success of multiculturalism in Canada is often 
explained in terms of Canada’s antecedent legal, linguistic, and cultural pluralism. 
Canada was founded through a set of treaty relations between European settlers and 
Indigenous people, and through agreements between English and French colonies, 
both of which inform its Constitution.6 It would be ironic if multiculturalism turned 
out to pose a threat to forms of diversity that are often considered foundational to 
the policy’s success.
The claim is also surprising since Canadian multiculturalism was never intended 
to protect the cultures of Indigenous peoples or French Canada. Multicultural 
policies aim to recognize and celebrate cultural diversity, to protect minorities 
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from discrimination, and to facilitate minority integration into the public culture. 
In contrast, Quebec and Indigenous peoples seek to secure and, in some cases, 
expand their jurisdictional authority over a territory and over areas of life impor-
tant to their communities. These jurisdictional claims sometimes include, but 
cannot be reduced to, protecting their cultural values and practices. Both groups 
are considered founding peoples with constitutional status that supersedes the 
cultural and religious protections targeted by multiculturalism. This difference— 
between founding peoples and cultural minorities—is reflected in Canada’s 
 federal division of powers, which guarantees Quebec legislative supremacy over 
numerous areas of public life in which the protection of cultural and linguistic dis-
tinctiveness is especially important (such as educational policy). It is also reflected 
in the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights,7 which separates and shields 
these rights from others that are guaranteed in the document.8 As Kymlicka 
observes, the policies governing Canadian diversity regarding ethnic minorities, 
Quebec, and Indigenous peoples have different origins, are embodied in different 
legislation, refer to different parts of the constitution, are administered by dif-
ferent government departments, and are guided by different concepts and prin-
ciples; “each forms its own discrete silo, and there is very little interaction between 
them.”9 Yet despite attempts to separate these different kinds of protections, they 
can become entangled and, on occasion, attempts by courts and policy-makers to 
manage cultural diversity generate a hornet’s nest of political controversy amongst 
these groups.
In this chapter I examine three key features of Canadian multiculturalism in 
practice and explain why they are perceived as threatening to either Quebec or 
Indigenous peoples. These three features—constitutional recognition, reasonable 
accommodation and cultural rights—comprise the leading approaches by which 
the normative ideals of multiculturalism are translated into laws and policies in 
Canada. As a normative ideal, multiculturalism is sensitive to the ways in which 
possessing a minority identity can be a source of disadvantage and disrespect, and 
as a form of liberal justice is committed to rectifying them.10 Whereas the multi-
cultural ideal can be attained in different ways, the three features I examine here 
are central to the Canadian approach and, I argue, have sometimes politicized and 
distorted relations amongst Canada’s founding peoples and cultural minorities.
THE POLITICS OF C ONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTING 
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN CANADA
Over the past forty years, over forty nation-states have entrenched cultural or 
Indigenous rights in their constitutions.11 In 1982, when Canada added the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms to its constitution, it included a section (§ 27) that states: 
“This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” This was initially 
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viewed as a statement of national values rather than a justiciable means of protect-
ing cultural diversity, but when combined with other Charter rights, it has success-
fully strengthened the identity of Canada as a multicultural society and enhanced 
the protection of minority rights. At the same time, the constitutional protection 
of multiculturalism has met with strong resistance in Quebec. To understand why 
this is the case, it is worth briefly considering how minority rights were protected 
before 1982, and the impact on Quebec of constitutionally entrenching these rights.
Legislative Protections for Multiculturalism
Minority rights are protected through hundreds of policies and regulations passed 
by all levels of government in Canada, which advance the aims of cultural equal-
ity and integration in relation to immigration and settlement, education, hous-
ing, zoning, employment, arbitration, translation, policing, recreation, security, 
and other areas of public life. Some of these policies were initially passed in the 
1970s and 1980s in response to federal and provincial human rights acts and the 
Multiculturalism Act (1988), all of which remain central sources of multicultural 
values today.12 The Multiculturalism Act established four political commitments 
to guide federal legislators in policy-making: (1) to provide funding for programs 
aimed at the cultural maintenance of ethno-cultural groups; (2) to remove cul-
tural barriers to full participation in Canadian society; (3) to encourage cultural 
interchange; and (4) to support official language acquisition by immigrants. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these aims, together with a generous infrastruc-
ture of legislators and bureaucrats, led to numerous initiatives and policy changes 
that together changed the symbolic order of Canada. In the words of one critic, 
until that time, Canada had been fixated “on Anglo-conformity . . . and, to a lesser 
extent, cultural dualism.”13
Even before the Multiculturalism Act was passed, minority rights were pro-
tected by provincial human rights acts, which were passed province-by-province 
after World War II to help realize Canada’s commitments as a signatory of the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.14 Starting with Ontario in 1948 and 
ending with Quebec in 1976, the provinces passed nonidentical acts that protected 
provincial residents against discrimination on numerous grounds (e.g., gender, 
age, ethnicity, race, religion, political affiliation) and in numerous areas of life (e.g., 
in relation to employers, landlords, insurers, schools, on billboards and signs, in 
restaurants and other businesses). The acts are nonidentical in the sense that some 
offer broader protections in more contexts than others do. The acts are also stat-
utory rather than constitutional, which means they can be altered by an act of 
the provincial legislature rather than requiring a constitutional amendment. As 
creations of provincial governments, they are controlled by provincially designed 
processes and by tribunals that are appointed and funded by provincial govern-
ments.15 Provinces each have a good deal of control over the content of the acts and 
how aggressively they are enforced.
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Whereas most of the human rights acts were passed before multiculturalism 
was on the agenda, the acts provide some of the most important protections for 
minorities in the public sphere. Unlike constitutional rights, which ensure that law 
is consistent with guaranteed rights, human rights acts protect individuals from 
discrimination in the context of everyday life. They play a crucial role in facilitat-
ing cultural integration in the workplace, consumer interaction, rental accommo-
dation, and other areas of public life where people are most likely to experience 
discrimination in ways that marginalize them from the mainstream and deny 
them equal access to opportunities and resources.
These two important sources of multiculturalism—the Multiculturalism Act 
and provincial human rights acts—remain key to the protection and management 
of social diversity in Canada, but both have lost considerable symbolic power 
compared to what they had in the past. The global backlash against multicultur-
alism has been felt in Canada as well.16 Today, fewer bureaucrats work directly 
on initiatives connected to the Multiculturalism Act, and the cabinet no longer 
includes a minister of multiculturalism, as once was the case. The Multicultural 
Directorate has lost some of its funding and the high profile it had twenty years 
ago.17 In many respects, multiculturalism is no longer presented as a priority of the 
federal government, except rhetorically, where it is sometimes used to project an 
image of Canada intended to attract skilled immigrant labor and expand Canada’s 
economic opportunities on the global market.18 In short, even though some of the 
infrastructure inspired by multiculturalism remains in place, the resources com-
mitted to it, and the political resolve of nationally elected governments to advance 
the values and ideals of multiculturalism, have diminished.
Provincial human rights acts have also lost much of their symbolic power 
and legal status, mainly due to the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter contains powerful guarantees of equality 
rights (s15), religious freedom, and freedom of conscience (s2a), which have 
been used in hundreds of cases to strike down law and shape government policy 
affecting cultural and religious minorities. Once the Charter came into force, 
the protection of rights, including minority rights, was increasingly overseen 
by courts, which have the power to require all federal and provincial law to 
conform to provisions guaranteed in the Charter. This includes provincial 
human rights acts, which are a form of provincial law. So, whereas before 1982, 
the protection of minority rights was generally the responsibility of provincial 
governments, after entrenchment, rights protection became a judicial respon-
sibility, with the Supreme Court of Canada in Ottawa being the court of final 
appeal. Provincial human rights acts continue to address claims of discrimina-
tion in everyday life, but these acts are symbolically and legally subordinate to 
the Charter. Similarly, the jurisdictional authority of provincial governments 
over the protection of nondiscrimination rights for minorities is now also sub-
ordinate to the Charter.19
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Quebec and the Charter
This transfer of power from provincial governments to a national court system was 
especially problematic in Quebec because in 1982 it refused to endorse the amended 
Constitution as all other provinces had done. To date, Quebec has still not agreed 
to the constitutional package, even though the Constitution is legally binding on 
the province. In negotiations leading up to entrenchment, many Quebecers sus-
pected that the constitutional amendments were part of a strategy orchestrated by 
the central government to weaken Quebec nationalism by enhancing the power of 
federal institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Canada, to establish and protect 
the rights of citizenship. And they were not far wrong in their suspicions. The 
Charter has proven to be a powerful source of “citizenization” and is symbolically 
and legally crucial to the integration of Canadians, including new immigrants.20
Today, some thirty years after this conflict, these tensions remain unabated. 
For instance, in 2013, the then-Quebec government proposed to pass legislation, 
which it called the Chartre des Valuers, that would prohibit provincial government 
employees and teachers from wearing religious symbols such as crosses, kippahs, 
hijabs, niqabs and turbans, to work. The legislation, which failed to pass following 
the electoral defeat of the government that proposed it, would have changed the 
terms by which religious minorities had access to the public sphere and employ-
ment within the province.21 The broad consensus amongst legal commentators was 
that the Chartre would not survive a constitutional challenge and was “plainly” 
unconstitutional.22 But, in the context, this was hardly a redeeming fact. The con-
troversy served to underline a message, which was helpful to Quebec national-
ists at the time, that the management of social diversity in the province had been 
transferred from the province to the federal courts.
The politics of minority nationalism combined with constitutional entrench-
ment has politicized the protection of minority rights in Quebec. With every 
court decision, Quebecers are reminded that judges, not legislators, decide how 
the aims and ideals of multiculturalism are translated into public policy, and that 
the Charter’s protections are imposed by the central state on a national minority 
without its consent.23 As a result, objections to decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada are often expressed in Quebec also as concerns about democracy—that 
the decisions of an unelected and anglophone-dominated court overrule the deci-
sions of local legislators who are accountable to the people of Quebec and more 
sensitive to their values. Even though Quebec courts also interpret the Charter and 
often decide cases in a manner consistent with Supreme Court of Canada rulings, 
the constitutional tensions between Quebec and Canada have enabled Quebec 
nationalists to frame Canadian multiculturalism and its protection in the Charter 
as an imposition by the central state on a national minority.24
A good illustration of this framing is found in Multani v. Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys, a case about a Sikh boy who wanted to wear his kirpan 
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to school in Montreal.25 The conflict initially involved a disagreement between a 
parent’s association and the district school board but was eventually appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which decided in favor of Multani on the basis of 
Charter protections for religious freedom (s2a) and multiculturalism (s27). The 
Court emphasized that accommodating Multani helps to realize multicultural 
values by demonstrating “the importance that our society attaches to protect-
ing freedom of religion and to showing respect for its minorities.”26 The decision 
led to widespread debate in Quebec about minority rights and to a government-
commissioned report, written by two prominent scholars—Gérard Bouchard and 
Charles Taylor—on minority accommodation in Quebec. Perhaps as a way of 
assuaging minority nationalist sentiment, Bouchard and Taylor characterize the 
conflict as a challenge to “local decision making.” They argue that to encourage 
citizens to manage their own differences, to avoid congesting the courts, and to 
respect Quebec’s distinctive integration model, conflicts about cultural diversity 
in Quebec are better resolved through a “citizen route” rather than a “legal route.”27
The Multani controversy may well illuminate a distinctive “intercultural” 
approach to integration and social diversity in Quebec. Quebec claims that its 
interculturalist approach places more emphasis than multiculturalism on the inte-
gration of ethnic minorities into the distinct culture of the dominant group.28 That 
Quebec should favor such an approach is hardly surprising given that the French 
majority in the province is, itself, culturally and linguistically vulnerable and 
insecure as well.29 But, at the same time, and despite some understandable diver-
gence between Quebec and Canada about multicultural policy, there can be no 
doubt that debates about minority rights in Quebec are politicized and distorted 
by ongoing nationalist opposition to the entrenchment of the Charter and the 
expansion of the Supreme Court’s authority. The controversy about Multani was 
driven by a politically motivated rejection by Quebec nationalists of Ottawa-based 
decision-making (i.e., the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling). It provided some 
political elites in Quebec with an opportunity to exaggerate the distinctiveness of 
Quebec’s approach to managing cultural diversity in order to enhance the electoral 
appeal of Quebec nationalist politics. On this more political and strategic view, the 
conflict over the kirpan in Montreal did not occur because Quebecers reject the 
values and principles of multiculturalism, but because this high-profile court case 
was decided outside Quebec by constitutional provisions to which Quebec had 
never consented.
The Risks of Reasonable Accommodation
In addition to constitutional entrenchment, a second feature of Canadian multi-
culturalism that politicizes the protection of minority rights is reasonable accom-
modation. Reasonable accommodation is the legal standard used to translate the 
values of cultural equality and nondiscrimination into practical reforms in work-
places and public institutions so that they are more fully accessible to minorities. 
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Over the years, the reasonable accommodation standard has become closely tied 
to the public philosophy of Canadian multiculturalism. The standard was intro-
duced into Canadian law in the mid-1980s in cases about religious discrimina-
tion in the workplace. Employers were required by the court to adapt workplace 
rules in order to “accommodate” the religious commitments of their employees 
within the limits of what is “reasonable” and short of undue hardship. As one legal 
scholar explains the principle, “facially neutral rules that have adverse effects on 
the basis of creed or religion are a violation of the right to religious equality unless 
the employer has taken reasonable steps, up to the point of undue hardship, to 
accommodate religious observance.”30 Since then, the principle has been used out-
side the employment context, first in 2006, in the case of Multani, discussed above. 
The court decided that the accommodation of Multani’s kirpan was “reasonable” 
because it could be managed with minimal risk to school safety.31 In 2007, the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission was mandated to explore whether practices of “rea-
sonable accommodation” in Quebec conform to Quebec’s core values.32
In all these contexts, the principal aim of reasonable accommodation is the 
same, namely, to ensure that individuals are treated equally and in a manner that 
is sensitive to their differences, including differences related to their cultural and 
religious identities. As Bouchard and Taylor explain, an appropriate measure 
of fairness and equality ensures that all people have equal access to the public 
sphere, including to employment, housing, and public services, in full light of 
their differences.33 Where rules disadvantage some groups without that being 
intended, the solution is to adjust the rule to accommodate the difference. The 
aim of reasonable accommodation is to mitigate the discriminatory effects of 
rules and workplace practices by making provision for an exception to the rule or 
a specific adaptation of it.
Despite the commitment to equality that animates the standard, some critics 
argue that, in practice, reasonable accommodation is far too protective of the sta-
tus quo and has been used too often to shield unjust workplace practices. This is 
because the standard, at least in the context of employment cases, requires minori-
ties to be accommodated only to the degree that doing so is “reasonable” and does 
not cause the employer undue hardship.34 This means that the more fundamen-
tal a rule is to workplace practice, the less likely it is that accommodation will 
appear to be reasonable, even if the rule will cause minorities, people with dis-
abilities, or women to be treated unfairly. The chief justice of Canada’s Supreme 
Court, Beverly McLachlin, recognized this in a ruling relating to the exclusion 
of women as firefighters through fitness standards for recruits that favored men. 
Reasonable accommodation, she argued, prevents the court from transforming 
standards despite their discriminatory and exclusionary effects: “The right to be 
free from discrimination is reduced to a question of whether the ‘mainstream’ can 
afford to confer proper treatment on those adversely affected, within the confines 
of its existing formal standard. If it cannot, the edifice of systemic discrimination 
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receives the law’s approval. This cannot be right.”35 On her view, the alleged hard-
ship of reforming status quo practices can be a poor test of whether accommoda-
tion is unfair and instead may indicate only the degree to which the dominant 
group’s position of power is written into the way that social institutions work.36
Instead of enhancing equality, the framework of reasonable accommodation 
can preserve and protect dominant norms and practices that disadvantage less 
powerful groups. It thereby offers a conservative translation of the normative ide-
als of multiculturalism, and one that favors reforms consistent with protecting the 
status quo. Using this standard, multiculturalism will appear to favor inclusivity as 
long as being inclusive is consistent with mainstream norms and practices. Beyond 
these limits, minority accommodation could appear “unreasonable.”
In addition to these conservative tendencies, a second drawback of reasonable 
accommodation is the adversarial incentive encouraged by the standard. Because 
accommodation depends on whether it is “reasonable” or not, the standard incen-
tivizes managers, employers, landlords and other respondents who wish to resist 
minority accommodation to articulate reasons why, in the case of their busi-
ness, accommodation is “unreasonable” and will cause them undue hardship. For 
instance, employers can avoid accommodating minorities only if they provide 
convincing evidence to show that accommodation will significantly compromise 
their profits, unduly restrict their productivity, or undermine workplace standards 
(as in the case of fitness tests and firefighting) to an unreasonable degree. These 
kinds of arguments were made in Multani, where the school board tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to convince the court that allowing Multani to wear his kirpan would 
compromise the safety of other children and thereby undermine a central purpose 
of school, which to provide a safe environment in which children can learn.37 In 
these and many other cases, the standard creates an incentive for respondents to 
define the status quo as intrinsically tied to practices that cannot change without 
jeopardizing the very enterprise at issue.
Unsurprisingly, a similar adversarial incentive can motivate state actors in 
disputes about whether minority rights ought to be protected. In order to resist 
accommodating minorities, political actors have an incentive to articulate ways in 
which accommodation will unduly burden public values. Recent debates in Quebec 
again offer a good illustration. The Quebec government defended its proposed 
Charte des Valeurs, which would have prohibited religious dress and ostentatious 
religious symbols, on the grounds that religious dress in the public sphere under-
mined Quebec’s identity and core public values, which reject religion in the public 
sphere. At the same time, it defended, as important features of Quebec’s historical 
patrimoine culturel, a crucifix that hangs in the main chamber of Quebec’s National 
Assembly, and the illuminated cross that overlooks Montreal from the top of Mont 
Royal. These seemingly contradictory positions on the religious symbols of minori-
ties and the majority can be reconciled only if one believes that minority accom-
modation must be consistent with the majority’s existing cultural preferences.
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As these conflicts show, reasonable accommodation can work in conservative 
ways. It can reduce cultural equality to a project that, at best, inserts minorities into 
the public culture only insofar as doing so does not upset the dominant group’s 
position of power. Its adversarial incentive can lead dominant groups to raise the 
stakes in a dispute by claiming that their identity or core values will be threatened 
if they have to accommodate minority practices. These tendencies, along with the 
ongoing dispute in Canada about constitutional entrenchment, point to some of 
the deeply political features of Canadian-Quebec debates about minority rights, 
and to two ways in which multiculturalism becomes entangled in the politics of 
minority nationalism.
THE PROTECTION OF CULTUR AL RIGHT S
We now turn to what is often recognized as the central feature of multicultural-
ism, the protection of cultural rights. These rights are integral to the central aim 
of multiculturalism, which is to acknowledge that people’s attachment to features 
of their identities can be a legitimate basis for the recognition and protection of 
their cultural practices and beliefs. The recognition and protection of cultural 
identity have been linked to broader principles of justice, equality, human rights, 
and democratic citizenship.38 Over the past thirty years, a leading task of scholars 
and policy-makers who work on issues related to multiculturalism has been to 
distinguish between cultural claims that advance these important values and those 
that do not. As a result of these efforts, the success of states in protecting human 
rights and democratic citizenship is partly measured today in terms of how well 
they protect minority cultures.
The Canadian experience suggests, however, that the state’s protection of cul-
tural rights is no substitute for the fair treatment of minorities, and this is per-
haps nowhere more evident than in cases about protecting the cultural rights of 
Indigenous peoples. As previously mentioned, in Canada, Aboriginal rights are 
legally distinct from rights protected by multiculturalism, and Indigenous peoples 
are recognized as possessing unique status as “First Nations,” rather than as the 
ethnic minorities whose interests multiculturalism is meant to address. Yet the 
limitations of protecting cultural rights are similar for both groups.
In the case of Indigenous peoples, since the 1990s, one of the leading approaches 
taken by the courts to Indigenous rights in Canada, has been to recognize dis-
tinctive and integral cultural practices as Aboriginal rights. On the face of it, this 
kind of recognition is desirable and is certainly an improvement on previous 
approaches adopted by the state. Until the 1970s and 1980s, the Canadian state used 
Indigenous cultural differences as a justification for denying Indigenous peoples 
rights to jurisdictional authority on their ancestral territories, the right to vote, the 
right to educate their children in traditional practices, and even the right to basic 
civil liberties.39 Against a historical background in which Indigenous culture was 
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denigrated, the possibility of having it recognized, constitutionally protected, and 
socially respected through state-mandated guarantees appears attractive.
Yet despite some significant improvements over the past thirty years in the 
treatment of Indigenous peoples, cultural rights have not fulfilled their initial 
promise. Beginning in the 1970s, Indigenous peoples advanced legal claims for 
rights and resources, some of which were based on arguments about the need to 
recognize and protect features of their cultural identity. Eventually, in the 1990s, 
the courts became receptive to the cultural aspect of these claims, but simultane-
ously imposed guidelines, in the form of a “distinctive culture test,” to distinguish 
claims that would receive protection from those that would not. The test requires 
Indigenous claimants to submit evidence to show that the cultural practice they 
are seeking to protect (e.g., to hunt, fish, or trade in particular customary ways) is 
“distinctive and integral” to their culture, a “defining characteristic” of their cul-
ture, and that their community has adhered to the practice since before contact 
with European settlers.40
No such legal test is applied to the rights claims of cultural and religious 
minorities in Canada, but these disputes about cultural rights share a feature with 
Indigenous claims. In most of these cases, the court assesses and interprets the 
cultural practice at issue before deciding whether it should be legally protected. 
For instance, in cases about wearing kirpans, kippahs, or veils, or practicing 
polygamy, judges often assess how important the practice is to the individual or 
group in order to determine the extent to which claimants will suffer disadvan-
tage in the absence of cultural protection. Such assessments are characteristic of 
cases involving religious practices, despite the deeply personal nature of religious 
practices. For instance, in R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, a Muslim woman refused to 
remove her niqab, which covered her face as she gave evidence against those she 
accuses of sexually assaulting her.41 Judges resolved the conflicts in two stages; 
firstly by determining how important the niqab is to the woman who wears it, 
which requires scrutinizing features of the practice, the woman’s religious beliefs, 
and her personal  behavior; secondly, only once the judges have determined 
what is at stake for this woman do they weigh the importance of the niqab in 
this  context against the importance of the rule in criminal cases that accusers 
face those they accuse when giving testimony. Such assessments of cultural or 
religious values can be hazardous. Judges, as cultural outsiders, will sometimes 
 misinterpret minority practices and, as several studies show, stereotype and 
essentialize minority cultures in the course of their rulings.42 But in addition to 
this problem, such assessments are likely to be experienced as highly intrusive by 
minorities, and may lead them to become more insular and resistant to outsider 
influence in general.
In the case of Indigenous claimants, these problems are intensified by the his-
torical backdrop of colonialism. Through the distinctive culture test, the Canadian 
court places itself in a position of deciding whether Indigenous cultural practices 
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are sufficiently central and integral to a community’s culture to merit legal pro-
tection. The distorting effects of requiring Indigenous claimants to justify their 
cultural practices are many, but three are sufficient to explain the problem: first, 
requiring a cultural practice to be justified in this manner encourages commu-
nities to self-essentialize by reducing complex practices to a set of pre-defined 
scripts that claimants believe will be easily understood by judges; second, insofar 
as cultural practices are more likely to be protected if they have historical continu-
ity and are widespread, such justifications discourage communities from reveal-
ing internal disagreement about how important practices are or how long they’ve 
been considered important; and, third, such justifications may create incentives 
for communities to marginalize members who do not participate in the practice 
or do not understand it. In at least these three ways, legal tests to establish cultural 
rights are likely not only to distort the claims of Indigenous peoples but also to 
distort Indigenous cultures.43
While these are important concerns, little evidence exists that Indigenous com-
munities have become more culturally static or homogeneous as a result of how the 
state now protects cultural rights. Instead, the main consequence of the “distinctive 
culture test” is to dissuade claimants from seeking legal protection from Canadian 
courts for their cultural practices. Both the intrusiveness of evidence gathering and 
the distorting effect of legal argumentation mean that cultural rights are difficult 
to secure. In addition, cultural rights cases also risk damaging relations amongst 
community members. For Indigenous peoples, the costs of cultural rights may out-
weigh the benefits, as all such cases involve asking the court of the colonizing state 
to decide what counts as central and integral to an Indigenous culture. For this 
reason alone, a more attractive option for these communities is to look for ways 
other than state-protected rights to protect their culture and ways of life.
As the distinctive culture test illustrates, cultural rights are no panacea for cultural 
injustice. In some cases, actual cultural rights—that is, those that are recognized and 
protected by courts or tribunals—provide only a semblance of cultural recognition 
and respect. Indigenous peoples in Canada cannot successfully defend their claims 
for cultural protection through processes that depend on Canadian courts assessing 
their cultures and deciding what gets protected.44 In fact, this strategy tends to breed 
a damaging cynicism. The Canadian state advertises its recognition and protection 
of Indigenous cultures while neglecting to address the basics of human well-being—
pollution, poverty, and child suicide—in Indigenous communities. Cultural rights 
appear impotent, or worse, a handmaiden of neoliberalism and a cover for neoco-
lonial policies. Modest claims for cultural protection become the focus of attention 
and debate, while the consequences of colonial dispossession and coercive assimila-
tion are ignored. Ironically, in an age and place where culture has been acknowl-
edged as an important source of respect and empowerment, Indigenous peoples 
in Canada are less likely to frame their claims in terms of culture and less likely to 
argue for cultural rights today than they have been in the past.
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C ONCLUSIONS
Canada is often portrayed as a “multicultural success story” in light of its numer-
ous policies and programs that successfully manage a highly diverse population 
guided by the normative ideals of multiculturalism. But understanding multicul-
turalism in relation to multinationalism and against a background of colonialism, 
reveals several shortcomings and risks of multiculturalism in Canada, some of 
which may have resonance elsewhere.
First, the constitutional protection of multiculturalism has entangled minority 
rights in the politics of minority nationalism. The lesson to be learned in this case 
is that, if local control of social diversity matters, as it does in many multinational 
states, the decisions of national courts about minority rights will become politi-
cized and are easily portrayed, whether opportunistically or not, as an imposition 
of the dominant majority on the minority, and thereby a threat to the local values 
of the national minority.
Second, reasonable accommodation can have the effect of encouraging a con-
servative status quo to be even more conservative and unyielding to the protection 
of minority rights. It can shield dominant norms from serious interrogation about 
their fairness and inclusivity. In this vein, today we see anxious governments that 
are quick to emphasize social integration as the sovereign value of multicultural-
ism, despite social circumstances—such as racism and anti-Muslim sentiment—
that erect impenetrable barriers to the integration of minorities. The adversarial 
incentive contained within reasonable accommodation can motivate opponents 
of minority rights to exaggerate the significance to them of practices or rules that 
they might be required to change. Measures to ease the integration of minority 
rights into mainstream life thereby become politicized, and the national identity 
of dominant groups takes on heightened significance.
Finally, cultural rights are no substitute for cultural fairness. Even though today 
Canadians are more likely to respect Indigenous customs and ties to territory than 
they did fifty or a hundred years ago, the protection of Indigenous cultural rights 
by the Canadian state has not translated into cultural security for Indigenous peo-
ples. Instead, cultural security has more effectively been enhanced by measures 
that recognize Indigenous jurisdictional authority over territory and features of 
community life. This suggests that, of the many different approaches that can be 
taken to protecting Indigenous rights, the legal protection of cultural rights may 
not be the best approach. It may also suggest, in the case of ethno-cultural minori-
ties that stand to benefit from multiculturalism, that what matters more than the 
approach adopted is the political will to ensure that the approach leads to just out-
comes. As in the case of constitutional protection and reasonable accommodation, 
cultural rights are impotent or even damaging in the absence of a political and 
societal commitment to the normative ideals of multiculturalism, in particular, 
the ideal that an appropriate measure of fairness and equality requires all people to 
have equal access to the public sphere in full light of their differences.
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Australia’s “Liberal Nationalist” 
Multiculturalism
Geoffrey Brahm Levey, University of New South Wales
Australia doubled its population through immigration in the space of fifty years 
following World War II, a feat otherwise achieved only by countries with much 
smaller populations, such as Israel and Luxembourg. The Australian population 
numbered 7.6 million in 1947, including some 87,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. The rest were mostly the descendants of people from Great Britain 
and Ireland. Three-quarters of the overseas born—then about 10 percent of the 
total population—came from the British Isles. By June 2013, Australia’s population 
had reached 23.13 million. The overseas born now amounted to 27.6 percent of the 
estimated resident Australian population and another 20 percent had at least one 
parent born overseas.1 As of the 2011 census, the United Kingdom accounted for 
only about one-fifth of the overseas born, while another fifth came from five Asian 
countries: China, India, Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia.2 For some years, 
Australia has been even more immigrant-rich than the other major “immigrant 
democracies,” the United States (13.1 percent foreign-born ca. 2013) and Canada 
(20 percent). And it well surpasses the former imperial powers of Europe, now 
grappling with immigration, including Britain (12.3 percent), France (12 percent), 
and the Netherlands (11.6 percent).3
Accompanying this demographic transformation has been an equally profound 
shift in Australia’s policy response to cultural diversity. After trying policies of 
racial exclusion and cultural assimilation, Australia has fashioned a distinctive 
“liberal nationalist” architecture that governs its approach to citizenship, cultural 
diversity, and national identity. Its adoption of state multiculturalism in the 1970s, 
following Canada, is an integral piece of this political architecture. How Australia 
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understands and practices multiculturalism—what it emphasizes, discounts, and 
ignores—distinguishes its approach to negotiating cultural diversity.
Australian multiculturalism was first and foremost a repudiation of previ-
ous Australian responses to human diversity. I will begin then with some brief 
comments on the pre-multiculturalism era before turning to the development of 
Australian multiculturalism and its career in recent years.
THE PRE-MULTICULTUR ALISM ER A:  1901–1972
From federation of the six British colonies in 1901 until at least the 1940s, Australia 
defined itself as an ethnic nation. The newly established Commonwealth of Australia 
passed the Immigration Restriction Act (1901), known as the “White Australia” 
policy, as its first order of business. Australian democracy was to be reserved for 
those of the “British race.”4 Those not of British descent were deemed unassimi-
lable and were to be excluded from Australian society; this applied as much to 
Aborigines inside Australia as to would-be immigrants outside it.5
Australia’s initial response to diversity was thus one of intolerance and exclu-
sion, grounded in a particular ethno-nationalism, that is, a construction of national 
identity based on a shared descent and culture.6 Some claim that the White 
Australia policy was egalitarian in that it sought to avoid replicating the United 
States’ experience of racial divisions and a labor underclass.7 Be that as it may, the 
policy appealed to a form of racial determinism and exclusion.
Officially abolished in 1973, the White Australia policy effectively began to 
unravel in the 1940s under pressure to populate Australia and grow the economy. 
As too few British immigrants could be found, the definition of acceptability was 
broadened first to allow northern Europeans entry and then southern Europeans, 
who didn’t look very “white” at all.8 In 1945, a federal Department of Immigration 
was established and charged with formulating a national assimilation policy.9 
Where previously the reigning ethno-nationalist assumption was that race deter-
mines culture, henceforth and increasingly Australia entertained the notion 
that Anglo-conformity could be achieved through assimilation.10 This cultural- 
nationalist formula—which required cultural conformity but no longer the “right” 
ethnic heritage—grew to ascendancy in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Nevertheless, some began to question the assimilationist approach in the 1950s. 
Sociologists working with immigrant groups reported that assimilation policies 
and expectations were undermining migrant absorption.11 Increasing numbers 
of migrants were returning to their home countries. By 1964, the Department of 
Immigration changed tack by casting its migrant programs in terms of “integra-
tion” instead of “assimilation.”12 By 1968, the department further capitulated after 
realizing that full assimilation was an unlikely outcome, regardless of the termi-
nology used. At this point, “integration” signified a new policy direction and was 
not simply a more palatable term.13 The insistence that migrants abandon their 
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original language, culture, and identity was replaced by an emphasis on simply 
settling and servicing migrants as they are.
THE AD OPTION OF MULTICULTUR ALISM:  1973–1999
The 1970s saw Australia grappling with local and international developments that 
precipitated a profound rethinking. A reformist Labor government led by Gough 
Whitlam was elected in 1972 after decades of conservative rule. It officially bur-
ied the White Australia policy in 1973, signed international human rights proto-
cols and introduced anti-discrimination institutions and law. At the same time, 
Britain’s receding imperial ambitions and switch to the European community in 
1973 forced Australia and Australians to reassess their sense of self.14 The Australian 
state and Anglo-Australian identity were pried apart. While Anglo-Australian cul-
ture and institutions remained dominant, the state was no longer coterminous 
with this particular identity.15
Australian multiculturalism emerges out of this reconfiguration. Al Grassby, 
immigration minister in the Whitlam government, alluded to the concept in a 
landmark policy speech titled “A Multi-cultural Society for the Future.”16 Similarly, 
Prime Minister Whitlam referred to Australia as a “multicultural nation” on the 
passing of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which, he said, “wrote it firmly into 
the legislation that Australia is in reality a multicultural nation, in which the lin-
guistic and cultural heritage of the Aboriginal people and of peoples from all parts 
of the world can find an honoured place.”17
Australian policymakers imported the idea of “multiculturalism” as a public policy 
for managing cultural diversity from Canada, where it had been officially introduced 
a few years earlier. But where Canada introduced multiculturalism strategically in a 
context of long established minorities, bilingualism and a restive Quebec, Australian 
multiculturalism began as a pragmatic effort to settle and support recent migrants, 
many from non-English-speaking backgrounds, or so-called “NESBs.”18 In the 1980s, 
the multiculturalism project was reframed as addressing “all Australians” rather than 
only migrants and “ethnics,” and centered on the themes of social cohesion, cultural 
identity, and equality of opportunity and access.19 Nevertheless, multicultural affairs 
continued to be administered by the Department of Immigration until 2011.
In 1989, the first national multiculturalism policy statement—National Agenda 
for a Multicultural Australia,20 overseen by the Hawke Labor Party government—
identified four main planks: the right of all Australians to maintain their cultural 
identities within the law; the right of all Australians to equal opportunities without 
fear of group-based discrimination; the economic and national benefits of a cul-
turally diverse society; and respect for core Australian values and institutions—
reciprocity, tolerance, and equality (including of the sexes), freedom of speech and 
religion, the rule of law, the Constitution, parliamentary democracy, and English 
as the national language.
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There have been four subsequent national policy statements. A New Agenda for 
Multicultural Australia and Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity were both 
developed during the term of the conservative Howard government.21 The People 
of Australia was issued by the minority Gillard Labor government.22 The Turnbull 
coalition government launched the current policy, Multicultural Australia: United, 
Strong, Successful, in March 2017.23 With the exception of the last policy, these docu-
ments have offered refinements in presentation and emphasis while largely retain-
ing the key principles of the 1989 policy. I will come to the current policy below. 
Here, it is worth highlighting some of the evolution in the preceding policies.
The National Agenda, the first national multicultural policy, presented a cit-
izenship-cum-social justice model of multiculturalism. A decade later the New 
Agenda put greater stress on national identity, social cohesion, and community 
harmony.24 It announced that the policy would henceforth be called “Australian 
multiculturalism” to underscore how “our implementation of multiculturalism has 
been uniquely Australian.”25 Australians’ citizenship obligations (as against rights) 
were now foregrounded as the first plank of the policy. The National Agenda had 
stressed the defining importance of Australia’s British heritage. The New Agenda 
also acknowledges that “Australian culture includes . . . our British and Irish heri-
tage,” along with Indigenous Australians and home-grown customs.26 However, it 
adds a dimension in speaking of “our evolving national character and identity,” a 
curious addition given the Howard government’s conservatism. The Gillard gov-
ernment’s multicultural policy went further by not even mentioning Australia’s 
British or European heritage and instead promoting the country’s long-standing 
diversity: “Australia’s multicultural composition is at the heart of our national 
identity and is intrinsic to our history and character.”27
Australian multiculturalism formally applies also to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. At the same time, it recognizes their “special status,” and that 
“it is appropriate that their distinct needs and rights be reaffirmed and accorded 
separate consideration.”28 Unfortunately, this recognition has seen little efficacious 
policy to date. A recent example, and among the most egregious, is the Turnbull 
government’s summary rejection of The Uluru Statement from the Heart, the out-
come of a national process of deliberation on suitable constitutional recognition 
for and by Indigenous Australians, in which they called for the “establishment of a 
First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution.”29 In any case, these initiatives 
have little to do with multicultural policy. For their own part, many Aboriginal 
leaders have rejected their inclusion under “multiculturalism,” believing that this 
compromises Aborigines’ special status and weakens their claims based on their 
particular historical experience.30
The federal provisions on multiculturalism have their counterparts in each of 
the Australian states and territories and often in local governments as well. The 
states of New South Wales and Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory have 
each enshrined their multicultural principles and approaches to cultural diversity 
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in legislation, while the other states and the Northern Territory have followed the 
federal governmental model and opted for policy statements or charters.31 During 
the Howard, Rudd, Abbott and Turnbull governments, it has been state and local 
governments that have often maintained the momentum behind Australian 
multiculturalism.
Some argue that Australian multiculturalism began as a sensible effort to 
improve the absorption of migrants only to morph into a quest to redefine 
Australian national identity.32 The criticism overlooks how the reforms of the 
1970s inevitably implied some change in Australia’s self-understanding and iden-
tity. “Anglo-Australia” could no longer define the country exclusively in its own 
image and interests once it had committed to a nondiscriminatory immigration 
program, an increasingly cultural diverse population, and the principle of nondis-
crimination in Australian law and policy. Moreover, while the Howard and Gillard 
governments’ multicultural policies may have referred to Australia’s evolving and 
multicultural national identity, Australian multiculturalism has neither in policy 
nor in practice repudiated the established institutions and culture. The Australian 
Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC), a government-appointed body, illus-
trated the point in its report to the Rudd government. While today’s “Australia 
is very different to the Australia of the mid-20th century,” it wrote, “much is 
unchanged: our political and legal institutions; our democracy; our liking for free-
dom, fairness and order; our language and the way we speak it; our love of the 
beach, the bush and sport.”33
Looking back over the history of Australian multicultural policy and practice, 
one may discern three animating propositions in relation to national identity. First, 
Australia’s British heritage and established institutions should be duly acknowl-
edged as an essential part of its foundation. Second, Australian national identity 
will inevitably change over time with the changing composition of Australian soci-
ety. Third, in the meantime, between a foundational past and an open future, the 
task is to ensure that all Australians, whatever their cultural heritage, enjoy the 
same rights and opportunities. This set of propositions conforms to what some 
political theorists call “liberal nationalism,” a view that recognizes the inevitability 
in practice of a dominant culture and the legitimacy of some limited institutional 
privileging of it.34 The first feature arguably distinguishes Australian multicultural-
ism from its federal Canadian counterpart where the Anglo cultural inheritance 
is formally denied. The second feature arguably distinguishes Australian multi-
culturalism from Quebec’s policy of interculturalism and the policies of many 
European countries, where the dominance of the foundational culture tends to 
be considered indelible.35 The third feature is common to most liberal versions of 
multiculturalism in seeking to check the power and privileging of the dominant 
cultural majority at the expense of other citizens.
Australia’s is therefore a decidedly liberal and pragmatic version of multi-
culturalism.36 However, even among liberal multiculturalisms, it is modest. Just 
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how modest can be gleaned from Joseph Raz’s typology of liberal responses to 
diversity.37 Historically, the first liberal response to diversity was toleration. Here, 
minorities are left to live as they please as long as they do not interfere with the 
dominant culture. After toleration, Raz says, came nondiscrimination, which pro-
tects the individual rights and liberties of all citizens by outlawing discrimination 
on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, and other group characteristics. In this it 
seeks to ensure that the common citizenship rights of liberalism are truly com-
mon. The most recent liberal response to diversity is affirmative multiculturalism, 
which rejects the individualistic focus of the nondiscrimination model, recognizes 
the value of cultural diversity, and actively assists groups to maintain their distinct 
cultures within the larger society.
Despite its name, Australian multiculturalism is overwhelmingly concerned 
with nondiscrimination and the protection of common citizenship rights—Raz’s 
second-stage issues. The policy makes it plain that diversity is always subject to 
Australian political values and institutions, that English is the national language, 
and that all rights and entitlements under the policy attach to individuals and 
not to groups. Some Australian provisions arguably do fit Raz’s profile of affirma-
tive multiculturalism, for example, the multicultural Special Broadcasting Service 
(SBS), grants-in-aid to community groups, and interpreter services and multi-
lingual government materials. However, these measures are also integrationist in 
purpose and effect. They are the opposite of the “separationist” multiculturalism 
and sanctioning of “parallel lives” of concern in Britain and elsewhere. Interpreter 
and translator services, for example, allow the effective administration of the busi-
ness of government and enable migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds 
to access resources and participate in civic affairs. SBS is a “public good” resource 
that all Australians can access and enjoy. The grants-in-aid programs—which were 
always modest, and were mostly abandoned by Howard in the 2000s—were based 
on the belief that having some diversity in the community enriches the lives of all 
Australians, and not just those of the grantees.
Although the term “liberal nationalism” scarcely figures in Australian politi-
cal discourse, Australians have lived according to this basic architecture since the 
1970s. It has not, however, gone uncontested. The most politically significant chal-
lenge comes from old-time Anglo-Australian conformity. This kind of cultural-
nationalist sentiment remains strong in certain quarters.
The other broad oppositional camp includes a variety of civic nationalists, post-
nationalists, and cosmopolitans. It rejects the liberal nationalist assumption that 
Anglo-Australian culture has a certain foundational status and contends that such 
notions only stymie multiculturalism proper. Some of these critics argue for aban-
doning the notion of national identity altogether, contending that shared political 
values and a civic compact are sufficient for national cohesion.38 Others argue that 
multiculturalism, cultural diversity, or a multicultural cosmopolitanism should be 
the basis of a new Australian national identity, though what this would amount to 
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is unclear.39 A more nuanced civic nationalist position agrees that civic or liberal-
democratic values should be the basis of Australian national identity, but argues 
they should be expressed in a nationalist idiom by invoking episodes in Australian 
life that best exemplify them in action.40
The civic-cum-postnationalist positions in Australia are mostly confined to 
academic discourse and bookshops. An exception was the Australian Citizenship 
Council, an independent body established to advise the government on Australian 
citizenship matters. It recommended that a “civic compact” setting out the ground 
rules by which Australians live should replace the notion of a national identity.41 
Tellingly, the proposal went nowhere. That a citizenship body should make such 
a recommendation is also unsurprising. The formal acquisition of citizenship is 
arguably the one institutional domain where civic nationalist assumptions, or 
something like them, prevail.42 To become an Australian citizen, one must accept 
Australian political values and institutions and pledge fidelity to the country and 
its people. The process does not require that one look, dress, or speak in a way that 
might be identified as “typically Australian.” In this, Australia follows the pattern 
and, indeed, the achievement of modern liberal citizenship in separating formal 
political membership from expressions of the national culture.
Cultural conservatives have criticized Australia’s “procedural” citizenship as 
too cold and sterile and call for it to be reinfused with warm national-cultural 
content and sentiment.43 In contrast, many on the left find the liberal model of citi-
zenship so compelling that they wish to extend its civic regime into every aspect of 
Australian governance and national life. Both inclinations conflate what Australia’s 
liberal nationalist framework seeks—rightly, in my view—to separate.
RETREAT AND RESURGENCE:  THE 2000S
Since the mid-1990s and especially in the wake of the 2001 World Trade Center 
attacks and the rise of militant Islam, there has been much talk of a retreat from 
multiculturalism or a “differentialist turn” in public policy in many countries.44 
Australia witnessed the same trend. In the late 1990s, a populist clamor against 
immigration and multiculturalism erupted, led by Pauline Hanson, a provincial 
fish-and-chip shop owner, who won a seat in the national parliament and went on 
to found her “One Nation” political party. In its first years One Nation won signifi-
cant electoral support, especially in Hanson’s home state of Queensland. Hanson 
and her party eventually fizzled out of political existence until her election to the 
Australian Senate almost two decades later in 2016.
As Hanson’s political resurrection indicates, coolness to cultural difference 
remains strong among Australians. Public opinion research consistently finds that 
a majority of Australians agree with the proposition that migrants should adopt 
the way of life of the country rather than maintain their distinct customs and tra-
ditions.45 At the same time, polls over many years show that between 60 and 70 
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percent of Australians support multiculturalism.46 The apparent inconsistency sug-
gests that “multiculturalism” is popularly associated with immigration, rather than 
viewed as a public policy that supports and accommodates cultural difference.
As noted, the Howard government updated its multiculturalism policy in 
2003. In some ways, given the fraught times and John Howard’s own antipathy to 
multiculturalism as a divisive doctrine, the very fact the policy was re-endorsed 
at all suggests how accepted some notion of multiculturalism had become to 
Australians. Howard came to office fiercely opposed to multiculturalism. In his 
first years as prime minister, he conspicuously avoided even saying the word, not-
withstanding his government having a multiculturalism policy.47 He rarely missed 
a beat in promoting Anglo-Australia as the core of Australian national identity, 
which migrants were expected to embrace.48 In 1999, for example, he sought to 
have the legendary Australian tradition of “mateship” enshrined in the preamble 
to the Australian Constitution by referendum (the Senate blocked his proposal). 
Concerned about social cohesion in the wake of international and some local con-
troversies involving Muslims, Howard introduced a raft of policies that promoted 
traditional Christian values.49 The 2003 policy update Multicultural Australia: 
United in Diversity was a mere five pages long and suggested a government going 
through the motions. There was a palpable sense that it was only a matter of time 
before the Howard government recanted on multiculturalism.
That time came in late 2006. Following the Netherland’s reassessment of mul-
ticulturalism, Britain’s decision to introduce a new citizenship test, and general 
concerns about the integration of Muslims in Europe, the Howard government 
flagged its intention to drop the word “multiculturalism” from governmental use.50 
In January 2007, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs became 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The residency eligibility period 
for acquiring citizenship was extended from two to four years, and a citizenship 
test (covering English-language proficiency, history and values) was introduced 
for those seeking to become Australian citizens.51 Controversially, the citizenship 
test included questions on Australian cricket heroes and other cultural icons along 
with questions on Australian political institutions.
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Labor Party government, elected to office in 
November 2007, showed little interest in issues of cultural diversity and gener-
ally retained its predecessor’s purge of the word “multiculturalism.” Its “social 
inclusion” policy was framed exclusively in terms of socioeconomic disadvantage 
and ignored the situation of cultural minorities. In 2008, Rudd convened a “2020 
Summit” at the national parliament, inviting a thousand of Australia’s “best and 
brightest” to share their ideas about the nation’s future. Notwithstanding some 
thirty years of official multiculturalism, the event was held on the first days of the 
Jewish festival of Passover, leaving many of the Jewish Australians invited unable 
to attend.52 Such examples show that although liberal nationalist multiculturalism 
may be the predominant or default position in contemporary Australian politics, 
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a strong current of Anglo-Australian indifference, if not outright resistance, to 
accommodating diversity persists.
Still, the progressive retreat from multiculturalism in the decade to 2010, when 
Rudd was deposed as Labor leader and prime minister, was not a return to the rank 
assimilationism of old. Howard’s citizenship test sought English-language profi-
ciency and knowledge of the Australian way of life, but it did not try to discourage 
migrants and their children from speaking foreign tongues as well, as was the case 
in the pre-multicultural era and as some conservative commentators still demand 
today.53 Also, the Rudd government revised the citizenship test in 2010, remov-
ing Howard’s national-cultural tropes and instead emphasizing Australia’s political 
institutions and values (thus returning citizenship acquisition to the terms of civic 
nationalism). The retreat from “multiculturalism” during this period seemed to 
be more about messaging than the underlying policies. Talk of “multiculturalism,” 
it was thought, was encouraging “separatism” and the impression that “anything 
goes.” Substituting the language of “citizenship” and “integration” and emphasiz-
ing “core Australian values” were intended to arrest these perceived trends.54
The “retreat from multiculturalism,” such as it was, seemed destined to continue 
on Julia Gillard’s watch after she replaced Rudd as prime minister in 2010. During 
the subsequent election campaign, Gillard rejected high levels of immigration, 
spoke of the “preciousness” of the Australian way of life, and, on assuming office, 
removed “multicultural affairs” even from the title of the parliamentary secretary 
assisting the minister for immigration and citizenship. She pivoted, however, after 
the precipitous collapse of Labor Party support in the election, which left her lead-
ing a minority Labor government with the aid of independents and minor par-
ties. As an ex-Labor politician put it, “We abandoned multicultural Australia and 
they abandoned us.”55 Earlier in the year, AMAC had recommended that multi-
culturalism be retained and reinvigorated with new programs. Gillard’s minor-
ity government acted on these recommendations in February 2011, launching a 
new and affirmative multiculturalism policy. This move stood in stark contrast to 
the international scene. Days earlier, British Prime Minister David Cameron and 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy had each publicly condemned multicultural-
ism.56 German Chancellor Angela Merkel had similarly denounced “multicultural 
society” as a failed experiment some months earlier.57
In announcing Australia’s new cultural diversity policy, Immigration and 
Citizenship Minister Chris Bowen rebutted European criticisms of multicultur-
alism in the Australian context. The “genius of Australian multiculturalism,” as 
Bowen called it, lay in three factors.58 First, Australian multicultural policy had 
always insisted on “respect for traditional Australian values.” These mainly liberal-
democratic values—including the freedom of the individual, equality between the 
sexes, tolerance, the rule of law, and parliamentary democracy, but also English 
as the national language—always prevail if ever there is a clash with minority cul-
tural practices. David Cameron had portrayed British-style multiculturalism as 
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allowing communities to live largely “separate lives” devoid of shared values, and 
advocated “muscular liberalism” as the antidote.59 Bowen argued that Australian 
multiculturalism just is “a matter of liberalism.” As he elaborated: “If Australia is 
to be free and equal, then it will be multicultural. But, if it is to be multicultural, 
Australia must remain free and equal.”60 Indeed, Bowen argued that Australia was 
more successful than even Canada in this regard. While in Canada “debates about 
language and the ongoing make-up of the nation continue,” Australia enjoys a 
greater “national consensus on our values” and the “geographic integrity of our 
nation” is settled.61
Second, Australian multiculturalism succeeds, Bowen argued, because it is a 
“citizenship-based” model. Unlike the European situation of guest workers being 
blocked from full integration, Australia encourages migrants to become citizens 
and accords full rights and benefits to all those who take the pledge of commit-
ment as a citizen. Finally, Australian multiculturalism has enjoyed bipartisan sup-
port over the years. Both Labor and Liberal governments have helped develop and 
guide multiculturalism policy, so each party has had a stake in the policy’s success.
Bowen’s cited factors for the success of Australian multiculturalism are valid. 
I would add a few others. Australia’s highly selective, skill-based immigration 
policy doubtless helps in moderating the challenges of social integration com-
pared to many European countries.62 Also, the architecture of the policy itself con-
tributes to the successful record. As noted above, the Australian policy combines 
liberal principles—the rights to cultural identity (liberty) and nondiscrimination 
(equality)—with the public benefits of a culturally diverse society competing in a 
global economy (public goods). It also pragmatically negotiates the delicate issue 
of national identity, neither equating multiculturalism with a new definition of 
that identity (as in federal Canada) nor seeking to protect the historic identity 
from cultural diversity policy in perpetuity (as does Quebec with its intercultural-
ism policy).
There are also significant weaknesses and tensions in Australian multicultural-
ism that went unremarked in Bowen’s speech. One is the lack of attention given to 
“inclusion” (or “fraternity” in its classic tricolor formulation) as a principle and a 
social practice in its own right. Also, the acceptance of Anglo-Australian culture 
and institutions as foundational obviously is in some tension with the acceptance 
that Australian national identity and culture will inevitably change over time with 
a culturally diverse society. The tension is managed in that the expectation is that 
such changes will occur “organically” over generations rather than through social 
engineering or legislative imposition. Moreover, even as an intergenerational pro-
cess, the vision is not entirely open-ended. As noted, Australian multiculturalism 
insists on respect for the country’s liberal-democratic and parliamentary institu-
tions. To this extent, the “British inheritance” will continue to enjoy precedence 
whatever other changes may eventuate to reflect and accommodate Australia’s cul-
tural diversity.
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OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES:  THE ABB OT T AND 
TURNBULL GOVERNMENT S
A Liberal and National Party coalition led by Tony Abbott was elected to office in 
September 2013. Its position on multiculturalism appeared fraught and confused. 
As a minister in Howard’s government, Abbott—an arch monarchist and avowed 
Catholic—had presented a “conservative case” for multiculturalism. “By accepting 
difference,” he wrote, “multiculturalism strives to avoid confrontation. By stress-
ing respect, it aims to foster the kind of dialogue that diminishes the potential for 
conflict.”63 He rejected attempts to prevent Muslim women from wearing heads-
carves and the “spurious obstacles” placed in the way of building mosques and 
establishing Muslim schools. Later, as opposition leader, Abbott confided that 
he had changed his mind about multiculturalism when running Australians for 
Constitutional Monarchy and found that Indigenous people and migrants were 
among “the strongest supporters of the Crown in our constitution” as “part of 
embracing Australia.” He endorsed multiculturalism because it ultimately was no 
threat to the traditional Australian way of life, saying: “The policy of multicultural-
ism, which all sides of politics support, expresses our willingness as a nation to let 
migrants assimilate in their own way and at their own pace, because of our confi-
dence in the gravitational pull of the Australian way of life.”64
As prime minister, Abbott lost some of his previous enthusiasm for multicul-
turalism even as a conservative strategy. He reprised the Howard government’s 
removal of multicultural affairs from ministerial responsibility, downgrading the 
portfolio to a parliamentary secretary assisting the minister for social services. Also 
scratched were the National Anti-Racism Strategy and grants programs. The new 
parliamentary secretary for multicultural Affairs, Senator Concetta Fierravanti-
Wells—herself the daughter of Italian migrants—promoted multiculturalism as 
a form of assimilation, explaining: “We become Australians and we assimilate at 
different paces. It’s a process, really.”65 Reflecting the conflicting inclinations within 
the government, Fierravanti-Wells’ Department of Social Services (then home to 
Multicultural Affairs) was meanwhile promoting an architectonic vision of multi-
culturalism. On its web page, it advocated a “Better Australia” in which “changes 
to organisations and structures . . . will result in a lasting capacity to respond to 
cultural diversity without the need for on-going external or additional support.”66
Abbott’s and Fierravanti-Wells’ support for multiculturalism sprang from a 
similar cultural nationalist outlook, the belief that the core culture and institutions 
of the country should remain proudly Anglo-Australian in character. Another 
challenge to multiculturalism soon emerged, however, from a different political 
quarter. The attorney-general, Senator George Brandis, announced his intention 
to repeal the Racial Discrimination Act’s anti-vilification provisions—which had 
been added in 1995—in the name of free speech. Section 18C of the RDA renders 
unlawful acts that “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” persons on the basis 
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of their race, color or national or ethnic origin. Section 18D provides exemptions 
for such conduct where it is done reasonably and in good faith in artistic, scien-
tific, academic, or journalistic pursuits in the public interest. Brandis stated that 
he wanted to “re-centre [the] debate so that when people talk about rights, they 
talk about the great liberal-democratic rights of freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, freedom of worship and freedom of the press.”67
The catalyst was a 2011 federal court decision that found the conservative col-
umnist Andrew Bolt to have breached the race-hate laws in two published articles 
in which he had questioned the identity and motives of light-skinned Indigenous 
people. Abbott denounced the decision and pledged to reform the RDA if elected 
to govern. However, where Abbott’s interest included protecting an ally in the 
media, Brandis is well known as a moderate in his party and for his civil libertari-
anism. He is also a long-standing supporter of multiculturalism in Australia.
The proposed changes to the RDA sparked a public outcry. Brandis responded 
by appointing an outspoken free-market libertarian, Tim Wilson, as human rights 
commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission in December 2013. 
Wilson had once called for the abolition of the Commission as an illegitimate use 
of state authority. Dubbed the “freedom commissioner” by Brandis, his role was 
to balance the perceived social justice focus of the other commissioners and to 
prosecute the case for free speech as the most fundamental and cherished of all 
liberties. Wilson assumed the role with zeal, denouncing the protections against 
nondiscrimination and of equal opportunity as dangerous “positive liberties”, 
which further antagonized community groups. Ethnic and religious leaders from 
the Greek, Arabic, Chinese, Indigenous, Jewish, and other communities mobi-
lized against the changes and cooperated as never before. In March 2014, after 
protracted public debate and community representations, the government circu-
lated a draft of its proposed changes to the RDA for comment and announced that 
it would hold a review on the matter. In August 2014, it was revealed that more 
than 76 percent of the 4,100 submissions to the review inquiry opposed the draft 
amendments.68 Days later, Abbott announced that his government would no lon-
ger pursue changes to the RDA, saying, “Leadership is about preserving national 
unity on the essentials and that is why I have taken this position.”69
The episode reveals much about Australian liberal democracy and its version of 
multiculturalism. First, in challenging the state regulation of citizen relations at all, 
the classical libertarian position of Wilson and his former employer, the Institute 
of Public Affairs, was unlikely to resonate much in Australia, which some have 
called a “Benthamite society.”70 From its inception, Australians have looked to gov-
ernment to solve every imaginable problem, including bad weather. Australians’ 
nondeferential attitude to authority and tradition is oft noted—and convention-
ally traced to their convict origins—but they do not instinctively fear government 
intervention.
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Second, the attorney-general’s more moderate, civil libertarian stance also faced 
a “perception” difficulty. His insistence on the need to “balance” freedom of speech 
and protection against the incitement to racial hatred is precisely what the RDA’s 
racial vilification provisions had been designed to achieve. Although the language of 
“offend” and “insult” could legitimately be questioned as overbroad and subjective, 
the tribunals and the courts have never interpreted them in isolation, such that some-
one merely taking offense or feeling insulted could seek relief under the Act. An action 
must meet a number of stringent tests before it can be considered unlawful, including 
falling outside of the “public interest” exemptions. Until the Bolt case, the balance 
struck by sections 18C and 18D of the RDA was widely thought to have worked well, 
a period of some sixteen years. The 2011 Bolt decision was certainly controversial, but 
even it did not turn on his targets simply being offended or insulted.71 Critics of the 
provisions cite their “chilling effect” on speech; meanwhile, Bolt reminds Australians 
every day of how unsilenced he is by continuing to write provocative newspaper col-
umns, and now with his own commentary television program.
Third, and most important, for ethnic minorities the anti-vilification provisions 
have immense symbolic as well as practical significance. As noted, Australian 
multiculturalism has mainly been about nondiscrimination and common citizen-
ship rights. After decades of racial exclusion and then cultural assimilationism, 
the switch to “multiculturalism” signaled an attempt to better realize Australia’s 
own long-proclaimed commitment to liberal-democratic values. No longer was it 
judged acceptable to deny people entry on the basis of their skin color or ethnic or 
national origin, or to exclude them from offices and opportunities on the basis of 
such group characteristics. All citizens are deemed entitled to full and equal par-
ticipation in the society. Australian multiculturalism does not emphasize minority 
cultural maintenance. Neither has it sought to frame the nation as “a community 
of communities” (as in Britain).72 Rather, it has been preoccupied with trying to 
create a society in which individuals from diverse backgrounds are able to enjoy 
the same liberties and opportunities. Mostly, this effort has focused on combatting 
direct, invidious discrimination and promoting “tolerance” and “community har-
mony.” Reforms designed to alleviate indirect discrimination, where institutions 
inadvertently adversely impact particular groups, have been piecemeal, at best.
Other measures associated with liberal multiculturalism, such as symbolic 
recognition, public subsidization of minority activities, and the public celebra-
tion of diversity, are minimal in Australia. There are no dedicated seats for ethnic 
group representation in the national and state parliaments. And, as the example 
of the 2020 Summit (discussed above) illustrates, multicultural Australia is still 
not much attuned to accommodating difference. Indeed, Australian multicultur-
alism has been slow to recognize inclusion as a worthy principle in its own right. 
“Inclusion” or “inclusiveness” appear in the 1989, 1999 and 2003 national multi-
cultural policies either as a corollary of equality and access and equity concerns or 
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else as bringing all Australians, not just migrants or “ethnics,” under the umbrella 
of multicultural policy.73 The 2011 national policy recognizes that “inclusion” 
involves not only formal rights and entitlements but also how people are “looked 
upon” and whether they are made to feel they belong. The second principle of the 
policy states that the “Australian Government is committed to a just, inclusive and 
socially cohesive society.” It elaborates: “Australia’s multicultural policy aligns with 
the Government’s Social Inclusion Agenda where Australians of all backgrounds 
feel valued and can participate in our society.”74 These sentiments were a step for-
ward, but they were scarcely supported in policy or even in public rhetoric.
Ethnic minorities’ sense of acceptance and belonging in multicultural Australia 
is thus still largely tied to the legal protections against discrimination. The anti-
vilification provisions of the RDA are considered to be a vital extension of the 
principle of nondiscrimination and a public sign of their societal acceptance. This 
is why they mobilized so concertedly against the proposed repeal of the federal 
provisions despite still being protected by anti-discrimination laws and multi-
culturalism policies at the state level. For them, at stake was the message that a 
dilution of the federal protections would send about their standing in modern 
Australia. It would throw into question whether they still retained, in Whitlam’s 
1975 phrase, “an honoured place.”
The campaign for reform of the RDA may have been waged on (civil) libertar-
ian principles, but the fear was that watering down the anti-vilification provisions 
would reopen the door to ethnic and cultural-nationalist prejudice. When the 
attorney-general stood in the Australian Senate and defended his reforms, saying, 
“People do have a right to be bigots, you know,” he painted a vivid picture of the 
kind of Australia that minorities and seemingly the public at large thought had 
been left behind long ago.75
Against this background, the Turnbull coalition government’s multicultural 
policy represents something of a watershed.76 Malcolm Turnbull became prime 
minister after defeating Abbott in a party leadership challenge in 2015. His Liberal-
National coalition then retained government by a single seat in the 2016 federal 
election. Many people thought Turnbull—a small-l liberal and progressive on 
many social issues throughout his life— had joined the wrong party. On several 
issues, he swung to the right to secure the party leadership and to appease the 
conservatives in the coalition. However, the Turnbull multicultural policy reflects 
a personal and philosophical outlook that only partly and incidentally converges 
with the preferences of his conservative colleagues.
The 2017 policy, Multicultural Australia: United, Strong, Successful, marks a 
significant departure from the previous national multicultural policies in a num-
ber of respects. It is the first multicultural policy statement to eschew the word 
“multiculturalism.” Its guiding principles are stated in the abstract, disconnected 
from the specific circumstances of cultural minorities. So, for example, instead 
of affirming a right to cultural respect and cultural freedom, as in past policies, it 
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opts for a general statement of respect and of freedom, including religious free-
dom. Instead of affirming principles of access and equity, nondiscrimination, or 
social justice for cultural minorities as before, it opts for a general endorsement of 
“equality.” Racism or racial hatred is condemned four times in the policy, discrimi-
nation but twice. The 2017 policy puts the onus on citizens and “new Australians” 
to integrate into the existing institutions. Compared with its predecessors, the cur-
rent policy says little about what steps government and public institutions will take 
to assist in the integration process and help accommodate cultural minorities. The 
2017 policy reprises the reference to “our British and Irish heritage” made in the 
1989 and 1999 multicultural policies but omitted from the 2003 and 2011 policies. 
However, the policy also breaks new ground in the degree to which it affirms the 
importance of “inclusion” and a sense of “belonging.” These words or variations 
thereof are stressed some eleven times.
The Turnbull government’s multicultural policy thus performs a kind of 
inversion. Previous multicultural policies emphasized the import of the liberal- 
democratic values of liberty and equality for cultural minorities while ignoring 
inclusion or belonging as an important value in its own right. The 2017 policy more 
than fills the latter gap, only to strip away the importance of the values of liberty 
and equality as fair terms of accommodation for cultural minorities. As mentioned, 
there are both personal and philosophical factors behind these changes.
Throughout his political career, Turnbull had avoided using the word 
“ multiculturalism.” His stock reference was rather to Australia being “the most 
successful multicultural society in the world.” The phrasing has the advan-
tage of avoiding what is, in sections of his party, a controversial term and state 
 policy, but it also conveys, I think, his genuine belief in Australia as a welcoming 
 country for people of all backgrounds. Turnbull himself practiced that welcome 
and openness. When addressing community groups, for example, he typically 
included a sentence or two in the community language. Turnbull’s reluctance 
to say the “M-word” is thus very different from Howard’s cultural nationalism. 
Yet his government’s multicultural policy ditches core principles of Australian 
 multiculturalism in a way that Howard’s never did. The Howard government’s 
retreat from multiculturalism conforms to what some scholars have called 
“post-multiculturalism”77 or a “civic rebalancing”78 during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Multicultural policies were continued in substance, if not 
always in name, but with greater focus on national identity, social cohesion, and 
the obligations of citizenship.
As I have suggested elsewhere, the 2017 multicultural policy marks a new kind 
of “post-multiculturalism.”79 The driving conviction is that multiculturalism in 
Australia has succeeded in doing its job such that it is no longer needed. Thus, 
on this account, “multicultural” policy should be mainstreamed. As the Liberal 
Party’s then shadow immigration minister Scott Morrison put it in an Australia 
Day address in London: “For the past four decades  .  .  . [t]he primary focus of 
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multiculturalism has been to build an appreciation of ethnic and cultural diversity 
to combat intolerance and discrimination that was denying Australians the oppor-
tunity to fully participate in Australian life. It has had success in this regard.”80
The imperative now, Morrison contended, is to ensure that cultural minori-
ties are not themselves frustrating the social and economic participation of their 
members and to focus on what Australians share rather than play to their differ-
ences. Morrison calls this a “post-multiculturalism approach” in which the “rem-
edies are . . . more likely to fall within the domain of more mainstream social and 
economic portfolio policy areas.”
In August 2018, Australia’s recent tradition of changing party leaders and prime 
ministers mid-term continued. Turnbull was challenged for the Liberal Party lead-
ership by disgruntled conservatives in the party with the unintended result that 
Morrison, who had not challenged Turnbull, became leader and prime minister. 
Since Morrison virtually wrote the rationale for the 2017 multicultural policy, we 
can expect little change on this front until the next election, due in 2019. Soon 
after becoming prime minister, Morrison declared that he had no interest in the 
so-called culture wars surrounding Australian identity, further underscoring his 
remove from the cultural nationalism of Abbott and Howard.81
C ONCLUSIONS
Australian multiculturalism is an expression of a broader liberal nationalist 
approach to national identity, citizenship and cultural diversity that emerged after 
decades of ethnic nationalist (racial exclusion) and then cultural nationalist (assim-
ilation) politics. In the liberal nationalist approach, Anglo-Australian institutions 
and culture are credited with a certain foundational status, but their privileging is 
seriously limited and equal citizenship rights and opportunities are extended to 
cultural minorities. In this sense, Australian multiculturalism is a policy frame-
work that seeks to check the cultural-nationalist aspects of the core culture from 
overreaching and violating its liberal-democratic side.
This feature of Australian multiculturalism is not well grasped by the political 
class or the general public. Many on the left cling to the notion that multiculturalism 
is a free-standing political philosophy that celebrates diversity. Cultural conserva-
tives tend, however, to view it as a “politically correct” assault on (Anglo-)Australian 
culture and identity rather than as an attempt to honor liberal-democratic values that 
are also part of the “British inheritance.” Meanwhile, ordinary Australians’ endorse-
ment of “multiculturalism” can similarly refer to widely differing notions. Some 
have in mind an unhurried process of assimilation to the traditional Australian way 
of life. Others mean a nondiscriminatory immigration policy and a generally toler-
ant attitude to cultural diversity, but without government policy affirming cultural 
difference. And yet others mean the kinds of principles and programs found in offi-
cial multicultural policy or even more extensive forms of cultural recognition.
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Support for multiculturalism at the national level has waxed and waned, often 
depending on the predilections of the prime minister and government of the day. 
Genuine bipartisan support characterized the initial period spanning the 1970s 
and early 1980s. That bipartisanship frayed somewhat when the Liberals were 
in opposition from 1982 to 1996. The Howard government lent multiculturalism 
nominal support until 2007, when it shelved the policy in name at least, a devel-
opment effectively continued by the Rudd Labor government (which ironically 
restored bipartisanship). The Gillard minority Labor government reinvigorated 
multiculturalism policy and programs between 2011 and 2013. But this enthusiasm 
evaporated under the Abbott coalition government, in office until September 2015. 
The Turnbull government inaugurated a new “post-multiculturalism” multicul-
tural policy in 2017, predicated on the assumption that Australian multicultural-
ism had done its assigned job and is no longer needed.
Both in terms of official policy and how it has operated in practice, Australian 
multiculturalism is more about “making room” for cultural minorities than “mak-
ing over” the country, at least in the short term. Those who cite Australia as evi-
dence of a worldwide trend towards liberal universalism accompanied by a purely 
civic conception of the nation, fundamentally misread the Australian case.82 The 
turn to multiculturalism has undoubtedly helped to open up public space and 
opportunities for minorities compared to “old Australia.” It is equally clear that 
minorities continue to be underrepresented in many Australian institutions and 
most leadership positions, and that the current mainstreaming approach is, at 
best, premature.83 The coalition government and the Liberal Party both suffer from 
a serious, chronic underrepresentation of women, of any cultural background, 
within their ranks. Meanwhile, cultural nationalists remain a genuine political 
force and will continue to press their case for Anglo-Australian precedence given 
the opportunity. To date, the liberal nationalist architecture that Australia has 
developed since the 1970s has weathered such challenges and resentment. Even 
the current “post-multiculturalism” policy is based on the success of Australian 
multiculturalism rather than its repudiation as a policy approach.
Looking ahead, the key question is what the Labor Party will do in this area 
should it be elected to government, as presently seems likely. Key advocates of 
multiculturalism in the Gillard government, such as Chris Bowen, remain senior 
figures in the opposition. Australia’s liberal nationalist multiculturalism may prove 
more resilient than the recent, ill-founded attempt to declare it obsolete.
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and National Identity in 
Aotearoa / New Zealand
Katherine Smits
In February 1840, New Zealand’s newly arrived first governor, William Hobson, 
concluded a ceremony at which a treaty was signed between the British Crown and 
some Maori chiefs at Waitangi on New Zealand’s North Island, with the words: 
“He iwi tahi tatou”—We are one people now. Hobson’s optimistic claim (armed 
conflict between Maori and the British broke out a few years later) is still cited 
today to invoke national unity in New Zealand. Ironically, it set the stage for a 
public debate about cultural difference and national identity that has dominated 
the country’s politics throughout its short post-settlement history. For most of that 
period, cultural difference was taken to refer to Maori and the British, or Pakeha, 
but over the past twenty-five years, the claims and discourse of diversity have 
broadened to encompass a wide range of polyethnic communities created as a 
result of liberalized immigration policies in the mid-1980s.
Multiculturalism can of course refer to the demographic realities of diversity, 
or to a set of governmental programs designed to protect, preserve, and promote 
minority cultures, or to the normative arguments for recognition that underlie 
these. The demographic facts of cultural and ethnic pluralism in New Zealand, 
which encompasses both indigenous and polyethnic groups, have particular 
implications for normative arguments and policies. In this chapter I focus on 
both  normative claims and state-sponsored and public discourses around cultural 
diversity. The terminology is particular in New Zealand: although the term “mul-
ticulturalism” referred to settler-Maori relations when first introduced to public 
debate in the 1970s, it is now assumed to refer to polyethnic diversity resulting 
from non-British immigration. It thus usually excludes attitudes and policies relat-
ing to indigenous Maori.1 The latter are considered part of “biculturalism,” a policy 
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position developed in the 1990s and still effectively pursued, although the term 
is much less frequently used. In terms of demographics, New Zealand is both bicul-
tural and multicultural, but unlike Australia and Canada, it has no specific legisla-
tion addressing multiculturalism, nor have governments of any stripe developed 
dedicated umbrella policies to cover polyethnic diversity. There are, as we shall see, 
particular policies in the area of state services that refer to minority ethno-cultural 
groups, often providing special status for Pacific Islander peoples, and grouping 
them together with indigenous Maori.
This chapter will explore bicultural as well as multicultural claims and argu-
ments, positioning indigenous and polyethnic recognition and rights claims in 
the context of a matrix of political and historical frames, and examining the way 
in which multiculturalism is shaped by, and shapes the normative and ideologi-
cal discourses around political value and meaning that prevail in New Zealand. 
A consistent theme will be the relationship between cultural pluralism and other 
state policy projects: political, economic, and nationalist. Multiculturalism is 
framed by the values and discourses of these projects, but is also developed and 
invoked in order to support them. In this latter sense, multiculturalism may be 
understood as a form of governmentality, sustained by a language of value.2 I rely 
in this aspect of my analysis (though I do not spell out its theoretical founda-
tions) on a loosely Foucauldian governmentality approach, in which the conduct 
and attitudes of citizens are shaped by discourses and practices supported by the 
state in order to maintain its legitimacy.3 Those discourses and practices reflect the 
distinctive and complex historical, social, economic, and global matrix in which 
New Zealand is located. I argue that multiculturalism as a set of normative claims 
and policy positions is intelligible only in the context that shapes it, and in which 
it shapes political action and meaning.
Multiculturalism in New Zealand is framed by the country’s specific historical 
 circumstances, as well as its current position in global politics and the world  economy, 
and by the terms of its available public discourses. New Zealand is a settler society 
with a relatively recent colonial history, dating from the early nineteenth century. 
Colonization brought into contact the indigenous Maori and settler British, who 
came mainly via the Australian colonies, with their own recent and bloody history 
of the colonial destruction of indigenous peoples. Although there were some early 
non-British migrants, such as Chinese and Dalmatians, who migrated to work in 
the gold and gum industries, the first substantial influx of non-British migrants 
was the arrival in the 1950s of Pacific Islander (Pasifika) unskilled workers on 
temporary work visas, many of whom stayed.4 Broader ethnic diversity dates 
only from the mid-1980s—not coincidentally, a period of intense modernization 
in New Zealand’s socioeconomic history. Compression in terms of the pace of 
cultural diversification and social change, and the consequent emergence of cul-
tural anxieties around political and economic, as well as cultural change, are key 
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factors shaping public discourse about multiculturalism. Maori-settler relations 
are of course another, and polyethnic multiculturalism is very much shaped in 
the bicultural or bi-national context of indigenous claims.5 The status of Pasifika 
peoples as immigrants who are often grouped with Maori for service provision, is 
another key framing factor.
Both multiculturalism and biculturalism are shaped by shifting and sometimes 
competing discourses around civic values and national identity, in the context 
of broader state economic and regulatory policy. The values of egalitarianism, 
social justice, and state support for communities are historically key parts of New 
Zealand’s national identity dating back to the 1930s. Despite the devaluing of these 
elements of national discourse by neoliberal governments since the mid-1980s, 
social justice is still invoked to justify affirmative action and service delivery to 
and equal rights for minorities. This is one of several paradoxes around multicul-
turalism and neoliberalism: the liberalization and acceleration of immigration to 
New Zealand was part of a raft of modernizing policies starting in the 1980s, and 
the cultural diversity this policy shift has produced has been appropriated for the 
construction of a national identity or “brand” that can be marketed abroad. At the 
same time however, polyethnic cultural diversity has exacerbated public anxiet-
ies about withdrawal of governmental support to communities and rapid changes 
in traditional (white) New Zealand cultural values. The relationship between the 
neoliberal state and indigenous biculturalism is similarly complex. The revival 
of Maori political claims, particularly to ownership of resources and culture, has 
accelerated in response to increased cultural diversity, as Maori have sought to 
distinguish their status from that of polyethnic groups. At the same time, in order 
to reinforce its legitimacy, the state invokes traditional Maori culture not only to 
promote trade and tourism, but also to provide a language of belonging and com-
munity membership that is otherwise absent from neoliberal discourse.
These framing factors allow us to analyze multiculturalism in New Zealand in 
the context of its domestic history and politics. In turn, this facilitates comparisons 
with other settler societies, particularly Australia, with which New Zealand shares 
many aspects of national identity but against which it also tends to define itself 
globally. Multicultural policy is also, of course, influenced by international dis-
courses around cultural diversity, in particular the emergence of an international 
norm of indigeneity over the past few decades.6
ETHNIC DIVERSIT Y AND IMMIGR ATION POLICY
For most of New Zealand’s post-European settlement history, the overwhelming 
majority of its immigrants have been British, and despite changed migration pat-
terns, this persists, although the gap between British and non-British immigrant 
numbers has substantially decreased. In 2015–16, 9 percent of all approvals for resi-
dence were granted to UK citizens (a steady decline from 26 percent a decade earlier), 
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compared to 18 percent and 16 percent for arrivals from China and India respec-
tively.7 Unlike Australia, New Zealand had no official “White New Zealand” policy, 
but government policies persisting well into the twentieth century aimed to encour-
age British and discourage Chinese immigrants.8 The 1881 Chinese Immigration Act 
imposed a poll tax on Chinese immigrants, and the 1899 Immigration Restriction 
Act restricted South Asian immigration. It is only in the past two decades that a 
change in the European/non-European proportions of the population has devel-
oped. In the most recent census (2013), 74 percent of New Zealanders identified as 
European, 14.9 percent as Maori, 11.8 percent as Asian (predominantly Indian and 
Chinese, followed by Korean, Filipino, and Japanese), 7.4 percent as Pacific Islander 
(mainly Samoan, but also Cook Islander and Tongan), and 1.2 percent as Middle 
Eastern, Latin American, or African. The population of Asian New Zealanders has 
almost doubled from the 2001 Census, while the population of other groups has 
increased more steadily.9 The proportion of Asian New Zealanders is expected to 
rise to 15.8 percent in 2026, up from 9.7 percent in 2006, while the proportion of 
European (mainly British) New Zealanders is projected to fall to 69.5 percent in 
2026, down from 76.8 percent in 2006.10 As New Zealand’s population rises, its eth-
nic diversity broadens: between 1996 and 2006, the number of North East Asians 
who immigrated increased 55 percent; sub-Saharan Africans by 71 percent; South 
and Central Asians by 66 percent; and Middle Easterners and North Africans by 
56 percent. The number of New Zealand residents who originated from the UK 
or Ireland increased by 9 percent. The proportion of Pasifika New Zealanders has 
increased, but as a result of this population’s high birthrate, rather than immigra-
tion. A high birthrate also fueled an increase of almost 40 percent in Maori New 
Zealanders between 1991 and 2013.11
Increased ethnic diversity is accompanied, not surprisingly, by other forms of 
cultural diversity. In terms of religion, the 2013 Census showed that 49 percent 
of New Zealanders identified as Christians, down from 55 percent in the 2006 
Census. There was a corresponding increase in the number of New Zealanders 
identifying with non-Christian religions, particularly Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims, 
and this is attributable to increased Asian immigration. In overall numbers, a little 
over 1 percent of New Zealanders identify as Muslim, and a little over 2 percent 
identify as Hindu. While the percentages are small, the rate of change is fast: the 
proportion of New Zealanders identifying with non-Christian religions tripled 
between 2001 and 2013, from 2 percent to 6 percent. In terms of languages, the 
number of people who could speak two languages rose by from 15.8 percent in 
2001 to 18.6 percent in 2013.12
The sharp increase in ethnic diversity in New Zealand is the result of legis-
lative change in the mid-1980s, part of a raft of modernizing laws and policies 
and an economic shift to neoliberalism introduced by Prime Minister David 
Lange’s Labour government. The Immigration Act passed in 1987 ended explicit 
preference for British, European, and North American (white) immigrants and 
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introduced a system whereby skills, and then points, were assessed irrespective of 
race or country of origin. The new legislation aimed at a less discriminatory, more 
deliberately internationalist migration policy, targeting work skills needed to fuel 
national economic growth. This was in line with a new neoliberal policy empha-
sis on growth and on competitiveness in the international economy. The legisla-
tion was preceded by a review of immigration that described New Zealand as an 
immigrant society, dating from the earliest Maori arrivals.13 This signaled a shift in 
conceptions of national identity, normalizing polyethnic diversity as a fundamen-
tal aspect of modern New Zealand identity. Diverse immigration to New Zealand 
has increased rapidly since then, which makes for an interesting comparison with 
Australia. There, European immigration diversified from the early 1950s, broad-
ening out to Asian and Middle Eastern countries of origin in the 1970s. In New 
Zealand, public debates and anxieties about immigration generally have arisen 
at the same time as racist concerns and moral panics about non-European and 
nonwhite immigration.
Until recently, the accepted policy towards immigrants across the political 
spectrum was assimilation, with no state recognition of polyethnic cultures. In 
1999, Augie Fleras and Paul Spoonley commented that cultural pluralism in New 
Zealand was cast not as a social good, but as a constraining factor or a potential 
problem to be managed.14 From around the turn of the twenty-first century, suc-
cessive left- and right-of-center governments have endorsed cultural and ethnic 
diversity as a social good for New Zealand. For example, the Ministry of Social 
Development, under the recent center-right National Party government reported 
that increased diversity can be a good thing for a society and its economy.15 This 
reflects to some extent the “sari, samosa and steelband” version of multicultur-
alism, which emphasizes the color and celebration of local cultures rather than 
reducing substantive inequalities.16 But state agencies and ministries also explicitly 
address the needs of diverse populations in areas such as social service provision, 
health, and education, in accordance with prevailing values of social justice in 
New Zealand. Integration, rather than assimilation is emphasized; state agencies 
promote the recognition of and dialogue across cultural communities. The Human 
Rights Commission now lists as a key goal the promotion of “harmonious relations 
between diverse groups,” and part of the brief of the Race Relations Commissioner 
is to pursue this. The promotion of diversity and intercultural dialogue was a key 
policy area for the Labour government of 1999–2008; the “Connecting Diverse 
Communities” project, introduced in 2007, aimed at “improving connections 
with cultural identity,” addressing discrimination and strengthening intercultural 
relationships.17 There is little difference currently between the two major parties 
on this issue: in recent national elections both have actively courted Asian votes, 
elevating Chinese and Indian New Zealanders to prominent positions on the PR 
party list (New Zealand uses a mixed-member proportional system of election 
to its unicameral parliament.) In government, the National Party has continued 
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to promote ethnic and religious inclusiveness, typically invoking the economic 
advantages of diversity.
This shift to integration policies in New Zealand has coincided with a shift in 
the opposite direction, toward explicit rejection of multiculturalism in Britain, 
Europe, and Australia.18 In part this reflects New Zealand’s relatively small Muslim 
population—anxieties in the post 9/11 period about fundamentalist Islam in ethnic 
communities were much more muted here than in other countries (as I discuss 
below). But it also reflects the role that discourse about cultural difference plays 
in New Zealand. Recognition of indigenous Maori cultural claims and aspirations 
has meant that assimilation into a dominant culture cannot be advocated with the 
same degree of public legitimacy in New Zealand as it can in other countries. But 
if the bicultural context lends some protection to the recognition of polyethnic 
diversity, it also limits it: no government has introduced an umbrella policy of 
multiculturalism or legislation on the issue, and biculturalism remains the domi-
nant discourse of diversity.
THE BICULTUR AL C ONTEXT
Crucial to understanding both state policy and public responses to ethnic diver-
sity in New Zealand is the central relationship between the dominant white 
Pakeha society and the Maori. The liberalization of immigration in the 1980s fol-
lowed a decade of renewed Maori political mobilization, and a new conscious-
ness of indigenous identity as the grounding for sovereignty claims. This took 
place, of course, in the context of the global emergence of indigenous political 
movements in settler states. Because the relationship between Maori and poly-
ethnic claims in New Zealand has such an influence on attitudes to multicultur-
alism in New Zealand, it’s important to establish the distinction between them. 
While both kinds of groups argue for official recognition of cultural identity and 
practices, indigenous communities crucially argue for some degree of autonomy, 
self- governance, and self-determination. In theoretical thinking about this in 
democracies, we can stake out two key positions: liberalism’s argument based on 
individual autonomy, as set out by Will Kymlicka, and the argument for indig-
enous sovereignty based on the illegality of imperial conquest—associated with 
James Tully, among others.
Kymlicka argues that the difference between polyethnic and indigenous (and 
minority national) communities is that only the latter constitute societal cul-
tures—that is, they form the entire and self-enclosed context in which the social 
identities, systems of meaning and value, and life plans of individual members 
are shaped.19 In order for members of such communities to exercise their auton-
omy, their societal cultures, their contexts for autonomy must be protected and 
preserved. Indigenous communities and national minorities constitute societal 
cultures, Kymlicka argues, because their members never chose—historically 
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or currently—any form of incorporation or integration. Polyethnic groups 
 constituted through immigration are by contrast only partial communities; their 
members have chosen to affiliate to the larger societal culture. Their cultural 
identities and practices still merit recognition and protection, but only so that 
those members can be included and integrated as autonomous members of the 
broader societal culture. Here we can draw also on Charles Taylor: public recog-
nition of cultural membership is an essential aspect of individual members’ sense 
of personal worth and value.20 This focus on integration as recognition and inclu-
sion is reflected in the public policies toward polyethnic groups argued for and 
implemented in New Zealand. As the Ministry of Social Development’s Social 
Report of 2016 comments: “Cultural identity is important for people’s sense of 
self and how they relate to others. A strong cultural identity can contribute to 
people’s overall wellbeing.”21
Critics like Tully reject the grounding of indigenous claims on the liberal values 
of Western postcolonial states, arguing instead that indigenous communities are 
entitled to self-determination on the basis of their original self-government and 
independence prior to their forcible incorporation into new states through coloni-
zation.22 The right to self-determination is central to a newly emerged global norm 
of indigeneity, reinforced by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples of 2007, endorsed in 2010 by New Zealand. Maori invoke the argument 
based on prior-existing sovereignty specifically in relation to the terms of the 1840 
Treaty of Waitangi, over which there is some dispute: in the Maori-language ver-
sion, the Maori retained sovereignty, but ceded to the Crown the right of gover-
nance. In the English-language version, the Maori ceded sovereignty. The current 
role of the Treaty, although it is not entrenched as a constitutional document, is so 
central in New Zealand that Maori claims in general are often referred to as Treaty 
claims. As Kymlicka notes, there are some disadvantages, however, to shaping the 
distinctive claims of indigenous peoples in terms of treaties, which tend neither to 
reflect current political realities, nor to address the current needs of indigenous 
peoples, inequalities, and issues in justice in contemporary terms.23 As we shall 
see, the Treaty of Waitangi has been invoked to support both biculturalism and the 
distinct position of binationalism.
The prominence of the Treaty of Waitangi in Maori claims is recent; it was 
declared a nullity by the chief justice of the New Zealand Supreme Court in 1877, 
and subsequently a policy of Maori assimilation was accepted and pursued.24 The 
Treaty was recovered, however, as a grounding for political claims during Maori 
political mobilization in the 1970s, and it has been incorporated into legislation 
since the mid-1980s. A key aspect of this historically has been the development 
of the policy of biculturalism. The Labour government elected in 1984 had com-
mitted itself before the election to reviving the Treaty, incorporating it into a bill 
of rights, and expanding the powers of the Waitangi Tribunal, established in 1975 
with limited powers to consider claims based on breaches of the Treaty.25 Once in 
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government, Labour focused on the Tribunal and on incorporating the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi into legislation. In 1986, the Puao-Te-Ata-Tu report on a 
Maori perspective for the Department of Social Welfare recommended strategies 
to incorporate Maori cultural dimensions into the department’s operations, and 
this became the model across state institutions.26
Also in 1986, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System “Towards a Better 
Democracy” heard submissions in Maori as well as English, and recognized the 
special status of the Maori as indigenous to New Zealand. In 1987, Te Reo Māori 
was accepted as an official language of New Zealand. These policies of cultural rec-
ognition and incorporation constitute the cultural redress dimension of Waitangi 
Tribunal recommendations, and form a key strand of what became the dominant 
policy of biculturalism. Biculturalism, the official recognition of both the domi-
nant Pakeha and Maori cultures within public institutions purports to reform state 
institutions, policies, and regulations so that they include greater participation by 
Maori people, as well as Maori concerns, forms of expression and cultural prac-
tices.27 This has meant a two-stranded strategy: the devolution of service provi-
sion to Maori organizations in partnership with the state, and the incorporation of 
Maori cultural practices into state institutions and processes—originally focused 
on those that deliver services to Maori, but now more widely adopted. Some of 
these cultural inclusion policies are more substantive, such as funding for Maori 
broadcasting and arts, and the inclusion of Maori history and culture in the school 
curriculum. The preschool curriculum is explicitly centered on Maori cultural 
values. Maori values are explicitly incorporated into the Resource Management 
Act, and into the activities of the Department of Conservation. In the social ser-
vice provision ministries of Education, Social Development and Health, the use of 
Maori ceremonies, rituals, and language is more symbolic, although policies con-
sistently emphasize the importance of establishing links to the extended family, or 
whanau, in Maori communities.28
Biculturalism was deemed by the 1986 report to be “the essential prerequisite 
to the development of a multi-cultural society.”29 The rhetoric of state institutions 
continues to emphasize the “unique place” of Maori culture, and the situating 
of polyethnic diversity within a bicultural context.30 However, the relationship 
between the two founding cultures and subsequent cultural diversity was not 
spelled out, and the emphasis on cultural expression, recognition, and inclusion in 
multicultural terms has attracted some recent criticism on the part of Maori. Maori 
culture has become more visible in public life, but critics argue that rather than 
challenging Pakeha cultural and political hegemony in New Zealand, it reinforces 
it by positioning the Maori as a secondary, junior partner to the Crown.31 Maori 
cultural identity is asserted in the context of Western political and bureaucratic 
institutions, rather than as a basis for self-determination through independent 
political structures. Critics argue that the changes introduced by biculturalism are 
merely window dressing, and that real power relations remain intact.32 Cultural 
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inclusion, or what Mason Durie calls “cultural capture” is in fact a strategy for 
managing and deflecting resistance.33 Tom O’Reilly and David Wood claim that 
biculturalism’s focus on cultural responsiveness is merely tokenism and point to 
the superficial use of cultural symbols and practices to satisfy Maori claims for 
recognition.34 Nor is the problem simply the superficiality of cultural inclusion. 
Echoing a common critique of multiculturalism, Dominic O’Sullivan suggests 
that biculturalism assumes that Maori have developed into a single homogeneous 
identity and culture.35 Cultural traditions are assumed to be homogeneous and 
 frozen in time, rather than the products of continual negotiation within and 
between cultural communities. As a result, real struggles and conflicts within Maori 
communities over the changing meanings of cultural traditions are repressed. In 
response to these concerns, and to disputes over the role of Maori ceremonies in 
state institutions, the Maori Party has called for an investigation into the use of 
Maori customs, or tikanga, across the state sector. The party claimed that Maori 
customs are being used by the state to co-opt Maori into institutions that remain 
essentially hostile to them.36
The Treaty of Waitangi is interpreted by some Maori activists as authorizing 
claims not to the recognition and protection of culture, strategies which are seen 
as more suitable for polyethnic multiculturalism, but rather to self-determination 
and autonomy, based on retained sovereignty. This position sidesteps the question 
of diversity in non-Maori society: Maori are cast not as an ethnic group jock-
eying for recognition within an increasingly diverse society still dominated by 
Pakeha culture, but as an independent people negotiating with the Crown. These 
Maori claims are beyond the scope of this chapter, but I would note that they do 
not include secession, but focus rather on ownership of resources and the self- 
management of tracts of lands, resources, and social services. Nevertheless, they 
do incorporate real transfers of power, and the New Zealand state’s reluctance to 
pursue self-determination (demonstrated by its refusal for three years to endorse 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) is not surprising.
Maori attitudes towards multiculturalism understood in terms of ethnic diver-
sity and state recognition of minority cultures, are complex and evolving. There 
has been a long history since the nineteenth century of close relations between 
Maori and non-British immigrant groups, particularly the Chinese.37 However in 
the 1990s, when the impact of liberalized immigration legislation was first becom-
ing apparent, Maori concern about immigration emerged, on the grounds that a 
more diverse population would not necessarily support the fundamental status for 
Maori of the treaty relationship with the British Crown. Some Maori commenta-
tors, noting developments in Australia, where polyethnic multiculturalism long 
preceded recognition of indigenous rights, have fiercely opposed any characteriza-
tion of New Zealand as multicultural. Ranginui Walker castigated the government 
in the late 1980s and 1990s for failing to consult with Maori over the extension of 
Multiculturalism, Biculturalism, and National Identity    113
immigration policy to cover non-Europeans. Some of this reflected racist anti-
Asian sentiments also expressed by Pakeha. Immigrants from Asia were, Walker 
claimed, driven by “egocentric” motives, rather than “a sense of altruism towards 
the host country.”38 They were insufficiently proficient in English, and their con-
tribution to economic growth was low, since they “usually employ their own 
people.”39 In response, defenders of multiculturalism argued that non-European 
immigrants were being excluded from the debate on the New Zealand’s identity 
and future. Drawing on the liberal philosophical arguments against recognition 
made by Chandran Kukathas, Ramesh Thakur argued that the state should give no 
preferential recognition to the language and culture of any ethnic group, including 
Maori, whom he characterized as immigrants.40
A succession of political groups, including the current Maori Party, have 
requested formal Maori input into immigration policy, and in 1991, a Waitangi 
Tribunal claim was launched in relation to the Immigration Act.41 In 2015, a gov-
ernment report found that Maori (and Pacific) New Zealanders were less likely 
than other groups to hold positive views of migrants.42 Maori concern about Asian 
immigrants and their commitment to the Treaty continued into the early twenty-
first century.43 In 2014, a survey found that Maori respondents disliked Asian 
immigrants more than any other demographic group.44 Nevertheless, over the past 
decade, public Maori discourse has shifted and has become more explicitly anti-
racist, perhaps in response to the expression of Pakeha racist sentiments against 
both immigrants and Maori. In 2007, the Maori Party co-leader Tariana Turia called 
for European migration to New Zealand to be reduced, claiming that the govern-
ment was trying to stop the “browning of New Zealand” by stepping up immigra-
tion from Australia, Britain, and Canada.45 In response to the 2010 Department 
of Labour report, prominent the Maori activist and academic Margaret Mutu 
advocated a cap on white immigrants to New Zealand, on the grounds that they 
brought with them “white supremacist attitudes.” She added that Maori were 
“ generally supportive” of immigration from Asian countries.46 Then Maori Party 
co-leader Pita Sharples agreed that there was concern about “western”  immigration 
to New Zealand, although the party was, he said, happy with Pasifika  immigration, 
since it recognized commonalities of experience between Maori and Pasifika 
peoples.47 Current Maori Party policy on immigration requires only that all new 
migrants complete a course on the history of the Treaty of Waitangi.48
The change in attitude among Maori leaders to multiculturalism, and especially 
the dropping of opposition to non-British migrants, undoubtedly reflects a shift in 
Maori political claims to binationalism and self-determination. While bicultural-
ism seeks recognition for indigenous peoples on the grounds of cultural status, a 
strategy always open to extension to other cultural minorities, self-determination 
invokes a quite distinct set of political demands and justifications, and one that is 
not subject to competition from polyethnic groups.
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THE LIMINAL STATUS OF PASIFIKA CULTURES
Pasifika peoples occupy a particular position in terms of cultural diversity: as 
immigrants they constitute a polyethnic community, but as Polynesians and the 
subjects of colonization elsewhere in the region, they are more closely linked to 
Maori than are other ethnic groups, and are key to the “branding” of New Zealand’s 
identity as a Pacific nation. Moreover, they tend to be concentrated in low-skilled, 
low-wage employment, and are relatively disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms. 
This has meant that they are often grouped with Maori as the beneficiaries of affir-
mative action programs. The 1993 Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on 
the grounds of race and ethnicity, among other categories, but specifically exempts 
provisions that are designed to ensure the equality of disadvantaged groups, 
such as training schemes and employment assistance measures. Several of these 
schemes, such as university entrance programs, have been set up to target Pasifika 
peoples as well as Maori. Pasifika peoples are also identified as the subjects of ser-
vice provision: government departments such as Health, Social Development, and 
Education specifically target Pasifika as well as Maori New Zealanders, and there 
are special Pasifika courts for young offenders, similar to Maori courts.
These accommodations for Pasifika communities suggest that the immigrant/
indigenous distinction is less important in shaping multiculturalist practices and 
policies than the ways in which national values and identity can be mobilized by 
the groups involved. As integrative multiculturalism has been justified in the past 
decade in terms of traditional New Zealand values of social justice and equality, 
provisions for immigrant groups that are systemically economically disadvantaged 
have been piggy-backed upon policies for Maori without objection. Potentially, 
this will benefit other disadvantaged polyethnic groups as well, such as refugees 
from Africa and the Middle East, but Pasifika peoples can also draw on discourse 
around national identity under globalization. Successive New Zealand govern-
ments have mobilized Maori, and increasingly, Pasifika culture, to promote the 
country as distinctive in the global trade and tourism market.
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO CULTUR AL DIVERSIT Y
Maori concern about immigration must be interpreted in the broader context of 
anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly directed at Asians, in the wider community. 
As is not surprising in an overwhelmingly white and British postcolonial society 
positioned close to Asia and the Polynesian and Melanesian Pacific, New Zealand 
attitudes have historically reflected suspicion of and skepticism about nonwhite 
outsiders. The speed of policy changes in the 1980s and subsequent diverse immi-
gration led to some strong social reactions around racial difference, sometimes 
expressed as moral panics. A notable example was the article “Asian Angst,” by the 
conservative former politician Deborah Coddington, published in the mainstream 
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magazine North and South, in which Coddington argued that Asian immigrants 
were involved in a “tide of crime.” Coddington pointed to an increase in arrest 
figures for Asian New Zealanders over the prior decade—without mentioning, 
however, that the number of Asian New Zealanders had also increased in this 
period, and that the arrest rate of Asians as a proportion of the population had 
halved over the decade.49 The article prompted much public debate, but it is worth 
noting that it attracted strong public opposition and was condemned by the Press 
Council. Anti-Asian sentiment has been boosted recently by the fast rise of house 
prices in New Zealand’s major cities, which is commonly blamed on Chinese off-
shore investors—a target often expanded by politicians and the popular media to 
include local New Zealander buyers of Asian ethnicity.50
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and in London and Bali in 2002 
and 2005, and the Danish cartoon controversy the same year produced some anti-
Muslim sentiment in public discourse in New Zealand. Opposition to multicul-
turalism increasingly took the form of verbal attacks on the Muslim community 
for its alleged support—or at least failure to criticize strongly enough—extremist 
Muslim radicalism. This became a focus for criticism by the populist politician 
Winston Peters, who emphasized the theme in the lead-up to the 2005 election, 
linking increasing Muslim immigration into New Zealand with the threat of ter-
rorism, suggesting that Muslim immigrants came from cultures with no respect 
for liberal values.51
Nevertheless, the government’s 2015 Community Perceptions of Migrants and 
Immigration survey found that respondents were generally positive in their atti-
tudes to migrants.52 This suggests that there has been a recent decline in pub-
lic anxieties about the cohesiveness of political community in New Zealand. 
Although these concerns focused on—or scapegoated—multiculturalism, they 
originated in broader social and economic changes. They arose in response to 
the neoliberal economic and administrative reforms imposed in the mid-1980s, 
which emphasized the country’s need to compete in global markets, and reduced 
the state provision of social services and institutional support that had become 
accepted as part of the national identity in New Zealand. Community was rede-
fined in terms of voluntary association, but was given no substantive content.53 
The cultural anxieties this produced were articulated, ironically, by neo-liberal 
advocate and then-leader of the conservative National Party Don Brash, in a well-
publicized and controversial 2004 speech. In terms familiar from international 
critics of multiculturalism who argue that a common language and culture are 
essential to the shared practices that constitute the civic nation, Brash argued that 
state recognition and promotion of diversity detracts from a sense of common 
identity that holds the nation together.54 Like other critics of multiculturalism 
from this perspective, Brash invoked liberal-democratic values as the content of 
that common identity, but implied in his argument that these are tied to a sub-
stantive culture.
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While Brash drew on a discourse of civic nationalism to reject biculturalism and 
express skepticism about state-sponsored multiculturalism, cultural diversity has 
also played positively in an emergent discourse about civic responsibility, citizen-
ship, and movements for citizenship education in schools. These strands of civic 
nationalism emphasize intercultural dialogue, respect for difference, and demo-
cratic values over substantial cultural content.55 In a 2002 statement of economic 
policy intent the Labour government under Helen Clark referred to New Zealand as 
“a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity.”56 Moreover, 
while neoliberalism has seen a move away from state-sponsored discourse about 
egalitarianism and state support, these long-standing national values continue to 
have popular traction and are still invoked to justify social support and welfare 
policies addressing migrants and polyethnic communities, as well as the Maori.57 
In this way, discourses of distributive equality are not contrasted to recognition, as 
is frequently claimed by critics of multiculturalism,58 but are mutually reinforcing.
MINORIT Y CULTUR AL PR ACTICES AND 
HUMAN RIGHT S
Critics of multiculturalism point to potential conflicts between the cultural prac-
tices of traditional society and prevailing Western norms of gender equality.59 
Controversies have arisen in New Zealand involving both Maori and polyethnic 
communities around particular cultural practices that have been interpreted as 
being contrary to central national values, entrenched in human rights law. In the 
case of Maori, this has occurred around the role of women in traditional Maori cul-
tural practices. In 2005, a Pakeha female officer in the Department of Corrections 
protested publicly when she attended a farewell ceremony for male offenders 
organized by the Department. The ceremony, a poroporoaki, required women to 
sit behind men. Pakeha feminists spoke in support of her position; however, the 
overwhelming public response of Maori women was to reject their arguments, 
and to interpret the officer’s actions as a refusal to accept the public expression of 
Maori culture.60 This is despite the documented history of Maori women making 
feminist critiques of gendered roles in Maori ceremonies—and indicates that 
indigenous identification tends to trump gender in New Zealand.61 In 2006, two 
conservative women members of Parliament refused to sit behind men at a Maori 
welcome ceremony, or powhiri, during a parliamentary visit to a Child Youth and 
Family Services event. New Zealand’s Human Rights Act of 1993 prohibits dis-
crimination on a number of grounds, including sex and culture, and these cases 
are usually interpreted to reveal an ongoing tension between biculturalism and 
Western human rights norms. But they also point to the difficulty of identifying 
fixed and stable interpretations of cultural meaning (another common critique of 
cultural recognition policies). As historians point out, the position of women in 
Maori culture shifted considerably after colonization.62
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Similar conflicts have involved polyethnic cultural practices. In 2004, two 
women witnesses in an insurance fraud case in the Auckland District court 
requested permission to give evidence while wearing the burqa. Defense coun-
sel objected, and the judge heard arguments about the issue outside the trial. 
Supporters of the women invoked the Human Rights Act of 1993 and the Bill of 
Rights Act of 1990, which prohibit religious discrimination. The judge decided that 
although wearing the burqa in court was a matter of right for the witnesses, this 
was outweighed by the impact it would have on the weight of evidence, since it 
prevented physical personal behavior and facial expression being assessed in cross-
examination and was incompatible with the required public nature of the proceed-
ings. In a compromise decision, the women were allowed to give evidence, without 
the burqa, behind screens, so that they were visible only to the judge, counsel, and 
female court staff.63
Cultural dress for women has in general attracted much less controversy in 
New Zealand than in Britain and Europe, and there is no movement to  prohibit 
the head scarf, burqa, or other forms of concealing dress in public institutions. 
The Human Rights Commission advocates a “human rights framework” to 
 balance and assess the conflicts caused by increasingly diverse ethnicity in New 
Zealand society, according to which rights to cultural expression are balanced 
against other individual human rights. (This framework has not, however, been 
explicitly invoked in response to disputes involving Maori.) State authorities 
in New Zealand have taken a generally pragmatic and conciliatory attitude to 
 cultural dress requirements—women are allowed to wear the head scarf in pass-
port photographs, for example, as long as the full face is shown, and female staff 
process the application if necessary.
CULTURE AND STATE LEGITIMACY
As we have seen, cultural diversity has played a complex role in conceptions of 
civic nationalism in New Zealand, deployed by both opponents and supporters of 
cultural recognition. As the nation moved in the 1990s to market its products in 
a global economy, a strong national identity was required to project New Zealand 
as a player on the international stage and distinguish it from competitors.64 
Particularly as New Zealand sought to enter Asian markets, cultural diversity has 
been emphasized as a key aspect of national identity, central to economic pros-
perity.65 Polyethnic multiculturalism has been effectively marketed in Australia 
as a key aspect of modern national identity, as it has in Canada. In tourism and 
trade promotion, and in international trade shows, settler societies have empha-
sized their cultural diversity.66 While polyethnic diversity is also promoted by New 
Zealand (notably in the area of selling education, at both school and university 
levels), particular emphasis has been given to Maori culture. To some extent this 
reflects long historical practice: since its colonial days, New Zealand has drawn on 
118    Multiculturalism in the “Old”  Commonwealth
its Maori heritage to differentiate itself from Britain and other settler societies. As 
David Pearson points out, part of the process of emerging national independence 
in settler societies is the appropriation of indigenous culture. This allows these 
societies to distinguish themselves from the imperial center, on the basis of the 
particularities of insider/outsider relations between settlers and natives.67 In the 
contemporary context, national identity is drawn upon in the global market as 
part of the “brand state”—the nation-state’s image is a key aspect of its presenta-
tion to the world.68 Jacqui True and Charlie Gao have shown that New Zealand has 
cultivated its image as “clean, green” and “100% Pure New Zealand,” and aspects 
of Maori culture are also key to this distinctive brand.69 The haka dance has been 
effectively deployed as a cultural symbol for New Zealand, as well as being mar-
keted by Maori themselves. The ubiquity of this performance in international 
sporting events has been noted by critics, but generally, the marketing of national 
culture has mainly been criticized by Maori. Their concerns were recognized in 
the 2011 Waitangi Tribunal case Wai 262, which recommended, inter alia, that 
Maori be granted ownership over cultural practices and knowledge, which are to 
be treated as intellectual property, and protected from commercialization without 
the consent of their Maori owners.70
While niche national marketing accounts for New Zealand’s promotion of 
Maori culture abroad, more complex reasons must be sought for the emphasis 
placed on biculturalism at home. As we have seen, biculturalism was developed as 
part of the response to Treaty of Waitangi claims, but its high level of support from 
both the state and Pakeha public suggest deeper social and ideological factors at 
work. Key here is the public concern noted above over the loss of traditional values 
of community and social support that has characterized political discourse in New 
Zealand since the neoliberal economic reforms of the mid-1980s.71 Public attitudes 
to the role of the state and the value of community have not altered substantially 
to match the values inherent in neoliberalism. A study conducted by Louise 
Humpage suggests that despite the individualist and minimal state rhetoric of neo-
liberalism, support for the public provision of social services such health and edu-
cation continued unchanged—66 percent of respondents favored free health care 
in 2005, despite over a decade of neoliberal “user pays” rhetoric. Similarly, support 
for increased government spending on education remained constant.72
These figures suggest that a majority of New Zealanders have continued to 
expect government to provide key social services notwithstanding the neoliberal 
rhetoric around personal responsibility and some popular enthusiasm for lower 
tax rates. Neoliberal rhetoric does not seem to have led New Zealanders to aban-
don their concern about the social impact of these reforms, especially upon fami-
lies and children.73 Moreover, support for the responsibility of the state to provide 
citizens with jobs remained fairly constant, despite the employment of “personal 
responsibility” rhetoric. Significant numbers saw the “laziness” of the unemployed 
as a factor in their circumstances, but Humpage’s own qualitative survey in 2010 
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found that 82 percent of participants agreed with the statement “Government 
should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.”74 Humpage 
concludes from this that popular attitudes to social and economic policy do not 
shift neatly in line with changes in official discourse.75
In the context of this misalignment between the views of citizens and the state’s 
own description of its role in maintaining and reinforcing social relations, Maori 
values of community, family, belonging, and tradition are drawn on by the state 
to supply a language that is missing in neoliberal rhetoric, but which continues 
to compel Pakeha New Zealanders.76 The traditional cultural values supplied or 
quoted in Maori cultural practices adopted, promoted, and appropriated by the 
state are easily identified as those that neoliberalism had rejected: communal iden-
tification and responsibility, social hierarchies, reverence for history and tradition, 
spirituality, and an ontological connection to geographical place. Whereas liberal 
individualism is associated with rationality and communities of choice, Maori cul-
ture is presented as a positive alternative to this. As emotional, spiritual, given 
rather than chosen, and closely linked to the land, it “appreciates the mystical 
dimension and transcends reason.”77 As this suggests, cultural pluralism is useful 
to the state on several levels. By promoting polyethnic and Maori diversity abroad, 
New Zealand positions itself as a modern nation with a range of skills essential 
in the global market, but also with a distinctive attractive culture. Domestically, 
the promotion of Maori culture maintains legitimacy for the state by providing a 
discourse of belonging.
C ONCLUSIONS
The absence of a comprehensive multiculturalism policy in New Zealand is best 
understood as resulting from the sensitive political relationship between long-
standing indigenous claims and the newer demands of polyethnic diversity. As 
the latter have become more salient as an aspect of the social landscape, govern-
ments have responded by acknowledging multicultural realities, while maintain-
ing the unique status of Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi. As the Ministry of 
Social Development’s 2016 Social Report puts it: “They [the outcomes of social 
policy] recognise New Zealand is a multicultural society, while also acknowl-
edging that Maori culture has a unique place. For example, under the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the Crown has an obligation to protect the Maori language.”78 The duties 
owed to other minority cultures are not spelled out. Current developments sug-
gest that there is likely to be increasing public recognition of multiculturalism: 
the increasing shift in Maori political claims away from cultural inclusion and 
toward self-management and self-determination, evident in the Wai 262 recom-
mendation and in accordance with international norms of indigeneity could 
potentially decrease tensions between the bicultural and multicultural aspects 
of New Zealand’s identity. Moreover, the human rights framework advocated by 
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the Human Rights Commission allows scope for greater formal minority cultural 
inclusion in public institutions.
As we have seen, the complex, mutually constituting relationship between cul-
tural diversity policy on the one hand, and broader social values and governmental 
policies on the other, provide strong sources of impetus both for increased formal 
recognition of multiculturalism, and for a more systematic policy approach. Most 
importantly, New Zealand’s need for growth will promote continued migration 
based on skills, which will, along with high birthrates in Maori and Pasifika com-
munities, increase demographic diversity. The promotion and marketing of New 
Zealand in a competitive global market, as against other multicultural societies, 
will require it to emphasize its cultural and linguistic diversity, as shorthand for 
modernity, adaptability, and a skilled and flexible labor force. At the same time, the 
dislocations and upheavals of the global market under neoliberalism are likely to 
continue to reinforce the appeal of cultural values of community, belonging, and 
tradition. At the same time, the framing of cultural diversity as a contemporary 
grounding for national civic ideals of inclusiveness, social justice, and  egalitarianism 
allows for pragmatic policies of cultural recognition in terms of service delivery to 
immigrants. This has already taken place with respect to Pasifika immigrants, and 
there is obvious scope to include polyethnic cultures and languages in, for example, 
schooling and social service delivery. Given current trends, it seems likely that mul-
ticulturalism as a discourse and policy program will become a stronger and more 
permanent aspect of the policy agenda in New Zealand, with a more sustainable 
future in a binational, rather than a bicultural, context.
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Rochana Bajpai, SOAS University of London
Theories of multiculturalism have been based substantially on the experience of 
Western democracies since the 1970s. However, several countries in the British 
Commonwealth have long-standing practices of ethno-religious pluralism 
that predate the establishment of liberal-democratic institutions. India is a key 
example. Its policies of group rights include legal pluralism in religious family 
law (Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Parsi), as well as affirmative action in the form of 
quotas in legislatures, government jobs, and educational institutions for caste and 
tribal minorities dating back to the nineteenth century. With territorial autonomy 
for several linguistic and tribal groups, India resembles a multinational federation 
in its institutional framework. India’s Constitution of 1950 has been hailed as a 
prescient model of multicultural accommodation, ahead of its times in institut-
ing the cultural rights of minorities and affirmative action for historically disad-
vantaged groups within a broadly liberal-democratic framework.1 The subsequent 
development of a multinational federal framework from the 1950s is regarded as 
an exception to the unitary, centralized nation-state framework adopted by many 
postcolonial states.2
While concurring that India is a key case for evaluating multiculturalism, this 
chapter argues that claims of Indian exceptionalism need to be qualified. Focusing 
on the subset of group-differentiated rights, minority rights, and affirmative 
action, I elaborate three main claims. First, while accommodating some multicul-
tural provisions, the Indian Constitution inaugurated a shift from consociation-
alism to affirmative action as the overarching framework of group-differentiated 
rights. Relative to the late colonial state, constitution-making marked a moment 
of containment in the long career of group rights in India. Second, the Indian 
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Constitution embodies two distinct approaches to the accommodation of group-
differentiated rights, which might roughly be termed integrationist and restricted 
multicultural. The former underpinned provisions for quotas for ex-Untouchable 
and tribal groups; the latter is embodied in provisions of minority cultural protec-
tion and religious family laws. Third, the restricted multicultural approach has 
remained undersupported in India’s constitutional vision. In particular, because of 
the confluence of liberal and nationalist concerns, there exists a normative deficit 
with regard to the protection of cultural difference and minority practices. Most 
acute in the case of religious minorities, this is the case to an extent for all minori-
ties, whether defined by religion, language, caste, or tribe.
The normative deficit of multiculturalism at India’s founding moment has per-
sisted over time and has been politically influential. Since the promulgation of the 
Constitution in 1950, group-differentiated rights have been augmented, without, 
however, a concomitant elaboration of their rationale by policy-makers in terms 
of their society-wide benefits. This in turn has left minorities and disadvantaged 
groups more vulnerable to majoritarian resentment and backlash. Deficiencies in 
justifications of group-differentiated rights dating back to constitution-making 
have been a contributing factor in the ascendance of the Hindu Right.
Does the Indian example then suggest that liberal and nationalist frameworks 
inherently lack the normative-ideological resources for the accommodation of dif-
ferential treatment, in particular, minority rights, as postcolonial theorists have 
suggested?3 While Indian constitutional and parliamentary debates provide some 
support for this view, these also suggest that such claims are overstated. In Indian 
policy debates, considerations of secularism, religious freedom and social justice 
have been construed, often appropriately, as consistent with group-differentiated 
rights.4 The main challenge for the accommodation of multicultural minority 
rights in India, as in many other countries, stems from policy-makers’ overly nar-
row understandings of the requirements of national unity. The long shadow of the 
country’s partition along religious lines in 1947 has limited political imagination in 
India regarding the accommodation of cultural difference. Furthermore, in India, 
as in many other countries in Asia and Africa, it is not so much liberal norms and 
institutions but their weakness—lack of support for rule of law, civil and political 
liberties for individuals in Indian liberal ideas—for instance, that renders minori-
ties vulnerable to attack and discrimination.5
A note on terminology is in order at the outset. First, it might be asked whether 
the concept of multiculturalism is adequate for capturing the deep, multilevel 
diversity of the kind encountered in India and other countries of Asia and Africa. 
Multiculturalism can suggest a flattening of difference, a reduction of multiform 
diversity to a single level, more suited to the recent immigrant experience of North 
America and Europe, than to the long histories of pluralism in Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East. It is also tilted toward liberal approaches to dealing with diversity, 
obscuring ways of dealing with difference in nonliberal traditions and societies 
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Terms such as “pluralism” might be preferred to denote the accommodation of 
difference in non-Western contexts. While these challenges have merit, multi-
culturalism remains a useful category for comparative analysis—for bringing 
non-Western experiences of group-differentiated rights into conversation with 
Western debates on multiculturalism—and is used as such here, with cognizance 
of its limits.
CHANGING FR AMES OF GROUP DIFFERENCE:  FROM 
“MINORIT Y ” TO “BACKWARD”
Two contrasting views of the Indian Constitution have been influential: that it 
represents a prescient model of multicultural accommodation within a liberal 
framework,6 and that it marked a sacrifice of minority rights at the altar of the 
nation at independence.7 Both views need to be nuanced. As I have detailed else-
where, constitution-making (1946–49), which marked the formal institution of 
a liberal-democratic state, was also a moment of containment in the long career 
of group rights in India.8 Nevertheless, unlike in many other postcolonial states, 
some minority rights were granted constitutional recognition, as were quotas for 
disadvantaged groups—the Indian Constitution was the earliest to institute affir-
mative action policies.
The Indian Constitution represented a cutback on minority representation pro-
visions that had characterized both British policy and group demands in colonial 
India. Group-based representation in colonial legislatures dates back to the late 
nineteenth century, with Indians included in the representative institutions of the 
Raj as members of particular groups.9 Special representation provisions (separate 
electorates, weightage, nomination) had expanded over the first half of the twenti-
eth century to a range of groups, including most prominently Muslims and other 
religious minorities, as well as Untouchables (then called the Depressed Classes). 
During constitution-making, these came to be limited in several respects, as the 
paradigm for group-differentiated rights was comprehensively recast from conso-
ciationalism to affirmative action in the transition from colonial rule. The starkest 
case of retrenchment was to be found in mechanisms for guaranteed representa-
tion of religious minorities in legislatures and government employment, which 
came to be abolished. However, consociational type provisions were rejected in 
the case of Untouchables (Scheduled Castes or Dalits) as well.
To take some examples, initial constitutional proposals and the draft 
Constitution of 1948 included provisions for legislative quotas for religious 
minorities and Depressed classes under joint electorates (separate electorates were 
rejected) and recognized the “desirability of representation of minorities in the 
Cabinet.”10 By 1949, each of these provisions had come to be restricted mainly to the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and some temporary provisions for Anglo 
Indians.11 Cutback can also be observed, albeit to a much lesser extent, in the case 
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of the “backward classes.” Babasaheb Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar’s Depressed Class 
organizations’ demand for separate electorates and guaranteed representation in 
the executive had been rejected in early deliberations, but the draft Constitution of 
1948 included an Instrument of Instruction to the president and provincial gover-
nors regarding the desirability of representation of minorities in the Cabinet.12 In 
the final stages of tidying up provisions in 1949, this provision was also deleted by 
the Constituent Assembly.13
The cutback in minority rights during Indian constitution-making was not lim-
ited to special representation provisions alone. Some have argued that the Indian 
Constitution marks not so much a containment of minority rights, as a shift from 
special representation provisions to cultural and educational rights of minorities.14 
It is true that the religious, cultural, and educational freedoms of minorities are 
protected in the text of the Indian Constitution as justiciable fundamental rights 
for individuals as well as groups (see Articles 25, 26, 29, and 30). My reading, 
however, suggests that minority cultural rights too came to be attenuated dur-
ing constitution-making, albeit much less drastically than political representation 
provisions. The wording of cultural rights provisions was changed, diluting the 
focus on religious minorities; furthermore, the protection of minority languages 
and scripts would be a matter for individual and community initiative.15 The con-
stitution-makers declined to stipulate any obligation on the part of the state to 
preserve minority cultures, in contrast to the “backward classes,” where the state’s 
duties were written into the Constitution.16 With regard to federal provisions, state 
rights also came to be limited after the partition of the country to create Pakistan 
in 1947. For instance, residuary powers earlier promised to the units, came to 
reside with the Central government.17 State rights also came to be curtailed during 
constitution-making in several other areas, including the Emergency provisions 
allowing for the president to assume the functions of the state government in the 
event of constitutional breakdown.18
Does the Indian case represent a sacrifice of minority rights at the altar of the 
nation at independence, as in many other postcolonial contexts? Indian constitu-
tion-making offers a more complex story. Although Partition undeniably denuded 
religious minorities of constitutional protections,19 the Constitution is not a majori-
tarian document. Against the demands of majoritarian nationalists, the religious, 
cultural, and educational rights of minorities were included in forms that were 
consonant with the concerns of minority representatives. For instance, a broad 
definition of the right to freedom of religion was adopted, including the right to 
“propagate” religion pressed for by several Christian representatives. Furthermore, 
in keeping with the wishes of several minority representatives, the state was not 
barred from aiding educational institutions that imparted religious instruction, 
despite objections by many staunch secularists. In the important area of religious 
family law, the demands of secularists and nationalists for a uniform civil code to 
supplant the different religious laws that governed family matters in colonial India 
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were rejected.20 In matters concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption, 
Muslims, Christians, and Parsis were to be governed by their respective religious 
personal laws, which were constitutionally protected by rights to religious freedom.
A majoritarian reading of the Indian Constitution is also inaccurate when we 
turn to examine provisions for historically disadvantaged groups, the Untouchables 
and tribal populations. Here, the Indian Constitution recognized that the national 
community was not homogeneous, and that state action was required to tackle 
entrenched socioeconomic inequalities. From the early stages of constitutional 
deliberations, committee reports sought to emphasize the need for special treat-
ment of the so-called backward groups.21 The final constitutional draft included 
a range of affirmative action provisions, including mandatory legislative quotas, 
provisions enabling employment and educational quotas for the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, as well as an undefined category of Other Backward Classes, 
expanding on colonial provision in some areas. In the case of Adivasis / Scheduled 
Tribes, there was some acknowledgement of cultural distinctiveness. Provisions 
included an element of self-government and sought to “balance improvement of 
their condition and a degree of assimilation with preservation of their distinc-
tiveness and a measure of autonomy.”22 Overall, group-differentiated rights in the 
Indian Constitution are principally addressed to difference deriving from disadvan-
tage. Differential treatment was envisaged for most part as a temporary measure for 
tackling socioeconomic disabilities and reducing intergroup difference over time, 
not as a permanent provision for the recognition of cultural difference.
The change in the regime of group rights during its passage from colonial to 
independent India was encapsulated in the declining fortunes of the term “minor-
ity” during constitution-making. At the start of the Constituent Assembly’s delib-
erations in 1946, the representatives of most groups claiming special provisions 
emphasized that their group was a minority of some kind. This appears to have 
been a response to the colonial institutional framework where groups designated 
as minorities were the chief beneficiaries of special treatment. For instance, rep-
resentatives of Untouchables called themselves “political minorities” on account 
of their historical exclusion from the governing structures of the country. In offi-
cial categorization, however, Untouchables were removed from the purview of the 
term “minority.” An amendment was adopted defining the term more narrowly so 
as to exclude the Scheduled Castes from its ambit, as well as deeming them part of 
the Hindu community.23 This reflected nationalist dislike of the term “minority” 
and a desire to restrict its usage, as well as an anxiety about the separation of the 
Untouchables from the Hindu community that, it was feared, their categorization 
as minorities would encourage. Whether Untouchables ought to be distinguished 
from the Hindu community for purposes of representation had been a sensitive 
point for nationalists in the decades preceding independence, with Ambedkar 
and Gandhi emblematic of the adversarial positions in this debate. By the close 
of the Constituent Assembly debates in 1949, the term “backward” had become 
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the favored designation to denote a group’s entitlement to special treatment. 
Representatives favoring quotas for religious minorities now sought to establish 
that there were “backward” peoples among Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs.24 The 
decline in the fortunes of the term “minority” during constitution-making, and 
corresponding popularity of the term “backward” classes, encapsulated the trans-
formation that the regime of group-differentiated rights underwent during its pas-
sage from colonial to independent India.
APPROACHES TO GROUP-DIFFERENTIATED RIGHT S: 
INTEGR ATIONIST AND LIMITED MULTICULTUR AL
On closer examination, three broad positions on group rights in the Constituent 
Assembly debates emerge: opposition to all group-differentiated rights, which 
encompassed assimilationist and integrationist positions (these were distinct); 
support for maximal group rights, which can be termed multinational; and an 
intermediate, restricted multicultural position of support for some group rights. 
The classification is heuristic: individuals and parties moved from one position 
to another over time and across issue areas.25 For instance, initially, minority par-
ties such as the Muslim League, the Akalis, and the Scheduled Caste Federation, 
favored multinational policies; by the end, most had moved to restricted multi-
cultural policies.
Constitutional outcomes varied across the different areas of group- differentiated 
rights. On quotas (termed “political safeguards” or “reservations”) for religious 
minorities as well as ex-Untouchables and tribals (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in official usage) in legislatures and government employment, the integra-
tionist position won. On the cultural rights of religious minorities (including reli-
gious family laws), and territorial autonomy for linguistic minorities and tribal 
populations, a restricted multicultural position was embodied in the constitution. 
Both the integrationist and restricted multicultural positions represented a cutback 
on the multinational provisions that had characterized colonial constitutionalism 
and minority demands. However, both were also distinct from the assimilationist 
positions espoused by Hindu nationalists in the Constituent Assembly.
Indian nationalism comprised diverse ideological strands that were articulated 
in public arenas in their modern forms from the nineteenth century. Apart from 
the national movement led by the Congress party, several political movements 
based on caste, religion, class, and gender had contributed to the development of 
nationalist ideals. Two main conceptions of India’s national identity are usually 
distinguished: secular and Hindu.26 In secular nationalist conceptions, the nation 
was conceived in political terms, as a community united by its commitment to 
common political ideals, notably those of secularism, democracy and develop-
ment: nationality was to consist in secular democratic citizenship. European mod-
els of nationalism based on language and descent were rejected; commonalities of 
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language, religion, or any other cultural attribute were not to serve as the basis of 
India’s national identity. In Hindu nationalist versions of India’s national identity, 
articulated by a section of constitution-makers, Indian identity was defined in cul-
tural terms, based typically on Hindi as the national language, descent from Indian 
religions particularly Hinduism, and other broadly Hindu themes. Minorities 
were assimilated in, or excluded from, the definition of the national identity.
In the Constituent Assembly debates, the normative-discursive repertoire of 
Indian nationalism comprised a constellation of inter-related concepts of secular-
ism, equal citizenship rights, democracy, social justice, development and national 
unity. These were configured differently in the varied strands of nationalist opin-
ion, generating multiple conceptions. For instance, national unity could denote 
political integrity, and/or social cohesion, and/or national identity. Secularism 
meant for some, equal citizenship for all individuals irrespective of religion, and 
for others, religious freedom for groups, distinct conceptions that supported policy 
implications that sometimes conflicted. Crucially, nationalists of different ideolog-
ical hues, Hindu sympathizers on the right as much as staunch secularists on the 
left (these included minority representatives) converged on the view that quotas for 
religious minorities detracted from national unity and also from secularism, justice 
and democracy. By contrast, this convergence was less evident in the case of quo-
tas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as well as provisions for religious, 
linguistic and cultural autonomy, where secularists and Hindu sympathizers often 
spoke in different voices, and group rights were maintained in the Constitution.
Nationalist claims of our period that minority representation necessarily dam-
aged national unity relied on a particular interpretation of the Indian past and 
of the history of minority safeguards under colonial rule. Against the colonial 
view that India was not a nation but a congeries of antagonistic nationalities, kept 
together by the exercise of imperial power, the nationalist account asserted that 
communal discord was the product of a deliberate colonial “divide and rule” strat-
egy that set one community against another, to legitimize British presence as the 
guarantor of peace and of minority interests, and thereby prolong colonial rule in 
India. Special representation provisions for minorities, notably separate elector-
ates, were the main instrument of the colonial divide and rule. These had bred 
community consciousness and rivalry, and once instituted, necessarily followed 
an escalating and separatist logic, leading to an ever-increasing number of groups 
demanding special measures, and ever-larger and more antagonistic claims, a pro-
cess that culminated in the bloody partition of the country in 1947. In this narra-
tive, the British as the architects of this policy were viewed as the chief culprits, 
the minorities, particularly Muslims, as pawns in the colonial game, culpable in 
allowing themselves to be misled, as blocking progress towards the national goal 
of liberation from British rule. The partition of the country on religious lines dem-
onstrated, catastrophically, that nationalist fears about the dangers of minority 
safeguards were justified.27
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Integrationist Approach: Legislative Quotas
The integrationist approach is most evident in the debates on reservations for 
religious minorities, ex-Untouchable and tribal groups. Reserved seats for reli-
gious minorities had been accepted in 1947 and were included the first draft of 
the Constitution of 1948. Nevertheless, nationalists sought to emphasize this was 
as “temporary” provisions and as measures of “compromise” or transition—in 
an ideal future, legislative quotas for religious minorities would no longer exist.28 
Legislative quotas for religious minorities were opposed as detracting from secu-
larism, democracy, justice, development, and above all, national unity, a mutually 
reinforcing constellation of concepts that was invoked by an ideologically diverse 
cross-section of nationalists. Reservations for religious minorities required the rec-
ognition of a person’s religion or caste in matters of public policy, and treated indi-
viduals differently depending on the community to which they belonged, which 
it was argued would undermine secularism. These were seen as detracting from 
democracy as these implied departures from the principle of the representation 
of individuals through territorial constituencies. But the overriding apprehension 
in this period was that the granting of special representation to religious minori-
ties would undermine national unity. Several national-unity concerns coalesced 
here—the “mixing of religion and politics” in the case of separate electorates was 
thought to have hardened differences between Hindus and Muslims, and resulted 
in the bloody break-up of the country. National identity was another concern—
quotas were instituted for groups defined in terms of the ascriptive criteria of reli-
gion, caste, and tribe, whereas the dominant conception of national identity in 
mid-20th century India, was civic rather than ethno-cultural, defined in terms of 
citizenship in a secular liberal-democratic state. And for some religion, caste, and 
other ethno-cultural affiliations were “backward,” pre-modern relics, inconsistent 
with the task of building a modern nation-state.
The convergence of liberal and nationalist concerns meant that Hindu nation-
alists often used the language of secularism, equal rights, and democracy in the 
Constituent Assembly. It was perhaps their close links with national unity and 
shared hostility to group-differentiated policies that accounted for the widespread 
use of a liberal language in this period.29 Secularist advocates of minority rights 
were also uncomfortable with mechanisms such as quotas that they saw as insti-
tutionalizing ethno-cultural groups. For instance, when legislative quotas for 
religious minorities were eventually withdrawn in 1949, Nehru commended their 
abolition as “a historic turn in our destiny,” confessing that he had never been con-
vinced about them, and that “doing away with this reservation business . . . shows 
that we are really sincere about this business of having a secular democracy.”30 At 
the same time, it is important not to overstate the overlap between nationalists on 
the left and the right. Convergence is not identity: secular and Hindu nationalists 
differed on several questions of minority rights in the Constituent Assembly.31
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By contrast, reservations in the case of Untouchables and tribal groups were 
easier to accommodate within a liberal nationalist framework. It was argued that 
these would enable the economic and social advancement of these groups that 
was desirable from the standpoint of the goals of social justice, national unity 
and development. In the case of national unity, the assumption was that vertical 
levelling would produce horizontal integration: bringing Untouchable and tribal 
groups “up to the level of the rest” in economic terms would reduce the social gulf 
that separated them from the rest of the population. In the case of national devel-
opment, “catching up” with the industrialized Western world was the desired goal; 
this in turn required quotas and other preferential provisions to boost the “back-
ward” sections of the population in the short run; such measures would uplift 
sections that were dragging the nation down and inhibiting its progress.32 The exis-
tence of “backward groups” was a symptom and a reminder of India’s own “back-
wardness,” the gulf that separated it from advanced Western countries, the club of 
powerful nations to which it wanted to belong. The register of such developmental 
arguments was one of paternalistic benevolence.33 “Backward sections” were cast 
in dominant nationalist discourse as objects of compassionate and philanthropic 
action on their behalf, rather than as agents of their own improvement.34
While liberal nationalist and developmentalist ideals offered resources for the 
accommodation of special representation provisions for Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes, it is important to note that these supported quotas as temporary affirma-
tive action provisions, and not as a multicultural right. In other words, nationalists 
rejected quotas as a means of recognizing social identity or protecting the dis-
tinct interests for all groups: special representation provisions were not intended 
as permanent instruments of self-government for any group. The case for special 
treatment of Untouchables and tribals was constantly distinguished from that of 
religious minorities through an emphasis on their poverty and “backwardness.” 
Recast as a form of “‘political’ affirmative action,”35 as short-term mechanisms36 
that would enable the realization of a future state of affairs in which special repre-
sentation would no longer be necessary, legislative quotas for Dalits and Adivasis 
were not intended to serve as a form of representation as such.
In other words, as in the case of religious minorities, in the case of the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes as well, nationalists rejected multicultural provisions 
as a means of recognizing the social identity or protecting the distinct interests of 
these groups.37 There was, for instance, little recognition in nationalist opinion that 
on account of being historically marginalized, Untouchables and tribals had “a 
distinctive perspective on matters of public policy [emphasis in original],”38 which 
merited representation, or that members of these groups were in a better position 
to understand and thereby represent these interests on account of their first-hand 
experience, better trust and communication with group members.39 Nationalist 
and developmentalist concerns did not support quotas as a multicultural right, as 
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a mechanism for minority representation as such.40 And while some constitutional 
provisions in the case of the Scheduled Tribes did include an element of self-gov-
ernment, insofar as legislative quotas were concerned, these were advocated as an 
integrative mechanism. Acute as always about institutional effects, Dr. Ambedkar 
saw reserved seats for tribal groups as counterbalancing “the tendency towards 
segregation.”41
Restricted Multicultural Approach: Religious Freedom, Family Law
A second approach to the accommodation of diversity in the Indian Constitution 
might be termed “restricted multicultural.” This approach is discernable in the 
provisions for religious freedom and family laws, as well as the rights of linguistic 
and tribal groups; I focus here on the former.
Indian constitution-makers adopted a wide definition of religious freedom 
for individuals and groups. Unlike many other secular constitutions, the Indian 
Constitution allows associational and institutional autonomy, and includes spe-
cific provisions for the public profession of religious identity. Under religious free-
dom provisions in the Indian Constitution, all individuals have the freedom to 
“profess, practice and propagate” religion (Article 25) and every religious group 
or denomination has the right to “establish and maintain institutions for religious 
and charitable purposes,” to “manage its own affairs in matters of religion,” to own, 
acquire, and administer property “in accordance with law” (Articles 25 and 26 
of the Indian Constitution). The wording of these rights in many cases assumed 
forms that were in keeping with the concerns of minority representatives. Thus, 
a broad definition of the right to freedom of religion was adopted after extensive 
debate, which included the right to practice religion in public spaces and, even 
more controversially in the face of vehement opposition of Hindu orthodox opin-
ion, the right to “propagate” religion. The latter was in keeping with the demands 
of Christian representatives who argued that propagation was fundamental to the 
Christian faith. Religious denominations were permitted by right to hold property, 
and after extensive debate, the state was allowed to aid educational institutions 
that imparted religious instruction (including minority institutions), overriding 
the objections of those who sought to restrict the domain of religion.42 Institutional 
pluralism is notably evident in the retention of separate religious family laws for 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Parsis.43 The demands of ardent secularists for a uni-
form civil code to supplant the different religious laws that had governed matters 
such as marriage and divorce in colonial India were rejected.
However, the approach remained limited multicultural overall. The right to 
freedom of religion is subject to other constitutional rights, including those of 
equality and nondiscrimination. State intervention is permitted, not just in the 
interests of public order, morality, and health, as common elsewhere, but also for 
purposes of social welfare and reform, departing from the colonial state’s stance of 
nonintervention in the religious affairs of its subjects. Despite previous promises 
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that religious family laws would be protected by specific constitutional provisions, 
no guarantees protecting religious laws from state intervention were included 
in the Constitution; explicit constitutional guarantees were rejected. The non- 
justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy include a provision for a uniform 
civil code, however, leaving open the door for legal unification in the future.
A restricted or weak multicultural approach has been defended by scholars 
as superior to strong or maximal multiculturalism in offering better protections 
for individuals and vulnerable groups within minorities, such as women.44 In the 
case of the Indian Constitution, the problem was less with the approaches adopted 
for the accommodation of diversity than with the normative resources, which 
remained deficient for supporting restricted multiculturalism.
THE NORMATIVE DEFICIT OF LIMITED 
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN THE INDIAN C ONSTITUTION
The repertoire of secular Indian nationalism did contain materials  supporting 
limited multiculturalism. Thus, in a departure from the standard liberal 
 position, groups as well as individuals were recognized as possessing rights and 
 entitlements.45 Speeches frequently emphasized, for instance, that individu-
als and groups should have the freedom to pursue their religions and develop 
their  languages and cultures. Equality and justice were seen to require religious 
and cultural freedoms for all groups, including minorities; justice, it was said, 
demanded that no individual or group be subject to compulsion in matters of 
religion or language. Although secularism was construed as incompatible with 
legislative quotas for religious minorities, it was also seen to require religious and 
cultural freedom for all groups, including minorities. In most connotations of 
secularism in nationalist discourse,46 the pursuit of religion and the preservation 
of language and culture on the part of citizens of all communities were held to 
be legitimate goals; their pursuit by citizens in both their individual and associa-
tional capacities was regarded as a corollary of the exclusion of religion from the 
political domain.
Nevertheless, for multiple reasons, justifications for multicultural provisions 
remained underdeveloped in nationalist opinion, unlike arguments for the inte-
grationist type of group-differentiated provisions. Prominent among these in this 
period was the emphasis on individual over group rights.47 Liberal individualist 
and developmentalist ideologies gained enormously from their convergence with 
nationalist concerns. The emphasis on the individual over the group, and on equal 
citizenship rights construed as the same rights for individuals from all groups pro-
vided a means for welding together a people divided by their group membership 
into a nation. It also provided the basis for a common national identity in a situa-
tion in which ethnic criteria were divisive. Given its links with national unity, it is 
unsurprising that a liberal language was espoused in the Constituent Assembly by 
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a wide range of nationalists of diverse ideological moorings, Hindu nationalists as 
much as Westernized socialists.
The normative deficit of restricted multiculturalism derived also because spe-
cial provisions for the protection of minority cultures remained undersupported 
in nationalist opinion. The move from all groups having rights to pursue their cul-
tures to the differential rights of minorities remained unarticulated in nationalist 
opinion. In the case of “backwardness,” the tensions between individual and group 
claims were confronted and arguments fashioned for special treatment of histori-
cally disadvantaged groups in terms of nationalist goals. By contrast, it is hard 
to find any elaboration in nationalist opinion on how the protection of minority 
cultures formed part of their vision of the common good. In particular, unlike in 
the case of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, there were no attempts 
to go beyond formal symmetrical notions of equality to substantive, contextual 
notions that could justify the differential treatment of cultures. There were, for 
instance, no arguments along the lines that minorities faced a greater threat to the 
integrity of their religion, language, or culture than the majority, whose practices 
are inevitably supported by society and the state.48 Thus, in the context of the draft-
ing of minority provisions Articles 29 and 30, the cultural rights of minorities were 
interpreted largely as negative liberties. The Constitution left open the possibility 
of state aid, but this was regarded as a concession rather than a duty of the state, 
whose responsibilities were limited to non-interference with the right of minori-
ties to practice their cultures freely.49
The normative deficit in nationalist discourse with regard to the protection of 
cultural difference is also observable in the case of other minorities, notably tribal 
groups. There was some acknowledgement in nationalist opinion of a distinctive 
cultural identity,50 but the need to protect tribal lands was qualified in important 
respects. Since a developmentalist perspective dominated discussions, progressive 
change in Adivasi cultures in the direction of greater integration with mainstream 
society was not ruled out, and protectionist provisions sought to give Adivasi com-
munities greater control over the pace and nature of cultural change. Further, pro-
tectionist policies such as land rights and tribal councils were envisaged mainly for 
areas where tribals formed a local majority in a given territory. For areas in which 
tribals were a minority, or had successfully assimilated into the local population, 
cultural protection was rarely admitted as a goal.
So far I have suggested that in India’s constitutional vision, there was a nor-
mative deficit with regard to the protection of cultural difference and minority 
practices, in large part on account of the limits of the liberal and developmentalist 
ideas of the time. Because of the recent partition of the country on religious lines, 
this was most acute in the case of religious minorities. It was also observable in 
the case of minorities defined by caste or tribe, and in relation to different types of 
group rights, such as legislative quotas, employment quotas, and rights to cultural 
autonomy. A normative deficit existed for group-differentiated rights in the case 
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of legislative quotas for ex-Untouchables and tribals as well, but this was easier 
to overcome within a liberal nationalist framework. In other words, the accom-
modation of special representation provisions for caste and tribal minorities was 
based on reframing these as temporary affirmative action provisions, rather than 
as permanent instruments of self-government for culturally distinct groups.51 As 
such, the Indian Constitution did not mark as radical a departure “from accepted 
liberal practices of the time” as scholars have suggested.52
Against my argument so far, however, it might be contended that India’s lin-
guistic federalism is a form of multicultural accommodation. In Will Kymlicka’s 
influential schema, based largely on Canadian experience, subnational autonomy 
is the paradigm form of multiculturalism. The relationship of multiculturalism to 
territorial self-government policies therefore needs greater examination.
FEDER ALISM AND MULTICULTUR ALISM IN INDIA
Indian experience suggests that the relationship of territorial self-government 
policies to multiculturalism is complex. Self-government rights can of course 
help protect group cultures, insofar as all relevant groups have such rights, but 
these are not necessarily instances of group-differentiated rights. During Indian 
constitution-making, federal provisions were not seen as an instance of a group-
differentiated right. All units were granted the same rights, and a single citizenship 
was instituted.53 Kashmir’s special status (Article 370) was not based on recogni-
tion of its ethnic or religious distinctiveness.54 Even in the case of princely states, 
technically sovereign once British rule ceased, proposals for separate constitutions 
and different relations with the federation were rejected.55
It might be argued, however, that policies of self-government based on language 
seek to compensate for disadvantages faced by their speakers in relation to the domi-
nant majority language that forms the basis of nation-building. In other words, as 
with affirmative action programs, self-government rights can be said to “asymmetri-
cally distribute rights or opportunities on the basis of group membership.”56 Such an 
interpretation of self-government rights assumes, however, nation-building centered 
on a single national language, whereas Indian nationalism emerged in the second half 
of the nineteenth century as a coalition of regional nationalisms and was envisaged 
as multilingual.57 A “sense of region and nation emerged together, through parallel 
self-definitions,” and so being Bengali-, Marathi-, or Tamil-speaking was regarded 
as congruent with, and reinforcing, a common Indian identity.58 The Congress Party 
recognized language-based units in its internal organization from the early twentieth 
century onwards (and particularly after 1920), advocating linguistic states as a more 
rational basis of provincial organization than the British administrative boundaries.59 
Thus, although during constitution-making there were pressures for the adoption of 
Hindi as a national language from Hindu nationalists and others, these were opposed 
from within the dominant Congress party by non-Hindi speakers.
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Ultimately a compromise formula was adopted. Hindi in the Devanagari 
script was designated as an official language, to be used for “inter-provincial 
 communication.”60 English would also continue as an official link language, 
 initially for fifteen years, extended since. Fourteen regional languages (now 
twenty-two) were also listed in the Constitution as national languages entitled to 
state  support, and to be used in public service examinations. Furthermore, while 
adopting a  federal framework, constitution-makers declined, despite pressures 
from linguistic nationalists to do so, to specify the basis for defining subnational 
units, i.e. whether this would be on linguistic lines. Although the many  proponents 
of linguistic provinces in the Constituent Assembly pressed their case, they “did 
not consider themselves separatists,”61 in contrast to the level of conflict between 
centralizers / federalists and provincialists / states’ rights advocates in Canada and 
the United States.62 The delineation of subnational units in India from the 1950s 
occurred as a result of a political process involving contentious mobilization, 
and was a “symmetrical reform, recognizing minority languages, but [only] on a 
symmetrical basis.”63
Finally, as self-government rights facilitate nation-building at sub-state levels, 
in India, as in the United States and other countries, they have in practice con-
flicted with the rights of minorities of religion, caste, tribe, or language. During 
constitution-making, the protection of minorities was often cited against the rights 
of states, and in favor of strengthening the central government.64 This concern has 
been borne out subsequently in the many instances of collusion by state govern-
ment and the police agencies they control in violence against religious minori-
ties.65 Most Indian state governments have passed laws against beef-eating and 
religious conversion that discriminate against religious minorities.
Indian experience thus suggests that while territorial self-government policies 
are instances of group rights, these do not necessarily constitute group-differenti-
ated rights, as all groups may have the same rights. Nor are they strictly speaking 
minority rights, since the relevant territorial units are often dominated by reli-
gious, caste and language groups that form majorities.
NEW C ONJUNCTURES,  OLD C ONSTR AINT S
Since the promulgation of the Indian Constitution in 1950, group-differentiated 
rights have expanded in several areas. Employment and education quotas have 
expanded since the 1990s to include large new groups of mainly intermediate 
lower castes (the so-called Other Backward Classes, or OBCs). Stronger multi-
cultural policies were instituted for Muslims in 1986, when the Indian Parliament 
passed a law that exempted the Muslim community from provisions of a com-
mon criminal code in the area of family law. On the other hand, the rise of Hindu 
nationalism since the 1990s has been accompanied by growing discrimination and 
violence against minorities, particularly Muslims, which has intensified since the 
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election of a Hindu Right government in 2014.66 Many factors have contributed to 
the complementary expansion of group-differentiated rights and of Hindu nation-
alism since the 1980s. In India, as elsewhere, majoritarian nationalism appears to 
be a reaction to multicultural and affirmative action policies, and a popular revolt 
against a liberalism seen as elitist.67
The paradigm shift in constitution-making from consociationalism to affirma-
tive action remains influential. Its long term, systemic effects can be observed in 
the fact that all substantial extensions of quotas have been to groups designated 
as “backward,” and in the shape of group rights claims, where “backward” has 
become the inclusive term to denote a group’s eligibility for special treatment, just 
as “minority” was in the late colonial period. Based on findings of Muslim socio-
economic deprivation, the 2004–14 Indian government sought to extend affirma-
tive action to Muslims in a limited form.68 Muslim parties and leaders have pressed 
for the inclusion of Muslims in the list of Scheduled Castes (currently Muslims are 
included in state lists of OBCs and STs, but not SCs),69 on grounds of economic 
and educational “backwardness,” invoking constitutional values of nondiscrimina-
tion and religion-neutrality of state policy.
The normative deficit of group-differentiated rights has remained and has 
been accentuated in some respects. In the case of cultural protection, for instance, 
although communitarian conceptions of secularism were advanced during the 
Shah Bano debate regarding the independence of Muslim personal law, policy-
makers failed to justify special treatment in terms of nondomination or group 
oppression.70 Why Muslims ought to have greater freedom from state  intervention 
than the Hindu majority, whose religious laws were subjected to state reform 
in the 1950s, remained unarticulated. During the expansion of educational and 
employment quotas to include intermediate castes since the 1990s, policy- makers 
neither elaborated justifications for these in terms of the common good, nor 
imposed institutional limits that would render them consistent with nondiscrimi-
nation and equality of opportunity. How benefits for lower castes would enable 
a more equal or just society for all, for instance, was not elaborated. As such, 
the expansion of quotas underpinned by the new discourse of social justice has 
remained  vulnerable to criticisms that these are sectional benefits to court elector-
ally powerful constituencies at the expense of the national good. The attempts by 
the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government (2004–14) to include 
religious minorities within the ambit of affirmative action have been executive-
led and ad hoc. These attempts have been unaccompanied by actions that could 
build a broader consensus, or the elaboration of reasons for affirmative action for 
religious minorities in terms of the common good.
As scholars have argued, differential treatment of minority personal law in 
India can be justified on several different grounds: on the basis of equal respect 
for all individuals, as minority religions are disadvantaged in relation to the 
 majority  religion; on the basis that imposition of reforms on subordinated groups 
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compounds injustices; and because minorities are under-represented in state insti-
tutions, and so disadvantaged with respect to collective self-determination in reli-
gious matters, unlike Hindus. Similarly, quotas for disadvantaged caste or religious 
minorities in education and employment can be justified as a universal benefit 
from the standpoint of democratic citizenship, since they offer individuals from 
different social backgrounds the opportunity to interact in ways that makes them 
better citizens,73 or better equipped to live together on terms of equality.74
There have, however, been few attempts by policy-makers to construct a robust, 
normative ideological basis for such policies in terms of the common good, as uni-
versal benefits that serve the national interest. The dominant narratives of national 
unity and national identity in India continue in a sense to be imprisoned in the 
Partition era, with successful examples of the recognition of group rights since 
then (e.g., the decline in demands to secede after the accommodation of linguistic 
claims through subnational territorial autonomy) having little impact on official 
discourse and popular understandings. Policy evolution and political change in 
India continues to be shaped by the resolutions arrived at, and those left unfinished, 
at its founding moment. In terms of policy, religious freedoms of minorities have 
been truncated by the enactment of laws against cow slaughter and conversions in 
most states. In politics, the continuing normative deficit of group- differentiated 
rights has meant that state assistance for particular groups is perceived as an ille-
gitimate concession detracting from the national good and motivated solely by 
electoral considerations, rather than a matter of justice. Unsurprisingly, the Hindu 
Right, with its rhetoric of putting the national interest first, and criticism of minor-
ity appeasement—that special provisions for minorities are a form of group par-
tiality, unjust favoritism with little principled basis—has benefitted.
Hindu nationalism in India, like majoritarian nationalisms elsewhere, reflects a 
“minority complex,”75 a sense that the majority religion is not getting its due share 
of recognition and resources from the state. Following V. D. Savarkar’s influential 
Hindutva (1923), Hindu nationalists locate Indian identity in Hindu civilization 
(sanskriti), defining a Hindu as a person who regards India as their father-land as 
well as holy-land. This definition includes members of Indic religions—Buddhists, 
Jains, Sikhs—but excludes Muslims and Christians. The duty of Hindu nationalists 
is to restore the lost “grandeur of Hindu culture and their supremacy over a land 
that had been invaded by foreigners” (Muslim and Christian invaders) through 
fashioning a more muscular, disciplined, and masculine Hindu identity.76 During 
the movement for Indian independence and constitution-making, Hindu nation-
alism was overtaken and, to an extent, subsumed within the Congress-led secu-
lar nationalism, held in check by leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru.77 However, 
Hindu nationalism has remained a powerful undertow throughout India’s political 
history, with the educational and social work at the grassroots level carried out 
by the RSS and its affiliates. It achieved its electoral breakthrough on the national 
stage in the 1990s, with the decline of the Congress Party creating the space for 
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the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP has consistently opposed multi-
cultural policies such as religious family laws and special status for Kashmir, and 
in support of normative Hindu food habits and attitudes to religion, has enacted 
or strengthened laws against cow slaughter and conversions. The BJP’s rise and 
periods in power have been accompanied by an increase in incidents of violence, 
intimidation, harassment, and hate speech against religious minorities, notably 
Muslims, as well as political dissidents. Since the election of a BJP majority gov-
ernment in 2014, instances of violence and lynching of Muslims by Hindu mobs 
have increased.
The BJP government since 2014 has resisted calls for strong condemnation of 
anti-Muslim violence, retained and elevated ministers who have made hate speeches 
against Muslims, and appeared to support the cultural domination of minorities, 
demoting public holidays associated with minorities such as Christmas and Easter 
and official Eid celebrations. In the routine violations of the basic human rights 
of religious minorities and dissidents, and growing authoritarianism, India looks 
less like a democratic exception, and more like its neighbors Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Myanmar, and many other countries in Asia and Africa.
C ONCLUSIONS
In the emerging literature on comparative multiculturalism, India is often regarded 
as an exceptional case.78 The Indian Constitution of 1950 recognizes the rights of 
religious and linguistic minorities, and indigenous groups and castes. Predating 
policies of multiculturalism in Western democracies by several decades, the consti-
tutional entrenchment of group rights in India derived from colonial and nation-
alist legacies, both informed by longer historical, political and social practices of 
dealing with difference.79
Multicultural provisions in India encounter similar challenges to those that 
have hindered their adoption in other Asian states.80 At independence, in India, 
as in other countries of the British Commonwealth, minorities were seen as “ille-
gitimately privileged” by the colonial state, and there was a desire “to roll back the 
privileges accorded to minorities under colonialism.”81 Relative to the late colo-
nial state, the Indian Constitution marked a cutback in multicultural provisions. 
Historical association with Western imperialism continues to pose a challenge to 
defenders of minority rights in India and other postcolonial countries. Moreover, 
the influence at constitution-making of a mid-twentieth-century developmentalist 
ideology meant that in India, as elsewhere,82 the nationalist hope was that religious, 
caste, linguistic, and other ethnic conflicts would fade away once modernization, 
arrested under colonial rule, got underway. From a nationalist developmentalist 
standpoint, exemplified by Nehru, ethnic claims were regarded as reminders of 
India’s “backwardness,” out of step with the times, and distractions from the real 
problems, which were economic.83
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Although liberal ideas in the Indian Constituent Assembly were more accom-
modating of group-differentiated rights than their Western counterparts,84 a nor-
mative deficit remained with regards to minority rights.85 Group-differentiated 
rights were accommodated predominantly as temporary affirmative action provi-
sions for the uplift of “backward” sections, a means toward the ideal of ethnic-
ity-blind citizenship.86 In India, as elsewhere, liberal opposition to differentiated 
citizenship was conjoined with nationalist concerns about the divisiveness of spe-
cial treatment in ways that constrained the normative-ideational space for group-
differentiated rights. An “acceptance of the existing cultural plurality” was not 
accompanied by “a positive evaluation of diversity that provided the rationale for 
the multicultural framework.”87
As in other countries of Asia and Africa,88 in India, too, group rights predate the 
institution of a liberal-democratic framework of equal individual rights Although 
liberal ideas have been more prevalent and influential in India than is commonly 
believed,89 their proponents there have rarely expanded on the need for constraints 
on state power for the sake of personal freedoms. The enforcement of rule of law 
and protections for individual freedoms remains weak, whereas communitarian 
ways of thinking have been more powerful. In India, as in other states of Asia and 
Africa affected by geopolitical insecurity, minorities have been seen as a threat to 
the security of the state, “a potential ‘fifth-column’, prone to collaboration with a 
neighbouring enemy.”90 Since the partition of India to create Pakistan, Muslims 
in particular have been accused of divided loyalties, exacerbated by continuing 
India-Pakistan tensions and the conflict over Kashmir. With the growing violence, 
hate-speech, and discrimination against Muslims that has accompanied the ascen-
dancy of Hindu nationalism, India is similar to other countries in Asia and Africa 
where ethnic majoritarianism prevails, unconstrained by rule of law.
Even though the Indian experience has many features in common with those of 
other states in Asia and Africa, it remains conceptually significant, bringing to the 
fore important features of multiculturalism often neglected in Western debates. 
For example, Indian Constituent Assembly debates highlight a close affinity—
often overlooked in the West—between liberal concerns of equal citizenship and 
nationalist concerns of political unity and social cohesion. Liberal opposition to 
group-differentiated rights has been underpinned by nationalist considerations to 
a much greater extent than contemporary defenders of liberalism acknowledge.91 
This is not, however, to suggest that liberal values are inextricably embedded 
within a unitary homogenizing nation-state, and so necessarily opposed to group-
differentiated rights, as postcolonial theorists have tended to suggest.92 In Indian 
policy debates, considerations of secularism, equal citizenship, and equality of 
opportunity have been construed, often appropriately, as consistent with group-
based rights, as I have detailed elsewhere.93 It is, however, to suggest that owing to 
overly narrow understandings of the requirements of national unity, the resources 
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that liberal-democratic principles offer for the justification of group rights remains 
to be elaborated by policy makers in India and elsewhere.
The Indian case also highlights the need to make a distinction between multi-
cultural rights in general, and minority rights, between group rights, on the one 
hand, and group-differentiated rights, on the other. Multicultural policies enhance 
the autonomy of majority as well as minority groups; minority rights or policies 
for the protection of cultural difference are a subset of multicultural rights. This 
distinction remains underdeveloped in contemporary theories of multicultural-
ism. In Kymlicka’s framework, for instance, the paradigmatic form of multicul-
tural right is territorial self-government for national minorities. Subnational 
autonomy, however, can apply to majority groups (e.g., the English in the United 
Kingdom), as well as minorities (e.g., the Scottish and Welsh in the UK). India’s 
multinational federalism that recognizes the claims of self-government of several 
linguistic and tribal groups is an example of a multicultural policy that is not a 
group-differentiated right, and has weakened protections for religious, caste, and 
linguistic minorities. This could be a sequencing issue;94 scholars have suggested 
that basic individual rights need to be entrenched before group rights are recog-
nized. However, majoritarian multiculturalism in India and elsewhere also sug-
gests that arguments for cultural protection need to be supplemented with those 
for the protection of cultural difference and minority practices.
Lastly, Indian debates highlight a complex fact: liberal frames are insufficient, 
but also remain necessary for the elaboration and evaluation of multiculturalism. 
On the one hand, a framework for multiculturalism in Asia and Africa needs to 
recover resources from a range of traditions—socialist, radical democratic, repub-
lican, and religious—for the justification of group rights. For example, Indian 
arguments for group rights have invoked considerations of national unity and 
development, communitarian conceptions of secularism, democratic values of 
equality and of status and dignity for the disadvantaged. On the other hand, for 
group rights to be more multicultural in terms of recognizing minority rights, 
these need to be more liberal in terms of respecting individual freedoms. In India, 
as elsewhere, most minority demands pertain to the lack of enforcement in the 
case of minorities of universal protections offered by liberal states to all citizens—
physical security and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of 
religion, nondiscrimination and equal opportunity in employment. Indian experi-
ence reminds us that standard liberal freedoms remain important and unrealized 
for religious, political, and sexual minorities.
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Farah Godrej, University of California, Riverside
M. K. Gandhi is sometimes thought of as the “spiritual father” of Indian secular-
ism, despite the fact that he is clearly not a secularist in the common Western 
sense of the term.1 This contradiction arises from what appears to be ambiva-
lence in Gandhi’s thought toward the notion of secularism. On the one hand, he 
insists that politics must be infused with religion or spirituality (terms he uses 
interchangeably). At other times, he expresses a strong sentiment that religion 
and the state should remain separate, and that the state should never interfere 
with matters of religion. How might this apparent contradiction be explained? 
I argue that this requires distinguishing between the different senses in which 
Gandhi used the term “religion.” Gandhi uses the term idiosyncratically: religion 
understood in one particular way is to be brought to bear on politics, while under-
stood in another way, religion is a pernicious force in political life. His multi-
faceted understanding of religion challenges the conceptual distinction between 
“public” and “private” as understood within Western discourses on secularism. In 
so doing, he both offered an idiosyncratic understanding of religious “freedom,” 
and challenged traditional Western secularist understandings of the relationship 
between individuals and communities.
This chapter also traces the dynamic and contested trajectory of “secularism” in 
post-Independence India, demonstrating that while many contemporary Indian 
thinkers have attempted to engage Gandhian understandings of secularism, few 
have recognized precisely how prophetic his opposition was to Westcentric secu-
larism. I identify a continuum along which thinkers are more or less inclined to see 
Western liberal secularism as appropriate for the Indian context, with those most 
critical of secularism’s applicability in India closest to Gandhi. Although these 
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critics do not always explicitly offer a distinctly Gandhian approach to Indian sec-
ularism, reading their critiques in conjunction with my interpretation of Gandhi 
explains some contradictions of contemporary Indian secularism in ways that also 
illuminate Gandhi’s own concerns.
THE CHALLENGE:  AN APORETIC GANDHI
“For me,” Gandhi observes, “every  .  .  . activity is governed by what I consider 
my religion.”2 “I cannot conceive of politics as divorced from religion,” he says. 
“[R]eligion should pervade every one of our actions.”3 Gandhi made no distinction 
between the spiritual and the moral,4 and considered each of these realms as syn-
onymous with truth-seeking. Thus, when he claims that “politics are not divorced 
from morality, from spirituality, from religion,”5 he means simply that politics is 
to be guided by the quest for truth, which to him is synonymous with dharma 
(duty or moral order) or spirituality.6 For those who understand secularism as 
strict separation of religion from politics, Gandhi’s views thus seem anti-secular.
Yet at other times Gandhi expresses a deep, abiding commitment to what he 
calls secularism. “If I were a dictator, religion and state would be separate,” he 
asserts. “I swear by my religion, I will die for it. But it is my personal affair. The state 
has nothing to do with it. The state would look after your secular welfare . . . but not 
your or my religion. That is everybody’s personal concern!”7 Elsewhere he claims 
that the state “should undoubtedly be secular. Everyone in it should be entitled to 
profess his religion without . . . hindrance.”8 In what sense, then, can we speak of 
Gandhian “secularism” or “religious freedom,” given his apparent desire for poli-
tics and religion to be complementary, rather than separate? Of course, one pos-
sible explanation is that Gandhi conceived of politics quite apart from the state, as 
occurring in the realm of daily personal interaction, not simply in the impersonal 
and bureaucratic sphere of statecraft. But I suggest that there is more to the story. A 
deeper exploration of Gandhi’s idiosyncratic usage of the term “religion” will reveal 
a foresighted critique of modern liberal notions of secularism, one which coincides 
remarkably with contemporary critiques of secularism in India.
In what follows, I offer a reading of Gandhi’s position on religion, religious 
freedom and secularism that is syncretic, rather than strictly exegetical. That is, it 
deliberately constructs an interpretive view through reliance on a combination of 
textual material and interpretations by other scholars. Gandhi’s writings are deeply 
aporetic: he rarely offers analytically unambiguous conclusions following from 
clearly stated assumptions. His political thinking is often scattered across treatises, 
pamphlets, newspaper articles, editorials, letters, and speeches, and characterized 
by ambiguity and nuance. The interpretive challenge this presents is compounded 
by the fact that many of his works were written in English, while many others (such 
as the seminal Hind Swaraj) were written in Gujarati, and subsequently translated 
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either by himself or by close associates. Linguistic nuances have often intervened 
to introduce interpretive plurality into the meaning of a concept or category, and 
even his own retranslation of his work multiplies rather than limits the possible 
meanings of his statements.
Gandhi’s writings have long been the subject of multiple, conflicting interpre-
tations, and extrapolating his views requires engaging creatively with this poly-
vocality.9 Arriving at a single, ostensibly “accurate” or “authentic” interpretation 
of Gandhi belies this understanding of the interpretive process as necessarily 
polyvocal, and so is deeply problematic. Nevertheless, polyvocality should not 
lead to impressionistic or relativistic interpretations that float free of a rigorous 
connection to the texts, ideas, or life-worlds they are intended to illuminate. All 
interpretations are appropriations of a sort; yet we can distinguish between those 
that are respectful, careful, and credible, and those that are disrespectful, ungener-
ous, or epistemically violent.10 My reading here seeks to reconstruct a Gandhian 
understanding of religious freedom and secularism, excavating his understand-
ing of the relationship between the state and religious groups (commonly called 
“church-state relations” in the West), and among various religious groups, in a 
multireligious polity.
RELIGION 1 :  “PRIVATE” TRUTH-SEEKING
Religion 1 (hereafter R1) is my term for Gandhi’s conception of religion as a “pri-
vate” activity of truth-seeking. When he calls religion one’s “private” or “personal” 
affair, he has a very specific meaning of “private” in mind. Understanding this 
requires a brief detour through Gandhi’s metaphysical views, including the crucial 
distinction between Absolute and relative truth that is foundational to the entirety 
of his political thinking. Having been deeply influenced in his early life by the Jain 
tradition in his home state of Gujarat, Gandhi always acknowledged the debt of his 
metaphysical position to the Jain doctrine of anekantavāda, or “many-sidedness.”11 
Like some of the Vedic texts from which it stems (but from which it ultimately 
departs), Jain doctrine holds that reality manifests itself within a plurality of mate-
rial forms and phenomena, many of which may conflict with one another. Truth 
and reality are perceived differently from diverse points of view, and no single 
point of view is the complete truth.12 Human beings are only capable of partial 
knowledge; consequently, no single, specific, human view can claim to represent 
absolute truth. Apparent contradictions in the earthly world of human ideas are 
thus an indication of the flexibility, fluidity, and plurality of ultimate reality.13 On 
this view, to hold any particular viewpoint as final is to hold a limited picture of 
reality. Rather than relying on establishing the validity of any given proposition, 
solutions to moral problems become concerned with investigating the multiplicity 
of truths and working through them in a nondichotomous fashion.
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This way of inquiring into problems defies the absolutist logic employed by 
many normative frameworks in Western political thought. Gandhi repeatedly 
emphasized that his own understanding of various truths, even as he held stead-
fastly to them, was always provisional and contingent, until further examined and 
tested through the nonviolent encounter. He distinguished between “Absolute” 
and “relative” truths. Absolute Truth was “the Eternal Principle, that is God,” while 
relative truths are our own individual perceptions of the many-sided and plural-
istic Absolute Truth.14 Absolute Truth is so pluralistic, many-sided, and fluid, that 
no single human mind can capture it entirely. Human life is most often a struggle 
to approximate a series of “relative” truths. Because human knowledge of this 
Absolute Truth is fallible, human beings are destined to see Truth only through 
the fragmented prism of their relative, everyday perceptions.15 This leads to an 
epistemic fallibility, a sense of contingency about one’s conclusions, and an ability 
to keep them open to correction at all times.16
It is important to emphasize that Gandhi privileges the activity or process of 
truth-seeking over definitive knowledge of truth. That is, he is mainly interested in 
arriving at less ambitious and provisional truths about the right action to be taken 
in a specific situation for a specific reason.17 While the goal of attaining Absolute 
Truth is always present, Gandhi reminds us of the danger of resting with the belief 
that we have in fact attained it, because it takes us away from the continued activity 
of seeking. Gandhi scholars have reminded us that there is a privileging in Gandhi 
of truth as experiential rather than cognitive.18 Truth is instantiated through 
everyday practices of truth-seeking, rather than in any formal, doctrinal, or final 
manner. It is not to be understood as an abstraction, but rather as something expe-
rienced through the everydayness of practice.19
To connect this back to R1: when Gandhi claims that religion should be a “pri-
vate matter,” he is using religion to mean the dharma (duty) of truth-seeking as a 
private process, activity, or practice, rather than a steady state. Gandhi’s R1 concep-
tion of religion is private in a very particular way. The individual conscience is cen-
tral for Gandhi in every endeavor of truth-seeking. The conscience, for Gandhi, 
is “the voice of God . . . of Truth.”20 The “call of the individual conscience” is the 
main vehicle for accessing truth, and the practices of truth-seeking are to consti-
tute a kind of systematic training of the individual will.21 Thus, when Gandhi calls 
religion a “private” and “personal affair,” he means this in an existential sense: it is 
between you and your God.22 R1 is a deeply experiential and interactive relation-
ship with the deepest part of the self, the part which Gandhi believes has a special 
connection to the Truth that is God.23
But crucially, this does not mean that those private practices of truth-seeking 
driven by the conscience cannot be brought to bear on collective, public life. In fact, 
the opposite is the case: Gandhi was particularly adept at taking “private” practices 
of truth-seeking—such fasting or celibacy—and bringing them to bear on public 
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matters.24 In so doing, he would exemplify his experience of a relative truth-claim 
rather than engage in dogmatic declarations of truth as principled commitment. 
When Gandhi says there can be no politics without religion, he is referring to R1, 
characterized by private activities and experiences of truth-seeking.
Of course, there is also a communitarian sense in which Gandhi uses the term 
“religion,” as something shaped by the power of tradition and community. Yet, as 
many scholars have demonstrated, Gandhi was hardly univocal on the question of 
deference to traditional community guidance: time and time again, he ran afoul of 
Hindu religious authorities in reinterpreting traditional religious guidance in ways 
that were reformist, claiming to do so on the basis of individual epistemic author-
ity legitimated by the call of conscience.25 Religious communities for him function 
as a support or supplement to the truth-seeking of the conscience, “ancestral prac-
tices” that serve as “action heuristics, instructing the individual on how to become 
a better human being.”26 Such supporting or supplementary guidance comes pre-
cisely in the form of everyday practice, rather than through the belief in Absolute 
Truth.27 These guiding practices derive their truth from the fact that they have 
been handed down from generation to generation. Practice and experience con-
tinue to take precedence over doctrinal belief.28
We are now in a position to understand why Gandhi may be thought of as 
an anti-secularist. He is keen that practices and experiences of truth-seeking be 
brought to bear on actions in the political realm, leading to a marriage between 
political life and truth-seeking.29 Certainly, one’s relationship to Truth, God, the 
Inner Voice, is deeply private in the sense that it is subject to one’s own inner expe-
rience. At the same time, Gandhi would want R1 and private truth-seeking to serve 
as the “repository or expression of moral values,” available for checking corrup-
tion, violence, and other ills of public life.30 Moreover, when this form of private 
faith is brought to bear on public political matters, Gandhi insists that it be done 
in an experiential, exemplary, and action-oriented manner: that is, not through 
declaring principled commitment to doctrinal truths, but through practices that 
demonstrate through exemplary engagement the activity of truth-seeking. We can 
now make sense of Gandhi’s claim that politics cannot be divorced from spiritual-
ity or religion, when religion is understood in a very particular way as R1.
RELIGION 1  VERSUS RELIGION 2 :  PRIVATE TRUTH-
SEEKING VERSUS D O CTRINAL TRUTH
Gandhi’s R1 can now be explored through a contrast with what I call Religion 2 
(hereafter R2). In contrast to R1 understood as private practices of truth-seek-
ing, R2 may be understood as principled commitment to absolute or doctrinal 
truth. I argue that Gandhi is deeply troubled by and suspicious of R2. He is refer-
ring to this conception of religion when he says the state should be “secular,” 
or remain apart from religion. In describing R2 as doctrinal truth or principled 
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commitment, I rely on analyses by scholars who have described the Semitic or 
Abrahamic concept of religious truth, in which religions are seen as a matter of 
mutually exclusive truth or falsity of doctrines, propositions, and beliefs.31 Each 
of these religions claims to be a unique revelation to humanity, and that its own 
doctrines are therefore the true self-disclosure of the divine.32 Other traditions are 
seen as false doctrines or rival claims to truth. This leads in turn to the obligation 
to proselytize, for if one believes in a universally valid truth, all others are neces-
sarily false, and one is obliged to combat false doctrines. In contrast, the overall 
ethos of anekantavāda permeates most non-Abrahamic faiths of the subconti-
nent, even as its conceptual roots can be traced specifically to Jain theology and 
metaphysics. Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, and Sikh traditions do not ascribe “exclusive” 
truth predicates to their doctrines or beliefs.33 As we have seen, other traditions 
are viewed not as competing doctrines, but rather as the transmitted “ancestral 
practices” of communities.34
Why might Gandhi be troubled by the intervention of this R2 conception of 
religion into political life? Gandhi repeatedly claims that “all faiths are true and 
divinely inspired, and all have suffered through the necessarily imperfect handling 
of men.”35 There is, he states, “no such thing as one true religion, every other being 
false.”36 Elsewhere he claims that “my Hindu instinct tells me that all religions 
are more or less true.”37 Or: “Religions are different roads converging to the same 
point. What does it matter that we take different roads so long as we reach the same 
goal?”38 Such statements are consistent with his understanding of anekantavāda: 
ultimate Truth cannot be completely grasped by finite human perception, and reli-
gious doctrine is a result of such finite perception. In such a world, all religious 
traditions are seen as parts in an ongoing human search for ultimate truth, con-
taining portions of some truth and some error. Gandhi suggests therefore that it is 
best to follow one’s own, but hold others as dear and close.39
In addition, let us recall that Gandhi’s commitment to anekantavāda involves 
an “epistemic humility” that leaves him skittish about claiming to have reached 
the Absolute Truth.40 It is not simply that it is difficult to know the truth; one must 
come to know it through a lifetime of practice rather than belief. Thus, the notion 
that one “has reached” the truth leads to an emphasis on belief and doctrine over 
practice and experience. It takes us away from constant seeking, allowing us to 
rest in the certainty that we “have” the truth. Gandhi believes this R2 conception 
of religion as inflexible or principled commitment to be a destructive force in 
politics. He repeatedly warns us that the claim to infallibility, in having reached 
Absolute Truth, “would be a most dangerous claim to make.”41 Karuna Mantena 
has reminded us that Gandhi is sensitive to the danger that idealism and attach-
ment to principle can facilitate ideological entrenchment in politics. “The worry 
is that when political disagreements are framed as arguments over fundamental 
principles, the potential for political progress may dissipate in an atmosphere of 
increasing hostility and polarization.”42
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There is yet another sense in which Gandhi fears the preponderance of R2 over 
R1. When Gandhi says religion is a “personal” or “private” affair, I read him as 
being deeply concerned that this private conception of religion (R1) should not 
be subject to the doctrinal authority of institutionalized faiths (R2) attempting to 
control the conscience.43 If an R2 conception of religion gains predominance over 
R1, then the individualized, everyday, action-based understanding of religion as 
conscientious truth-seeking could be displaced by a doctrinal and absolutist one, 
privileging “truth professed” over “truth lived.” One way we can see this is by fol-
lowing the debates around Gandhi’s aversion to proselytizing, to which he was 
staunchly opposed. In his often tense communications with Christian missionar-
ies, Gandhi insists that Christianity is simply one among many true religions (each 
of which also contain some measure of error). He repeatedly questions the mis-
sionary goal of obtaining the confession of cognitive belief in Christian principles, 
instead of simply practicing truth through exemplary action and encouraging oth-
ers toward such action.44
For Gandhi, when religions function as rival movements entitled to gather as 
many adherents as they can, this encourages the view of religion as “private” in 
the wrong sense. It turns the realm of belief into an ideological battlefield where 
doctrinal belief systems square off against each other by attempting to win the 
allegiance of individual consciences. The conscience, that delicate instrument of 
R1, comes under pressure to pledge allegiance to doctrinal principles, rather than 
engaging in practices of truth-seeking. This conception of the “private” sphere is 
exactly the wrong one, if it means that the privacy of the individual’s struggle with 
her own conscience (R1) becomes the object of appropriation by doctrinal reli-
gions attempting to win validity for their truth claims (R2). This model of religious 
competition in the so-called “private” sphere is focused on pursuing commitments 
to abstract ideals more than on providing guidance regarding exemplary practices 
for living well. When the notion of “freedom of conscience” is reduced to compe-
tition among doctrinal truth systems, religion is no longer “private” in the sense 
that truly matters for Gandhi. Instead, the tendency is to reify doctrine, belief, and 
principle over practice and exemplary lived experience.
We are now in a position to understand how Gandhi envisioned the appro-
priate relationship between individuals and religions in a multireligious polity. 
When he claims that everyone should be allowed to profess their religion with-
out hindrance, he means that each person should be left alone on their own pri-
vate path to truth-seeking. Here, I do not use the phrase “left alone” in a literal 
sense: Gandhi clearly sees a role for traditional ancestral guidance. Rather, I use 
“left alone” in an existential sense, as individuals struggle to find truth for them-
selves through repeated practice and struggle. Gandhi envisions a truly individual, 
conscience-driven search for truth, instantiated through practice, with the occa-
sional guidance of a community, to be accepted or rejected as conscience sees fit. 
When this traditional guidance in the practice of truth-seeking gets transformed 
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into a competition among the inflexible doctrinal truth claims of various religions, 
the relationship between individuals and religious communities starts to go awry. 
Individual consciences can come under pressure and be led away from the private 
activity of truth-seeking, rightly understood, as communities focus on ideologi-
cal entrenchment grounded in the certainty of one’s own truth and the falsity of 
others’. In contrast, Gandhi suggests that the individual activity of truth-seeking 
(R1) should not be subject to appropriation by the forces of religious doctrine 
(R2). Instead, individual truth-seeking must not only focus on habituation and 
practice, it must be brought to bear on public matters through exemplary actions, 
rather than through doctrinal belief. It is in this sense that Gandhi claims that there 
should be no separation between religion and politics. Let us now see what role the 
state might play in all of this.
SECUL ARISM IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA
For most Western theorists, secularism means the strict disestablishment of reli-
gion from state, or the strict exclusion of religion from all state affairs for the sake 
of promoting the religious liberty and equal citizenship of all individuals.45 Rather 
than conforming strictly to the Westcentric model of church-state separation, 
secularism has been defined in India, not as neutrality toward all religions, but as 
“equal respect” for all religions (sarva dharma sambhava). The precise meaning 
of this is rarely clear, but it has often manifested itself as equal tolerance toward, 
intervention in, and sometimes embrace of, myriad public and private expressions 
of faith. Meanwhile, the state’s intervention in the majority religion (Hinduism) 
through the legal abolition of untouchability coexists uneasily with its reluctance 
to intervene in the gender-biased legal practices of Islam, a minority religion in 
India. Rather than requiring a strict distance and equal neutrality from all reli-
gions, the Indian state reserves the right to selectively intervene in and engage with 
religions and religious practices. The Indian Constitution, even as it implies the 
strict separation of state and religion, recognizes the rights of religious minorities, 
commits the state to give aid to educational institutions established and admin-
istered by religious communities, and permits religious education in institutions 
partially funded by the state.
Contemporary theorizing about secularism in India has long been divided 
around the question of whether the liberal-democratic institutions adopted in 
post-independence India were Western theoretical impositions alien to indigenous 
ideas and practices. This issue has become particularly salient since the emergence 
of a religious and caste-based politics of identity in India. The rise of an assertive 
political Hinduism has been accompanied by: instances of mass religious violence; 
the reemergence of a sociopolitical hegemony privileging the Hindu majority; a 
desire to reassert the rights of upper-caste Hindus; and subsequently, rising anxi-
ety about the rights of minorities such as Muslims, Christians, and lower-caste 
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Hindus.46 By the turn of the millennium, both the conceptual apparatus and 
practice of secularism in India were said to be in crisis.47 Such anxiety has been 
heightened by the election as prime minister of Narendra Modi, a right-wing poli-
tician who is widely known to have incited religious riots involving the massacre 
of Muslims by Hindus.
One can identify several discernible strands along a continuum of contempo-
rary Indian political thinking about the purpose and place of secularism in Indian 
political life.48 On one end we have Nehruvians or liberal democrats committed to 
the secularist project in the accepted Western sense. Nehru’s concept of secular-
ism was recognizably modern, rationalist, and rooted in European Enlightenment 
ideals.49 It is well known that Gandhi’s religiousness was both puzzling and mildly 
annoying to Nehru, an agnostic who wished the state to observe neutrality with 
regard to all religions, considering most Indian forms of religious belief backward, 
superstitious, and antithetical to modernity. Nehruvian secularists insist that it is 
precisely because of India’s religious diversity that it requires something like the 
Western model of secularism, understood in terms of the religious neutrality of 
the liberal state. Moreover, “to people like Nehru, to conceive of the high ideals of 
rationality, secularism, or even socialism as ‘European’ was a mistake. These were 
intrinsically universalist ideals that were generated by early modern European 
debates.”50 For proponents of this position, secularism represents progress, liberty, 
and the “operation of scientific temper and rationality.”51 The persistence of com-
munalism represented the failure of Indians to modernize adequately and of reli-
gion to take its proper place in the private sphere.
In the middle of the spectrum, there are discourses that argue that some modi-
fication of the Westcentric secularist conception is required in order to apply it 
to the distinctiveness of the Indian situation, a “deliberate crafting of different 
rules to respond to a historically distinct situation.”52 Rajeev Bhargava argues, for 
instance, that Indian secularism can be redefined as “principled” distance, a doc-
trine through which the state can reserve the right to intervene in and engage with 
religions and religious practices for the purpose of promoting certain values con-
stitutive of secularism (however these are defined).53 Meanwhile, Partha Chatterjee 
proposes a criterion by which the long history of intricate involvement of the 
Indian state in the affairs of religious institutions can be justified as legitimate 
and fair. Nonintervention in the affairs of a religious community should be predi-
cated on internal representativeness and democratic structures: those members of 
minority religious groups who demand noninterference from the state should also 
demand that their group publicly obtain from its members consent for those prac-
tices that have regulatory power over the lives of members.54 Other thinkers in this 
range of the spectrum argue that secularism is in fact “an empty category devoid of 
any stable meaning,” which has meant different things in different circumstances 
of its contestation.55 In her excellent history of Indian secularism, Shabnum Tejani 
lists a variety of Indian thinkers who have addressed the profound ambivalence 
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at the heart of the secularist project, arguing that secularism in India can only be 
understood when situated in the particularities of its historical context.56
Finally, at the other end of the continuum, we have discourses that question 
the very viability of secularism within India, arguing that secularism is a Western 
transplant with almost no intelligibility in the Indian context. It is this set of dis-
courses that allows us to best understand the relevance of Gandhi’s thinking to 
contemporary debates about secularism. One of the earliest proponents of this 
position, T. N. Madan, called secularism “an alien cultural ideology, which lacks 
the strong support of the state [and] has failed to make the desired headway in 
India.”57 Madan claims that the creation of the secular state relies on the intellec-
tual history of Christianity, and on a peculiarly Christian culture.58 “The transfer-
ability of the idea of secularism to the countries of South Asia . . . should not be 
taken for granted,” he writes.59 “Neither India’s indigenous religious traditions nor 
Islam recognize the sacred-secular dichotomy . . . therefore, the modern processes 
of secularization  .  .  . proceed in India without the support of an ideology that 
people . . . may warm up to.”60
Other scholars say that secularism is a Western transplant that migrated to India 
without its larger world view and conditions of intelligibility. It therefore has little 
meaning in the Indian context, partly because there is no equivalent understand-
ing of the separation between religious and secular, or even an equivalent under-
standing of what religion is. In such a situation, using the language of secularism 
only exacerbates rather than ameliorates conflicts among religious groups.61 Ashis 
Nandy, a prominent neo-Gandhian, alleges that the statist model of secularism in 
India is itself responsible for much interreligious strife, because of its attempt to 
exorcise religion from public life.62 Secularism is linked to an unnecessary empha-
sis on modernization and rationality, understood as a loss of meaning, a desacral-
ization and erasure of religion from public life, a neglect of religious community 
and sensibility, and a misplaced valorizing of statist intervention. If a religious way 
of life “cannot find normal play in public life, it finds distorted expression in fun-
damentalism, revivalism and xenophobia.”63 As Madan argues, “it is not religious 
zealots alone who contribute to fundamentalism . . . but also the secularists who 
deny the very legitimacy of religion in human life and . . . provoke a reaction.”64
Thinkers in this last group of discourses are also concerned with the question 
of the relationship between the state and various specific religions, and among the 
adherents of these different religions. S. N. Balagangadhara and Jakob de Roover 
argue convincingly that the problem of religious conflict in post-independence 
India has been exacerbated rather than ameliorated by the so-called neutral-
ity of the state.65 The position of liberal neutrality, according to which the state 
is to remain strictly neutral with respect to all religions in a multireligious state, 
has been considered the benchmark for a secular state. The framers of the Indian 
Constitution tried to transplant the theory of the Western liberal state into Indian 
soil. Its cognitive framework construed non-Semitic traditions like Hinduism as 
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the structural equivalents of Christianity, viewing them as embodiments of doc-
trinal truth claims. This continued the colonial mechanism that had compelled 
Indian religious traditions to refashion themselves according to the Semitic model 
of religion, gradually pushing what were once fluid and open-ended religious com-
munities to transform into rigid bodies that required specific religious texts and 
doctrines as canonical for each community. Non-Semitic religious traditions like 
Hinduism were forced to “semiticize” by aggressively defending their own prac-
tices and demonstrating their foundations in terms of “religious doctrines” and 
“sacred texts.”66 When the post-independence Indian state adopted this Semitic 
model of religions by allowing proselytization, it implicitly privileged the notion 
that religion was a matter of doctrinal truth and falsity.67 This further transformed 
the relationship between its religious communities from one in which all religions 
were seen as equally legitimate paths to truth into a zero-sum conflict of competing 
doctrines, in which communities now saw other religions as rivals to truth claims.
Religious conflict was exacerbated as each tradition’s orthodox factions 
entrenched their attempts to establish their “doctrines” as the superior form of 
religion in Indian society. Balagangadhara and de Roover cite this as the most 
compelling explanation for the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the consequent 
breakdown of cultural pluralism and interreligious harmony in contemporary 
India. Ashis Nandy claims that distorted or perverted versions of religion circulat-
ing in modern or semi-modern India owe their origins to the perception of the tri-
umph of secularism.68 Religious zealots looked longingly at more “monotheized” 
Western faiths and attempted to replicate their doctrinal power and authority.69 As 
Ajay Skaria notes, religion for Gandhi only became undemocratic and intolerant 
when identified with the modern Western conception of it.70
How might we connect all of this back to Gandhi’s seemingly idiosyncratic 
and contradictory understanding of “secularism”? The cited criticisms of secular-
ism’s “transplanted” nature would seem to explain the contradictions of secular-
ism in India in ways that converge most closely with Gandhi. His thought can be 
interpreted as a warning to Indians about the dangers of the modern secular state 
adopting the R2 conception of religious truth, moving us away from a conception 
of religion as activity and practice (R1), and toward religion as a set of doctrinal 
truth-claims (R2). These warnings are visible in contemporary critiques of secular-
ism in which Gandhi’s R1 and R2 conceptions, and the primacy of anekantavāda, 
are reflected. These critiques point to the problems of ideological entrenchment 
stemming from a conception of religion as reified doctrinal truth rather than as 
exemplary individual practice based on truth-seeking by the conscience.
The Western secular liberal state is able to sustain its claim to neutrality with 
respect to the truth-value of religious claims—while extending the freedom of 
proselytization to all religions—only because it shares with Semitic religions their 
beliefs about what constitutes religion.71 In so doing, it has privileged a certain 
conception of religious truth. When the postcolonial Indian state adopted this 
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model of liberal secular neutrality after independence, making proselytization 
legally permissible as a condition of “religious freedom,” it implicitly took a posi-
tion on the nature of religion, and adopted a Semitic theology that was hardly 
neutral, especially in comparison to anekantavāda. The ostensibly neutral, secular 
state has seemed all the more intrusive and violent in a society constituted mainly 
of non-Semitic faith traditions. The state’s commitment to a specific understand-
ing of religious truth—and thus to a non-neutral metaphysical claim—is at odds 
with the non-Semitic one that has historically been predominant among its citi-
zens.72 The Indian state encourages an understanding of religion as closer to R2 in 
Gandhi’s sense, and further away from R1 and anekantavāda, exerting a cultural, 
interpretive power over social understandings of religion.73
Thus, Gandhi’s contention that proselytization should be impermissible is 
more than a seemingly odd and oppressive stance toward what is construed as 
religious “freedom” in the West. Instead, it can be understood as a decoding of, 
and a resistance to, the underlying Semitic metaphysical commitments of the lib-
eral secular state. It can also be seen as a reenvisioning of the meaning of religious 
freedom as R1 rather than R2, a call to remain free from the imposition of an 
R2 conception. The fact that the modern secular state wishes to extrapolate poli-
tics away from truth-seeking is only one reason—albeit perhaps the most com-
monly cited one74—that Gandhi finds such a state to be flawed. But on the reading 
I have offered, the modern state is intrusive and coercive for Gandhi because it has 
implicitly privileged an R2 (or Semitic) view of the relationship between religions. 
In turn, this leaves non-Semitic faiths at a disadvantage, subject to proselytizing 
by Semitic faiths, while their own notions of religion are ignored and pressured to 
change in favor of a Semitic one.
C ONCLUSIONS
My reading of Gandhi’s approach to secularism and religious freedom is not taken 
from a literal or strict exegetical approach to his textual corpus. Gandhi himself 
did not use the terms R1, R2, Semitic or non-Semitic religions, liberal neutral-
ity, and so forth. Rather, I suggest he was responding to the categories that were 
invading India through the colonial process, providing a reception to epistemi-
cally loaded terms from Abrahamic traditions. Whether or not he directly engaged 
the framework from which these terms arose, he was able to anticipate the dangers 
with which their reception in India was fraught. It is this responsive reception that 
I have attempted to excavate here. Gandhi’s suspicion of an R2 conception of reli-
gion over an R1 one had to do with precisely the sorts of critiques that contempo-
rary critics of Indian secularism raise: an emphasis on doctrinal truth claims over 
practice and action, and a lack of epistemic humility stemming from the inflexible 
or doctrinal commitments of religion understood as R2. I have also argued that 
Gandhi was concerned about the atmosphere of hostility and polarization that 
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results when religions are seen as competitors attempting to win validity for truth 
claims. Indeed, this appears to be precisely the scenario that contemporary India 
finds itself in, since the language of modern secularism has forced communities to 
conform to an alien understanding of religious truth, while introducing a steady 
stream of distortion into their self-understandings. Meanwhile, it destroys a his-
torically stable, age-old model of interfaith harmony, in which adherents of vari-
ous religions saw their respective practices as complementary, nonexclusive paths 
to truth, often involving fluid processes of intercultural borrowing and assimila-
tion. The secular Indian state presents itself as a “neutral” power standing above 
competing claims to religious truth, while all along privileging the Semitic con-
ception of religious truth.
What has resulted is exactly what Gandhi appeared to have feared: a competi-
tion among the inflexible, principled doctrinal truth claims of various religions 
(R2). Meanwhile, the individual conscience, rather than engaging in the activity 
of truth-seeking understood as “private” in Gandhi’s sense (R1), becomes engaged 
in the work of ideological entrenchment grounded in the certainty of knowledge 
about doctrinal truth, and the concomitant falsity of “other” truths (R2).
To say that Gandhi was resistant to the modern liberal language of secularism, 
and found it to be a “parochialism claiming universal provenance,”75 is not news to 
us. But he prophetically reminds us that the language and operation of the liberal 
secular state violate the assumption of anekantavāda according to which all reli-
gions are equally “true” paths. When the state takes a position on what religion is, 
this leads to a competition among abstract doctrinal truth claims, while getting in 
the way of the truly private practice of religion in Gandhi’s sense. This allows us 
to understand Gandhi’s apparently contradictory claims—that “the state should 
undoubtedly be secular” and that he “cannot conceive of politics as divorced 
from religion”—in a way that relies on more than simply the semantic distinction 
between “the state” and “politics.” Gandhi’s understanding of secularism may be 
read as a warning about the violence inflicted by the secular state when culturally-
specific notions of “religion” and “neutrality” are transplanted into non-Semitic 
contexts. While Gandhi’s usage of terms such as “religion,” “secularism,” “private,” 
and “public” was admittedly aporetic and idiosyncratic, I have offered here a  knitting- 
together of meaning, suggesting that he refigures the private/public distinction 
in Westcentric discourse, and gives the “private” practice of religion a whole new 
meaning. He also offers an understanding of religious “freedom” predicated on an 
understanding of the relationship between individuals and communities, as well 
as among different religious communities. Above all, I have attempted to show 
that his fears about the encroachment of Westcentric conceptions of religion in 
the non-Western context were not entirely unfounded. Rather, they coincide with 
contemporary discourses about the distortions wrought by postcolonial secular-
ism in India, resulting from the transplanting of secularism from the Abrahamic 
to the Indian cultural context.
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Federalism and Unitarism in Late Colonial Nigeria
Wale Adebanwi, University of Oxford
This chapter examines the different approaches to multiculturalism among 
Nigeria’s three core and competing regions in the period of decolonization.1 The 
key questions that are confronted here in focusing on the contention over the 
nature and dynamics of multiculturalism in this era are these: Is multiculturalism 
the best way to deal with diversity in an emerging but divided (African) nation-
state? Is multiculturalism antithetical to nation-building and mutual recognition 
of equal value among different ethnic-nationalities within African polities? What 
happens when multiculturalism simultaneously constitutes the basis of politi-
cal architecture as well as the fundamental problem of political organization in a 
multi-ethnic state?
I suggest that engaging with these questions can be helpful in understanding 
the unending political instability in contemporary African states caused largely 
by the unremitting antagonism between the constituent groups. The chapter 
explains the historical sociology of the politics of ethno-cultural diversity in 
Nigeria in relation to the struggle to construct a suitable political architecture for 
the governing of a vast country, an architecture that was strong enough to respond 
to as well as manage Nigerian’s diversity while ensuring unity. Generally, I suggest 
that contemporary problems in multi-ethnic postcolonial African states concern-
ing the best approaches to national unity, diversity, party politics, power sharing, 
and so on, are rooted in different visions of multiculturalism, as exemplified in 
the Nigerian case.
Will Kymlicka recently argued that “ideas about the legal and political accom-
modation of ethnic diversity have been in a state of flux around the world for 
the past 40 years.”2 However, Kymlicka reflects a dominant trend in the literature 
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in the West,3 in which contemporary multiculturalism is assumed to be largely a 
Western experience or problem.4 Even while admitting that multiculturalism is a 
phenomenon that has been around for many centuries and that even in the con-
temporary era, “in very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same 
language, or belong to the same ethnonational group,”5 thus making multicultur-
alism “a normative response to that fact,”6 yet the focus and examples drawn by 
many scholars from, or based in, the West are almost always from Euro-American 
contexts (extending sometimes to Australia). In this context, multiculturalism, 
for the most part, is captured either as a phenomenon defined by the social, eco-
nomic, political, and policy responses to increased immigration from the devel-
oping world to the West,7 or as represented in the challenges faced by minorities 
(racial, ethnic, religious, or gender) in contemporary Western societies8—or both. 
Perhaps because of its peculiar experience of state racism that survived up the last 
decade of the twentieth century, South Africa is the only country in Africa that has 
attracted sufficient attention in the literature on multiculturalism.9
Kymlicka, among others, also dates the “struggle for multiculturalism and 
minority rights” as having emerged “in the late 1960s,” as one of the three “waves” 
of movements that arose against the backdrop of “this new assumption of human 
equality [which] generated a series of political movements designed to contest 
the lingering presence or enduring effects of older hierarchies [emphasis added].”10 
Contrary to this position, the Nigerian case—as evident in several other African 
countries, including Kenya, (South) Sudan, South Africa, Cameroon, Uganda, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritania, and the Central African 
Republic—shows that the struggle for multicultural diversity in Africa preceded 
this period, even if the specific language of “multiculturalism” was not used at 
this point. Also, many cases in Africa point to the fact that the struggle for mul-
ticulturalism regarding “the lingering presence or enduring effects of older hier-
archies” is not only one in which minority groups are pitched against dominant 
majority groups. In some cases, such struggles set dominant or marginal majority 
groups against one another or even marginal majority groups against dominant 
minority groups.
Against this backdrop, Amy Gutmann’s definition of multiculturalism as “the 
state of a society or the world containing many cultures that interact in some sig-
nificant way with each other [emphasis added],”11 is one of the most useful ways 
of approaching this phenomenon. However, as the African experience has shown, 
although multiculturalism is potentially a positive principle in multi-ethnic societies 
and states, its practices may not necessarily produce beneficial consequences. The 
uses to which dominant groups, systems, or parties put multiculturalism may in fact 
portend danger for the democratic principles inherent in the idea. As Asef Bayat has 
argued, although multiculturalism “calls for equal coexistence of different cultures 
within a national society,” its politics is paradoxically also steeped in “the language 
of separation and antagonism [as well as] cultural superiority and ethnocentrism.”12
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To account for this, it is important to pay attention to the historical context 
of multiculturalism in understanding its contemporary successes or failures in 
actually existing societies. Examining particular contexts of multiculturalism 
also helps to explain what it means in different societies and at different points. 
Here, I examine the debate between those who have imagined multiculturalism as 
(semi-)separatism—called by all sorts of names, including “Pakistanisation” and 
“ tribalism”—and those who have approached multiculturalism as a critical basis for 
the survival of a deeply divided and plural society, such as Nigeria. I want to use the 
“solutions” provided in the Nigerian experience to reflect on the questions I pose 
above by reflecting on British colonial legacy in Nigeria, the decolonization-era 
debates on the best political architecture for a multi-ethnic state, the principles that 
inform the positions taken, the responses that these positions generated, and how 
the Nigerian experience speaks to the phenomenon of multiculturalism in general.
THE (POST)C OLONY AND THE CHALLENGE  
OF MULTICULTUR ALISM
Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one 
country. But the people are different in every way, including religion, custom, 
language and aspirations. . . . We in the North take it that Nigeria’s unity is 
only a British intention for the country they created . . .
—Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first prime minister
In August 2014, over five hundred delegates, representing different groups, partic-
ularly ethno-regional groups, concluded five months of contentious deliberations 
on the existing divisive political structure and the future of Nigeria. The funda-
mental crisis of nation-building that provoked the convocation of the National 
Conference, the fourth of its kind in post-independence Nigeria, as the BBC 
reported, “has seen bitter conflicts between [Nigeria’s] numerous ethnic, religious 
and linguistic groups.”13 At the end of the conference, over six hundred resolu-
tions were passed. Based on these resolutions, a 335-page report was produced 
and submitted to President Goodluck Jonathan. The chairman of the National 
Conference Committee, former Chief Justice Idris Kutigi, reportedly stated that 
fears expressed in some parts of the country that the conference would lead to the 
disintegration of the country had been dispelled.14
However, the fact that questions are still being raised about basic issues of 
national unity fifty-four years after independence and six decades after the key 
structural issues regarding unity were assumed to have been resolved at the pre-
independence constitutional conferences points to the lingering problems regard-
ing the multicultural nature of Nigeria. Mohammed Haruna, a leading journalist 
and one of the most vociferous defenders of northern interests and Islam in Nigeria 
and an antagonist of the idea of a national conference in Nigeria, told the BBC that 
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“virtually every [post-independence] constitutional conference in this country has 
come with a hidden agenda by its convener and virtually all of them have come 
to grief [emphasis added].”15 What Haruna calls a “hidden agenda” is the suspi-
cion among the political elite of the core northern region that post-independence 
national conferences in Nigeria promoted by the southern political elite were 
designed to limit the influence of the north in the country. Therefore, the region 
has always been opposed to all post–civil war national conferences and the struggle 
for “political restructuring” of the federation, championed mainly by southerners. 
Indeed, it is significant that all the successful (national) constitutional conferences 
were the ones held in the late colonial period. These conferences determined the 
fundamental structures of the Nigerian federation. Every other major successful 
instance of tinkering with the structure of the federation since independence was 
by the military, mostly led by northern soldiers. The only major change under a 
non-northern military ruler, General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo (southern) military 
ruler, was one of the factors that provoked a countercoup (in July 1966), which 
ultimately led to civil war (1967–70). The Ironsi regime had abolished the federal 
system and replaced it with the unitary system (of provinces). This was reversed 
after Ironsi’s assassination in July 1966.
In the light of the fact that all attempts to fundamentally reshape the Nigerian 
federation through democratic processes has failed, it is important to reexamine 
the original positions and debates among the country’s three regions and their 
leaders, which continue largely to determine the current attitudes toward multi-
culturalism in Nigeria.
Diversity or plurality is one of the most important issues constantly raised in, 
and about, Nigeria. The recognition of the multicultural nature of the country evi-
dent in the old national anthem,16 and the national “aspirations” encoded in it, 
could as well have served as a reflection of the controversies and contestations 
over Nigeria’s unity and nationalism in the two decades preceding Nigeria’s inde-
pendence. This was especially true as the leaders of the different ethno-regional 
formations fought hard to ensure the recognition of their different political and 
cultural identities. The Nigerian experience is no surprise, though, given that, as 
David Theo Goldberg argues, “multiculturalism and commitments to diversity 
emerged out of [the] conflictual history of resistance, accommodation, integra-
tion, and transformation.”17 Against this backdrop, a central question that arose 
in late colonial Nigeria, as reflected in the struggles between those who wanted 
independent Nigeria to be a federal state and those who favored a unitary state, 
was this: Is multiculturalism a menace?18
Indeed, before the British amalgamated the northern and southern protector-
ates in 1914 to form Nigeria as a single colony, and even more so since, differ-
ence and multiculturalism were largely constructed by important sections of the 
national political elite—including even those who affirmed their own identities—
as a menace. The British colonialists themselves also believed and exhibited this, 
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even while insisting that the fate and fortunes of the different ethnic, cultural, and 
religious groups in Nigeria were tied together. As Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
one of the leaders of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC)—who later became 
Nigeria’s first and only prime minister—put it, since the amalgamation “the British 
Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country.” Balewa saw this as 
a futile effort, because he considered the people who made up the country as “dif-
ferent in every way, including religion, custom, language and aspirations.” He con-
cluded that “Nigeria’s unity is only a British intention for the country they created.” 
The differences among the components parts of Nigeria, Balewa submitted, were 
too deep to make unity possible.
John N. Paden, biographer of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late first premier of the 
Northern Region of Nigeria, recalls an encounter in the mid-1960s between two 
of the three Nigerian leaders whose attitude to multiculturalism helped to shape 
Nigeria’s future—against the backdrop of the powerful effects of the colonial archi-
tecture. Bello and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first premier of the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria and, later, the country’s first ceremonial president, are said to have had a 
meeting in which the latter demanded of Bello, “Let us forget our differences . . . ” 
to which Bello responded, “No, let us understand our differences. I am a Muslim 
and northerner. You are a Christian and easterner. By understanding our differ-
ences, we can build unity in our country [emphasis added].”19
Even though Bello and Azikiwe did not specifically use the language of mul-
ticulturalism in this encounter, their preceding and succeeding statements and 
actions constitute further evidence of their different and differing attitudes to cul-
tural diversity among Nigeria’s many ethnicities and faiths. If multiculturalism is, 
at the core, “a principle [that indicates] respect for the pluralism of cultures,”20 then 
forgetting differences might connote disregarding the pluralism of cultures, while 
understanding difference might mean accepting the reality of such plurality, just as 
Bello insisted. He and his party, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), strongly 
challenged the assimilationist policy championed by Azikiwe and his party, the 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), even though Bello envisaged 
multiculturalism in restrictive terms, as applying only along ethno-regional and 
religious lines.21
Before Bello and Azikiwe had this encounter, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the third 
of the triumvirate Nigerian nationalist leaders and first premier of the Western 
Region, had led a  contentious debate between his political party, the Action 
Group, and Azikiwe’s NCNC about the best structural political and constitutional 
arrangement to guarantee Nigeria’s multicultural realities. This debate revolved 
around whether federalism or unitarism would be the best political system for a 
multi-ethnic state such as Nigeria after independence from Britain. Incidentally, 
the two sides agreed that the question of Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
nature was a critical one that ought to be confronted through the political arrange-
ment that would succeed British colonial rule. Azikiwe and the NCNC, for the 
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most part, identified the multicultural nature of Nigeria as a menace or a prob-
lem that ought to be transcended, if not solved, through assimilationist or (politi-
cally) centralizing policies, starting with a unitary system of government. In this 
model, a central government would be supreme, and all subnational units would 
exist by the authority of the central government. On the contrary, Awolowo, and 
later Bello—both with different inflections—argued that Nigeria’s multicultural-
ism should be approached as a strength that ought to be recognized and honored, 
through decentralizing policies, which would constitute essential building blocks 
in the struggle for national unity and development.
This debate was not limited to Nigeria; in much of Africa during the late colo-
nial and early independence era multiculturalism was regarded as a “menace.” 
Colonialism created most modern African states, with the possible exception of 
Somalia, as multi-ethnic entities, but federalism was viewed in most parts of the 
continent as disuniting, separatist, or secessionist.22 In many instances, federal sys-
tems collapsed, among them the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–63), 
where Nyasaland became Malawi and Northern Rhodesia became Zambia at inde-
pendence in 1964; Cameroon (which switched to a unitary system in 1972); Kenya 
(where the Majimbo (“regions”) constitution with federal features was changed 
to a unitary system under Kenyatta); and Uganda (where President Milton Obote 
dropped the asymmetrical relations between the center and the provinces in 
1955).23 The dominant attitude in African states to federalism has produced dif-
ferent consequences, including authoritarian rule, the silencing of ethnic, reli-
gious, and cultural minorities, the imposition of unitarist forms of government, 
and one-party (or one-dominant-party) states. At independence and for much of 
the first two decades thereafter, most African states attempted officially to forget 
their inherent multiculturalism rather than recognize it. In the few cases where 
multiculturalism was accommodated to some extent, extreme centrifugal forces 
eventually encouraged the victory of centripetal forces. In the late colonial and 
early independence eras in Africa, multiculturalism was thus regarded as a threat 
to nation-building, “national unity,” “peace,” “progress” and economic, political 
and social “development.”24 Despite this, however, no African country could avoid 
the challenges of multiculturalism. Each country faced these in different forms 
and responded in different ways, depending on their historical circumstances.25
MULTICULTUR ALISM,  BRITISH C OLONIALISM,  
AND INDIRECT RULE
No robust analysis of multiculturalism in Africa can proceed without understand-
ing the historical context. In the case of Nigeria, in particular, the structuring—
as well as epochal—powers of the indirect rule system introduced by the British 
colonial administration and its consequences in determining the nature of the 
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multiethnic state are critical. The “principle of ruling through the native chiefs” 
imposed on Nigeria, as its chief architect, Frederick Lugard,26 the first British 
governor-general of amalgamated Nigeria, described the indirect rule system 
(or Native Authority System), was one in which “racial dualism” was “anchored 
in a politically enforced ethnic pluralism,” as the Ugandan academic Mahmood 
Mamdani puts it.27 And because this “ethnic pluralism” was underlined by “the 
contradictory character of ethnicity,”28 when the bifurcated states created by colo-
nialism were deracialized in much of Africa, they were not democratized.29 Hence, 
though inherently a democratic phenomenon, process, and policy, multicultural-
ism has remained more of a (democratic) potential than reality in much of Africa. 
In most of the countries, struggles to achieve democratic multiculturalism—
whether violent or nonviolent—have been the rule rather than the exception.
Given that the indirect rule system was a form of “decentralized despotism,”30 
multiculturalism was produced and entrenched as a technology of rule rather than 
as a democratic tool for recognizing difference and diversity. The multi-ethnic 
African postcolonial states that succeeded the colonial states therefore reproduced 
forms of multiculturalism that were a dimension of power as well as a form of 
resistance, part of the problem as well as part of the solution.31
From 1900 to 1906, Lugard was the high commissioner of the British Protectorate 
of Northern Nigeria where he established the practice of administering the colony 
through emirs and local chiefs.32 In 1914, he was appointed as the governor-gen-
eral of the amalgamated territories (of the Northern and Southern Protectorates) 
called the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Although the indirect rule system 
was most suitable for the Northern Protectorate (largely dominated by the Fulani 
emirs), less so for the western part of the Southern Protectorate (with its monar-
chical system), and most unsuitable for the acephalous societies of the Igbo areas 
of the eastern part of the Southern Protectorate, it was nonetheless extended over 
the whole of colonial Nigeria, thus producing specific forms of struggles for mul-
ticulturalism that Nigeria still contends with today.
In the early years of the twentieth century, the British approached multicultur-
alism in contradistinction to unity. Lugard’s successor, Sir Hugh Clifford, found 
the idea of a “Nigerian” nation “dangerous” and encouraged multiculturalism as a 
means to “divide and rule.” He observed:
Assuming . . . that the impossible were feasible—that this collection of self-contained 
and mutually independent Native States, separated from one another, as many of 
them are, by great distances, by differences of history and traditions, and by ethno-
logical, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers, were indeed capable of 
being welded into a single homogeneous nation—a deadly blow would thereby be 
struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria, which secures to each 
separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its national-
ity, its chosen form of government; and the peculiar political and social institutions 
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which have been evolved for it by wisdom and by the accumulated experience of 
generations of its forebears.33
Evidently, Clifford did not accept the “premise of multiculturalism as a principle 
[of] respect for the pluralism of cultures.”34 What he articulated was fear of such 
pluralism as the basis for constructing mutual peace, justice, and equity among 
cultures. In his Background to Nigerian Nationalism, James Coleman captures this 
attitude, which didn’t change significantly as Nigeria approached independence: 
“The artificiality of Nigeria’s boundaries and the sharp cultural differences among 
its peoples point to the fact that Nigeria is a British creation and the concept of 
a Nigerian nation is the result of the British presence.  .  .  . The present unity of 
Nigeria, as well as its disunity, is in part a reflection of the form and character 
of the common government—the British superstructure—and the changes it has 
undergone since 1900.”35
Such was the depth of the differences between the administration of the two 
hitherto separate northern and southern protectorates that “the different policies 
and conceptions of colonial administration which evolved in each of the two pro-
tectorates during the fourteen years of their separate existence continued to domi-
nate official thought and action.”36 The bureaucracies in the two areas operated 
separately, and the colonial officials in the two protectorates also represented the 
two areas as if they were representatives of two different countries.
However, the process that led to the bifurcation of the north and the south 
and the further bifurcation of the south into western and eastern regions, for the 
most part, glossed over the several minority groups in these three regions, thus 
imposing the three largest majority groups, Hausa-Fulani (north), Igbo (east), 
and Yoruba (west) over more than three hundred minority groups. By the late 
1940s and 1950s, it became apparent that “ethnicity, and the need to accommo-
date disparate ethnic nations within the proposed Nigerian independent terri-
tory, would pose a sizeable challenge.  .  .  . [Because the] ethnic minorities were 
not to be pacified by the usual rhetoric and promises.”37 Given the agitations of 
the minority groups as Nigeria approached independence—as evident in the 
1957 Conference on Nigeria’s (Independence) Constitution at Lancaster House in 
London—a Minorities Commission was set up by the British government. Despite 
this, before, and even a few years after the creation, in 1963, of the first minor-
ity region in Nigeria (the Mid-West Region), the struggle for multiculturalism in 
Nigeria was largely defined by the tripartite arrangement involving the original 
three regions, that is, the Northern Protectorate and the western (including the 
Lagos colony) and eastern sections of the Southern Protectorate. This rendered 
“cultural minorities vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the major-
ity, while exacerbating ethnocultural conflict.”38 The hierarchical subdivision of 
the country during colonial rule into provinces, and districts or divisions, which 
were supposedly based on “territorial boundaries of indigenous political units,”39 
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encouraged these provinces and districts—in which the minority groups were the 
majority—to “become the focus of a new loyalty and thus . . . [progress] from the 
status of an artificial administrative unit to that of a political unit possessed of its 
own individuality.”40
These two factors—indirect rule and hierarchical subdivision of the country 
during colonial rule—as Nigeria moved toward independence particularly in the 
1950s, when different regions of the country fought for and gained a measure of 
autonomy, ensured that, to use Mamdani’s words, “participatory forms (“empow-
erment”) that stress[ed] the autonomy of a bounded group—only to undermine 
any possibility of an alliance-building majority-based representation” eventually 
justified and strengthened “the most undemocratic forms of central power.”41 In 
the context of the British government’s attempt to develop Nigeria into a unitary 
state, which Awolowo dismissed as “patently impossible,”42 multiculturalism thus 
became a big challenge for the emergent country.
“Nigeria is not a nation [but] a mere geographical expression,” Awolowo had 
contended in his Path to Nigerian Freedom (1947).43 The Oxford historian of the 
British empire Margery Perham shared that view, observing in her foreword to 
Awolowo’s book: “There is at present  .  .  . no Nigeria but the one traced on the 
map by Britain and held together in a state-system maintained by this country 
[Britain].”44 She added: “If Mr. Awolowo is right, as I believe he is, that in face 
of the deep divisions of race, culture and religion in Nigeria, political advance 
through natural groups and regions is the only way to a wider unity, then Britain 
may for long be required to provide the framework which holds three groups 
together until they are able to fuse into unity or federation.”45 One of the most 
salient controversies in this era, therefore, was whether the best system by which 
“the main groups [could] come together at the centre to pool and share their tra-
ditions and resources” was a federal or a unitary system.46 Thus, in the decoloni-
zation period, the colonial government and the representatives of the Nigerian 
groups confronted the question of how to protect and preserve multiculturalism 
within the independent nation-state.
Multiculturalism can be understood in the Nigerian context as a strategy for the 
political management or protection of the country’s multi-ethnic reality (includ-
ing the imbrication of this with religious differences, especially along ethno-
regional lines. It also connotes, as evident in many parts of Africa, what Tariq 
Modood calls “political accommodation of minorities.”47 However, the politics of 
minoritization in Nigeria is politically salient and thus more regularly expressed 
in the language of marginalization. Thus, minoritization or marginalization is not 
limited to ethno-linguistic groups that are politically categorized as minorities; it 
also involves majority groups that at one point or the other have imagined them-
selves to have been, or likely to be, marginalized by other groups. Furthermore, 
in Nigeria, multiculturalism is not only a response to the politics of identity; it is 
also critical for the politics of resource distribution and access to political power. 
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Additionally, it can be argued that, in the decolonization and immediate post-
independence eras, multiculturalism in principle constituted a rhetoric for pre-
venting the breaking up of the country in the light of the threats or attempts by the 
three regions of the country to secede at different points.
“WHEN WAYS OF LIFE C OLLIDE”
Nigeria is one of the stark examples of “what actually happens when issues of 
group identity are made the focal point of public attention and political argument 
in the inevitably rough and ready tumble of real politics [in Africa].”48 The leaders 
of both the Northern Region and the Southern Region approached the question 
of when Nigeria would achieve self-government as one that reflected the “essen-
tial” difference between the two hitherto separate territories. In one strand of what 
I describe as the cultural discourse of duality—which in colonial Nigeria consti-
tuted the backdrop to this difference—northerners, generally, were constructed by 
their leaders and the British colonial officers as “restrained,” “dignified,” “cultured,” 
“respectable,” and “respectful” of their British overlords; southerners were con-
structed by the same people (northern leaders and the British) as “rash,” or “impa-
tient,” “aggressive,” “disdainful of the ‘backward’ north,” “eager to dominate the 
north,” and “disrespectful” of their British overlords. In the alternative strand of 
the cultural discourse of duality, southerners, generally, were constructed by their 
own leaders as “progressive,” or “radical,” “freedom loving,” “forward-looking,” 
“modernity-embracing,” “enlightened,” “developed” (comparatively) and opposed 
to perpetual foreign domination; northerners were constructed by the southern-
ers as “backward,” “conservative,” “feudal,” “unenlightened stooges of imperialists,” 
and opposed to the unity and independence of Nigeria.49
No doubt the reality was far more complex than the simplistic attitudes and 
discourses alternatively deployed by these leaders, their supporters, the press, and 
British colonial officers; but this cultural discourse of duality was at the center of 
the question of multiculturalism in colonial Nigeria, reflecting both the dimen-
sions and the limitations of multiculturalism in the late colonial era. As the pres-
sure for self-government became more intense after the end of World War II, 
with the British Empire expressing willingness to bring its former colonial pos-
sessions into the British Commonwealth, the challenge of managing multiple 
identities in these colonial possessions moving toward independence became a 
central concern. However, managing the multiple identities could not be done in 
a vacuum, and the pressure for self-rule also quickened the pace of constitutional 
advance,50 given that the constitutional or legal process was the best guarantor of 
the right to difference. The pace of constitutional development in the colonies, 
in turn, stimulated the development of political parties,51 given that the power to 
protect difference and identities during that period could not also be acquired 
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in a vacuum—particularly, where cultural, ethnic, communal, and other identity 
groups were insufficiently powerful to dictate the sharing of political power.
In the case of Nigeria, the indirect rule system, which promoted decentral-
ization, left a contradictory political legacy in relation to the emergent need for 
centralized parliamentary democracy. Although British imperial interests and 
conservative chiefs and traditionalists favored the continued development of the 
native authority system, most Nigerian nationalists favored a move toward parlia-
mentary institutions.52 However, even among those who favored the latter, there 
were deep disagreements regarding the details and the pace.
Given the existing unitary structure imposed by the British, the first constitu-
tional attempt at federalism in Nigeria was the constitution promulgated in 1945 
under Governor Sir Arthur Richards.53. The concept of regionalism was the most 
important and acceptable feature of this constitution.54 This was a compromise 
between regional separatists, who wanted three separate states, and the strong fed-
eralists, who wanted a central parliament. For Richards, the “embryonic, quasi-
federal structure” created by the 1945 constitution was a “practical means” of 
ensuring two major objectives. It had the potential both to promote national unity 
in Nigeria, and to accommodate diversity within that unity.55 Responding to those 
who argued that regionalism would promote separatism, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, 
one of Richards’s predecessors, stated that “in fact, this measure represents not 
the division of one unit into three, but the beginning of the fusion of innumer-
able small units into three and from these three into one.”56 Despite the objections 
of the three regions to some parts of this constitution, all the major parties and 
the leaders of the three regions, particularly the Northern Region, applauded the 
regional arrangement.
Why did all the regional leaders at this point embrace regionalism in the 
context of multiculturalism? What constituted the historical circumstances that 
dictated this position in each case, and what were the responses? What were the 
differences in their approaches to regionalism in relation to multiculturalism and 
nationalism? I will attempt to answer these questions in the following sections.
MULTICULTUR ALISM:  BET WEEN BURKEAN  
AND JAC OBIN NATIONALISM
As I suggested earlier, the constitutive challenge of multiculturalism in Nigeria 
should be understood and analyzed mainly against the backdrop of the legacy 
of colonialism, particularly late colonialism—a period during which “prevail-
ing communal forces reinforced regional networks of power and patronage that 
dominated political behavior.”57 By bringing together two separate territories 
and governing these for a few decades as two or three separate territories with 
two or three “distinct” cultures, the British, with the ironic collaboration of the 
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leaders of the ethno-regional political parties in the colonial era, created a poli-
tics in which multiculturalism became a crisis or a problem to be confronted 
and transcended, rather than an asset to be embraced and managed. In Nigeria 
ethnic and ethno-regional self-consciousness thus produced a situation in which 
“relationship among groups was one of ethnic stratification…rather than ethnic 
coexistence.”58 This problem was exacerbated, as Coleman correctly noted, by the 
uneasy balance between the main three groups, which left them “as in all situa-
tions of bi- or tripolarity, vulnerable to the delicate balance of their ethnic duality 
or plurality suddenly giving way to a polarization into total ethnic bloc opposi-
tion or rivalry.”59
Since no territorial or political unity had existed before, no real unity was 
achieved, despite the fact that most of the nationalists paid lip service to, or indeed 
desired, national “unity-in-diversity.” As Rupert Emerson observed: “Where there 
is original unity, nationalism serves further to unite; where there is a felt ethnic 
diversity, nationalism is no cure.”60 It is important, therefore, to understand the 
different approaches of the major pre- and immediate post-independence ethno-
regional blocs, political parties, and regional leaders to multiculturalism through 
the lens of the traditions of Jacobin and Burkean forms of nationalism.
Jacobin Nationalism: Azikiwe, the NCNC, and the Eastern Region
The National Council of Nigerian Citizens, under the leadership of the Nigerian 
nationalist, journalist, and anti-colonial agitator par excellence, Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe—an Igbo from eastern Nigeria—was Nigeria’s earliest example of a political 
party driven by a Jacobin approach to multiculturalism. Although the NCNC was 
later identified with the Igbo-dominated eastern region of Nigeria, it was founded, 
Azikiwe stated, “in order to unify the various elements of our communities . . . and to 
emancipate our nation from the manacles of political bondage [emphasis added].”61
The mantra of the Jacobin form of nationalism, emerging from the French 
experience, is la nation une et indivisible (the nation, one and indivisible). Its goal 
was to combine “the heritage of the different regions  .  .  . in one national heri-
tage; producing a republican monocultural universalism from disparity.”62 As Tom 
Furniss would have described it, the NCNC’s form of nationalism was a “mod-
ernizing nationalism that sought to replace local identities and differences with a 
homogenized national politics and culture.”63
Among the nationalist leaders, Azikiwe, using the NCNC and his chain of 
newspapers, particularly the West African Pilot, was the most vociferous about cre-
ating a nation that sidestepped or transcended the existing “tribal” (ethnic) groups 
and emergent ethno-regional arrangements. Despite Azikiwe’s rather ironic posi-
tion as the president of the Ibo State Union, and his statement at the 1949 confer-
ence of the union that “it would appear that the God of Africa has specially created 
the Ibo [Igbo] nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages,”64 
he and his chain newspapers were opposed to the building of what the Pilot called 
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“ethnic shrines.” Azikiwe, the NCNC, and the Pilot insisted that they were cham-
pioning an “integral nationalism” and offered themselves “as the protector of mor-
ally superior national values and interests,” to use André van de Putte’s words.65 
Azikiwe argued that the recognition and validation of ethnic particularities were 
antithetical to the emergence of a strong and united Nigeria. Despite its multicul-
tural heritage, Nigeria ought to become a melting pot rather than a potpourri, he 
argued. This position was adopted by many Igbo leaders and intellectuals in late 
colonial Nigeria and thus became not only the NCNC’s position, but also the “Igbo 
position,” given the preponderance of Igbo support for the party and its leader. 
The Pilot dismissed any contrary position as “pakistanization,” a metaphor for the 
feared balkanization of Nigeria (along Indian/Pakistani lines) by those champion-
ing federalism.
Azikiwe at some points supported the adoption of a federal system for Nigeria, 
even though federalism involves a fundamental recognition of difference and 
diversity, allowing complex societies to manage their common affairs at a central 
level while also guaranteeing the independence of constituent units in the man-
agement of their local affairs.66 Between 1943 and 1948, he advocated that Nigeria 
be divided into eight protectorates, some of which roughly coincided with eth-
nic boundaries, in a federal colony. In 1948, in its Freedom Charter, the NCNC 
also advocated a federal system based strictly on ethnic units.67 This was a clear 
acknowledgement of the country’s multiculturalism.
However, in 1951, Azikiwe and the NCNC leaders suddenly changed their 
minds. The party stated that “in view of recent divisionist tendencies in the country 
and to accelerate the attainment of our goal for a united Nigeria, a unitary form 
of government with the acceptance of the principle of constituencies will be bet-
ter for Nigeria [emphasis added]”68 The excuse for the new position was that the 
colonial government “and anti-NCNC Nigerians were using federalism as a cloak 
for dismembering Nigeria [emphasis added].”69 As Coleman correctly notes, other, 
perhaps more critical, reasons for the change were the emergence of a strong and 
well-organized political party in the Western Region, the Action Group (AG), and 
the structure and organization of the 1951 Macpherson Constitution—which suc-
ceeded the Richards Constitution. Based on a more democratic process than was 
followed in the adoption of the Richards Constitution, the Legislative Council in 
Lagos appointed a select committee to consider the question of the status of the 
national capital, Lagos. As a member of the committee (representing the NCNC), 
Azikiwe wrote a minority report in which he objected to the tripartite division 
of the country into regions, or what he called a “tri-sected Pakistanized coun-
try.”70 He argued for “the division of the country along the main [ten] ethnic and/
or linguistic groups in order to enable each group to exercise local and cultural 
autonomy.”71 The position of Azikiwe and the NCNC might seem inconsistent, 
but the emergence of the Yoruba-dominated AG in the Western Region (which at 
some point included Lagos), where the NCNC had held sway, meant that the party 
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faced the possibility of defeat in the Regional House of Assembly under a federal 
system, as indeed happened later in the 1951 elections.72
Azikiwe and NCNC members insisted that their party—unlike the others, par-
ticularly the AG, and later the Northern People’s Congress (NPC)—was champi-
oning the building of a “homogeneous” nation. It was not until 1954 that Azikiwe 
and the NCNC again accepted the federal system in the march toward Nigeria’s 
independence. However, it was obvious to the other parties and regions of Nigeria, 
that this was a grudging acceptance of the reality, resulting from the rigidity of 
the stances of the Action Group/Western Region and the NPC/Northern Region. 
Indeed, Azikiwe and the NCNC never abandoned their position that regionalism 
and ethno-regional parties were manifestations of “division” rather than diversity. 
In the rhetoric and writings of Azikiwe and the spokesman of the NCNC, multi-
culturalism was portrayed as a problem for any emerging African nation-state. 
What the others saw as the refusal of Azikiwe and the NCNC/Eastern Region to 
accept the reality of Nigeria’s multicultural composition by canvassing for a uni-
tary system was linked to fears of what the other two major ethno-regional groups 
described as an attempt at “Ibo [Igbo] domination” of Nigeria. This continued to 
hover above ethno-political relations, thus defining the relationship among the 
three major groups. It also partly provoked the countercoup led by northern sol-
diers against the Igbo-led military regime in July 1966 and, eventually, the Nigerian 
Civil War (1967–70).
Burkean Nationalism: Awolowo, the AG, and the Western Region
In contrast to the Jacobin form of nationalism championed by Azikiwe and the 
NCNC, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the Action Group articulated a Burkean 
notion of nationalism, which fitted Nigeria’s multicultural nature, even though it 
had the potential to acerbate ethnic tension and deepen existing conflicts, par-
ticularly between the two major southern ethnic groups, the Igbo and the Yoruba.
In arguing against French “revolutionary nationalism .  .  . whose centrist and 
potentially totalitarian tendencies he represents as destructive of the sense of 
nation,”73 Edmund Burke supported “such divisions of our country as have been 
formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority,” adding that “the love 
to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality.”74 For Burke, local 
attachments, identifications, and loyalties were not barriers to national ones, but 
only prepared the mind for larger loyalty. In advocating for a hierarchy of loyal-
ties, “each supreme in its own sphere,”75 Burke pointed to the form of multicultural 
nationalism that Awolowo and AG advocated for Nigeria.
Unlike the NCNC members and its leader, who emphasized their pan-Nige-
rian identity, Coleman argues that, “more in the tradition of Burke, Awolowo had 
always been a Yoruba nationalist first and a pan-Nigerian nationalist second.”76 
Therefore, from “the beginning . . . there was a fundamental difference in attitude 
regarding the ends toward which the nationalist movement should be directed.”77 
When the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa) was 
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formed as a cultural organization for the Yoruba, first in London in 1945 and later 
in Nigeria in 1948, the group advertised two of its objectives to include the accel-
eration of “the emergence of a virile modernized and efficient Yoruba state with 
its own individuality within the Federal State of Nigeria,” while striving “earnestly 
to cooperate with existing ethnic and regional associations and such as may exist 
thereafter, in matters of common interest to all Nigerians, so as to thereby attain 
to unity in federation.”78
The Egbe later became the basis of the creation of a political party, the Action 
Group, devoted to capturing power in the Western Region in the decoloniza-
tion period. The party, led by Awolowo, resolved that “under the circumstances 
then prevailing in [late colonial] Nigeria the only certain avenue to power was a 
regional political party.”79 Thus, one of its most important campaign strategies for 
mobilizing support in the region was opposition to Azikiwe, the NCNC, and the 
threat of “Igbo domination” under the unitary system.
In his autobiography, Awolowo states that he wanted to rebuild Yorubaland to 
ensure that every cultural group would have its rightful place in a multicultural 
Nigeria. This attitude and the activities geared toward validating it were dismissed 
by the NCNC and Azikiwe’s Pilot as a process of the “pakistanization” of Nigeria. 
The Pilot regarded AG’s version of multiculturalism as a “determination to remain 
difficult to Nigerian unity” through the imposition of “the evils of regionaliza-
tion.”80 The AG was described as a “parochial party,” pursuing “parochial national-
ism” and engaging in “tribalistic demarcation of the country,”81 as opposed to the 
NCNC, which had a “national policy.”82
In Path to Nigerian Freedom, Awolowo emphatically rejected the unitary system, 
arguing that “since the amalgamation, all the efforts of the British Government 
have been devoted to developing the country into a unitary state. . . . This is patently 
impossible.” He added that although the existing three regions were “designed for 
administrative convenience, a truly federal system would require boundary read-
justments to ensure that each group, however small, is entitled to the same treat-
ment as any other group, however large. . . . Opportunity must be afforded to each 
to evolve its own peculiar political institution.”83
In the end, by leveraging Yoruba cultural nationalism, Awolowo and the Action 
Group not only contested the Jacobin “revolutionary nationalism” preached by 
Azikiwe and the NCNC but successfully promoted a Burkean recognition of a 
hierarchy of loyalties in a multicultural federal state in which each component 
part of the federation, at least notionally, was supreme in its own sphere. However, 
Awolowo and the AG did not succeed in making ethno-linguistic units the com-
ponent parts of a multicultural Nigerian state. The units remained three (later 
four) multi-ethnic regions until 1967, when they became states.
Neo-Burkean Nationalism: Bello, the NPC, and the Northern Region
Given its delayed and reluctant encounter with European modernity, the Northern 
Protectorate, the huge, conservative laager constructed around the Fulani-led 
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caliphate that emerged from the 1804 jihad, had an understandably different atti-
tude to the struggle for national unity as Nigeria moved toward independence. 
Apart from the factors already mentioned above, several other factors also pro-
vided the context for the specific approach that the Northern Region, its domi-
nant party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and its preeminent leader, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello, adopted in responding to the challenges of national unity after the 
two protectorates were amalgamated to form a single British colony.84
These included the insulation of the Northern Protectorate from Christian 
missionary conversion and the enlightenment campaign—including expansion 
of opportunities for Western education—which strengthened existing differences 
and ratified it strongly along ethno-regional lines; a shift in the production of cash 
crops for export;85 and the expansion and consolidation of Islamic influence and 
dominance based on the numerical strength of the combined ethnicities of the 
Hausa and the Fulani (Hausa-Fulani) in much of the Northern Region. The British 
colonial officers in the Northern Protectorate too were instrumental in this pro-
cess. Such was their commitment to making the north distinct from the south, 
despite the amalgamation, that between 1923 and 1947, the northern leaders were 
not represented in the central Nigerian Legislative Council in Lagos, the capital 
of colonial Nigeria. Therefore, the north lagged behind the south in engaging 
with modern democratic institutions and practices. These led to fears of southern 
domination, the policy of “northernization” in the late colonial and early postcolo-
nial eras, the north’s initial opposition to Nigeria’s independence in the mid-1950s 
and a unique outlook on multiculturalism that admitted of a different standpoint 
for the multicultural region from the one adopted for the whole of Nigeria. Thus, 
while northern leaders, led by Ahmadu Bello, were eager to unify the Northern 
Region and transcend cultural, ethnic, and religious differences within the region, 
particularly among the region’s many minority groups,86 they insisted that Nigeria 
was a multicultural polity, in which the Northern Region must be recognized as a 
single cultural whole as well as a united political community. This was despite the 
fact that “the Northern Region is not a cultural or a historical unit.”87 Indeed, “from 
a tribal standpoint,” Coleman observed, “the north is far more heterogeneous than 
the south,” notwithstanding that the “integrative bonds of Islam and the Fulani 
Empire, however, [gave] a large part of the north a certain feeling of identity.”88 
This background is important, because the reality in the north, or the way in which 
that reality was understood by the leaders of the NPC in relation to the rest of 
Nigeria, dictated their approach to multiculturalism, particularly in response to 
the most suitable political system for Nigeria as the country approached indepen-
dence in the late 1940s and the 1950s.
Even though both Bello and Awolowo preached Burkean nationalism, the 
Bello NPC’s articulation of why and how federalism was the most suitable politi-
cal system for “understanding” and protecting differences was qualitatively dif-
ferent from the Awolowo AG’s. It emerged from a different reading of history 
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and comparative experience. The AG-Awolowo position emerged from a deliber-
ate, elaborate analysis of both local and global experiences of multiculturalism 
and was influenced by desire for power in the emerging political configuration, 
whereas the Bello-NPC position was influenced largely both by fears of southern 
domination in a unitary system and the associated disagreement with the south-
ern leaders over a proposal, favored by the AG and NCNC, that Nigeria be granted 
independence in 1956. The leaders of the Northern Region felt that the region was 
not ready and thus risked the substitution of internal (Southern Nigerian) “colo-
nialism” for the British variety. The northern leaders’ position followed a pattern 
adopted by groups that felt disadvantaged by the move toward independence and 
thus attempted “to slow down the march to independence or to gain special con-
cessions,” as famously noted by Donald Horowitz.89
While Bello and NPC focused on and campaigned for regional multicultural-
ism, that is, the recognition of each region as a cultural unit within the federa-
tion of Nigeria, and the primary form of affiliation/nationalism, Awolowo and 
the AG favored ethno-linguistic multiculturalism,90 that is, a federation of nation-
alities, with ethnic nationality as the primary form of affiliation/nationalism. 
Awolowo emphasized the country’s multiculturalism, noting that groups called 
“tribes” were actually “nations,” and cited ten such groups recorded during the 
1931 census, the Hausa, Ibo (Igbo), Yoruba, Fulani, Kanuri, Ibiobio, Munshi 
or Tiv, Edo, Nupe, and Ijaw.91 There was “as much difference between them as 
there is between Germans, English, Russians, and Turks,” he observed, and the 
fact that they had “a common overlord [the British] does not destroy this fun-
damental difference.” The languages of these groups “differ.  .  .  . Their cultural 
backgrounds and social outlooks differ widely; and their indigenous political 
institutions have little in common. Their present stages of development vary. . . . 
It is evident from the experiences of other nations that incompatibilities such 
as we have enumerated are barriers which cannot be overcome by glossing over 
them. They are real, not imaginary, obstacles.”92 Bello shared this position only 
to the extent that the differences were limited to external regional differences, 
not differences internal to the region, particularly his own Northern Region. 
Thus, for Bello, the Northern Region was a cultural unit, while for Awolowo, the 
ethno-linguistic group ought to be the cultural unit. Therefore, for Awolowo, the 
Hausa-Fulani (ethno-cultural group) would be a federating unit rather than the 
north (region), as favored by Bello.
After the crisis over the date of independence, as Bello notes in his autobiog-
raphy, the Northern Region decided to “take a modified line.”93 He elaborated on 
this by stating that the Northern Region “must aim at a looser structure for Nigeria 
while preserving its general pattern—a structure which would give the regions 
the greatest possible freedom of movement and action; a structure which would 
reduce the powers of the Centre to the absolute minimum and yet retain suffi-
cient national unity for practical and international purposes.”94 He advocated for 
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a “federal principle” in which “what happened in Lagos [the federal capital, would 
not be] of great consequences . . . in the north.”95
Eventually, the federal system adopted by Nigeria at independence was largely 
a compromise between the Bello-NPC-Northern Region and Awolowo-AG-
Western Region positions. As one of the earliest scholars of Nigerian federal-
ism notes, these two were the most vociferous in “repeating that they would not 
be dominated by other areas of tribal groups.”96 However, even while notionally 
encouraging multiculturalism, structurally, the federal system adopted in Nigeria 
before independence leveraged multiculturalism while limiting it largely to ethno-
regional differences. This became a problem in the post-independence era, since 
minority groups in the three regions demanded greater recognition of their differ-
ences from the three big ethnic groups.97
THE LIMIT S OF REGIONALIST FEDER ALISM
Some scholars have argued that one of the primary steps that must be taken to 
achieve a “fuller conception of multiculturalism” in the quest to “deal with diver-
sity” is to break down “the false opposition between unity and difference, between 
solidarity and diversity, or . . . between universalism and particularism.”98 Against 
this backdrop, they propose that multiculturalism should be approached in mul-
tiple ways as (i) “a critical-theoretical project,” (ii) “an exercise in cultivating new 
conceptions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of pervasive 
and increasing diversity,” (iii) “a response—or a set of responses—to diversity that 
seeks to articulate the social conditions under which difference can be incorpo-
rated  .  .  . and order achieved from diversity.”99 Hartmann and Gerteis argue for 
bringing these different approaches into a “productive tension with each other” in 
order to reconcile different “visions of difference.”
The Nigerian case examined here illustrates the fundamental challenges faced 
in the attempt to reconcile “visions of [multicultural] difference,” as well as the 
problem of constructing a workable political system to accommodate and address 
the difference. Even though the federalists won the debate in the late colonial era, 
with Nigeria becoming a federation at independence, it was specifically the region-
alist version of multiculturalism that triumphed, insofar as the struggles by minor-
ity groups for recognition beyond tokenism were largely ignored in the tripartite 
arrangement—a Hausa-Fulani-dominated Northern Region, an Igbo-dominated 
Eastern Region, and a Yoruba-dominated Western Region—that was established. 
However, the attempt to return the country to a unitary system after the January 
1966 coup had disastrous consequences including the civil war, in which more than 
a million people died. Multiculturalism is not antithetical in principle to nation-
building, but it has served contradictory purposes in the Nigerian federation. 
Though the multicultural nature of the country is not always respected and hon-
ored, recognition of the multicultural nature of the federation and the limitations 
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and responsibilities this imposes on political leaders have, on the one hand, pre-
vented Nigeria from fully achieving its potential as a rich, powerful nation in the 
developing world, and, on the other hand, averted the total disintegration of the 
country. Also, although there is a popular view in Nigeria that the recognition of 
the country’s multiculturalism has thwarted national integration, there is also a 
conflicting popular recognition of the fact that even the existing instrumental rec-
ognition of multiculturalism helps in the unending struggle to ensure that all the 
major cultures are given a measure of, if not equal, space and value.
Shortly before the civil war, the political elite seemed to have reached a con-
sensus regarding the wisdom of some of the country’s leaders who had earlier 
advocated multiple territorial division of the country beyond the three regions 
(later four in 1963) inherited from colonial rule. Even though the twelve states that 
emerged from the four regions before the outbreak of civil war did not exactly 
match the ethno-linguistic divisions proposed in the 1940s and 1950s—apart from 
the fact that this was specifically geared toward discouraging the minorities in 
the old Eastern Region from supporting the Igbo-led attempted secession—the 
creation of more states pointed to greater recognition of the multicultural reality 
of the Nigerian federation. It was evident, as James Coleman had predicted in his 
1958 book Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, that the country could not survive 
on the basis of exclusive regional multiculturalism with the (structural) region-
based federalism that was adopted at independence.
The end of the civil war (1967–70) witnessed greater recognition and accommo-
dation, even if not totally satisfactory, of minority interests, and a greater embrace 
of Nigeria’s multicultural realities. Structural unitarism was adopted by a succes-
sion of the misnamed federal military governments (1966–79; 1983–99) in the 
guise of federalism, but in spite of the structural unitary system, the division of the 
country into more and more states (three regions, four regions, twelve states, nine-
teen states, twenty-one states, thirty states, and now thirty-six states) has to some 
extent decreased tension over the nonrecognition of difference. Nonetheless, this 
solution constitutes what Eghosa Osaghae calls a “broad catch-all” policy.100 Still, 
the fundamental questions regarding the terms of national relations remain  critical 
and in “productive tension,” in Nigeria,101 particularly because bi- or tri-polarity 
still largely determines the nature of power sharing at the highest level of national 
relations. This has since been further divided administratively into six zones: north-
west, north-east, north-central, south-east, south-west, and south-south.
C ONCLUSIONS
The Nigerian experience, as reflected in the debates on the best political system in 
the late colonial era, points to the failure of assimilationism in multi-ethnic poli-
ties in Africa. The attempt to deny the mediating role of ethnic and cultural groups 
and “deal with difference by removing it,”102 championed by the Azikiwe NCNC, 
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did not succeed. What triumphed in the late colonial era was what Hartman and 
Gerteis have described as “fragmented pluralism,” based on “strong preexisting 
group boundaries,” with a strong emphasis on the maintenance of “distinctive 
group cultures.”103 This is the opposite of assimilationism, of course, and it was 
what the Bello NPC and the Awolowo AG supported and practiced. The orienta-
tion to diversity in this model is “closest to the standard definition of multicultur-
alism.” In late colonial Nigeria, the ethno-regional group was regarded as the valid 
group. In this sense, because the three (later four) regions and even the ethnic 
groups subsumed under them were also based on what Durkheim described as 
“mechanical solidarity,” “group boundaries [were] policed in the way that social 
boundaries [would have been] in assimilationism.”104
Yet, although fragmented pluralism was triumphant in the pre- and immediate 
post-independence period, what the pluralists actually preached in the emphasis 
on “understanding difference,” as Bello articulated it, was a “better” form of plural-
ism, that is, “interactive pluralism.” I suggest that this is what the Burkean notion 
of nationalism actually aims for. It is what Nigeria’s postcolonial leaders, despite 
their actions, have also publicly valorized. As explained by Hartman and Gerteis, 
interactive pluralism emphasizes “mutual recognition and respect of difference,” 
even while insisting on “the importance of the [ethno-regional] groups as primary 
basis for association in society.”105 However, because the “groups in interaction” 
were based on mutual fears and negative evaluations of the other groups’ assumed 
intention, Nigerian multiculturalism in the late colonial and early postcolonial 
era was fragmented rather than interactive. Though much hope was expressed for 
an emergent unity in the future that would honor and respect multiculturalism, 
token efforts were undertaken in terms of “substantive commitments” to produce 
sustainable democratic federalism. However, despite the fact that federalism has 
survived without being entrenched in post-independence Nigeria,106 the survival 
has been sufficient in keeping the multicultural state together, even if the nature 
and ideal of multiculturalism continue to be contested.
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Race, Capitalism, and State Formation  
in Malaysia and Singapore
Daniel P. S. Goh, National University of Singapore
Malaysia and Singapore are often hailed as pluralistic postcolonial countries that 
have succeeded in institutionalizing peaceful and stable ethnic relations. Malaysia 
is a federal constitutional monarchy spread over nearly 330,000 square kilometers 
and divided into Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo. 
Of the country’s over twenty-nine million people, around half consider them-
selves Malays, and another one-tenth are indigenous peoples, both making up 
the important political category of bumiputera (literally, “son of the soil” in the 
Malay language) peoples. The two largest minority groups are the Chinese and the 
Indians, mostly second- and third-generation descendants of migrants, compris-
ing a quarter and one-fourteenth of the population respectively. Non-naturalized 
new migrants make up a tenth of the population. Singapore is a republic and 
island city-state of only over 710 square kilometers sitting at the tip of the Malay 
Peninsula. Over a third of its 5.3 million population are non-citizens. Among the 
citizens, almost three-quarters are Chinese, 13 percent are Malays, and 9 percent 
are Indians.
The achievement of peaceful ethnic relations is remarkable, given that the 
tumultuous post–World War II decades witnessed the alignment of class struggles 
and ethnic conflicts. Both countries are successor states to the swath of colonial 
territory that was known as British Malaya and British Borneo. After the war, the 
British prepared for decolonization and promoted multiracial citizenship to inte-
grate the disparate ethnic groups making up the local population. The next two 
decades saw policy reversals and nationalist machinations, guerrilla insurgency 
and civil strife, and the merger of Malaya, British Borneo, and Singapore into 
192    Multiculturalism in the “New” Commonwealth 
Malaysia, culminating in the fatal Chinese-Malay racial riots in Singapore in 1964, 
which led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, and in Malaysia in 1969.
These traumatic events pushed forward divergent economic development pro-
grams aimed at resolving the political conflict, and institutional arrangements that 
utilized different forms of multiracialism as the foundation for nation-building. 
Patronage multiracialism was institutionalized in Malaysia, and corporatist multi-
racialism in Singapore, aligned with economic policy to promote bumiputera and 
statist capital accumulation respectively. Now, after decades of political stability 
and economic growth, the old multiracialism is fraying due to economic crises, 
and the new multiculturalisms envisioned in the 1990s in the midst of reforms in 
response to globalization have failed to take off.
In this chapter, I discuss the divergence of multiracialism and the arrested 
development of multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore. Against conventional 
explanations privileging nationalism as the main theoretical register, I argue that 
both the divergence and arrested development were primarily influenced by state 
formation in relation to capitalist development. In turn, the trajectories of capital-
ist development and state formation were heavily shaped by the contradictions of 
colonial racial formation and the political responses to these contradictions by 
both colonial and postcolonial actors. In other words, I argue that the divergent 
multiracialisms and the arrested multiculturalisms in contemporary Malaysia and 
Singapore have deep origins in the intertwining of race and economic develop-
ment in colonial Malaya, particularly in the provision of migrant labor for the 
important tin-mining and rubber plantation export sectors.
Economic histories of Malaya tended to be written in the vein of J. S. Furnivall’s 
theory of the plural society, which postulates the making of a medley of racial 
groups who interact in the marketplace but do not cohere as a nation.1 The ques-
tion has been framed as whether the plural society of disparate Chinese, Indian, 
and Malay groups was “the outcome of conscious government policies ascribing 
roles and capitalising on ethnic separation to make overall control easier and to 
promote British economic interests.”2 For the most part, scholars have interpreted 
the evidence to answer in the affirmative, that the colonial government promoted 
“deliberate segregation of labour along racial lines,”3 or encouraged “a racialized 
division of labour.”4 For Charles Hirschman, the colonial political economy under-
pinned the racial ideology that saw each race as biologically programmed to fulfill 
specific economic functions, and this ideology in turn was used for the colonial 
census that informed economic and social developmental policy.5
While the theory of colonial pluralism could be fruitfully used as an analyti-
cal frame to understand the making of multiracialism in Malaysia and Singapore, 
historical narratives employing the frame tend to revert to a functionalist view of 
the relationship between state, economy and society.6 These narratives treat racial 
ideology as functional in the production and maintenance of political control 
and economic exploitation, as though state actors had the clarity of mind and the 
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institutional capacity to engineer political economies with mere racial ideas. This 
neglects the disruptive influence of events on historical processes that produce the 
possibility and probability of the events occurring in the first place. It also ignores 
the autonomy of racial discourses and their lineage in scholarly histories and colo-
nial archives, and the political contestations between myriad groups of state and 
nonstate actors seeking to appropriate and subvert the discourses.
The approach I adopt here follows Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s racial 
formation perspective, which takes race as a concept signifying social conflicts by 
indexing phenotypical features of the human body. Racial formation refers to the 
process of “historically situated projects” of interpreting and representing human 
bodies and society in order to organize and distribute resources along racial lines.7 
Colonial racial formation in Malaya refers to the process of ethnographic projects 
representing native bodies and colonial society in order to organize and distribute 
land and labor along racial lines in order to develop and maintain the colonial 
state. This privileges a focus on state actors but is justified because the colonial 
state, through gradual centralization and expansion over the decades from the 
1870s to 1930s, was the single most powerful transformative agent in the colony. 
However, the racial formation perspective requires that my analysis also account 
for historical contingencies, including the discursive contestation, politics, and 
unintended consequences that flow from the underlying contradictions of colo-
nial racial formation.
THE C ONTR ADICTIONS OF C OLONIAL 
R ACIAL FORMATION
Nineteenth-century British interests in Southeast Asia led to the establishment of 
the Straits Settlements of Penang, Singapore, and Malacca as free ports, to which 
laissez-faire colonialism attracted Chinese merchants. Chinese mining and trade 
interests penetrated the neighboring Malay states on the peninsula using the 
Straits Settlements as their base. This exacerbated succession crises in the sultan-
ates and fostered widespread political instability in the Straits region. Throughout 
the 1870s, local governors intervened in the Malay states of Perak and Selangor 
of their own accord, but London forced the governors to implement Resident 
rule by advice rather than direct rule. To pay for the start-up costs of govern-
ment, the British supported development of Chinese tin mining, controlled by 
triad secret societies. Up till the turn of the century, Perak and Selangor state rev-
enues depended heavily on a duty on tin, mining land rents, and taxing Chinese 
labor consumer goods such as opium. However, the colonial government did not 
see dependence on Chinese mining as tenable in the long run and encouraged 
European planting to supplant Chinese mining.
Shortage of labor hindered the development of the European estates. Some offi-
cials wanted to protect the customary authority of the Malay rajas, which entailed 
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keeping the Malay peasantry in their kin-ordered villages. In any case, most offi-
cials thought that their bountiful environment had made the Malay peasants too 
lazy and self-indulgent to supply useful labor to the European plantations. Chinese 
workers were favored for their industry, but they were “inclined to be disorderly, 
cost more in police and supervision, and give more trouble,” the British surmised 
from frequent riots among the Chinese in the Straits Settlements. Tamil workers, 
however, were seen as “well-behaved and docile” and “accustomed to British rule.”8 
Moreover, since southern India was under direct British rule, the supply of labor 
from there was better assured. The British therefore preferred Tamils. To keep up 
with the rubber boom in the 1900s, the government promoted free-wage labor by 
assisting in the recruitment and shipment of Tamil workers.
The state apparatus was greatly expanded and centralized in this period to deal 
with the exigencies of the boom. The Federal Council was established as a legisla-
tive body structured along the lines of the Straits Legislative Council to better 
represent the interests of the increasing number of European planters and busi-
nessmen resident in the Federated Malay States. An elite colonial civil service 
aided by a subordinate native service staffed mostly by Malays was expanded to 
oversee the rapid economic development. The Malay elites were no longer seen 
as a martial group to be salvaged by careful diplomacy. They were now racial 
resources valued for their local knowledge and to be deployed in the subordinate 
bureaucracy as assistants to British officers in rural districts.
Chinese labor, previously left alone, came under increasing governmental regu-
lation in efforts to aid the previously neglected European tin-mining sector, which 
depended on heavy capital investment in machines, as opposed to labor-intensive 
Chinese mining. Malay farmers, who quickly caught onto the rubber boom and 
switched to rubber trees, also came under increasing regulation. Concerned about 
potential Chinese usurpation of Malay smallholdings, the colonial government 
enacted the Malay Reservations Act in 1913 “to provide protection for the Malays 
against themselves” by limiting land transactions in reservations to Malays.9 To 
resolve food shortages during World War I, the colonial government also enforced 
rice cultivation on lands alienated to Malay farmers.
By the time the war ended, the key features of colonial racial formation in Malaya 
had become discernable. The state held a monopoly on the land in the name of the 
Malays, recruiting Malay elites to manage it. Malay peasants, meanwhile, were tied 
to the land and segregated from both market forces and the Chinese through the 
promotion of customary rice production. The distrusted Chinese were increasingly 
displaced from tin mining, obstructed in agricultural settlement, and left to fend for 
themselves in urban areas. Tamils, apparently obedient and docile, were imported 
to work the plantations. European capital dominated the tin and rubber sectors, 
and Chinese capital, pushed or locked out of these, remained largely mercantile.
This colonial racial formation deepened in the interwar years, and its contradic-
tions began to show. Rubber production restrictions during the postwar commod-
ity slump and the Great Depression saw Malay smallholders further segregated 
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from the market economy and pushed toward customary rice cultivation. Malay 
reservations were expanded to curb Chinese agrarian development and lock in 
Malay rice planting, which deepened Malay underdevelopment.
Policy toward the Chinese crept toward exclusion. In response to political 
demands from local-born Chinese elites who actively supported the empire during 
the war, native representation was expanded in the Straits Settlements Legislative 
Council from one to seven unofficial members in 1923 to reflect the multiracial 
character of the colony. But this concession was counteracted by the increasing 
use of Malay indigeneity to keep the Chinese at bay throughout Malaya. When the 
unofficial members in the newly expanded council called for the civil service to 
be opened to non-Malays, the government replied that the British were trustees of 
the Malays, “the owners of the soil,” who possessed “special rights in this matter 
more than any others.”10 Placed on the defensive, conservative local-born Chinese 
turned to a Chinese racialism that repudiated their centuries-long Malay accul-
turation. The Malacca-based unofficial council member Tan Cheng Lock opposed 
the compulsory learning of the Malay language, claiming that Peranakans (Straits-
born Chinese) “with a strong Malay admixture revealed  .  .  . dire physical and 
moral depravity,” and that it was the “continual infiltration of pure Chinese blood” 
through immigration that saved the Straits Chinese. and allowed them to prosper.11
Labor unrest in the late 1930s caught the colonial government by surprise. 
In 1937, despite labor segregation, Chinese and Indian workers in urban sectors 
and rural estates and mines struck. The involvement of the latter was a revela-
tion, because the Indians were supposed to be docile and well taken care of, and 
officials had fondly portrayed the Tamil as a simple, childlike figure. The Labour 
Department had taken special care to prevent them from being politicized, turn-
ing the barracks of Tamil laborers into family housing, promoting gardening, and 
improving vernacular education. After the strikes, the colonial government did 
an about-face and established state-supported labor unions and industrial courts. 
These modern institutions of labor representation had important postcolonial 
consequences, forming the grounds of struggle between centrist and radical-leftist 
nationalists after World War II, but the government did not have time to develop 
the unions before war broke out. The unions were unable to challenge the leftists, 
who had developed strong support on the ground during the decades-long politi-
cal vacuum caused by British neglect of Chinese workers. Even patronage ties to 
the estate Indians were not as strong as they seemed, British officials being too 
blinded by the ethnographic caricature of Tamil docility to see that the Tamils also 
harbored nationalist sentiments.
DEC OLONIZ ATION AND THE POLITICAL EC ONOMY 
OF R ACIAL C ONFLICT
After World War II, the contradictions of colonial racial formation intensified. The 
Chinese-dominated, communist-led leftists who had formed the local resistance 
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to Japanese occupation now controlled the countryside, ready to stage revolution 
if their demands for equal political representation of the non-Malay masses were 
not met. Many Indians had joined the Indian National Army and fought alongside 
the Japanese to win Indian independence, and widespread public support for the 
INA during the Red Fort trials of its captured officers for treason meant that the 
British could no longer ignore Indian nationalism in Malaya. Many of the Malay 
elites collaborated with the Japanese, but the British could not replace them easily 
with functionaries who were equally loyal and able to command authority over 
the Malay masses.12
Political calculations led to the Malayan Union in 1946, which federated the 
Malay states and the Straits Settlements states of Penang and Malacca under a 
single government, with the Malay rulers surrendering their sovereign powers 
to the British Crown and granting equal rights to most non-Malays domiciled in 
Malaya. But this led the Malay elites to unite under the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), staging civil disobedience campaigns and withdrawing 
from participation in the government bureaucracy. The government machinery 
ground to a halt, and the Union collapsed in 1948. The Federation of Malaya 
was established, restoring the sovereignty of the Malay rulers and the special 
rights and position of the Malay people, while tightening citizenship require-
ments for the non-Malays. The communists revolted and fought the British in a 
long insurgency.
The British proceeded to establish interethnic bargaining. The Communities 
Liaison Committee, comprised of six Malays, six Chinese, and one representative 
apiece of the Indian, Ceylonese, Eurasian, and European communities, was set up 
in 1949. It was tasked with discussing and make recommendations on the Chinese 
aiding the economic position of the Malays, political relations between Malays and 
non-Malays, and the Malayanization of education.13 The Committee served not 
only as the platform for interethnic bargaining but to institutionalize the domi-
nant model of multiracial political rule. Conservative noncommunist Chinese and 
Indian leaders formed the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), led by Tan Cheng 
Lock, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), and joined UMNO to form the 
coalition Alliance Party, which won elections in 1955, 1959, 1964, and 1969 and gov-
erned throughout the period. The “consociational democracy” stabilized ethnic 
relations through quid pro quo bargaining between communal leaders, supported 
by the communities, mobilized in discrete racial silos.14 Through the coalition, the 
non-Malay minorities recognized the special position of the Malays in exchange 
for equal citizenship rights, while the coalition provided a platform for the nego-
tiation of material concerns specific to each group. As T. N. Harper succinctly 
summarizes it, the Chinese were concerned with “land rights, and an openness 
to new leadership which could guarantee a minimum of interference in their eco-
nomic and cultural affairs,” the Indians with “unionism and movements of social 
reform,” and the Malays with “the root cause of Malay poverty, through self-help 
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and political mobilisation.”15 The communist insurgency was defeated and, with 
ethnic relations stabilized in the consociational compact, Malaya became inde-
pendent in 1957.
The Singapore Question
The one thing that was the constant throughout the whole period was the exclu-
sion of Singapore from the politics of decolonization, from both the Malayan 
Union and the Federation of Malaya. The British kept Singapore out of the Union 
so as to keep the demographic balance between Malays and non-Malays, number-
ing almost 2.5 million people in each category. Postwar Singapore had a popula-
tion of almost a million, one-fifth that of Malaya, with the Chinese making up 
around three-quarters of it. The democratization of the colonial racial formation 
as nationhood approached meant such calculations were necessary to maintain 
British influence after decolonization. After all, British capital was still heavily 
invested in the mining and plantation sectors, and rubber and tin remained impor-
tant strategic resources, especially when the Allies got sucked into the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars. Singapore mattered directly in this regard because it was the trade 
and services hub for capital and export of the commodities. By keeping Singapore 
out of the Union and Federation, the British retained economic control.
Still, it was an anomaly that had to be addressed once Malaya became indepen-
dent. Singapore clearly could not be kept as a colony indefinitely, while the rest of 
Southeast Asia achieved independence. Through the 1950s, leftist nationalist influ-
ence made its presence felt in Singapore. The Singapore question became acute 
when it became clear that the sinophone leftists dominated the political scene and 
the conservative anglophone Straits Chinese leaders supported by the British had 
no clout after the advent of mass politics. If the British continued to dither on 
granting Singapore independence, then either the city would eventually be lost to 
a mass uprising or the Malayan economy would collapse due to political instabil-
ity caused by the use of force to maintain control. But if the British were to grant 
Singapore independence quickly, then the city would be handed to the leftists 
through legitimate elections. The option to integrate Singapore into Malaya, belat-
edly, was unacceptable to the UMNO leaders, since it would upset the racial bal-
ance, inject even greater Chinese power into the economy, and introduce a large 
group of highly educated non-Malays into the civil service.
Fortuitously for the British, the issue was resolved by a group of anglophone 
Fabianists, led by a young lawyer, Lee Kuan Yew, who formed the multiracial 
People’s Action Party (PAP) in alliance with sinophone leftists, providing English-
educated respectability to the latter. When the PAP pressed for early elections, 
knowing that it would easily win, the British took a chance and supported Lee’s 
faction so as to outmaneuver the sinophone leftists, whom they suspected of being 
communist sympathizers. In May 1959, with expanded suffrage, the PAP won the 
first general election in Singapore under the new Constitution, which allowed for 
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self-governance. UMNO won three of the eight seats it contested, signifying the 
strong presence of Malay nationalists in the city-state.
The split between the two camps came when Lee’s group started preparing with 
the British and UMNO to unite Singapore with Malaya, whose prime minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, viewed merger as more acceptable than having sinophone 
leftists control Singapore, and hence Malaya’s economy. The merged state would 
also include the two territories of British North Borneo, Sabah and Sarawak, thus 
maintaining the demographic balance between Malays and non-Malays. Opposed to 
merger, because they saw it as hampering their goals of quickly establishing an inde-
pendent socialist state, the sinophone leftists left the PAP to form the Barisan Socialis 
(Socialist Front). But months before the merger referendum and general election 
proceeding the referendum, this new party was crippled by crackdowns and admin-
istrative detentions of its leaders and unionists on grounds of communist subversion.
In September 1963, the Singapore electorate voted for merger, and five days 
later, the PAP was returned to government of what was now an autonomous state 
in the Federation of Malaysia, with less than half the popular vote and a reduced 
parliamentary majority. Crucially, UMNO broke an agreement with the PAP not 
to campaign on each other’s turf, and supported the Singapore Alliance Party, a 
multiracial coalition of communally organized parties mimicking the Alliance 
Party across the causeway, which came third in the popular vote. Despite the vote 
in favor of a merger, within two years, Malaysia and Singapore would go their 
separate ways. The reasons for this split relate directly to their divergent political 
economies, which were both rooted in colonial racial formation.
The Political Economy of Racial Conflict
As much as the economies of the two previously separate political entities of 
Malaya and Singapore were interlinked and interdependent, the differences were 
stark and significant. The postwar economic growth of Malaya was still driven by 
primary commodity exports, with the steady rise in world prices for tin and rubber 
from 1947 to 1960 fueling the growth of the public sector.16 Agriculture was still the 
primary economic sector in Malaya, accounting for nearly 62 percent of workers 
in 1957, but there was a shift in the distribution of labor from agriculture to the sec-
ondary industries of manufacturing and construction, and to the tertiary sectors of 
commerce and services. In Singapore in 1957, secondary industries accounted for 
21 percent and tertiary for 72 percent of the workforce, compared to 10 and 28 per-
cent respectively in Malaya. Much of the increased labor engagement in secondary 
industries in Malaya was in construction, whereas in Singapore, it was in manufac-
turing.17 Thus, Singapore was industrializing while retaining its trading and export 
hub functions for Malaya, and Malaya was deepening its agrarian economy in the 
midst of urbanization and the growth of commercial activities among the Chinese.
From the perspective of the PAP leaders in Singapore, the way forward for the 
economy was to push for industrialization led by the Chinese, who dominated the 
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secondary and tertiary sectors and held the stock of local capital. Goh Keng Swee, 
the minister of finance, wrote in 1965 that the strategy was to mobilize domestic 
savings by relying on profit-oriented business enterprises rather than on a rentier 
class, and to pursue import substitution in the context of the commodity export 
economy, since imports accounted for more than a third of the gross national 
product of Malayam.18 A few years before merger, in order to attract foreign multi-
national corporations to drive industrialization, rather than rely on local Chinese 
capital, Goh created the Economic Development Board and began development 
of the Jurong industrial estate. Goh believed that the Chinese would be the mod-
ernizers of the postcolonial state because they were uprooted migrants shorn of 
traditionalist institutions, while the Malays remained steeped in the ethos of an 
agrarian society.19 He was skeptical, however, of the ability of traditional capital to 
turn away from the primary commodity sectors.,20 and so saw his task as recruit-
ing (with the help of foreign manufacturing capital) a new class of industrial labor 
from the Chinese population.
In contrast to Singapore, economic growth in Malaya was still very much 
grounded in the agrarian export sector, buoyed by a commodities boom in the 
world market. However, the situation was getting dire, and the sustainability of 
growth was threatened by the lack of new planting and replanting, especially for 
Malay smallholdings. Progress was made belatedly in the late 1950s with commit-
ted planting schemes, but a lack of administrative expertise caused attempts to 
kick-start rural development oto falter.21 In addition, problems of capital and expe-
rience meant that enterprise in Malaya could not progress beyond cottage indus-
tries and contract work. As a result, from 1957 to 1970 the average monthly income 
in Malaya climbed by 23 percent, to U.S.$172, for ethnic Malays, and by 26 percent, 
to U.S.$381, for the Chinese.22 The postcolonial state tried to tackle the inequality 
by preferring Malays in government work and specific economic sectors, while 
leaving the urban sector, rural plantations, and mines dominated by the Chinese 
and Western corporations alone. Progress was slow, and it did not help that the 
Chinese opposed the learning of Malay as the national language and medium of 
instruction and the integration of Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools into the 
state system.
These economic and political issues led to the deterioration of cooperative con-
sociationalism and threatened the prospect of democracy without consensus. Just 
as this was occurring, the PAP encouraged an alternative vision.23 The PAP accused 
the Alliance Party of fostering “Malay Malaysia” racialism, and in contrast called 
for a multiracial “Malaysian Malaysia” with equal rights for all. Singapore’s min-
ister of culture, S. Rajaratnam, described this vision as one of gradual and equal 
acculturation toward a Malayan culture by enlarging the overlapping areas of cul-
tural beliefs and practices shared by the Malay, Chinese, and Indian cultures.24 
Arguably, however, the PAP’s vision was not free of racialism, as it both tapped 
into the widespread fear of assimilation into Malay culture among Malaysian 
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Chinese, and presumed that the Chinese and Indians would have to modernize 
the nation because the Malays lacked the capacity to do so.
Following the 1963 Singaporean elections, relations between UMNO and the 
PAP, with their competing multiracial visions quickly soured. Kuala Lumpur 
dragged its feet in establishing a common market, which would have benefited 
Singapore’s industrialization and led to further entrenchment of non-Malay eco-
nomic power. These tensions began to be reflected in strained Malay-Chinese rela-
tions in Singapore, which were exarcebated when the Singapore-based PAP won a 
seat in the suburbs of the federal capital, Kuala Lumpur, in the general election in 
peninsular Malaysia in April 1964 by campaigning on the slogan of a “Malaysian 
Malaysia.” In this toxic political climate, the usually peaceful Malay procession 
to celebrate the Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday in Singapore quickly deteriorated 
in July 1964 into riots between Chinese secret society and Malay ultranationalist 
gangs. Curfews were imposed for almost two weeks, but less than two months 
later, riots broke out again. Thirty-six people died, over five hundred were injured, 
and over three thousand were arrested, in the worst violence yet seen in postwar 
Singapore. Chinese-Malay tensions continued to brew, and in an attempt to defuse 
them, Tunku Abdul Rahman thus decided to expel Singapore from the Malaysian 
Federation, making Singapore an independent country on August 9, 1965.
However, Chinese-Malay tensions continued to brew in West Malaysia, partic-
ularly in the context of widening wealth and income inequality between Chinese 
and Malays. Things came to a head at the 1969 general election. Having had a 
glimpse of the PAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” vision, the Chinese swung their sup-
port from the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to two new left-wing Chinese-
dominated parties, the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s 
Movement Party) and the successor to the PAP, the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP). Many Malays also swung from UMNO to the Pan-Islamic Party (PAS), 
indicating unhappiness with the widening racial-class inequality and lack of gov-
ernmental intervention in the economy.25 The Alliance Party suffered its worst 
result, barely getting the majority of the popular vote and a slim four-seat buffer 
for its parliamentary majority. An opposition victory parade in Kuala Lumpur and 
a UMNO countermarch led to riots, on May 13, 1969, that spread across much 
of the city and neighboring areas in Selangor. The rest of the country remained 
relatively calm, but hundreds, mostly Chinese, died in the violence, the causes of 
which remain controversial and disputed to this day.
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERGENT 
POSTC OLONIAL MULTIR ACIALISMS
The 1964 and 1969 race riots disrupted the existing organization and distribu-
tion of land and labor along racial lines in Malaysia and Singapore. As we saw 
earlier, these configurations were crucial to the development and maintenance of 
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the colonial state, yet they contained contradictions which ultimately altered the 
postcolonial trajectories of both countries. These contradictions were expressed in 
both the disjuncture of “Chinese” capital, “Malay” land and “Indian” labor, and the 
recurring claims by left-wing movements to represent “Chinese” labor. Yet racial 
formation is not simply a matter of economic or political arrangements; it also 
requires ethnographic projects that represent the bodies of workers—and society 
itself—in ways that support the arrangement of labor and land. It is therefore sig-
nificant that the underlying contradictions of colonial political economy exploded 
in racial violence by way of the cultural practices of processions and parades. These 
processions required interactions between individual bodies, and were a popular 
expression of communal life in the colonies. As cultural practices they therefore 
embodied and represented various individuals and communities in different ways. 
Yet the racial violence of the 1960s left these dual bodies indelibly marked as racial 
bodies, as “Chinese” and “Malay”.
In the aftermath of the 1964 and 1969 riots, the already divergent multiracial-
isms in Singapore and Malaysia, the former favoring equal citizenship rights and 
the latter involving the recognition of the special Malay position in exchange for 
citizenship rights, developed in very different directions. Given the existing politi-
cal economy, both, however, favored capital. In Malaysia, the Malay special posi-
tion became the basis for rapid capital accumulation using the UMNO-captured 
state to build up a Malay capitalist class on par with the non-Malays. In Singapore, 
the PAP entrenched formal equality as the basis for extensive autocratic interven-
tions in society, brushing aside the old bourgeoisie to build a state-based capital-
ism in alliance with multinational capital. Postcolonial racial formation in both 
Malaysia and Singapore therefore refers to the process of political projects repre-
senting Chinese and Malay bodies and society in order to accumulate capital along 
racial lines to develop and maintain the new nation-state.
Malaysia: Malay Capital Accumulation and Patronage Multiracialism
After the 1969 riots, the National Operations Council was established and ruled 
by decree in a state of emergency in Malaysia. Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
Razak became director of the Council and the de facto head of government. Tunku 
Abdul Rahman was subsequently forced to resign in Tun Abdul Razak’s favor in 
September 1970, and then as UMNO president in June 1971, a few months after 
parliamentary rule was reestablished. During the period of Council rule, a debate 
ensued between mainstream economists in the government and a group of politi-
cal economists associated with the Department of National Unity. The former 
group involved many highly educated non-Malay elites and “liberal” Malays led 
by the minister of finance, who was the MCA representative. Two of the National 
Unity political economists, the Norwegian Just Faaland and the Malaysian Rais 
Saniman, went on to document the work that led to the adoption of the New 
Economic Policy in 1971 in a book published in 1990, Growth and Ethnic Inequality.
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For Faaland and Saniman, the problem was Malaysia’s dual economy, in which a 
wealthy modern sector existed “side by side with mass rural poverty and underem-
ployment in the traditional sector.” Malays were overwhelmingly concentrated in 
the latter.26 Mainstream economists saw the problem as Malays not being respon-
sive to capitalism and not working as hard as the Chinese and Indians.27 Assistance 
for the poor would help uplift the Malays, and the trickle-down effect of growth 
would do the rest. Malays were trapped in structural imbalances in income, 
employment, and ownership of capital.28 The New Economic Policy aimed, first 
and foremost, to improve the income balance for Malays, and then secondarily, to 
maximize employment creation for all races through promotion of labor-intensive 
production and export-led industrialization.29 This was to be achieved by tearing 
down the “system of ‘apartheid’ constructed against the Malays, openly or indi-
rectly, by the colonial masers,” promoting “active participation and equal part-
nership rather than of disruptive distribution and hand-outs to the Malays,” and 
developing Malay capability for active and equal participation through education 
and training.30
Faaland and Saniman’s approach recognized the political and sociological fac-
tors in colonial racial formation, but the treatment of the problems remained 
racial. One of their key recommendations was to design programs that would 
increase Malay rural income and employment, while stemming Malay migration 
to the cities and slowing Chinese and Indian migration to Malay-dominated states 
with principally rural economies. The intention was not to permanently segregate 
the races, but to foster political stability through integration of races as economic 
peers.31 Nevertheless, the progressive project involved the marking and separation 
of racial bodies.
Furthermore, like mainstream economists, Faaland and Saniman believed that 
“disunity among the Malays is a historical ‘adat’ [custom]  .  .  . born out of their 
instinct, [and] perfected by.  .  . practice.”32 The New Economic Policy aimed to 
unite the Malays, but an additional challenge was to construct “a new alliance of 
moderate elements (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) within the nation.”33 In 1973, to 
support the New Economic Policy, a new alliance, the Barisan Nasional (National 
Front), was formed by the component parties of the Alliance—UMNO, the MCA, 
and the MIC—and a slew of other political parties, including the Parti Gerakan. 
Barisan went on to win the next four general elections handsomely. In this period, 
1974 to 1990, the New Economic Policy formed the bedrock of Malaysian state 
formation and the political bargaining between the parties representing various 
racial constituencies.
Faaland and Saniman criticized the five-year plans after 1975 for deviating 
from the New Economic Policy by focusing on growth rather than racial income 
equity.34 They pointed out that Malays accounted for only 13.6 percent of corpo-
rate ownership at par value in 1990, up from 3.6 percent in 1975, whereas non-
Malays accounted for 56.7 percent, up from 37.5 percent; the greatest loss was to 
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foreign ownership, which dropped from 53.3 percent to 23.7 percent.35 The ratio of 
non-Malay to Malay income fell from 1.71 in 1967 to 1.40 in 1985, but Faaland and 
Saniman appear to lament that this improvement had come at a cost to racial eco-
nomic equality in terms of capital ownership.36 The New Economic Policy aimed 
for a 30 percent Malay share of corporate ownership by 1990, but together with the 
trust agencies for Malay interests, only 20 percent was achieved.37
The implementation and outcome of the New Economic Policy have been well 
analyzed; scholars note the strengthening of the state’s hand in the economy, partic-
ularly in relation to the ownership and management of corporate assets. Beginning 
with the replacement of the MCA’s leader as finance minister by Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak himself, UMNO elites took control of the administrative-legal 
levers of the state to make deals on their own behalf with local Chinese and foreign 
capitalistst.38 Consociational bargaining between peer parties in a coalitional polit-
ical framework gave way to communal trading of patronage political capital and 
access to economic privileges dispensed through the UMNO-dominated state.39
For UMNO, especially after Mahathir bin Mohamad became prime minister in 
1981, political control of both the new Malay and old non-Malay economic elites 
became the chief objective in the pursuit of national unity. A new Malay capitalist 
class and middling business class rose up through state patronage within UMNO. 
Non-Malay capitalists shared in the spoils of nationalizing foreign corporate 
property and privatizing state assets through the other Barisan Nasional parties, 
and so were also tied to the political fortunes of UMNO.40 Export-led growth in 
commodities, especially in the oil and gas sector, became the focus of the “state-
capitalist network.”41
Singapore: State-Led Industrialization and Corporatist Multiracialism
In the 1970s and 1980s, Singapore’s trajectory was similar to Malaysia’s in its 
underlying thrust: the deepening of state intervention in plural society to main-
tain political stability and drive economic development, which were seen as mutu-
ally reinforcing and necessary condition for each other. The difference was that 
whereas Malaysia started from the premise of the special position of the Malays 
as first among equals, Singapore began from a foundation of formal multiracial 
equality. The New Economic Policy reoriented Malaysia’s economic development 
toward the modernization of the rural sector and the nationalization of the com-
modity sector to boost Malay income and capital accumulation. After the sepa-
ration from Malaysia and the loss of the hinterland, there was very little room 
for Singapore to move as a mercantile city-state. Singapore moved in exactly 
the opposite direction to Malaysia by seeking to urbanize the island completely 
for industrialization and proletarianization. Without a large domestic market, 
import-substitution industrialization was no longer viable, and export-oriented 
industrialization, following in the footsteps of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong was the way forward. Local capital was too deeply involved in 
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production and trade in the Malayan commodity sector, so the state moved to 
participate directly in development.
Goh Keng Swee’s nascent industrialization program introduced in the early 
1960s proved to be a prescient hedge. The newly minted Jurong industrial estate 
was expanded for export production in the context of heightened regional demand 
fueled by U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The Economic Development Board took 
the lead in attracting multinational corporations to invest in the country. A new 
ideology of survival as a small city-state surrounded by potentially hostile neigh-
bors was formulated, which emphasized a disciplined social organization and 
competitive labor costs as necessary conditions and therefore implied, politically, 
the corporatist cooptation of unions and other social groups.42
Coupled with forced resettlement of villagers, farmers, and shop house resi-
dents into public housing flats, which eventually came to house over 80 percent 
of the population, the corporatist cooptation of unions and suppression of dis-
sent represented nothing less than a brutal social and cultural revolution that 
transformed Singapore society into an urban proletarian society dependent on 
state provision of welfare. For Goh, this was inevitable. Speaking to Australian 
radio in 1967, Goh cited Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and spelled out the need 
for an “integrated, comprehensive, all-embracing approach” to modernization. 
Unapologetically, mentioning the examples of Victorian England and Stalinist 
Russia, Goh stated that there was “no easy way to grind out of the mass of poor 
people the economic surplus or savings needed to finance capital accumulation.”43
The multiracialism that was forged turned out to be corporatist too, with insti-
tutions formed to represent racial and religious groups within the ambit of the 
state, while community grassroots organizations were formed and placed under 
the direction of the state’s People’s Association. Mobilized as a cultural resource to 
cultivate Singapore’s social ethic, ethnicity was, however, neutralized as a discur-
sive and electoral resource for oppositional parties and other groups. Speaking at 
the University of Singapore in 1972, Goh refuted the notion that the government 
should set norms of good behavior and motivation for individuals to adjust to 
modernization, citing the difficulty of legislating such matters, and of commu-
nicating these needs. “In a multiracial community, there are different criteria by 
which good conduct is assessed.,” he said.44
This was disingenuous, since modernization by way of public housing and 
myriad social engineering campaigns that followed resettlement was already shap-
ing the Singaporean worker, whose work ethic was expected to mimic that of the 
Chinese. The multiracialism of equal differences represented by the linking of 
Chinese, Malays, Indians, and Eurasians arms was used to convey the message that 
the Singaporean social ethic was to be one of disciplined national unity, with the 
government acting as a neutral arbiter for the universal good of society regardless 
of race. But the equivalent relativity of differences was also used to cut off political 
organizations from speaking up for any particular group by claiming that it would 
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open the arena to completing cultural claims that could not be reconciled. The auto-
cratic government tagged dissidents as racial, ethno-linguistic, or religious chauvin-
ists who threatened communal strife, or as agents of neocolonialism or communism.
In a belated move to recognize the persistent socioeconomic marginality of the 
Malays for historical and structural reasons (and worsened by economic develop-
ment relying on the proletarian work ethic of the Chinese), the state set up the 
Council for the Education of Muslim Children in 1982 to fund additional educa-
tional programs to help the Malays. By that time, the education system, reformed 
by Goh to emphasize race-blind academic streaming for the general population, 
but special education catering to the Chinese elites, had already entrenched the 
centrality of economic capital and cultural capital for educational outcomes.45 
Thus, the socioeconomic marginality of the Malays was dealt with in a differenti-
ated corporatist manner, in which the Malays were given state funding to help 
themselves achieve better social mobility through education, because racial self-
help was ostensibly the best method to do so given the relativity of racial differ-
ences. A decade later, reflecting the state’s corporatist multiracialism, equivalent 
Chinese, Indian, and Eurasian self-help groups were formed to target uplifting 
of low-income workers—the reproduction of labor through education and the 
reskilling of labor through training—in racial terms.
GLOBALIZING CAPITAL AND ARRESTED 
MULTICULTUR ALISMS
By the 1980s, the contradictions of postcolonial racial formation were surfacing in 
both countries. In Malaysia, the focus on Malay capital accumulation moved the 
society toward racial equality in terms of class structure and inequality. UMNO 
came to be dominated by Malay businessmen and grew detached from both 
grassroots labor and the growing Malay urban middle classes. Nationalization 
of foreign corporate holdings was hitting the limits, thus reducing the scope of 
patronage dispensation to the non-Malay capitalists and the ability of the state to 
keep the multiracial alliance tight.
In Singapore, resettlement of the population was completed, thus ending the 
supply of new workers and eroding the labor cost competitiveness that multina-
tional corporations were sensitive to. Growing Malay marginality, with politically 
destabilizing consequences, was only starting to be addressed in a long-term man-
ner through the education of children of low-income families. A policy of foreign 
immigration distinguishing between low-skilled transient workers and skilled long-
term residents, was accelerated to keep labor costs low, but came with an increasing 
price for corporatist multiracialism, since the migrants could not be integrated into 
the existing institutions tailored for control of the working-class citizenry.
The contradictions were expressed politically as democratizing pressures. In 
1987 and 1988, the Singapore government used the colonial-era Internal Security 
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Act to arrest over a score of Catholic Church social workers, civil society activists, 
and opposition party members. Accused of engaging in a “Marxist conspiracy” 
to overthrow the state, they were kept under indefinite extrajudicial detention. In 
Malaysia, the government launched copycat crackdowns on civil society and the 
opposition. In both crackdowns, the need to keep the multiracial peace was used 
to justify the actions, though it was clear to international human rights organiza-
tions and the local middle classes that the governments were trying to stem the 
tide of democratization hitting East Asia.
The two ruling parties saw large swings against them. Barisan saw its vote share 
drop from over 60 percent in 1982 to 53 percent in 1990, with the opposition just 
short of capturing one-third of the parliamentary seats to block constitutional 
changes. The PAP’s vote share dropped from nearly 78 percent in 1980 to 65 per-
cent in 1984, and, during the crackdowns, to 63 percent in 1988 and 61 percent in 
1991, with the disorganized opposition prying open four parliamentary seats in 
that election. The PAP did better than Barisan did in Malaysia because it estab-
lished a couple of new multiracial institutions in the late 1980s that hampered the 
opposition parties: group representation constituencies for the election of a slate 
of candidates that had to include a candidate of a specified minority race; and the 
ethnic integration policy to prevent minority ethnic enclaves from forming voting 
blocs in public housing estates.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s response to the political swing was 
belated but far more liberal and progressive, at least rhetorically, than that of the 
PAP. In 1991, in line with a new national development policy to promote manufac-
turing and accelerate Malay capital accumulation, Mahathir announced a grand 
Vision 2020 program to mold a single “ethnically integrated” nationality, the 
“Bangsa Malaysia” (Malaysian Race), which would underpin an advanced indus-
trialized economy, mature democratic polity, and tolerant multicultural society.46 
In Singapore, the new prime minister Goh Chok Tong promised liberalization 
and to build a kinder and gentler Singapore, as opposed to the brutally disciplined 
decades of industrialization and proletarianization. Economic reforms to move 
the economy up the value chain to advanced manufacturing and research-based 
industries emphasized middle-class formation. Singapore began to see the influx 
of skilled migrants, and in the early 2000s the government announced that it 
aimed to foster a new cosmopolitan multiculturalism.
The new multicultural visions resonated with the sustained economic develop-
ment. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Communist China 
through to the 1990s accelerated global capital flows and kept growth rates high in 
industrializing Malaysia and reindustrializing Singapore. Singapore’s GDP growth 
averaged 9.0 percent in the decade prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, from 1988 
to 1997, compared to the 8.9 percent in the previous two decades marked by pri-
mary industrialization.7 Malaysia’s growth rate was more impressive, with corre-
sponding figures of 9.3 percent from 1988 to 1997 compared to 6.5 percent from 
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1968 to 1987.48 Helped by a disorganized political opposition starved of discursive 
resources to challenge its ideological hegemony and unable to present a multicul-
tural alternative, the PAP regained its peak of electoral support with 75 percent 
of the votes in the 2001 general election. Barisan garnered 65 percent in the 1995 
general election.
However, the contradictions of patronage and corporatist multiracialisms soon 
redoubled in the era of financial crises. The old postcolonial multiracialisms were 
still institutionally dominant, and the new multiculturalisms remained largely 
visionary and saw only minor translations into policy. In Malaysia, the 1997 finan-
cial crisis brought about a grave challenge from the progressive wing of UMNO 
led by Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, which was purged and suppressed 
by draconian crackdowns. Drastic capital and currency controls stabilized the 
economy and maintained a slower but sustainable pace of growth, thus largely 
shielding the economy from the further vagaries of global capital in the 2000s.49 
The rural plantation and commodity sectors were protected, and the industrial-
izing and financial sectors were the most affected. The government extended its 
share of the economy, bailing out and absorbing Malay-owned companies and 
Chinese banks, while failing to promote local small and medium-sized enterprises 
(many of which were either non-Malay or interethnic partnerships) because of its 
focus on Malay capital accumulation.50
The main opposition parties, Anwar Ibrahim’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s 
Justice Party), the PAS, and the DAP—respectively representing the urban Malays, 
rural Malays, and non-Malays—formed a loose multiracial coalition, Pakatan 
Rakyat (People’s Alliance), in 2004 to challenge the Barisan Nasional. In the 2008, 
in the continued low-growth situation, Barisan saw its electoral support dip to 
50  percent, and Pakatan broke Barisan’s two-third parliamentary majority and 
formed the state governments of industrialized Penang and Selangor and rural 
Kedah and Kelantan. In response, the new prime minister, Najib Razak, launched 
a “One Malaysia” campaign to promote national unity and expounded a New 
Economic Model to attract foreign investments to sustain growth. Communal 
patronage trading and political support from the non-Malays collapsed, as Chinese 
ownership of the economy plunged, while Malay capital accumulation stalled.51 
The more liberal aspects of Najib’s model, such as the move away from Malay capi-
tal accumulation and affirmative action, were dropped after the reactionary fac-
tions of UMNO revolted. In the 2013 general election, Barisan’s electoral support 
slipped to a record low of 47 percent, its parliamentary majority kept intact by 
political support from resource-rich Sarawak and Sabah.
In Singapore, the 1997 crisis hastened economic restructuring, and the economy 
began to shift from a manufacturing to a service base. Foreign immigration accel-
erated, with the percentage of citizens in the population dropping from 86 percent 
in 1990 to 74 percent in 2000 and 64 percent in 2010. At the same time, wage 
growth lagged behind cost-of-living inflation. The socioeconomic marginality 
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of the Malays persisted, corporatist multiracialism faltered, and younger genera-
tions ceased to participate in the grassroots activities organized by the People’s 
Associations. Anti-foreigner sentiment spread in this period, as socioeconomic 
inequality widened between the top 20 percent income bracket of elite managers 
and professionals who moved in the same social circles as the foreign expatriates 
and the rest of the population living in the public housing heartlands. In the 2006 
general election, electoral support for the PAP swung downward by almost 9 per-
cent, and in 2011, it fell to a record low of 60 percent. Losing a group representation 
constituency for the first time, it also lost a key cabinet minister.
Even before the new multiculturalisms could be translated into institutions to 
secure political stability for development in the context of globalizing capital, the 
old postcolonial multiracialisms were therefore, eroded by the political-economic 
contradictions it engendered. Though Malaysia and Singapore went their separate 
ways and developed their political institutions and economies on different multi-
racial premises, they ironically came to share the same characteristics of arrested 
development. Direct involvement of the state in the economy resulted in the 
underdevelopment of local enterprises and dependence on foreign multinationals. 
Overlapping racial and class inequalities persist in a slow-growth environment.
C ONCLUSIONS
Malaysia and Singapore represent a paradox in the making of postcolonial multi-
culturalism, where peaceful ethnic relations that have been achieved by the build-
ing of strong states depend on the enduring context of racial conflict. This chronic 
racial conflict has deep roots in the contradictions of colonial racial formation, 
manifested economically in the racial division of labor, and politically in the diver-
gent native policies of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements, and 
then the successor postcolonial states of Malaya and Singapore. While attempts 
were made by postcolonial state builders to meet each other halfway in the merged 
state of Malaysia, the state builders eventually fell out, because Singapore looked 
toward transforming its mercantile economy into an industrial hub, while Kuala 
Lumpur privileged agrarian and natural resource capitalist development. Due to 
the racialized character of the economic division of labor, each side pushed for a 
political multiracialism that suited its economic approach.
After their 1965 separation, the multiracialisms of Malaya and Singapore 
diverged, based on the differing political-economic logic of capital accumulation 
and state formation in the two polities. By the 1990s, state formation matured, and 
their multiracialism became inadequate for a new era of globalization. From the 
1990s on, with each deepening capitalist crisis, the contradictions of the old multi-
racialism and the new economy have shown up in deepening social conflicts, thus 
arresting the development of more liberal multiculturalisms to match the political 
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economy of globalization. At the time of writing, both countries stand at a cross-
roads. Their state-led multiculturalisms have been arrested, and their economic 
engines are spluttering. The Chinese-Malay conflict, formed by colonial conceit 
and hardened during decolonization, remains as real as ever. Both countries are 
thus marked by peaceful ethnic relations that co-exist with enduring racial con-
flict, a paradox which has historically been mitigated by strong state-building. Yet 
attempts to resolve the contradictions of the colonial political economy and then 
economic globalization have deepened the paradox. The postcolonial states must 
continue to maintain the precarious balance between peace and conflict if they are 
to endure. Fifty years after the race riots of the 1960s, racial conflict in Malaysia 
and Singapore has once again become a frightening prospect.
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The Cunning of Multiculturalism
A Perspective from the Caribbean
Viranjini Munasinghe, Cornell University
CARIBBEAN MULTICULTUR ALISM AS EXCEPTION
When Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, a Trinidadian of Indian descent, 
announced in her Indian Arrival Day speech in 2010 that the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago’s Ministry of Arts and Culture was being renamed the Ministry of Arts 
and Multiculturalism, she triggered a heated public debate about the formal adop-
tion of multiculturalism as policy. This was, in many ways, a predictable response 
for Trinidadians, who are acutely aware of the mutual entanglement between politics 
and culture and ever vigilant of instances of it.1 The Indo-Trinidadian2 journalist Kris 
Rampersad, chair of UNESCO’s T&T National Commission, had this to say:
While we reel at the emphatic denouncement of multiculturalism [by leaders 
in  Germany and the U.K] in Germany  .  .  . , the local Ministry of Multiculturalism 
 hosted a conference “Towards a Multiculturalism Policy for Trinidad and Tobago.” Its 
 keynote . . . speakers were foreign academics and technocrats from . . . Canada and 
the United Kingdom, who admitted that they had no answers for us on our efforts. . . .
Apart from the few . . . voices . . . from the Caribbean . . . trying to represent what 
this region can bring to the debate [on multiculturalism and cultural policy] . . . Ca-
ribbean Governments and States have been largely inaudible, invisible and relatively 
inactive in the international discussion.
Compared to our societies, which are already multicultural, the multicultural 
conversation in the international arena . . . has largely been a reaction to “globalisa-
tion” and directed at immigrants, who are seen to be potentially disruptive of the 
“mainstream.” . . .
. . . We have largely evolved a unique brand of multiculturalism from many mi-
gration streams.3
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Despite both the critical interventions of postcolonial theory and empirical evi-
dence to the contrary, identification of the North Atlantic as the originary site 
of events and ideas of global (universal) significance—industrialization, moder-
nity, human freedom, liberal democracy, and the nation, to name a few—remains 
widely accepted.4 Rampersad’s remarks reference this temporality, which distin-
guishes between those who set the pace and those fated to follow, and highlight 
the paradox contained in this distinction for Caribbean countries like Trinidad, 
which have long been presumed to be multicultural. Rampersad captures, in mea-
sured language, an array of concerns expressed by Afro- and Indo-Trinidadian 
scholars, public intellectuals, politicians, and concerned citizens in their criti-
cal assessment of formalizing multiculturalism as policy.5 The rallying concern 
driving Trinidadian protests was alarm at introducing a policy that leaders of the 
developed world, where it was first implemented, were already declaring a failure 
and a threat to national integration.6 The general anxiety haunting the debate over 
multicultural policy was the possibility that state intervention directed at fostering 
diversity would compromise the hard-won common ground, or national cohe-
sion, that had organically developed in Trinidad in spite of its legacy of colonial 
racialization.
The varied claims and positions informing the debate on multiculturalism may 
seem at odds with normative understandings of diversity (heterogeneity; impu-
rity) and unity (homogeneity; purity) conditioned as they are by nation-building 
trajectories of former metropolitan and settler societies where the initial goal of 
homogeneity through assimilation was later, in the face of radical alterity, redi-
rected to managing diversity through multiculturalism (non-Anglo/Euro immi-
grants). I flatten the experiences of former metropolitan and settler societies, not 
because I think the differences between them are insignificant, but because these 
nation-builders had access to a viable, if tenuous, native subject who could sig-
nify the cultural core of their respective nations.7 When multiculturalism came to 
these societies, the dominant race and class, through nation-building projects of 
homogenization, had already fixed the cultural coordinates of civil society as the 
symbolic core of the nation.8 Given the early decimation of Native American pop-
ulations first by Spanish and later by English colonizers, no such option was avail-
able to Caribbean nation-builders, who faced the formidable task of making Old 
World ancestries native to the New World. This “symbolic lack” is fundamental 
to understanding how nation-building in Trinidad simultaneously incorporated 
both heterogeneous and homogeneous principles.
The temporal sequence of homogeneity giving way to heterogeneity is undone 
by Trinidadians’ simultaneous claim to an a priori multiculturalism (“natural 
multiculturalism”) and common ground for Trinidad. Furthermore, given that the 
two are asserted to coexist, fears that formal adoption of multiculturalism might 
fragment this common ground are puzzling. This chapter analyzes these seeming 
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contradictions by attending to the empirical particulars directing Trinidad’s pas-
sage from extractive colony to “a United Nations in miniature,” a postcolonial 
nation reputed for its cosmopolitan excess even by Caribbean standards.9 In so 
doing it adds another layer of complexity to the tenuous claim of multicultural 
inclusion from the vantage point of Caribbean exceptionalism.
Given the trend toward multiculturalism based on liberal aspirations to inclu-
siveness, nations are now expected simultaneously to straddle unity and diver-
sity, and the demand that they do so is commonplace. Yet despite multicultural 
“inclusion,” specific ancestral groups continue to argue that they suffer symbolic 
marginalization, and this chapter addresses how such exclusion operates in the 
postcolonial context of Trinidad despite—or through formal—inclusion. The 
Trinidadian example suggests that classical nationalism—which is to say, the 
impulse to homogenize and to create “purity” out of “impurity”—has hardly been 
crushed by multiculturalism. Although the putatively hybrid and cosmopolitan 
subjectivities of this age of late capitalism are widely celebrated, Trinidad shows 
that even multicultural nations constituted on the basis of cultural/racial differ-
ence may mask the homogenizing narratives of nationhood often relegated to the 
safety of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century models of nationhood.
REVISITING CARIBBEAN MULTICULTUR ALISM
The formal emergence of multiculturalism, understood as a strategy for ensuring 
national cohesion by incorporating minority and immigrant groups as full par-
ticipating members of society, without their losing their cultural distinctiveness, 
is seen as having occurred first in Canada in 1971, followed by Australia in 1973.10 
As the term “multiculturalism” spread to metropolitan centers and postcolonial 
nations the meanings invested in it varied.11 Despite critical assessments of mul-
ticulturalism informed by postcolonial theory and ethnic and cultural studies, 
liberal theorizations of multiculturalism remain for the most part in thrall of its 
association with non-Anglo/European minorities and immigrants, beginning in 
the 1970s, as a term to describe, analyze, and manage what might be called “new” 
diversity, the Third Worlding of the First World.12 The dominant theorizations of 
cultural difference thus remain confined to the register of cultural Other without 
referencing the mutual entanglements that make all identities, dominant and sub-
ordinate, open and vulnerable to one another.13 As a consequence, theorizations 
of multiculturalism that preserve the symbolic core of the nation reproduce the 
fiction of equivalence of the different cultural units implied by the term itself. The 
multicultural discourse in Trinidad provides an intriguing contrast to such famil-
iar multicultural formulations because the issue of which ethnic group can more 
legitimately represent the nation remains unsettled. Indeed, in the case of Trinidad, 
it is precisely the lack of a legitimate culture-history referent for the nation, or an 
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undisputed symbolic core to it, that drives the multicultural struggle between dif-
ferent ethnic groups over, and on behalf of, that nation.
Nation-builders and scholars with liberal leanings debate whether liberal 
democracies should recognize cultural groups in politics, and if so, how best to do 
this without compromising fundamental liberal values. Meanwhile, critical analy-
ses of the politics of recognition foreground the moral and cultural constitution of 
liberalism’s subject, the “abstract universal citizen,” against which the particularity 
of other citizens is measured and evaluated.14 The disclosure of particularity does 
not necessarily undermine liberal claims to the universal provided the cultural and 
moral foundations of liberalism are still assumed to possess a singular capacity to 
generate that universal. This allows for a conceptualization that locates the very 
generative conditions of the demand for recognition in the contradictory workings 
of late modern democracy, and, more specifically, in the compromise between two 
cherished liberal principles, individual freedom and social equality.15 This is a sig-
nificant analytical departure from prevailing liberal formulations of the politics of 
recognition that view the politics of difference as an external and potential obstacle 
to liberal values underpinning democratic nation-states. Contrary to the anxieties 
expressed by defenders of the liberal order, subjects’ demands for recognition of 
their difference based on memories of historical injury tend to reinscribe—rather 
than threaten—liberal values and institutions, in part because the injured seek rec-
ompense that aligns their identification with liberal bureaucratic desires.16
Liberalism’s subject, the “abstract universal citizen,” leaves open the possibility 
of including previously excluded groups, yet the privileges of “equal citizenship” 
have been found to be highly unequal.17 “For racialized subjects [in the United 
States] the fiction of ‘equal citizenship’ can mean denying the continuing effects 
of racial exclusion through the government’s failure to protect civil, political and 
social rights of people of color,” according to Leti Volpp.18 Parsing four registers of 
citizenship—as status, rights, politics, and identity—Volpp argues that for Asian 
Americans in the United States, citizenship as identity is not derived from politi-
cal and legal rights, and that their cultural identity can hinder their access to these 
rights. Writing of “the general failure to identify Asian Americans as constituting 
American national identity,” Volpp claimed in 2001 that “to be Asian American 
suggests in the American imagination the idea that one acts according to cul-
tural dictates somehow fundamentally different from those known in the United 
States. One’s Asianness seems to be the difference one must suppress in order to 
be a full citizen.”19
By foregrounding the relation between culture and citizenship (citizenship as 
identity), Volpp draws attention to the moral and cultural limits of multicultural 
inclusion through political and legal rights.20 The privileges and costs attached to 
cultural citizenship are in turn determined by the extent of overlap or dissonance 
between a particular culture indexing diversity and the culture-history referent 
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for the nation. The power to fix the cultural coordinates of civil society, which 
set the terms for incorporating diverse Others, is thus highly privileged, and not 
always transparent and open to contestation, as with the multicultural discourse 
in Europe and Anglo/European settler colonies. But, in the New World context of 
Trinidad the debate over multicultural policy addresses precisely this struggle over 
the symbolic definition of the nation.
Trinidadian Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism as official policy, with its liberal promise of realizing equality 
through recognition of cultural difference, came to Trinidad relatively late (in May 
2010) compared to Canada and Australia, which are credited with implement-
ing it in the early 1970s. The hesitance of earlier Trinidadian political leaders to 
adopt it is puzzling, because in this region of the oldest colonies of the West the 
imprint of racialization is pervasive, from Trinidad’s celebrated cosmopolitanism 
to Trinidadians’ reputation for “racial voting.” From the period leading up to and 
since independence in 1962, the pivotal challenge for nation-builders has been to 
define the common ground (distinct from liberal common good) of the nation (a 
culture-history referent) in relation to the ancestral groups comprising Trinidad. 
At a formal level, the challenge of nation-building in Trinidad—forging the rela-
tion between the particular (different ancestral groups) and the universal (com-
mon ground)—is similar to the challenge of recognizing multicultural distinctions 
(particular) in relation to the foundational principles of a liberal-democratic 
nation (universal). The critical question for the latter is how to incorporate diverse 
individuals or groups so as to enable their full participation in the nation without 
loss of their cultural distinctiveness or threat to fundamental liberal values of the 
nation embodied by the universal rights-bearing citizen.21 Substantively, however, 
there are fundamental differences between how “multiculturalism” operates in 
Trinidad’s national project, which is democratic and liberal in spirit, and the nor-
mative script for multiculturalism in liberal-democratic nations. Trinidadian spec-
ificity can be understood only through a reading of its colonial history, founded on 
operations of racialization peculiar to extractive colonies in the New World.
Contrary to received wisdom that relegates the problem of heterogeneity to 
new states, Robert Young and Wolfram Schmidgen among others have questioned 
the cultural homogeneity attributed to the old states of Europe.22 Academic dis-
closures of “impurities” aside, the fact remains that “historic” nations are deemed 
such precisely because they have been, for the most part, successful in their claim 
to homogeneity. The New World context of the Caribbean, however, resists the 
sentiment of a single kind of belonging, because as descendants of immigrants, 
slaves, and bonded labor, nation-builders of these societies have no option but to 
acknowledge the diversity of their Old World ancestors in staking a claim in the 
New World. Historical memory of Old World origins runs counter to claims of 
autochthony, a pivotal moral criterion for establishing belonging to the nation. 
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The challenge for nation-builders in the Caribbean was to transform Old World 
distinctions into New World purities.
First ruled by Spain (beginning in 1498), then Britain (from 1796 until indepen-
dence in 1962), Trinidad’s population also has a significant French component—a 
result of an agreement between Spain and France in 1783—“the Cedula [schedule] of 
population”—that saw the influx of a number of French Catholics and their African 
slaves into the island.23 Between 1845 and 1917, almost 143,000 indentured laborers 
from India also came to Trinidad to work in the sugar plantations to replace the 
labor of African slaves after emancipation in 1834. In addition, some Trinidadians 
also trace their ancestry to China, Madeira, Syria, Lebanon, Venezuela, and the 
smaller Caribbean islands. Shaped by a historical legacy of plantation slavery and 
its attendant racial hierarchy, the significance of ancestral diversity was amplified 
by the rigid correspondence between occupation and ancestral origin—Europeans 
as masters, Africans as slaves, and East Indians as indentured laborers.24 This his-
tory of voluntary and forced immigration from diverse areas of the Old World, 
and the life experiences imposed by the hierarchical relations structuring the plan-
tation-slavery complex, significantly inform Trinidadians’ understanding of their 
society as composed of people with diverse ancestries.25
This colonial history posed specific challenges for nation-building in Trinidad. 
Unlike in settler societies where Anglo/European immigrants were able to trans-
form Old World ancestral diversities into New World purities, in Caribbean 
extractive colonies independence called for the transfer of state power from 
European colonizers to formerly subordinate groups.26 And, unlike in Asia and 
Africa, where nation-builders could fashion indigenous native subjects to justify 
nationhood, the contenders for inheriting the state in Caribbean societies could 
not claim ancestral cultures that were either indigenous or had the capacity to 
transcend their particularisms, imprisoned as they were by a heritage of colonial 
racialization. The problem of reconciling the sociological fact of difference with 
the national imperative of unity—a general Caribbean predicament—was height-
ened in Trinidad, because the racial hierarchy encompassing the European and 
African mix typifying Caribbean societies was complicated by the significant pres-
ence of East Indians. As such, Trinidad could not even count on the tenuous unity 
based on a shared African ancestry claimed by other anglophone Caribbean soci-
eties. Much has changed since independence, but the current debate over formal 
multiculturalism and the anxiety that it will erode the existing common ground, 
reinscribes a tension fundamental to Trinidad, which has historically resisted 
attempts to resolve heterogeneity (multiculturalism) and homogeneity (national 
unity; common ground).
This tension is powerfully illustrated by the tendency of Trinidadians to use 
either “callaloo” (a stew made with the leaves of the dasheen bush, and flavored 
with okra and coconut milk) or “tossed salad” as metaphors for the nation. 
Trinidadians, mostly of African descent, see callaloo as a fitting metaphor, because 
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this stew made of local ingredients conveys both native origins (in the New World) 
and the containment of diverse elements within a single unit. In the “callaloo” meta-
phor homogeneity trumps heterogeneity and thereby attests to a common ground 
legitimizing the nation, thereby creating a single New World purity through a 
homogenizing narrative. Alongside callaloo, however, is the metaphor of “tossed 
salad,” which is not as ubiquitous as callaloo, but references an equally signifi-
cant different model for Trinidadian society. This metaphor is primarily used by 
Trinidadians of Indian ancestry, who take exception to the callaloo metaphor, 
because the diverse ingredients in a callaloo are boiled down to an indistinguish-
able “mush,” which erases the specific (taste) identities of the original ingredients, 
flattening them all into a homogeneous taste. Many Indo-Trinidadians thus find 
this metaphor inappropriate. Instead, they opt for the metaphor of “tossed salad,” 
which also permits the containment of diversity within a single unit, but here, 
unlike in the callaloo, each diverse ingredient maintains its original unique iden-
tity. This subtle but significant distinction attests to a complex dialectical relation-
ship informing Trinidadian national narratives, which were founded on colonial 
racializations that presented African and Indian as radically different, leaving the 
privilege of representing the nation open to contestation.
The “projected” incapacity of African and Indian cultures to transcend their 
particularities (and effectively symbolize the nation) can only be understood in 
relation to Anglo/Euro cultural claims to a monopoly of universals, which may be 
academically challenged, but remain formidable in setting the political and cul-
tural agenda for “the rest.” In Trinidad, the question of which group’s culture is 
suitably equipped to represent the nation remains open, thereby rendering visible 
the cultural claims backing power that have been neutralized in more normative 
contexts of multiculturalism, such as in former Anglo/European settler colonies 
and metropoles. In short, the multicultural debate in Trinidad unsettles the claims 
of North Atlantic liberal multiculturalism to monopolize universals, and fore-
grounds the issue of culture in politics.
Examining a variety of texts that depict a positive vision of the Trinidadian 
nation for the benefit of tourists, foreign investors, and foreign scholars, Daniel 
Segal has argued that the projected “cosmopolitanism” of Trinidadian society—
the image of a “United Nations in miniature”—suggests a nationalist narrative that 
emphasizes the continuity of ancestral diversities into the present.27 The plurality 
or heterogeneity embodied by the various immigrant groups on their arrival in 
Trinidad is said to continue into the present. According to Segal, the Trinidadian 
nationalist narrative celebrates “not the creation of unity from heterogeneity—not 
the capacity to invent a new identity out of many old identities—but the coex-
istence of diverse ancestral kinds in ‘harmony.’ ”28 The original ancestral types 
reproduce themselves as discrete elements, preserving purity at the level of each 
and every group. This cosmopolitan narrative of Trinidad, which emphasizes the 
continuity of original ancestral types, resembles a multiculturalist narrative that 
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corresponds to the metaphor of “tossed salad.” Mixture here is nominal, a mere 
juxtaposition of different types (or purities).
The Trinidadian nationalist narrative of the continuity of pure ancestral types, 
however, exists in dialectical tension with another, equally visible Trinidadian 
(or anglophone Caribbean) nationalist narrative that pivots around the notion of 
mixture as symbolized by local understandings of their identities and societies as 
creole. A conception of Trinidadian national identity as oscillating between the 
polarities of mixture and purity is necessary for understanding how certain groups 
deemed pure (like East Indians) are symbolically positioned outside an imagined 
national community that ironically purports to celebrate precisely such ancestral 
purities. Such a dialectical reading complicates the very notion of purity, forcing 
one to recognize that not all purities represented in the cosmopolitan narrative of 
Trinidad are accorded the symbolic privilege of nativeness.
Creole understood as signifying the synthesis of new cultural and racial identi-
ties indigenous to the New World, provided a powerful counternarrative to the 
depiction of Caribbean societies as “a patchwork of not-yet-sewn together frag-
ments.”29 This latter view was epitomized by M. G. Smith’s “plural society” model, 
which posited the absence of a consensus of cultural values between Europeans 
and Africans in the anglophone Caribbean.30 Smith argued that West Indian (or 
anglophone Caribbean) societies consisted of culturally distinct social segments—
“Whites,” “Coloreds,” and “Blacks”—who practiced different forms of the same 
institution, and that these societies were held together by the political power 
exercised by a dominant demographic minority. “The connection between cul-
ture and nationalism was highly problematic in the West Indies,” Smith asserted. 
“The common culture, without which West Indian nationalism cannot develop the 
dynamic to create a West Indian nation, may by its very nature and composition 
preclude the nationalism that invokes it. This is merely another way of saying that 
the Creole culture which West Indians share is the basis of their division.”31
This projected lack of a common, unifying culture dovetailed with the widely 
held image of Caribbean societies as excessively dependent on the metropole—
hence, V. S. Naipaul’s caricature of Caribbean peoples as “mimic men.”32 To counter 
the idea that cultural identity was somehow problematic for West Indian peoples, 
West Indian scholars advanced the “creole society thesis,” which emphasized the 
role of a distinctive common culture as a basis for national unity. Although the 
“creole thesis” was, in fact, the ideology of a middle-class intelligentsia seeking a 
leading role in an integrated, newly independent society, it nevertheless enhanced 
the emerging Caribbean nationalism of the third quarter of the twentieth century, 
forming a significant element in the Caribbean decolonization process.33
The term “creole” refers in common Caribbean usage to “a local product which 
is the result of a mixture or blending of various ingredients that originated in the 
Old World, suggesting an appropriate site of unity. Nationalists and local and for-
eign scholars alike saw creolization as a process of cultural interaction, synthesis, 
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and change, whereby diverse Old World forms combined to create novel forms 
indigenous to the New World. This not only supplied the basis of common cultural 
identity for Caribbean people, it was also a narrative of indigenization. Anything 
and anybody native to the New World as a consequence of mixing was “creole.” 
In Bolland’s words “ ‘Creole’ refers to people who are culturally distinct from the 
Old World populations of their origin [emphasis in original].”34 The principle of 
the creole narrative is in tension with the Trinidadian cosmopolitan narrative— 
creole signifying distinctions from Old World origins and the cosmopolitan narra-
tive signifying continuity of Old World ancestries. In contrast to the cosmopolitan 
narrative, creolization was all about the creation of new (World) identities out 
of the many old (World) identities. In Trinidad, the colored and black middle-
class intelligentsia’s efforts to elevate calypso, steelband, and carnival (formerly 
the culture of the urban black lower-classes, whom the local elites despised) as 
the national symbols of the nation during the period leading up to independence 
rested on the premise that such cultural forms, while influenced by Old World 
strains, originated in the New World.35 In this sense, one could argue that all things 
Creole—people, cultural forms, and languages—constitute core symbols of native-
ness or indigeneity in Trinidad.
Trinidad’s popular national narrative of cosmopolitanism, in which pure ances-
tral identities continue to the present, echoes M. G. Smith’s analytical model of plu-
ralism. The nationalist narrative of mixture (or creolization), on the other hand, as 
embodied in the term “creole,” corresponds to the creole society thesis. These cor-
respondences are somewhat jarring in that they juxtapose lay and analytic models, 
which seem in principle to be at odds. On the one hand, the analytic model of 
pluralism, which characterized these societies as deeply divisive and held together 
only by the power wielded by the white minority, is positioned in a paradigmatic 
relation to the lay model of the cosmopolitan, multicultural society with its prom-
ise of inclusion to all citizens. On the other hand, the creole society model, which 
emerged as an anti-imperialist discourse that emphasized the creative capacity of 
Caribbean peoples, is annexed to lay understandings of Creole, which excludes 
some Trinidadians from native status.36 In order to understand how the various 
pure ancestral types represented in the cosmopolitan/multicultural narrative are 
differentially privileged in their claims to native status, the second narrative of 
mixture must be considered.
The ideology of mixing, variously conceived, was integral to defining native 
status in the Americas. But not all ancestries were privileged with the capacity to 
mix. In his analysis of Trinidad’s colonial racial order, Segal illustrates how East 
Indians were excluded from the mixed category.37 Trinidad’s colonial racial order 
was built on the premise that pure races (representing different parts of the Old 
World) came to Trinidad, and subsequent mixing of these pure races was a feature 
peculiar to Trinidad and the Caribbean in general. This colonial rule of racializa-
tion located pure races outside of Trinidad, and those that embodied race mixture 
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as indigenous to Trinidad. This legacy of racialization constituted a major ideologi-
cal axiom through which East Indians later came to be defined outside the nation 
of Trinidad.
The idea that East Indians were “unmixables” was premised on Orientalist cari-
catures of Indians as persons saturated with an ancient (albeit inferior) culture 
that militated against mixing: as such, Indians remained of the “East” regardless of 
their ties to Trinidad.38 Africans, in contrast, were seen as lacking an ancestral civi-
lization, and their imputed status of “cultural nakedness” permitted the African, 
through mixing, to incorporate new elements and thereby become West Indian, 
or native.39
Mixing, which defined nativeness, was represented in the color spectrum 
defined by the end point values of black and white. All persons with some European 
and African ancestry were considered colored, and in this way both a pragmatic 
and ideological connection was established between the two groups: a connec-
tion thought to be particular to Trinidad yet reminiscent of the entire Caribbean. 
Even though blackness was devalued, the fact that the category black constituted 
a crucial axis in this pervasive system of social classification indicated recognition 
of the black or colored person’s place in Trinidad. In contrast, East Indians were 
excluded from accountability within this system or any other that would have rep-
resented their ties to other groups and by extension to Trinidad. As such, there is a 
conspicuous lexical absence for East Indian mixing, an absence all the more telling 
when contrasted to the plethora of terms—both pseudo-scientific historical terms 
such as mulatto, quadroon, octoroon, and others and more popular contemporary 
terms such as black, black black, red, light black, brown, colored, French Creole, 
white, so-called white, and Trini white, among others—to account for different 
proportions of black and white mixing. Despite the ample empirical evidence that 
pointed to East Indians mixing with other groups, what is significant to my argu-
ment is the absence of social recognition of such mixing.
East Indians were also excluded from the term Creole, which applied to all 
persons of white and black extraction (those represented in the color spectrum). 
Excluded from accountability within the color spectrum, East Indians were 
not considered an ingredient in this resulting mixture. If mixing was the prin-
ciple through which nativeness was defined, then to be native or local was also 
to be Creole. Denied the capacity to mix and denied social recognition of their 
local connections to other ancestral groups, East Indians never became Creoles. 
Accordingly, even today East Indians are not designated by the term Creole. The 
exclusion of East Indians from Creole status had significant implications for this 
group’s positioning vis-à-vis the incipient nation of Trinidad during the decoloni-
zation period when Creole came to metonymize Trinidadian national identity.40
The narrative that to be Trinidadian is somehow also to be racially mixed is as 
prevalent as the narrative of the continuity of ancestral purities. Paradoxical as it 
may seem, these two nationalist narratives—emphasizing purity and impurity—are 
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not mutually exclusive. Many Trinidadians “know of six or more racial . . . strains 
in their ancestry,” Daniel Crowley observed. “Such people are proud of their mixed 
origins, and boast that they are ‘a real mix-up,’ or ‘a West Indian callallu.’ ”41 Even 
whites, whom one might assume to have a vested interest in claims to purity, read-
ily acknowledge the illicit mixings in their genealogies. A member of a respect-
able upper-class French Creole family in his early fifties recounted his Portuguese, 
English, Scottish, and East Indian ancestry to me with amusement, adding that the 
term “French Creole” designates “so-called whites”—“so-called” because in fact 
they are all mixed. “Perhaps the epitome of a Trinidadian is the child . . . with a 
dark skin and crinkly plaits who looks at you out of decidedly Chinese eyes and 
announces herself as Jacqueline Maharaj,” the Trinidadian novelist Merle Hodge 
observed.42 On the other hand, Trinidadians continuously dissect or calibrate dif-
ferent proportions of mixture by resorting to the original ancestral categories, 
thereby insisting on defining persons or behavior on the basis of pure types—
hence, even in Crowley’s example, people display their mixedness by breaking it up 
into its constituent pure parts. Similarly, each feature of Hodge’s Trinidadian child 
is isolated and attached to different ancestral types. Even in this instance when 
East Indian elements are recognized in the mix, the name “Maharaj,” as an isolated 
trait, denotes culture not phenotype.43 In a speech at a forum on the subject “What 
Is the Culture of Trinidad and Tobago?” the renowned carnival bandleader and 
designer Peter Minshall eloquently summed up Trinidadians’ penchant for speci-
fying the diverse purities that make up their native selves:
I created several years ago a character called Callaloo. He was in everyman, with 
particular reference to these islands, in that who ever you were if you look at him it 
was your own self you would see. If you were black and you looked at he it was your 
own black self you going to see. White, brown or anything . . . it was your self you 
going to see in. He was all of us in one. Callaloo had a speech and in the course of 
the speech he said to de people and dem, “de differences is here to delight not divide 
and destroy.”44
Insistence on racial accounting on the basis of pure ancestral types subverts 
the coherence and integrity of narratives of homogenization. That is, when a 
Trinidadian accounts for a person’s racial makeup by saying “he half white and half 
black,” mixture is acknowledged, but the insistence on accounting on the basis of 
pure types subverts complete flattening of heterogeneity to homogeneity. This nar-
rative of mixture, which insists on racial calibration posits two stages. The first sig-
nifies the mixing of the originally pure types—Africans, various European groups, 
Chinese, and Amerindians—and the second signifies the calibration of the result-
ing mixtures on the basis of the pure types. In this national representation, East 
Indians who circumvented the cauldron of mixture (and hence the first stage)—at 
least in terms of social recognition of their mixture—enter into the second una-
malgamated stage as yet another pure type like all other pure groups representing 
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cosmopolitan Trinidad. The implication is that East Indians can be considered 
just as Trinidadian as those groups represented in the color spectrum that were 
subject to miscegenation. But such a reading is misleading, eclipsing more subtle 
principles of exclusion. Given that mixture embodied in the term Creole remains 
a defining principle for nativeness in Trinidad, pure ancestral types represented 
in the cosmopolitan or multicultural narrative of the nation are not symbolically 
equivalent. Trinidadian nationalist narratives distinguish between two types of 
purity that are differentially positioned in relation to national  identity—the purity 
of ancestral types that never passed through the cauldron of mixture and the puri-
ties that constitute parts of a mixture. The latter type of purity never represents 
a whole in and of itself; it is the purity that is created through the calibration of 
mixed instances. In contrast, the purity supposedly embodied by ethnic groups 
who never mixed, like the East Indians, does constitute wholes, and as such they 
were placed at a considerable ideological disadvantage with respect to claiming 
native status in the New World.
The Trinidadian example complicates cosmopolitan or multicultural narratives 
that posit equivalence between racially subordinate groups. Colonial racialization 
combined with national imperatives to indigenize and mediate diversity through 
mixing, so as to fix African ancestry as the nation’s ideological culture-history ref-
erent, making Afro-Creoles the legitimate inheritors of the state and the nation. 
Afro-Trinidadian claims on the postcolonial state were legitimized by the narrative 
of creolization for almost three decades. Creolization, however, was a narrative of 
homogenization that also allowed for the recognition of ancestral diversity, or het-
erogeneity. Claiming both indigeneity and ancestral diversity, Afro-Creoles were 
able to harness this tension better than any other group. Ironically, however, their 
political and cultural hegemony was buttressed by the representation of cosmopoli-
tan/multicultural difference—which is to say, all ancestral differences in Trinidad—
as fundamental to Trinidadian nativeness. Yet, as I have illustrated, creole difference 
and cosmopolitan difference are not equals in relation to native privilege. Such 
multicultural inclusion is nominal when they draw sustenance from homogenizing 
national narratives that invest only some groups in the multicultural nation with 
native privilege.
Elsewhere I have analyzed how, from a position of considerable disadvantage, 
Indo-Trinidadians gradually secured economic and political power.45 Beginning in 
the 1980s, Indo-Trinidadians challenged Creole definitions of the nation and bat-
tled for national inclusion on the basis of their Indian ancestry. Indo-Trinidadians 
sought to displace the privileged creole narrative of mixture by redefining the 
nation’s culture-history referent to include “purities” that were not mixed. It was 
this struggle around the symbolic definition of the nation that polarized the 
national narratives invoking callaloo and tossed salad. Indo-Trinidadians, intent 
on preserving their projected ancestral purity as Indians and also asserting their 
claims as authentic Trinidadians, sought to displace the callaloo/creole narrative 
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(which they perceived to be an ideology of homogenization and assimilation) with 
that of tossed salad.
The political landscape has transformed dramatically since the struggles in the 
1980s and 1990s over the symbolic definition of the nation. Since independence, 
political parties have largely relied on ethnic constituencies, with Afro-Trinidadians 
dominating politics and Indo-Trinidadians in opposition. Indo-Trinidadians were 
never seen as legitimate contenders for the postcolonial state because of the cul-
tural particularities defining them and their “sectional” interests. Even in the early 
1990s, the sentiment that an Indo-Trinidadian could not legitimately be prime 
minister prevailed. The elections of 1995 changed the political trajectory of the 
country, however, when an Indo-Trinidadian party and its leader, Basdeo Panday, 
came to power.
The political landscape has been significantly transformed, so that the state is 
no longer the preserve of Afro-Trinidadians, and Indo-Trinidadians are no longer 
perennial outsiders. Nevertheless, in negotiating the balance between common 
ground and cultural diversity, the former is aligned with Afro-Trinidadian and the 
latter with Indo-Trinidadian interests. The debate around multiculturalism thus 
remains animated by differing narratives of ancestral purity that contrast those 
who are mixed (calibrated purities), with those who never mixed (whole puri-
ties). Indeed, the official rationale for the adoption of multiculturalism as policy 
addresses Indo-Trinidadian pleas for such a policy. In 2011, the renamed Ministry 
of the Arts and Multiculturalism noted:
Local Calls for a platform for Multiculturalism have traditionally revolved around 
perceived inequity in distribution of state resources amongst disparate ethnic 
groups in Trinidad and Tobago. This call has been most popular amongst the Hindu 
artistic and cultural fraternity as evidenced by the [Hindu charitable organization] 
Maha Sabha’s request that the Ministry of Culture be labelled the Ministry of Mul-
ticulturalism. . . . The Honourable Prime Minister has clearly demarcated the focus 
of Multiculturalism on greater equity in the distribution of state resources in the 
Cultural Sector.46
The justification for multiculturalism in Trinidad as a corrective for previous state 
bias that cultivated Afro-Creole forms foregrounds the particularity attributed to 
those of both African and Indian ancestries. While Afro-Creole culture symbol-
ized the Trinidadian nation until as recently as the 1980s, it was nevertheless always 
open to contestation. The elevation of Afro-Creole culture to national culture did 
not render invisible its particularities. Ironically, it was the particularity assigned 
to Indo-Trinidadians, even though subordinate, which continually interrupted 
narratives of homogenization that would exhaust the symbolic space of the nation. 
Even when East Indians were situated as outsiders, Afro-Trinidadian nation-
builders were compelled to acknowledge East Indian difference and thereby admit 
to their own difference—if only to qualify their culture and history as the most 
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suited referent for the nation. The retrospective Indo-Trinidadian charge of state 
bias in sponsorship of Afro-Trinidadian culture is possible because homogenizing 
national narratives of creolization did not or could not establish an uncontestable 
new purity. The significance of this Caribbean exception is borne out if we reflect 
on the absurdity of directing the same accusation at Anglo/Euro purities defin-
ing English, American, Canadian, or Australian native subjects. The doxa of these 
purities making up the symbolic core of each nation may be tweaked to accommo-
date multicultural difference, but this difference always remains the difference of 
the Other, rarely challenging Anglo/European symbolic ownership of the nation. 
In Trinidad, the dialectical play between homogenizing and cosmopolitan nar-
ratives, founded on colonial race hierarchies, continues to resist consolidation of 
either African or Indian ancestry as the nation’s symbolic core. And the relent-
less proclivity of Trinidadians to read Indian or Creole interests into any instance 
that mixes culture and politics reveals the stakes tied to cultural citizenship, which 
transcend the Caribbean exception. The Trinidadian case, where the work of cul-
ture in politics is for the most part transparent and legible, provides a unique angle 
from which to critically engage privileges of liberal citizenship attached to other, 
more familiar formulations of liberal multiculturalism.
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In this concluding chapter we explore the implications of this volume for the 
theory and practice of multiculturalism. We provide clear answers to the central 
questions raised at the outset: What is “multiculturalism,” and how did it come 
about? What dilemmas has it posed for liberal-democratic governance? How have 
these been responded to in theory and practice, and are the different responses 
adequate? Are there alternative approaches to cultural diversity that have been 
overlooked? The chapters in this volume demonstrate that multiculturalism has 
implications that stretch beyond its current formulations in both public and aca-
demic discourse, casting doubt on basic assumptions of modern liberal democ-
racy, and even on the viability of the nation-state in its present form.
Decolonization caused a significant increase in internal cultural diversity in 
many liberal democracies, which gave rise to multiculturalism as a social fact, 
related set of policy challenges, and normative debates. Yet the legacies of the 
British Empire also conditioned the various responses to cultural diversity, thereby 
helping to construct different forms of “multiculturalism.” The dominant under-
standing of multiculturalism in political practice is in terms of the accommodation 
and integration of minority immigrants. The political theory of multiculturalism 
is broader in scope, including national minorities and indigenous peoples as well 
as immigrants, but nevertheless generally only ascribes self-government rights to 
the former two, and then only in certain circumstances. Conceptualizations of 
multiculturalism in current theory and practice have been conditioned by decolo-
nization, which affected countries differently depending on both their domestic 
history and their position within the Empire. Comparing forms of multicultur-
alism across the British Commonwealth demonstrates that “multiculturalism” 
230    Multiculturalism in the “New” Commonwealth 
properly understood has profound ramifications for modern societies. The 
 putative “siloing” of multiculturalism in theory and practice is problematic, and 
the holistic account of multiculturalism provided by this book points toward a 
radical approach to cultural diversity, which is to reform governance to make it 
much more polycentric, i.e. operating through an overlapping set of formal and 
informal institutions, no single one of which is empowered to trump all the others. 
Polycentric institutions, and an emphasis on pluralism within them, would better 
be able to accommodate the fluid, interrelated, and mutually constructing nature 
of the relevant issues and groups. In so doing, we might unwind unhelpful forms 
of social construction that occurred during imperialism, decolonization, and the 
creation of “multiculturalism” itself.
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN POLITICAL PR ACTICE: 
IMMIGR ATION AND INTEGR ATION
The dominant political and public understanding of multiculturalism is in terms 
of postwar immigration and the dilemmas this has posed for traditional forms of 
liberal-democratic governance. In response to these challenges, many states have 
granted cultural minorities exemptions from putatively neutral and difference-
blind laws, complemented by more positive assistance, such as language rights, 
education reforms, and funding for minority cultural activities. The explicit or 
implicit aim of these multicultural “regimes” is to help immigrants integrate into a 
polity understood as having a dominant cultural majority. These policies and laws 
are therefore aimed primarily at immigrant groups, rather than national minori-
ties or indigenous peoples, who are usually seen as falling outside of the ambit 
of debates about “multiculturalism.” Comparison of different countries across the 
Commonwealth undermines this narrative, however, in several key ways.
For example, the different issues raised by cultural diversity are not cleanly 
separable from each other, suggesting that neither are the different “types” of mul-
ticulturalism. In both Singapore and Malaysia, the forms of multiracial conso-
ciationalism adopted around independence have political, economic, and cultural 
aspects that affect each other, and thereby “multiculturalism,” in various ways. 
Political tensions followed the ascription of individual citizenship rights within 
the context of an overarching group politics. In turn, this political competition 
is itself entangled with cultural practices, as seen in the community processions 
and parades that helped trigger the Malaysia/Singapore split. Yet economics has 
demarcated these different ethno-cultural groups even further by way of programs 
of development seen as necessary for political stability and cultural harmony. The 
entanglement of politics, economics, and culture can likewise be seen in India, 
where the adoption of Western liberal secularism has exacerbated political conflict 
between religious groups. The constitution adopted at independence also recast 
issues that are ostensibly religious or cultural—such as discrimination against the 
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Scheduled Castes—in socioeconomic terms, embroiling multiculturalism even 
further in interest group politics. These cases show that multiculturalism raises 
cross-cutting issues that affect the way groups relate to each other and to the state. 
In turn, this suggests that “integration” is not a unitary process, but takes place 
across a number of different “spheres,” including the political and economic, and 
through processes that span public and private, individual and group. We therefore 
should not automatically prioritize cultural integration above all other forms, or 
assume it can/should take place in splendid isolation. Nor can we simply assume 
that integration in one sphere inevitably aids integration in another, or even that 
this would be desirable.
Although the cases cited above are from the “New” Commonwealth, the underly-
ing point has traction elsewhere.1 For example, recent public discourse in the United 
Kingdom has been dominated by calls for immigrants to integrate into British cul-
ture more completely.2 Yet this ignores both the historical specificity of articulations 
of the cultural nation and the long-term degradation of the welfare state that aids 
integration. The pluralistic nature of integration thus suggests that even in cases such 
as the British one, which seem to fit the paradigmatic model of immigrant multi-
culturalism, we need to be aware of the historical nuances of particular “regimes” 
of integration, and the ways in which modern debates may gloss over underlying 
factors that are not overtly cultural. In turn, this reinforces the need to ensure that 
multicultural policy frameworks and the accompanying public rhetoric are open 
and holistic, rather than rigid and totalizing, in their approach to integration.
The interrelated nature of politics, economics and culture not only affects the 
way we should approach the integration of immigrants, however. It also embroils 
multiculturalism in debates over the treatment of national minorities and indig-
enous peoples, even if this is not always clearly understood in public discourse. 
For example, one reason behind the Brexit vote was the widespread perception 
that the welfare state—and the postwar British national identity of which it is a 
part—is being threatened by immigrant multiculturalism. Yet immigration and 
“Britishness” are understood and valued differently in different parts of the United 
Kingdom, which each have their own underlying national identity.3 The dominant 
public understanding of British multiculturalism in terms of immigration and race 
therefore masks direct political connections to issues involving national minori-
ties, in particular Brexit and renewed pressure for Scottish independence. In New 
Zealand “multiculturalism” is also understood primarily in terms of immigrant 
integration, yet again it is entangled at a deeper level with issues relating to national 
minorities/indigenous peoples. Its multiculturalism is shaped by debates over civic 
values and national identity, which take place against the background of official 
biculturalism. The neoliberal reforms that created immigrant multiculturalism 
threatened key aspects of New Zealand’s national identity rooted in social justice, 
provoking a public backlash. Related government attempts to co-opt communal 
values based in indigenous culture were resisted by the Maori, who distinguished 
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themselves from immigrant groups by articulating their claims in terms of bina-
tionalism. Yet in recent years the Maori have softened their stance on immigration, 
seeing immigrant groups as potential allies in their struggle to resist racism and 
maintain a robust biculturalism. Both the British and New Zealand cases therefore 
illustrate the inevitable entanglement of multiculturalism in contests over national 
identity, which means immigrant multiculturalism cannot be neatly separated 
from issues relating to national minorities and indigenous peoples.
It is therefore unsurprising that government attempts to treat immigrants, 
national minorities and indigenous peoples separately can be ineffective, with 
the different groups influencing each other even as they try to distinguish their 
claims. This process occurs in both Britain and New Zealand, but is perhaps clear-
est in Canada. Canada’s reputation as a world leader in multiculturalism is in part 
built on features of its legal system that have helped to accommodate a variety 
of groups and claims. Ironically, however, this has had negative consequences. A 
crucial effect has been the siloing of discourses surrounding Quebec, indigenous 
peoples, and the integration of nonwhite immigrants, with “multiculturalism” in 
public discourse construed predominantly in terms of the latter. Not only does 
this gloss over connections prominent in the philosophical literature, it has also 
resulted in unhelpful politicization of debates. Multiculturalism is presented as a 
mechanism by which Anglophone Canada can intrude in Quebec’s political and 
cultural autonomy, and as potentially undercutting the distinctive claims of indige-
nous peoples. These difficulties are exacerbated by the legal doctrine of “reasonable 
accommodation,” which facilitates opportunistic resistance to liberal egalitarian 
norms by local majorities, and by the potentially essentializing treatment of indig-
enous cultures by the courts. Variegated legal arrangements and constitutional 
protections therefore interact with interest-group politics in Canada, meaning that 
even as the different groups and issues are perceived as separate in law and policy, 
they interact at a deeper level.
Attempts to treat immigrant groups, national minorities, and indigenous peo-
ples separately are also ineffective in the New Commonwealth. We have already 
seen that in Malaysia, Singapore, and India, multiculturalism raises political, eco-
nomic, and cultural issues that cut across each other, and that this has contributed 
to its politicization. A similar process can be seen in in Trinidad and Tobago, where 
the recent adoption of “official” multiculturalism draws on policy discourses that 
construe it primarily in terms of integration. Yet this multiculturalism has dis-
turbed the precarious balance between the organically developed commonality 
aligned with Afro-Trinidadian interests and the self-conscious cultural diversity 
favored by Indo-Trinidadians.4 Overall, therefore, the cases show that even nar-
row conceptualizations of multiculturalism are implicated in contests over state 
resources, national identity, and cultural recognition. “Multiculturalism” thereby 
helps to construct competing groups as social entities through policy, law, and 
public discourse, even as they try to keep themselves separate.
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Lastly, cases in the New Commonwealth highlight that the association of inte-
gration with immigration is contingent. Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Trinidad 
and Tobago have all struggled to blend different cultural groups together, yet of 
these states only Malaysia and Singapore have received significant numbers of 
postwar immigrants, many of whom are treated like guest workers who do not 
require permanent integration. The Nigerian case provides the clearest illustra-
tion, however, that framing multiculturalism in terms of immigrant integration 
may be unhelpful. Nigerian independence was shaped by political competition 
between three main groups, none of which formed an overall majority, with no 
clear way of integrating the groups into a single cohesive polity. The cases thus 
highlight that integration is a key issue even in the absence of mass immigration 
or a dominant majority.5
Casting multiculturalism in public discourse in terms of immigrant integra-
tion appears to be conditioned by historical experiences in Britain and the “Old” 
Commonwealth. Even in those countries, attempts to separate immigrant multi-
culturalism cleanly from other groups and issues—in particular those relating to 
indigenous peoples and other national minorities—are often ineffective, and per-
haps counterproductive. Just as multicultural “issues” cut across politics, econom-
ics, and culture, the different groups—immigrants, national minorities, indigenous 
peoples, and other “cultural” groups—mutually construct each other, even in the 
absence of a dominant cultural majority. Confining “multiculturalism” to policy 
approaches aimed at immigrant integration is therefore historically conditioned, 
theoretically unconvincing, and practically impossible.
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN POLITICAL THEORY: 
CULTURE,  IDENTIT Y,  AND GOVERNANCE
The dominant understanding of multiculturalism in political theory draws on the 
typology of groups and rights conditioned by historical experiences in the Old 
Commonwealth and made famous by the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka. 
In political theory “multiculturalism” thus encompasses national minorities and 
indigenous peoples as well as immigrant groups, and potentially supports rights 
to special political representation, self-government, and historical reparations. 
Prominent claims made in support of these multicultural rights are that culture 
facilitates individual autonomous choice, supports self-respect, and grounds 
shared identities vital for democratic governance.6 Unlike policy discourses, how-
ever, political theorists do not simply assume that the polity contains a cultural 
majority into which minorities must integrate. Rather, prominent advocates—and 
sometimes even critics—of multicultural rights support altering political struc-
tures in order to track the boundaries of individual cultural groups, in particu-
lar national minorities or indigenous peoples.7 These structural changes are often 
supplemented with “polyethnic” multicultural rights aimed at integrating—but 
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not assimilating—immigrant groups into the dominant (usually national) cul-
ture. On the face of it, therefore, this means that multicultural political theory 
supports our claim that casting multiculturalism purely in terms of immigrant 
integration is unhelpful. Yet even this more expansive understanding of multicul-
turalism in political theory is too rigid to accommodate the complexity of postwar 
multiculturalism.
A comparison of different countries across the Commonwealth casts doubt on 
the central claims in multicultural political theory in ways that build on the cri-
tiques from the previous section. Postcolonial polities are often defined by cultural 
hybridity or pluralism rather than homogeneity or unity, and therefore may lack 
fixed identities either at the state, substate, or even individual level. For example, 
while Afro-Creoles have historically dominated postcolonial Trinidadian politics, 
the hybridity that is definitional of creole culture destabilizes even this identity, 
preventing consolidation of either African or Indian ancestry as the nation’s sym-
bolic center. In India and Nigeria, the sheer scale of diversity within the state has 
arguably militated against the construction of a clear, stable shared identity, and 
even in the much smaller Britain there is pluralism at the heart of the cultural 
nation. Decolonization and multiculturalism have fundamentally—and perhaps 
irrevocably—destabilized British national identity, and postwar articulations of 
an inclusive Britishness continue to be pressured by resistance to immigration, 
economic globalization, and a suspicion of Islamic groups. This instability has 
been exacerbated by differences between England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. Even these underlying nationalisms are too fluid to secure productive 
shared identities in the way many multicultural theorists presume.8 National and 
cultural identities are dynamic and variegated, which indicates that their hybridity 
must be taken into consideration by both the theory and practice of multicultural-
ism, undercutting simple accounts of their role in governance that are common in 
the literature.9
Even where there are relatively clear forms of group identity, the nature of the 
relevant “culture” or “nation” can change in ways that undercut common assump-
tions regarding their effects and the neat separation of groups/rights. For example, 
in resisting the shift to neoliberalism, Pakeha (white/European-descended) and 
Maori New Zealanders drew on shared values that were grounded in divergent 
forms of national identity. Yet even these dual forms of identity are dynamic, 
with the Maori simultaneously defending domestic binationalism and reject-
ing the homogenized version of their culture co-opted by the state to “brand” 
New Zealand internationally. In addition, the elision of state services for the 
Maori and Pasifika immigrants means that the latter sometimes occupy a lim-
inal status between the two dominant “nations.” Similar issues occur in Canada, 
where Anglophone citizens form a clear cultural majority, albeit one that must 
co-exist with Francophone Canada and the First Nations. Yet variations between 
Quebec’s “interculturalism,” Federal “multiculturalism,” and the legal treatment 
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of indigenous cultural rights, demonstrates that the multiple cultural nations and 
groups in Canada are not immutable, but are expressed differently depending 
on context and fora, as is their response to cultural difference. Even in Australia 
the Anglophone “core” of the nation is not static. An early exclusionary ethno-
nationalism was replaced by an assimilative cultural nationalism, which in turn 
has been tempered by a liberal nationalism that stresses integration. Australian 
multiculturalism is in part a pragmatic compromise between competing aspects of 
national identity, predicated on the ever-changing nature of the nation in response 
to cultural diversity. Comparison of cases across the Commonwealth therefore 
indicates that multicultural theorists can neither simply assume that “shared” val-
ues or identities rooted in culture or nation are identical at a deeper level nor that 
they will remain constant across time and domestic context. The relevant groups 
are not fixed and stable entities that play a predictable role in liberal democracy, 
but rather are dynamic, fluid, and contested.
Even a “political” nation that could potentially bridge underlying diversity may 
become entangled with thicker cultural nationalisms, as can be seen in India’s 
post-independence nation-building. India has a distinctive approach to cultural 
diversity, rejecting overt group consociationalism in favor of more individualized 
forms of liberal governance, which are then supplemented by a “limited” multicul-
tural regime of group-differentiated rights. Yet this approach came about largely 
because constitution-making at independence led to a compromise between dif-
ferent forms of liberalism and nationalism. Liberals and secular nationalists valo-
rized difference-blind individual citizenship and a political conception of the 
nation, whereas conservative nationalists sought greater social unity through a 
cultural understanding of the polis. The growing power of Hindu nationalism 
suggests, however, that this convergence of interests was temporary and therefore 
unstable. Parallel difficulties can be seen in Britain, where public figures frequently 
suggest that a British national identity construed primarily in terms of shared val-
ues and institutions can unite different groups. Yet the “rebalancing” of British 
multiculturalism by forms of liberal nationalism potentially excludes more con-
servative cultural minorities, and Brexit has been accompanied by a resurgence in 
ethno-nationalism. The tendency of British debates over national identity to draw 
(often reflexively) on thicker aspects of British history and culture suggests that 
attempts to use a thin version of “Britishness” to unify the polity are misplaced.
Our comparative study of multiculturalism thus indicates that any given “cul-
ture” or “nation” is complex, dynamic, and alters across different contexts. The 
cases also suggest that the “political” nation is not robust enough to resist thicker 
forms of cultural and even ethno-religious nationalism. Yet the claims of mul-
ticultural theorists typically revolve around the function of culture in support-
ing autonomous choice, self-respect, and useful shared identities. This volume 
thus supports prominent “cosmopolitan” critiques of liberal multicultural theory 
alleging that it—and thereby the literature more broadly—implicitly relies on a 
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simplistic account of culture.10 The crux of this critique is that individuals simul-
taneously participate in multiple and overlapping forms of culture and identity. If 
true, this means that assigning rights to particular cultures on the basis that they 
play a necessary role in individual or group life is both unwarranted and poten-
tially counterproductive.11
Cultures are socially constructed in two key senses that make rigid and mono-
lithic accounts of it unsustainable. Firstly, since cultural meanings are necessar-
ily abstract generalizations of concrete individual meanings, they are subject to 
human agency, as demonstrated by cultural change.12 Secondly, any attempt to 
identify a culture is itself a form of social construction, and therefore placing an 
individual in one clearly identifiable culture with a precise boundary would require 
reducing it to a stipulative list of features. It is therefore unpersuasive to claim that 
an individual is necessarily located in a single culture that functions as an exclu-
sive context for choice or identity. Since cultures are socially constructed, we have 
reason to suppose that individuals are located in multiple cultures and have several 
cultural identities, and therefore that whatever role “culture” plays will vary with 
how we define it. There may be different levels of overlapping understandings and 
identities that have important social effects, but there are many different levels of 
abstraction from individuals, of which any particular culture is only one.
Overall, therefore, the cases discussed in the preceding chapters support the 
contention that tracking the boundaries of specific cultural groups is empirically 
and philosophically problematic, undermining attempts to separate groups typo-
logically and ascribe them different rights on this basis. This volume therefore 
casts doubt on the main reasons given in multicultural theory for wanting to pri-
oritize particular cultures, and on the ability to do so in practice.13 
MULTICULTUR ALISM,  LIBER ALISM,  AND EMPIRE
Dominant accounts in philosophy and politics are thus fundamentally flawed in 
their conceptualization of multiculturalism. Since various “multicultural” issues 
and groups are interrelated and mutually constructing in both theory and practice, 
attempting to separate them cleanly is bound to fail. Our analysis of multicultural-
ism only shows us, however, that our response to cultural diversity must be holis-
tic. It does not offer us positive guidance as to what type of rights, for which sort 
of groups, are justified. Should we treat all minority groups like immigrants or as 
equivalent to national minorities? Is the correct response to cultural diversity cen-
tralization and integration, devolution and local political autonomy, or something 
else entirely? Is it possible to have an integrated response to multiculturalism that 
productively spans both theory and practice?
In order to find a way out of this impasse, we must move up a level of analy-
sis and examine multiculturalism in greater historical depth, and in its interna-
tional as well as domestic contexts. The interaction of liberal and colonial forms of 
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governance has conditioned the forms taken in each by multiculturalism, which 
not only challenges liberal-democratic norms and conceptions of the nation, but 
has remade states at a fundamental level. Modern multiculturalism is itself part of 
the process of decolonization, which continues to affect relationships both within 
and between the Commonwealth states. Tracing the roots of current philosophical 
and political debates foregrounds the depth of the dilemmas it poses to traditional 
liberal democracy, starting to bring into focus the issues that a fruitful form of 
multiculturalism must address.
The clearest examples of the entanglement of liberalism, colonialism, and 
multiculturalism are in the New Commonwealth. In what are now Malaysia and 
Singapore, the colonial state maintained itself by limiting ethnic groups to dif-
ferent economic roles: “Chinese” capital, “Malay” land, and “Indian” labor. This 
crude division showed strains under the Empire, and at decolonization the British 
advocated blending the diverse populations into unified polities through equal 
citizenship rights. A purely individualized approach was rejected by local elites, 
however, in favor of multiracial consociationalism that drew on the categories of 
colonial political economy. The state’s capacity to balance the different groups has 
depended on economic growth, and so fluctuating fortunes have amplified calls for 
democratization and newer forms of multiculturalism. These efforts at reform have 
been undercut, however, by highly mobile labor and capital, and by recent financial 
crises. Nation- and state-building in both countries is thus still conditioned by the 
consociationalism drawn from racialized colonial governance, and its interactions 
with globalized liberal economics. Similar factors in Trinidad and Tobago have 
affected the development of nation and state, and thereby the way cultural diver-
sity has been managed. Plantation slavery resulted in a rigid racial hierarchy, with 
Europeans as masters, Africans as slaves, and East Indians as indentured laborers. 
The annihilation of indigenous peoples led to recasting the descendants of enslaved 
Africans as “native,” however, and so as the legitimate inheritors of the postcolonial 
nation and state. Afro-Creoles have therefore dominated domestic post-indepen-
dence politics, but recently this has been challenged by Indo-Trinidadians, in part 
through an official multiculturalism that draws on policy discourses from Europe 
and the Old Commonwealth. The intertwined effects of colonial and liberal gover-
nance therefore contribute directly to the hybridity at the heart of the nation and 
colors political competition between subnational groups.
Colonialism also caused some polities to reject aspects of liberal governance, 
or to adopt aspects of it unsuited to local contexts. For example, the form of fed-
eralism adopted at Nigerian independence was the result of British influence, yet 
this tripartite division was inherently unstable, and cut across important religious 
and linguistic differences. In addition, the way the three main groups understood 
one another politically and culturally was conditioned by strategies employed by 
the British, as can be seen in their leaders’ private statements and rhetoric in their 
party-controlled newspapers. British colonial governance therefore contributed 
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to the distrust between the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani, who favored differ-
ent balances of federalism and nationalism. The entanglement of liberalism with 
colonialism in Nigeria helped to cast both cultural diversity and decentralization 
as threats, delaying the institution of a more radical federalism suited to Nigeria’s 
deeper underlying cultural diversity.
Indian elites were also suspicious of British divide-and-rule strategies, and 
some had a strong commitment to universalist forms of liberal governance, 
including secularism. A pragmatic compromise between liberals and nationalists 
at independence reinforced resistance to colonial-era decentralization and group-
rights, resulting in a rejection of consociationalism in favor of a “limited” multi-
cultural framework. Subsequent expansion of multicultural policies and rights in 
India has thus occurred through ad hoc concessions to lobbying rather than the 
consistent application of political principle. This “normative deficit” plays into the 
rhetorical strategies of the Hindu Right, which also portrays multiculturalism as 
a threat to the nation. The interaction of liberalism, colonialism, nationalism, and 
religion is therefore vital for understanding multiculturalism in India. Although 
the early liberal state was defined by its relegation of religion to the private sphere, 
European colonialism was often justified by attempts to spread the Christian reli-
gion around the globe, and this dual inheritance altered the trajectory of both 
religion and politics in India. The Abrahamic faiths understand religion in terms 
of absolute doctrinal truth, and thereby prioritize the conversion of individuals 
through missionary work. Yet the religious traditions native to India do not share 
these commitments, but rather see truth as partial, perspectival and subject to 
open-ended pursuit from within one’s own community. The imposition of Western 
secularism therefore incentivized the reconstruction of Indian religious traditions 
and communities in competitive “Semitic” terms, feeding ethno-religious conflict. 
Cases in the New Commonwealth therefore illustrate the deep historical connec-
tion between liberalism and colonialism, which has conditioned not just multicul-
turalism, but the structure, nature, and development of the postcolonial nation, 
state, and even religious groups.
The entwined legacies of liberalism and colonialism are also at work in the 
Old Commonwealth. In New Zealand, the Maori resisted the commodification 
of their culture for purposes of both domestic politics and international trade, 
and in so doing asserted their status as a distinct and equal founding group. 
Yet in responding to the neoliberalism that sought to open New Zealand more 
widely to global economic forces, they articulated their claims to internal politi-
cal autonomy through emerging norms relating to indigenous peoples, which in 
turn drew on the international human rights law created by the postwar crisis in 
liberal governance. The influence of these international discourses led to signifi-
cant domestic legal changes, such as the renewal of treaty claims and human rights 
legislation, which in turn have interacted with debates over immigrant multicul-
turalism and national identity. A parallel process has occurred in Australia, where 
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multiculturalism—although it ostensibly also applies to indigenous peoples—is 
understood primarily in terms of nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity. 
These universalist liberal principles, and the political institutions and forms of 
citizenship through which they are expressed, are a key part of the British legacy 
in Australia. Unlike in Nigeria and India, however, where the experiences under 
colonial governance tainted liberal principles and practices, these aspects of the 
imperial inheritance have been readily accepted as central parts of Australian 
national identity and state governance. Australian multiculturalism also draws 
on inter- and transnational discourses, however, including a mix of norms and 
practices from other Commonwealth countries.14 Yet Australia is unique in the 
way it has blended these international and domestic elements, maintaining a bal-
ance between cultural nationalism, liberal democratic principle, and the forces of 
globalization released by decolonization. In the Old Commonwealth, liberalism 
and colonialism have thus conditioned multiculturalism in both its domestic and 
international aspects—which are themselves not cleanly separable—and thereby 
altered the basic structure of both state and nation.
The United Kingdom lacks a written constitution or formal federalism, and 
so has addressed cultural diversity through policy and legislation rather than an 
overt restructuring of the state. Nevertheless, multiculturalism has reconstituted 
Britain at a fundamental level, and there has been a failure fully to acknowledge 
the deep connection to empire. Colonization provided a common project for 
the different nations of the United Kingdom, helping to form both the modern 
British state and a new “national” identity. The end of empire therefore not only 
challenged Britain’s status as a world power but destabilized “Britishness” itself. 
The overall result was a postwar transformation of UK nationality, citizenship, 
and immigration law, which in turn has meant that multiculturalism focuses on 
integrating immigrants into the British nation. Yet there is no consensus regard-
ing what that nation is, or should be. Thinner political identities compete with 
thicker forms of “muscular liberalism” and cultural nationalism, which in turn 
often slide into ethnocentrism. These different forms of British national iden-
tity cut across underlying nationalisms, which have different relationships with 
multiculturalism, immigration, and a welfare state under pressure from domes-
tic neoliberalism and economic globalization. These cleavages and their histori-
cal roots are rarely foregrounded in debates over British multiculturalism. The 
resulting public discourse therefore also suffers from a “normative deficit,” which 
stems from a failure to address directly the ways in which liberalism and colo-
nialism have conditioned Britain’s self-understanding. British national identity 
continues to be expressed through a Whiggish exceptionalism that alternates 
between sanitizing and celebrating British imperial history, ignoring the effects 
of the end of empire on the plural identities it held together. The refusal to face 
the intertwined nature of Britain’s colonial past and multicultural present thus 
masks the depth of the challenge cultural diversity poses to the British nation 
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and state, suggesting that efforts to limit its scope to immigrant integration will 
be counterproductive.
Domestic cultural diversity thus cannot be understood without reference to 
international discourses, and forms of modern multiculturalism are conditioned 
by the historical legacy of liberalism and colonialism. Postwar multiculturalism 
challenges traditional liberal-democratic norms and practices that are themselves 
entangled with the history of colonial governance. Multiculturalism, and the 
decolonization of which it is a part, have also altered the basic form of the nation 
and structure of the state, albeit that these processes have varied in their mecha-
nisms, effects, and how they are understood. Comparison of different cases across 
the Commonwealth indicates that a productive response to postwar cultural 
diversity must address its multiple contexts, but still acknowledge the depth of its 
challenges to nation and state. In particular, any fruitful form of multiculturalism 
must remain cognizant of the ongoing effects of colonialism on its own theory and 
practice, and on liberal-democratic governance more broadly.
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN THE BRITISH 
C OMMONWEALTH:  NEW, OLD,  AND ORIGINARY
The dilemmas posed by the end of Empire looked very different from the center 
than at its periphery, and therefore the categories of colonizer, settler-colony and 
colonized which structure this volume help to explain important features of the 
different cases. For example, polities in the New Commonwealth, which had to 
balance multiple competing groups after decolonization, all encompass a degree 
of cultural diversity that cannot readily be encapsulated by the Westernized con-
ceptualizations of multiculturalism that arose in the 1970s.15 Racialized colonial 
governance has conditioned Trinidadian national identity, fixing Afro-Creole, 
East Indian and White Settlers as the organizing groups, even as these categories 
are constantly pressured by hybridity within and across the correlated identities. 
Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore has been determined by economic 
development rather than political institutions, but both of these are beholden to 
racialized categories inscribed by the British. And in India, the legacy of colonial 
missionary work and Western liberalism has masked the underlying normative or 
cultural issues and exacerbated ethno-religious conflict.16 Meanwhile, in Nigeria, 
resistance to decentralization in reaction to the colonial divide-and-rule strat-
egy had disastrous consequences. Multiculturalism in the contemporary New 
Commonwealth therefore cannot be understood without reference to the ongoing 
effects of governance rooted in the intersection of liberalism and colonialism.
The legacy of colonial governance is significantly different in the nations of the 
Old Commonwealth. As “Greater Britain” these colonies all had longer experi-
ences of self-rule, preferential treatment by the United Kingdom, greater initial 
homogeneity, and more controlled transitions to independence. The privileged 
status of these countries bolstered the stability of their political institutions 
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and economic development, which aided the creation of a robust welfare state. 
These political, economic, and cultural factors supported the integration of new 
arrivals following immigration reforms, which in turn drew out policies that 
self-consciously addressed cultural diversity. The unique position of the Old 
Commonwealth within the Empire thus facilitated the development of forms of 
official bi- and multiculturalism that were able to blend traditional liberalism, 
domestic reformulations of it, and newer international discourses. The nature of 
the nation in the Old Commonwealth, and its relation to Britishness, is also very 
different. Stuart Ward has demonstrated that the collapse of the imagined com-
munity of “Greater Britain” after World War II forced the countries of the Old 
Commonwealth to develop forms of nationalism to fill the void.17 Even as these 
settler-colonies shifted away from the imperial metropole, however, the articula-
tion of their “new nationalisms” drew on aspects of their British inheritance. The 
dominant cultural nation was still presumed to be anglophone, albeit that it was 
self-consciously reconstructed in relation to national minorities, indigenous peo-
ples, and immigrant groups.18 In addition, the “Anglo-Saxon” cultural inheritance 
could be construed in broadly homogenous terms, without looking through the 
anglophone “core” to potential tensions within it among the English, Scots, Welsh, 
and Irish elements.19 This stable cultural core has helped the Old Commonwealth 
countries evolve gradually in the face of cultural diversity, facilitating the adoption 
of “multiculturalism” as part of their national identity. All of the above factors are 
plausibly the result of their position within the Empire, and seem to have helped 
these states tailor their responses to local conditions, aiding their ability to meet 
the challenges of postwar cultural diversity.
Such opacity has not been a long-term option within the United Kingdom itself, 
however. Before World War II, Britain had never existed without empire, and the 
attempt to manage post-imperial foreign relations—including issues related to 
race—via nationality reforms caused mass nonwhite immigration. Britain devel-
oped a bifurcated form of multiculturalism in response, which conditioned the 
public understanding of it in terms of immigrant integration. Modern British mul-
ticulturalism is therefore also a direct legacy of colonial governance and the way 
it interacted with liberal norms (such as anti-racism) both domestically and inter-
nationally. Ironically, however, this hides its connection to basic issues regarding 
the nation and state. “Britishness” is a distinctive identity, but is constructed out of 
underlying nations that have all reacted differently to multiculturalism, as Brexit and 
renewed calls for Scottish independence have shown. The British nation is inher-
ently unstable in a postcolonial setting, which casts doubt on the postwar attempt 
to integrate migrants into a single national identity. It may well be, therefore, that 
Britain requires more a fundamental and deliberate legal restructuring in response 
to multiculturalism than the nations and states in the Old and New Commonwealth, 
who have addressed its challenges more self-consciously and more systematically.
Exploring the ways in which experiences of multiculturalism have been condi-
tioned by both local factors and countries’ positions within the Empire therefore 
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reinforces and deepens our analysis. The different conceptualizations of multi-
culturalism are functions not just of geography and history but also of different 
forms of power, and of how these were instantiated both during and after empire. 
Colonial governance at least partly constructed the issues and groups in each 
locale, and its legacy affected attitudes to, and interpretations of, liberal democ-
racy. In turn, this altered the trajectory of nation- and state-building in each case, 
and conditioned understandings of multiculturalism in theory and practice. Our 
narrative demonstrates that not only does “multiculturalism” cut across the bor-
ders of policy and theory, it also straddles the boundaries of nations and states, 
and undercuts traditional accounts of their origin. Prominent narratives in the 
social sciences, humanities, and law see the formation of modern nations, states, 
and liberal democracy as taking place within Europe, and only then exported to 
other parts of the world. Yet this volume strengthens claims that this story is a 
myth, and an unhelpful one at that.20 The countries of the British Commonwealth 
have never existed in complete independence from one another, and the legacy of 
the Empire continues to affect their development. The multiple layers of identity 
and governance engaged by multiculturalism stretch across individual countries, 
none of which exist in splendid isolation from each other. Modern polities are 
not closed political, economic, or even moral communities, but rather are related 
parts of an interdependent global system. It is not just the different “multicul-
tural” groups and issues that are interrelated and mutually constructing, but the 
Commonwealth nations and states themselves.
This volume therefore leads us back to venerable struggles over the proper nature 
and scope of liberal democracy, helping to clarify what form our response to mul-
ticulturalism should take, and at what level it should be applied. Multiculturalism 
must be understood holistically, as a process by which different groups—including 
nations and states—construct each other, and “multiculturalism” itself, through 
a series of overlapping debates regarding politics, economics, and culture.  Our 
responses must be similarly flexible, yet nevertheless engage the deep-rooted 
issues of identity and governance raised by cultural diversity and the end of impe-
rialism. Our form of multiculturalism must therefore be wide-ranging, traversing 
politics, economics, and culture, and all manner of different groups and rights. It 
must be radical in its scope, questioning long-standing presumptions regarding 
the history, nature, and function of both nation and state. And it must address the 
depth of the challenge posed by multiculturalism to traditional liberal-democratic 
governance, suggesting that we must reform not just principles and practices, but 
also the basic structure of the polity.
MULTICULTUR ALISM AS THEORY AND PR ACTICE: 
POLYCENTRIC AND PLUR AL GOVERNANCE
In this final section, we bring together the different strands of our analysis, and 
this volume more broadly, sketching the central lessons of our comparative 
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study for the theory and practice of multiculturalism.21 We have seen that across 
the postwar Commonwealth cultural diversity has called into question not just 
whether the nation-state in fact facilitates liberal democracy, but whether it is even 
viable in its traditional form. Multiculturalism presses directly on potential cleav-
ages in the modern world, revealing the contingency of cherished national narra-
tives and fundamental forms of governance, and engaging identities grounded in 
the former as well as norms relating to the latter. The interrelationships between 
culture, meaning, and identity, and their normative ramifications for governance, 
are crucial issues for any form of multiculturalism. Yet current understandings of 
multiculturalism in theory and practice are unhelpful in the way they generally 
attempt to separate out different “multicultural” groups, rights, and issues. Instead, 
we need to reconstitute our basic forms of our governance to be radically polycentric 
and pluralist.22
The dominant understanding of multiculturalism in contemporary politics 
is in terms of immigration, but this is unduly narrow. It underplays historical 
 interactions between different groups and the way these have influenced the pol-
icy and legal frameworks applying to each. The politicization of public discourse 
surrounding multiculturalism and national identity also discourages some groups 
from framing their claims in multicultural terms, glossing over important phil-
osophical problems and deeper connections between different issues. In public 
debates over national identity, the overarching goal is to articulate an inclusive 
form of it that can integrate a multicultural citizenry. Yet current popular  discourse 
fails to address the pressing question as to whether nonexclusionary forms of iden-
tity can have the desired effects, not just on immigrants but on the wider populace. 
Integration is not a unitary process but rather takes place in different ways, across 
many locales, and into multiple groups. This suggests we should not focus on the 
participation of immigrants in specific spheres of public life, such as the majority 
culture or national identity, or through narrow mechanisms such as policy and 
law. Cultural meanings and identities are fluid, dynamic, and overlapping, which 
means that generalized calls for “integration,” “assimilation,” or even “cohesion” 
may be misplaced.
Current practices of multiculturalism may therefore have something to learn 
from the philosophical issues addressed in multicultural political theory, and its 
wider scope. It is clear that multiculturalism stretches far beyond the challenges 
posed by postwar immigrant integration, potentially justifying a radical remak-
ing of the state, including grants of political autonomy to national minorities. Yet 
political theory may also have something to learn from our historical study of 
multiculturalism. For example, many postwar immigrants to the United Kingdom 
already possessed the equivalent citizenship status to natural-born British citizens 
by the time they arrived, and so do not fit the standard typology in multicultural 
political theory. Nor do the many of the various substate groups reconstructed 
by colonial and liberal governance in the New Commonwealth, many of which 
straddle the boundaries between politics/economics/culture, nation/national 
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minority, and even indigenous/alien.23 This volume therefore suggests that claims 
to self-government on the basis of culture are not necessarily limited to peoples 
subject to colonization, or to minority national groups such the Québécois who 
were co-colonizers. Rather, immigrants from former colonies, and a wide variety 
of autochthonous groups within them, may have a plausible claim to more sub-
stantive rights, including political autonomy.24 A blanket asymmetry of rights is 
therefore unpersuasive.
The division between groups and rights employed at the level of theory thus 
potentially ignores important aspects of history. The standard typology is also 
philosophically unconvincing, arbitrarily valorizing the role and nature of culture 
in some groups at the expense of others. What sort of rights can be justified on the 
basis of cultural difference has been a recurring issue in the philosophical literature, 
as have connected concerns about the reification and essentialization of cultures.25 
We have suggested above that liberal multiculturalists—and perhaps some of their 
critics—are committed to the claim that particular cultures play a necessary role 
in individual choice, ground self-respect, and facilitate useful shared meanings 
and identities. Yet philosophical holism rules out a rigid view of culture, indi-
cating instead that it is plural, fluid, overlapping, and contested.26 Our historical 
study of the Commonwealth supports these philosophical claims, demonstrating 
that multiculturalism straddles multiple and interconnected historical, geographi-
cal, temporal, and discursive contexts. The intersection of multiculturalism and 
liberal democracy, and—through imperialism—the intertwining of the nations 
and states of the postwar Commonwealth themselves, means that any attempt to 
separate groups and issues in policy and theoretical discourse is unconvincing. It 
is therefore presumptively problematic to assign rights on the basis of culture to 
particular groups of individuals but not to others. Identification of individuals as 
members a group to which we might ascribe multicultural rights—such as a cul-
ture, national group, or perhaps even a state—is itself an act of social construction, 
which means that the difference between those inside and those outside the group 
may be unclear and contested. In fact, an anti-essentialist account of culture seems 
to rule out any fixed cultural identities, and thereby undercut claims for their pro-
tection based directly in culture itself.
The issues multiculturalism raises cannot simply be ignored or dismissed, 
however. The forms of identity and governance that multiculturalism challenges 
are deep-rooted, and our case studies also show that sensitivity to local history 
and conditions is important. Superficially similar groups may therefore have dis-
tinctive claims in different contexts, and require tailored forms of “multicultural-
ism.”27 This means we should be suspicious of one-size-fits-all and one-time-only 
solutions, whether it be in terms of moral values, political practice or the composi-
tion of the polity itself. Yet, although we have good reason to believe that cultural 
identities and groups are fluid, some people will believe—and act as if—they are 
not. Any “multicultural” regime must therefore be flexible enough to account for 
Comparative Perspectives on the Theory and Practice    245
those that experience culture as singular and natural and those that see it as plu-
ral and constructed. Our holistic understanding of multiculturalism thus points 
toward the value of radically restructuring polities to be more polycentric, and 
thereby better suited to the plural patterns that constitute our social world. In 
order to move beyond the impasse between current forms of multicultural the-
ory and practice, therefore, we should treat all “cultural” groups akin to national 
minorities or indigenous peoples rather than immigrants. Such reforms would 
address the fundamental issues raised by multiculturalism, be sensitive to histori-
cal context, but also philosophically and normatively robust. All of the chapters in 
this volume speak to this claim, although not all of our authors would necessarily 
make it as forcefully as the editors, or even at all.
More open-ended forms of social organization would better reflect the fluid 
and interrelated nature of the various issues and identities that multiculturalism 
engages, allowing different groups to determine their boundaries, practices, and 
norms for themselves. It would enable individuals to express different aspects of 
their identity according to their own priorities, and thereby accommodate those 
who wish to embrace cosmopolitan forms of identity, yet would also open spaces 
for others to focus on more traditional practices. Multiple and overlapping forms 
of governance may also help to foster partial—and context-sensitive—forms of 
integration that serve purposes of justice or social cohesion.28 Polycentric institu-
tions would thus accommodate deep diversity and help to secure social stabil-
ity. Yet they would also facilitate social change. Since our theories and practices 
are mutually constructing, our reasoning is best instantiated in lived practices, 
which will inevitably take many experimental forms whereby our plural forms of 
life are constantly remade in different ways. Allowing genuine self-governance for 
those who reject dominant norms could productively utilize the different ways in 
which the understandings and identities of individuals overlap and interact. We 
hope greater polycentricity and pluralism in governance would encourage politi-
cal experimentation, economic innovation, and cultural renewal.29
Yet any systematic response to deep diversity, whether by direct state action 
or otherwise, risks constructing groups in precisely the way that philosophical 
critiques of multiculturalism allege.30 We suggest that reorganizing our institutions 
to be more polycentric minimizes these risks, however, even if it cannot eliminate 
them entirely. Structural changes will inevitably have effects on groups—in the 
main by increasing exit and thus experimentation—but these more flexible forms 
of self-governance will allow the evolution of a group in any direction, including 
multiple variations of it. Such effects are materially different from the state impos-
ing fixed rights from outside the group, which necessarily affect the rate of change 
(or condition its form) by privileging some interpretations of the group over 
 others.31 We do not claim that structural reforms and pluralist public discourse 
will automatically produce beneficial practices, rather that it is plausible that they 
will. Harmful forms of social construction are inevitable, but the sheer complexity 
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of identities and issues at play suggests that they cannot be prevented by top-down 
control. Rather, they must be reformed through countervailing practices led from 
below, which will be facilitated by polycentric institutions and pluralistic practices. 
Nor do we suggest that it is impossible or unjustified to draw boundaries between 
different groups in order to ascribe rights. Legal rights are an important tool for 
correcting historical injustices against a particular group, and the bounds of the 
group and scope of the right can be identified by tracing the negative effects of 
previous practices of social construction on its members. For example, race is a 
social construction, but one that has clearly benefited those identified as “white” 
rather than those who are not, and rights for the latter may therefore be justified 
as a corrective. Yet the nature of the difficulty addressed implies that these rights 
should be temporary rather than permanent, more akin to affirmative action than 
constitutional principle.
We also suggest that structural changes, if instituted correctly, will encourage 
pluralist discourses, which can make our inevitable practices of social construc-
tion more transparent, and thereby potentially more productive. Political practice 
and theory evolve in tandem, but this is often through messy historical processes 
that obfuscate the empirical effects and normative issues, as this volume demon-
strates. Part of the process of instituting polycentric reforms could be public dis-
cussion of why and how they address multiculturalism as we have conceptualized 
it here. Emphasizing in public discourse and education the history behind our 
current cultural pluralism would help to foreground the realities of empire and 
its afterlife, in particular those that relate to race and national identity. Polycentric 
structures, and an emphasis on pluralism within them, may thereby make us more 
self-conscious of previous instances of social construction and assist attempts to 
unwind them. We must also be cognizant of the new social realities we create, 
some of which may even flow from attempts to deconstruct older ones. For exam-
ple, valorizing any identity, even a cosmopolitan one, will exclude those who do 
not meet its criteria, and thus is potentially divisive. And while listening to the 
voices of people who have traditionally been silenced is a vital part of overcoming 
injustice and exclusion, we must be cautious in our embrace of those who claim to 
speak with authority for fellow members of marginalized groups, lest we turn the 
historical experiences of some into reified identities that silence others.
Holism means that individual judgments and identities are always provisional, 
and must be understood as such. As societies we therefore should not attempt 
to instantiate ahistorical principles, protect fixed identities, or track “objective” 
boundaries between groups. No matter how important we feel any of these to 
be, they cannot form completely fixed, foundational points in social life. In turn, 
this suggests that we should not attempt to impose specific values—including 
the robust forms of autonomy or equality that inform many theoretical accounts 
of liberalism and cosmopolitanism—but rather focus on persuasion. We there-
fore sympathize with accounts of multiculturalism such as those offered by Seyla 
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Benhabib and Sarah Song, who both emphasize the socially constructed nature 
of cultures and foreground the importance of deliberation in negotiating changes 
within and across them.32 Nevertheless, we must guard against focusing too nar-
rowly on disputed liberal values or formal democratic processes, which we have 
seen are often historically implicated in the forms of social construction we are 
trying to address.33 Rather than valorizing moral rules or particular political pro-
cedures, it may be more productive to cultivate a pluralist ethic of openness to 
difference, and to encourage free exchanges between and within groups. In any 
event, uncertainty as to the relative importance in their members’ lives of the mul-
tiple groups/identities present indicates that the precise structures of governance 
adopted cannot be fixed in advance. Reforms must be tailored to local condi-
tions, subject to negotiation and deliberation, and take diverse forms. We should 
therefore be wary of theoretical arguments that prioritize governance at one level 
over another, whether it be the claims of postnationalist cosmopolitans such as 
Arash Abizadeh regarding the global demos, liberals such as David Miller regard-
ing the nation, or the communitarians and civic republicans who gravitate toward 
smaller-scale communities.34
The challenges presented by multiculturalism, and our advocacy of polycen-
tric institutions in response, connects current debates to long-standing tensions 
between the central and local. The juxtaposition of centralization and localism 
occurs in all contexts, either directly in debates over liberal-democratic gover-
nance, or indirectly through contests over national identity. Our preference— 
particularly within Britain, the case the we know best—is for radical devolution 
to a wide range of groups and associations. In part, this is because we would like 
to re-empower the local, which we feel has been systematically devalued, even as 
we continue to look upward towards international organizations. The pull toward 
the local is itself contingent, however, and is not tied to a particular physical space. 
Rather polycentric governance may furnish a variety of overlapping ‘local’ con-
texts, between which individuals could move both literally and figuratively. Radical 
polycentricity maximizes the ability of individuals to self-sort into the associations 
that are the most beneficial to them, and to learn from forms of life that are not. 
We therefore suggest that the state must facilitate the movement of people through 
guaranteeing both a potent form of the right of exit, and substantive freedom of 
information within and across the different levels of organization.
Drawing on postanalytic philosophy, and nonstatist aspects of the socialist tra-
dition such as the guild socialism of G. D. H. Cole, Ashcroft will argue elsewhere 
that as well as guaranteeing the right of exit, the polycentric multicultural state 
must provide the economic and cultural capital to utilize it, including shelter, sus-
tenance, and education. The state must provide a physical and social space for 
those moving around within it to exit into, where they may engage in reflection, 
enquiry, and reassociation. Perhaps this version of the “welfare” state would func-
tion more like Michael Walzer’s “hotel” than a permanent home, but would be 
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more than this, containing information about other associations and ways of life.35 
The state would thus also be a library, a rail network, and a marketplace of ideas. 
We are therefore committed to a much more robust state than other theorists who 
advocate polycentricity, such as Chandran Kukathas, in part because we offer a 
thicker (albeit nonessentialist) account of cultural identity and meaning, and in 
part because of our own political and philosophical commitments.36
Our overall position therefore bears a passing resemblance to John Stuart Mill’s 
“experiments in living.” Yet our postfoundationalism severs our account from 
the individualism, romanticized cultural essentialism, and substantive autonomy 
central to Mill, but which also can be seen in much contemporary liberal, mul-
ticultural, and cosmopolitan theorizing. Our form of pluralism is thus distinc-
tive, drawing on a variety of intellectual traditions, yet is still multicultural in a 
meaningful sense. And our polycentricity forms a generally applicable—but not 
homogenizing—approach to cultural difference that is normatively justifiable, yet 
still allows for a degree of historical nuance. By providing a holistic response to 
multiculturalism that bridges both theory and practice, polycentric and pluralist 
governance may therefore help to mitigate the tension between historical specific-
ity and normative principle that is particularly acute within multiculturalism, and 
which runs throughout post-Enlightenment philosophy and politics.
Ultimately, however, the way forward lies not in following the plaintive cries 
of political theorists, but rather in harnessing the extraordinary variety that origi-
nates in everyday lives. By opening ourselves to the radical diversity of human 
beliefs and practices through which individuals and communities remake them-
selves, we can move forward without becoming disconnected from the past, and 
look to the global without abandoning the local. If we do, we may start to address 
the underlying tensions in our thought and practice that are both old and new, and 
central to the many worlds we share.
NOTES
1. We use “Old” and “New” Commonwealth to distinguish Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
from other colonies in the Empire, which were never intended to be permanently settled by the Brit-
ish, and whose relationship to Great Britain was marked by more nakedly extractive practices. We do 
not include South Africa and Zimbabwe within the former, for reasons we discuss in the introductory 
chapter, as part of a detailed discussion of these terms and our other vocabulary choices.
2. We use the terms “United Kingdom” and “Britain” interchangeably, i.e., including Northern Ire-
land in both.
3. Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, “Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship: Britain after 
Brexit,” Political Quarterly 87 (2016): 355–59.
4. The island of Tobago is much less ethnically diverse than Trinidad, since it is almost entirely 
populated by people of African descent. Its population is around 60,000, compared with 1.3 million 
in Trinidad. The overwhelming weight of political and economic power therefore resides in Trinidad, 
as do the dominant narratives of nationhood. We therefore follow Viranjini Munasinghe in frequently 
using “Trinidad,” “Indo-Trinidadian,” and “Afro-Trinidadian” as shorthand.
Comparative Perspectives on the Theory and Practice    249
5. We argue elsewhere that Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is part of a broader family of 
liberal positions—along with, e.g., David Miller’s On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995)—that see the cultural nation as vital for the functioning of modern democracy (Richard T. Ash-
croft and Mark Bevir, “Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: Multiculturalism and Scottish 
Independence,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21, no. 1 [2018]: 65–86). 
The influence of Kymlicka’s early work means these presumptions have shaped much of the political 
theory literature, particularly work by liberal supporters of multiculturalism. Even those theorists who 
do not fall squarely within that camp came to share key assumptions regarding culture and governance. 
For example, the “politics of recognition” made famous by Charles Taylor overlaps with liberal mul-
ticulturalism as it relates to identity and self-respect, and shares a similar commitment to the cultural 
group as the primary locus of governance, especially when it coincides with the nation. See Report of 
the Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Difference (Quebec: Government of 
Quebec, 2008), which Taylor co-authored with Gérard Bouchard; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Rec-
ognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and for an excellent discussion of the “Herderian” aspects of 
Kymlicka’s argument that push him closer to Taylor, see Helder de Schutter, “The Liberal Linguistic 
Turn: Kymlicka’s Freedom Account Revisited,” Dve domovini/ / Two Homelands, no. 44 (2016): 51–65. 
For an overview of “cultural nationalism” broadly compatible with ours, see Arash Abizadeh, “Does 
Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments,” American Political Science Review 
96, no. 3 (2002): 495–509.
6. This is clearly true of Kymlicka and Taylor and thus forms the dominant view in the theoreti-
cal literature, albeit subject to caveats and critiques. Multicultural political theory therefore tends to 
emphasize the relationship between culture and governance, but unlike some liberal nationalists, such 
as David Miller, both Kymlicka and Taylor disconnect the “cultural” nation or group from the state. 
Postcolonial theorists tend to share the presumption that some minority cultural groups, particularly 
indigenous peoples, should be self-governing: see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism 
in the Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Glen Sean Coulthard, Red 
Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014). Likewise, Iris Marion Young endorses claims to self-government by indigenous peoples, 
albeit “more as a means to the achievement of structural equality .  .  . than an end in itself ” (Young, 
“Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference,” in Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen, eds., 
Multiculturalism and Political Theory [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 60–88, at 61). 
Even Chandran Kukathas, who does not think culture grounds specific rights, grants self-rule to 
any group or association that desires it, and thus allows for the possibility of self-governing cultures 
(Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003]). We therefore think it is uncontroversial to state that the norm in theoretical accounts of 
multiculturalism is to focus on immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous peoples as separate 
groups, and only seriously to contemplate substantive self-rule for the latter two. Our critique will pro-
ceed on that basis, although we must admit it has greater traction on Kymlicka and Taylor than some 
other political theorists in this area.
7. Ashcroft and Bevir, “Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship,” and “Liberal Democracy, 
Nationalism and Culture.”
8. Ashcroft and Bevir “Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture,” and Abizadeh “Does Liberal 
Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation?”
9. Ashcroft and Bevir, “Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship” and “Liberal Democracy, 
Nationalism and Culture.”
10. This accusation is most often leveled at Kymlicka’s theory and liberal variants thereof, but also 
has traction on Taylor and possibly also theories that foreground indigenous claims. Kymlicka’s central 
claim is that that culture forms the context of meaningful choice within which individuals choose how 
to live their lives, and thus must be protected by the liberal state. Ashcroft will argue elsewhere that 
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Kymlicka’s theory makes unsustainable assumptions regarding the effects of culture on meaning and 
identity, and thereby also cannot avoid essentialism and reification, and that these weaknesses can 
be traced to his overarching luck-egalitarian framework, which requires that any given individual is 
located within a single culture to act as an unchosen context of meaningful choice.
11. See Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), chap. 2, for our underlying account of meaning and for a detailed examination of the issue of 
cultural limits.
12. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka suggests that some groups may have claims to self-rule 
based directly in historical agreements with the state, and also that some multicultural rights may 
grounded in the value of cultural diversity. Nevertheless, if the claim that we are located in a single 
societal culture as our context of meaningful choice is not tenable on the terms in which it is stated, 
Kymlicka has lost the central plank of his core “equality” argument based in individual autonomy and 
self-respect. Although his distinction between immigrants and national minorities turns largely on the 
decision of the former to immigrate rather than the role of culture per se, any attempt to keep groups 
cultural groups separate is fraught with empirical and philosophical problems. Kymlicka’s modifica-
tion of his original typology in his later work, such as Multicultural Odysseys, might appear to mitigate 
this problem, and thereby side-step our critique of multicultural political theory. The central thesis of 
Multicultural Odysseys is that the spread of multiculturalism across the globe requires tailoring mul-
ticulturalism to local conditions more carefully. Kymlicka’s primary recommendation is to increase 
policies and laws that “target” specific types of group, thereby refining the Western-centric typology by 
adding new categories of rights and groups (pp. 8–9, and 24–25). Yet multiplying the number of groups 
and rights makes marking the boundaries between them harder, not easier. There are still no natural 
kinds to identify, and no stable criteria for choosing one boundary over another, or a particular ver-
sion of the typology over an even more detailed one. Kymlicka’s gloss on the typology in Multicultural 
Odysseys thus seems more like a concession to the “cosmopolitan critique” than a defense against it, 
and Ashcroft argues elsewhere that it fails to mitigate the theoretical and empirical problems with the 
typology, and his theory more broadly.
13. Australian policy-makers imported the idea of “multiculturalism” as a framework for managing 
cultural diversity from Canada, although—as in the UK and New Zealand—it is expressed primarily 
through policy rather than constitutional law. Unlike both Canada and New Zealand, however, Austra-
lian multiculturalism ostensibly applies to indigenous peoples and thereby also draws on international 
law, even as indigenous leaders reject their inclusion within “multiculturalism,” and the dominant pub-
lic understanding continues to be in terms of nonwhite immigration.
14. Here we refer to both standard policy approaches to multiculturalism and the more wide- 
ranging scope of political theory. Both of these seem to assume the existence of a cultural or national 
“core” that must subsequently learn to accommodate cultural diversity through integration and/or 
 substate political autonomy. This assumption has little traction in the New Commonwealth, save in 
Malaysia, where the Malay are given preferential treatment in some respects, forming something like a 
“core” to the nation, albeit within an overall consociational model. As discussed at note 12 above, although 
the later Kymlicka acknowledges the problems with the typology and the need for more contextualized 
forms of multiculturalism, the underlying difficulties with separating groups/rights in both theory and 
practice seem more profound and pervasive than he realizes, and the traction of the cosmopolitan cri-
tique more enduring that he acknowledges (see Kymlicka, “Essentialist Critique” note 22 for more detail).
15. This is arguably also at work in Nigeria, Singapore, and Malaysia.
16. Stuart James Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Mel-
bourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001); Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand: Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World,” in Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grim-
shaw, and Stuart Macintyre, eds., Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Culture 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 2007), 231–63; and Ward, “Imperial Identities Abroad” in 
Sarah Stockwell, ed., The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell 2007) 219–43. See 
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also the work of Jatinder Mann, such as The Search for a New National Identity: The Rise of Multicultur-
alism in Canada and Australia, 1890s–1970s (New York: Peter Lang, 2016).
17. Here we are distinguishing between the demise of British “race patriotism” in favor of more 
local attachments and the broader British cultural currents out of which the new nationalisms were 
built.
18. For primary source material on different articulations of the relevant nations, see Jatinder 
Mann, “The Introduction of Multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, 1960s–1970s,” in Nations and 
Nationalism 18, no. 3 (2012): 483–503, in particular 493–94 re Australia. This claim has less traction on 
Canada, but a prominent claim was that Canada was a compact between two nations (French and Brit-
ish) not five (English/Scots/Welsh/Irish/French), albeit that discourses of multiculturalism may have 
arisen in part to destabilize the dual compact account, e.g., by foregrounding the role of Ukrainians in 
settling the prairie provinces.
19. See, e.g., the work of Gurminder K. Bhambra, in particular Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonial-
ism and the Sociological Imagination (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Ward cited in n. 16 above, 
and Catherine Hall, “British Cultural Identities and the Legacy of Empire” in David Morley and Kevin 
Robins, eds., British Cultural Studies: Geography, Nationality and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 27–39.
20. In what follows, we generally use the term “polycentric” to refer to structures/institutions, and 
“pluralist” to refer to both practices of governance and orientations that embrace diversity and social 
experimentation more broadly.
21. E.g., religious groups and the Scheduled Castes in India, the three dominant groups in indepen-
dence-era Nigeria, and the ethno-cultural groupings in Malaysia, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago.
22. Charges of essentialism are often leveled at Kymlicka’s dominant theory of multiculturalism, 
although he rejects these, arguing they misdiagnose the issues and conflate theoretical and practical 
argument; see Will Kymlicka, “The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos,” 
in Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood, eds., Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas, 
New Directions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 209–49, at 212. Kymlicka’s organizing 
vocabulary is different from ours, revolving around the distinction between philosophical approaches, 
actual policies, and real-world outcomes, and utilizing his typology of indigenous peoples, national 
minorities, and immigrants (see the notes to chapter 1 for a fuller discussion). Our position would 
qualify as “post-multiculturalist” in Kymlicka’s sense. Ashcroft will analyze the essentialist critique of 
liberal multiculturalism at greater length elsewhere, responding directly to Kymlicka’s arguments, and 
so here we simply note the key differences between our position and “post-multiculturalism” as Kym-
licka articulates it. Firstly, our critique of liberal multiculturalism does not turn purely on a rejection 
of “culturalist aspirations,” which we accept as a social reality—albeit one we think has problematic 
effects, particularly at the level of the cultural nation—and try to accommodate through polycentricity. 
Secondly, our critique does not leave “all real-world practices of [liberal multiculturalism] untouched,” 
but rather engages with the effects of “siloing” multicultural issues/groups in both theory and practice, 
and points toward a radical remaking of the state and liberal-democratic norms/practices far beyond 
that typically envisaged by liberal multiculturalists. Thirdly, we identify interconnected forms of essen-
tialism in political theory, policy/law, and public discourse. We trace these back to the real-world 
entanglement of liberal and colonial governance, overly narrow policy approaches and resulting public 
discourse, and philosophical flaws in dominant forms of multicultural theory. Our holistic diagnosis 
of the problem, and our radical solution to it, addresses all three of Kymlicka’s “levels” simultaneously, 
unlike the post-multiculturalists (ibid., 221–33). And lastly, our approach addresses the shortcomings 
Kymlicka identifies relating to temporary migrants, nationalism, and non–geographically concentrated 
religious groups (ibid., 239–44). For the broader political theory debates regarding essentialism, see 
Andrew Mason, “Multiculturalism and the Critique of Essentialism,” in Anthony Simon Laden and 
David Owen, eds., Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 221–43, and Sarah Song, “Multiculturalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
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Edward N. Zalta, accessed November 19, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/
multiculturalism.
23. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1991): 751–94.
24. Andrew Mason, “The Critique of Multiculturalism in Britain: Integration, Separation and 
Shared Identification,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2018): 
22–45.
25. Ashcroft and Bevir, “Pluralism, Nationality and Citizenship.”
26. Supporting particular minority cultures via legal rights may require ascribing essential features 
to them, which might imbue them with a false naturalness that hampers reform. Public discourse or 
social practice might also embody underlying presumptions about the nature and worth of other cul-
tures and thereby construct both minority and majority groups as social realities. For a discussion of 
effects that flow from interactions between and within minority and majority cultures, see Sarah Song, 
Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
27. Focusing on structures that can accommodate a wide variety of overlapping and constantly 
changing identities, rather than legislating on the basis of the nature of individual groups at a specific 
point in time, reduces the risk of “freezing” cultures in place. Kymlicka rejects this accusation in “The 
Essentialist Critique,” but Ashcroft will argue in detail elsewhere that essentialism and reification are 
inevitable in Kymlicka’s theory if he is to maintain its basic luck-egalitarian premises. Likewise, we 
reject Kymlicka’s defense of minority rights as a response to majority nation-building on the basis that 
he only grants political autonomy to certain groups, a limit we see as unwarranted.
28. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), and Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism.
29. There is therefore substantial overlap between our “constructivist” account of culture and 
that set out by Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism, particularly in relation to the 
importance of understanding local historical factors, the mutually conditioning nature of majority and 
minority cultures, and a bias toward deliberation as a way of resolving particular issues. Her commit-
ment to substantive equality is stronger than ours, however, in part because she focuses on multicul-
turalism within individual liberal democracies, in particular, the United States. Also, our arguments 
suggest that the intertwined legacy of colonialism and liberalism calls undermines basic presumptions 
regarding liberal democracy and nation-state that Song perhaps takes for granted, or at least does not 
address directly. Finally, our focus on the mutually constructing nature of theory and practice fore-
grounds the importance of expressing different forms of life in practice, not just through deliberation 
and negotiation.
30. Arash Abizadeh, “Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence 
of Global Solidarity,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 45–60, and Miller, On Nation-
ality. See also Mark Bevir, “Postfoundationalism and Social Democracy,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 
35 (2001): 7–26, and Song, “Multiculturalism.”
31. Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1987), 14–15, and Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
32. See Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago. Ashcroft develops elsewhere a postfoundational critique of 
Kukathas’s theory based on his account of conscience.
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